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A Note from the Editors

The First Ten Years of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*

In the spring of 1977, the first issue of a new journal, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (*HUS*), was presented to the scholarly community. "It intends," wrote the editors in their introductory note, "to be an international forum for the exchange of current scholarly research in Ukrainian studies and to cultivate an interdisciplinary approach to the field."

Now, ten years later, we can look back at the ten volumes (in twenty-five issues, comprising over 5,500 pages) of *HUS*. In these years we have tried to follow the intent of our introductory note. Our journal has kept an international and interdisciplinary profile, both when it came to its contributors and to its subject matter. While topics dealing with modern folklore, economy, and political science were not absent from *HUS*'s pages, our profile has been historical and philological, with the stress on pre-modern periods; within those periods, there was virtually no limitation as far as the philologies were concerned—we ranged from the Slavic to the Chinese.

The bulk of *HUS*'s articles and reviews dealt with Ukrainian studies as the term is commonly understood, with special attention paid to publication of source materials. In order to offer a forum for the examination of crucial problems in Ukrainian studies, special thematic issues were put together, of which three have appeared hitherto. "The Kiev Mohyla Academy" commemorated the 350th anniversary of the founding of the first Orthodox college in Eastern Europe. The focal point in this discussion was the multicultural aspect of that institution of higher learning. The issue, "The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj," was devoted to the ideas and theories of that Ukrainian political thinker, and for the first time his legacy was made known to Western scholars. The problem of Ukrainian national consciousness was brought into relief in an issue devoted to "Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe," with contributions coming from scholars representing many of the nations involved. The fourth thematic issue, the volume for 1988, will be the publication of the proceedings of the International Congress Commemorating the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine (Ravenna, April 1988).

So much for Ukrainian studies in the strict sense of the word. The ten volumes of *HUS*, however, also contain articles dealing with two areas of research relevant to the Ukrainian past: Oriental and Byzantine studies. In

part, the presence of such articles in *HUS* reflected the interests and competence of its editors, one of them an Orientalist, the other a Byzantinist. There was also a theoretical reason behind according hospitality to publications of this kind: the conviction that the Ukrainian past, especially its early periods, could best be understood in two of its important contexts, Oriental and Byzantine. This had not been the prevailing view since the 1930s, and the narrowing of outlook in Ukrainian scholarship happened both in the Soviet Ukraine and outside of it. When it came to Byzantium, we realized that the present-day Rus'-Ukraine—a land which a thousand years ago accepted Byzantine Christianity and culture, and which in prerevolutionary times boasted prominent Byzantinists, was the only major European country without a significant academic position in the field of Byzantine studies.

The same could be said of Oriental studies. Between 1918 and 1930 there were active at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences four institutions, the Chair of Jewish Culture and the Jewish Historico-Archaeographic Commission, and two Near Eastern Centers for Arabo-Islamic studies and for Turkology. All four were headed by the eminent Orientalist Ahantanhel Kryms'kyj. At present, the land with the Khazarian and Turko-Tatar background, which for centuries was also home to large Jewish and Armenian minorities, has no scholarly institutions worth mentioning in these respective fields. The past volumes of *HUS* corrected this imbalance within our limited means: the journal also became a meeting place for students of the early Ukrainian past, as well as for Byzantinists and Orientalists.

As a further example of the contributions of *HUS* to interdisciplinary studies, we should mention Jewish topics discussed in the journal. Both Ukrainian and Jewish scholars found in its ten volumes new discoveries and analytical studies concerning a people many of whose members made the Ukrainian territory their home for centuries, starting with Ancient Greek and Khazar times.

* * *

HUS has published 419 articles and reviews by 241 authors from 22 countries. The majority of them (158) came from the United States; they were followed by scholars from Canada (27), Poland (13), England (9), Israel (9), Germany (8), and France (7). Three each were from Italy, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, and two each were from Austria, Australia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania. Finally, one each came from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Lebanon, Singapore, Sweden, and the Ukraine. The new developments in the Soviet Union give us reason to hope that participation by Soviet Ukrainian scholars in *HUS* will increase in the near

future. Of the 241 *HUS* authors, only 70 were Ukrainians or scholars of Ukrainian background. This shows that Ukrainian studies have established themselves in international scholarship.

Time brings inevitable changes of perspective in scholarly matters. Still, in all cultural enterprises, some continuity is salutary. Thus, as *HUS* enters upon its second decennium, we expect it to continue its role as an international forum for Ukrainian studies and their wide background, but we also expect that the new generation of able contributors and editors who are now assisting us will improve upon our efforts.

Omeljan Pritsak
Ihor Ševčenko
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The Pogroms of 1881*

OMELJAN PRITSAK

To Marc Raeff

The pogroms that began in the Russian Empire in April 1881 in the city of Elisavetgrad (now called Kirovohrad) are rightly regarded as a watershed in the history of modern Jewry.[1] Scholars have been unable to elucidate the causes of these deplorable events. The specialized literature suggests three sets of questions. The first set asks how the disturbances started, who started them, and whether they were planned or spontaneous.[2] The second set of questions deals with the character of the disturbances, that is, whether they were a rural or urban phenomenon.[3] Finally, the third set inquires into the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the pogroms. Were they conditioned by "historical geography,"[4] or were they sparked by the accelerating urbanization and industrialization of a backward society?[5] The "historical geography" hypothesis proposes two basic catalysts for the pogroms:

* This is a revised version of a paper presented on 14 December 1980 at the conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the pogroms, arranged by the Center for Jewish Studies, Harvard University. I use this opportunity to express my thanks to Professors Ezra Mendelsohn and Marshall Shatz for their contribution in editing this version.

[1] The basic literature includes: Iulii Gessen, "Pogromy v Rossii," *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, vol. 12, cols. 611–18; Shimon Dubnov, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, trans. I. Friedlander, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1918), especially pp. 247–51; idem, *Evrei v Rossii i Zapadnoi Evrope v antisemitskoi reaktsii* (Moscow and Petrograd, 1923), especially pp. 11–15; Mina Goldberg, "Die Jahre 1881-1882 in der Geschichte der Russischen Juden" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Berlin 1933; hereafter cited as Goldberg); Mark Vishniak, "Antisemitism in Tsarist Russia," in K. S. Pinson, ed., *Essays on Antisemitism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1946), pp. 121–44; Yehuda Slutsky, "Ha-geografiya shel praot 1881," *He-avar* 9 (1962): 16–25; Slutsky, "Pogrom," *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1971), vol. 13, cols. 694–701; Hans Rogger, "The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism: A Reappraisal," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, 25, nos. 1-2, n.s. 22-23 (1971), pp. 42–51; J. Michael Aronson "Geographical and Socio-economic Factors in the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia," *Russian Review* 39, no. 1 (1980): 18–31.

[2] Archival material published in 1923 absolves both the imperial government and revolutionary circles from complicity, but not (as is shown here) from covering up.

[3] An urban origin is suggested by J. Michael Aronson in his "Geographical and Socio-economic Factors."

[4] Elaborated by Yehuda Slutsky, "Ha-geografiya shel praot 1881."

[5] The second view has been defended by J. M. Aronson in his "Geographical and Socio-economic Factors."

the alleged traditional rebelliousness of the local (Ukrainian) masses, and their alleged tradition of anti-Jewish hatred and persecution, going back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

I

Two groups of primary sources on the 1881 pogroms have been published: official documents from the archives of the Department of Police of the Ministry of the Interior in St. Petersburg, and private papers. The documents were published soon after the revolution of 1917 (when for a short time researchers had access to the state archives) by G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni.[6] They consist of two parts: telegrams and reports, mainly from the local authorities to the imperial government; and a collection of memoranda and information received or compiled by the state-appointed investigator of the pogroms, Major-General Pavel Ippolitovich Kutaisov, dispatched to the south on 12 May 1881. The Kutaisov papers date from approximately May 1881 to February 1882. The instructions to Kutaisov, signed on May 12 by both the Minister of the Interior, Count N. P. Ignat'ev and the chief of the Department of Police, V. K. Plehve, required Kutaisov to visit all places where disturbances had occurred, to present an account of events, and to analyze what conditions caused the unrest.

The official documents list places and dates of the disturbances. In the majority of cases they also describe and estimate the value of the destroyed property. They do not, however, always give exact numbers of either the victims of the disturbances or of the rioters. Data about these groups are often incomplete. In 1929 the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Rybyns'kyi maintained that the materials published by Krasnyi-Admoni did not exhaust all documents relating to the pogroms of 1881 in the archives of the police department in St. Petersburg. Also, Krasnyi-Admoni did not deal at all with documents in the provincial archives, including those in the Kiev Central Historical Archives, where—according to Rybyns'kyi—Ukrainian documents that never reached the tsarist capital are stored.[7]

6 *Materialy dlia istorii antievreiskikh pogromov v Rossii*, vol. 2: *Vos'midesiatye gody (15 aprelia 1881 g.—29 fevralia 1882 g.)*, edited and with an introduction by G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni (Petrograd and Moscow, 1923). Hereafter cited as Admoni.

7 Volodymyr P. Rybyns'kyi, "Protyievreis'kyi rukh r. 1881-ho na Ukraini," *Zbirnyk prats' ievreis'koi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi Komisii / Vseukrains'ka Akademiia Nauk. Zbirnyk Istorychno-Filolohichno Viddilu* 73.II (1929), 139–40. Hereafter cited as Rybyns'kyi.

In addition to the published documents, a description of the Elisavetgrad pogrom is among materials prepared at the direction of Baron G. Ginzburg for the use of Pahlen's Commission (1882). The description, written by a Jewish group, was later published by Shimon Dubnov.[8]

Most other publications and private papers relating to events in Elisavetgrad are not concerned directly with the pogrom.[9] There are two exceptions: the reminiscences of a Russian public figure and publicist under the pseudonym P. Sonin-M., published in *Evreiskaia starina* in 1909,[10] and a study by Volodymyr Rybyns'kyi, published in Kiev in 1929, of the diary of a Ukrainian eyewitness of the Elisavetgrad pogrom, Opanas Mykhalevych, town physician and Ukrainian political activist.[11]

II

On 1 March 1881, Alexander II was assassinated by members of the revolutionary organization *Narodnaia volia* ("People's Will"); among the conspirators was a Jewess.[12] During the latter half of March an intensive anti-Jewish campaign was launched in the Russian right-wing press, spearheaded on March 20 by *Novorossiiskii telegraf* published in Odessa.[13] The press spread rumors that the Christian population of Novorossiia (New Russia) was planning to mount anti-Jewish pogroms during the Easter holidays to avenge the killing of the "beloved Tsar." The city of Elisavetgrad was named as the starting point for the actions. Naturally enough, Elisavetgrad Jews asked the local police to take action to protect them. They also started to buy arms.

8 Dubnov, *Evrei v Rossii*, pp. 13–14; for an English translation, see his *History of the Jews*, 2:250–51.

9 I have in mind the following documentary editions: *Die Judenpogrome in Russland. Im Auftrage des zionistischen Hilfsfonds in London*, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1909–10); "Antievreiskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1881 i 1882 g. (Iz zapiski, prednaznachennoi dlia Palenskoi Kommissii)," *Evreiskaia starina*, 1909, pp. 88–109, 265–76; S. Dubnov, ed., "Zapiska ob antievreiskikh pogromakh 1881 goda," *Golos minuvshego* 1916, no. 3, pp. 243–53; N. M. Gelber, "Aktenstuecke zur Geschichte der Judenpogrome in Russland im Jahre 1881," *Menorah* 5, no. 7 (1927): 7–13; idem, "Di rusishe pogromen onheyb di 80-er yorn in sheyn fun estereikhisher diplomatisher korespondents," *Historishe shriftn fun Yivo* 2 (1937): 466–96; E. Tscherikover, "Naye materialn vegn di pogromen in Rusland onheyb di 80-er yorn," *Historishe shriftn* 2 (1937): 444–65; Israel Bartal, ed., *Ha-sufot ba-negev 1881–1882* (Jerusalem, 1975).

10 P. Sonin-M., "Vospominaniia o iuzhnorusskikh pogromakh 1881 goda," *Evreiskaia starina* 1, no. 14 (1905): 207–81, especially 207–11. Hereafter cited as Sonin.

11 Rybyns'kyi, pp. 171–82.

12 Hessia Helfman (1855–82).

13 See *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, vol. 12, col. 612, and Admoni, pp. 226, 230, 241.

On about March 15, the chief of the Elisavetgrad city police, Il'ia Petrovich Bogdanovich, received a strange visitor, who claimed to be a retired state councillor. He surprised the police chief by his strong anti-Jewish sentiments, and he spoke about an impending Jewish pogrom in Elisavetgrad. On about March 20, the state councillor departed, but his hotel room was taken by two young visitors, one from St. Petersburg and the other from Moscow. One was clad as a fashionable merchant, the other as a coachman. They visited local taverns and other establishments selling beer and liquor, and fraternized with the clientele.[14]

Following the instructions of the governor-general of Odessa, the governor of Kherson ordered, on April 10, that all police district chiefs exercise special vigilance during the Easter holidays.[15] Consequently, the city administration of Elisavetgrad asked the commander of the military unit stationed nearby, General Kosich, to place some of his troops at the disposal of the chief of the city police for the duration of Easter.

The Easter holidays, April 12–14, passed without incident. The police and the military maintained order in the city. In the fair grounds (*moskovskie lavki*), the vodka taverns remained closed. Meanwhile, some twenty young strangers arrived in town, laden with money and attired like their two predecessors from the capitals. They mingled with the local people and were noted in different parts of the city.[16]

Since Easter had passed by without incident, on Wednesday, April 15 the chief of police informed General Kosich that there was no longer any need to maintain the state of alert. City life returned to normal: it was the first market day after Easter, and the prohibition against selling vodka was lifted. Peasants from the surrounding villages started to arrive; surprisingly, many of them were pulling empty carts.[17] Around 2:00 p.m. the military retired to their barracks. The chief of police sent a telegram to the governor of Kherson with the assurance that life in Elisavetgrad had returned to normal.

14 Sonin, pp. 207–210.

15 Admoni, pp. 20, 241–43. The following presentation is based mainly on documents published by Admoni, Sonin, and Rybyns'kyi.

16 See Sonin, pp. 212–13, and Rybyns'kyi, p. 176. They were thought to be (and probably were) youths from Moscow, since in the sources they are several times referred to as "Moskvichi" (fellows from Moscow). See Admoni, pp. 77, 80, 400, and Rybyns'kyi, pp. 165, 176.

17 Admoni, p. 211. The pogrom's organizers regarded the peasants as incapable of starting disturbances. They were only summoned to come to the city with empty carts to take away the Jews' property once it lay in the streets. This was the typical role of peasants in an urban pogrom. Compare, for example, the situation in Kiev (Admoni, p. 403) and Pereiaslav (Admoni, p. 114).

Two hours later, around 4:00 p.m. that same April 15, disturbances broke out in the marketplace. In a tavern owned by a Jew, a local drunk broke a vodka glass, which prompted the proprietor to strike him. Other drunk patrons let out cries of "the Jews are beating our people," "the Jews have bribed the police," and "the Jews have purchased firearms." Havoc broke out. It spread to the surrounding taverns. Their patrons and the marketgoers turned into a mob. They robbed and destroyed Jewish shops and houses, throwing everything they found within them into the street.[18]

The mob in the marketplace was estimated by eyewitnesses to number about one thousand. Simultaneously, bands of about forty people each sprang up in different parts of the city, led by the strangers from the capitals.[19] The mob included women of high society (some of whom participated in the drunkards' orgies) and children, so the police, some of whom were also heavily intoxicated, avoided using force. The chief of police personally made futile efforts to stop the mob. At his order, some fifteen to twenty activists were arrested (the strangers from the capital were not caught). The police chief now demanded help from General Kosich, and soon one detachment of hussars arrived. With the hussars' help, order was partially restored in the center of the city by evening. Only the synagogue was still beleaguered by the mob, which claimed that Jews were shooting from inside the building. The disturbances continued throughout the night. In one tavern an elderly Jew was found dead, the only fatality of the Elisavetgrad riots.

At about 7:00 a.m. on the morning of Thursday, April 16, the mob started to reappear in small groups, joined by peasants who continued to arrive for the post-Easter market. Many, as mentioned above, were pulling empty carts—an unusual circumstance. The newly arrived peasants did not actively participate in the riots, but some of them started to collect the "ownerless" goods in the streets. The military and the police had received no specific instructions on how to act. Now also organized into small units, they remained passive; some even accepted looted gifts, such as watches or sweets. Many of the policemen had already been treated to vodka.[20] In some instances the mob prevented the military from arresting rioters. The passivity of the local police and military units, under the inept command of General Kosich, gave rise to the idea that in fact the actions against the

[18] See the diary of Mykhalevych, in Rybyns'kyi, pp. 173–75.

[19] Sonin, pp. 210–211.

[20] Some policemen voluntarily pointed out Jewish homes to the rioters so as to spare Christian houses and possessions. See Rybyns'kyi, p. 174.

Jews were not a crime, but to the contrary had been instigated or were supported by the government.

The riots continued into late evening throughout the city, except in its center, where rich Jews and Christians lived; that quarter was well guarded by the military. General Kosich demanded more troops. Only after three cavalry squadrons of the Ol'viopol' regiment arrived, at about 11:00 p.m., did the military start to act professionally. The city was divided into several military sectors and placed under tight control. The peasants already in the city were not allowed to leave with looted goods. Sentries at the city gates prevented a new wave of peasants from entering. Finally order was restored, just before the arrival of the governor of Kherson, A. E. Erdeli, on the morning of Friday, April 17.

But the damage had already been done. On Thursday, April 16, for the first time, the looting and beating of Jews by a city mob had taken place in the presence of the police and military without their appropriate intervention. That day is responsible, in a sense, for the entire subsequent wave of pogroms in the Russian Empire. On that day was born the misguided conviction that the tsar's subjects had a duty to beat Jews.

III

The riots in Elisavetgrad directly ignited a total of five pogroms (and one failed attempt), all in places along the railway. These occurred in two waves, on April 16–18 (Elisavetgrad, Znam''ianka [Znamenka], Holta [Golta], Oleksandriia [Aleksandriia]) and on April 16–17 (Anan'iv [Anan'ev] and Berezivka [Berezovka]). The largest one took place in Elisavetgrad itself; it claimed one victim and caused extensive damage. The second largest pogrom took place at Berezivka, a town with a Jewish majority. The remaining three occurred on a much smaller scale. One attempted pogrom, at the city and railroad station of Oleksandriia, was aborted.[21] All in all, forty-eight anti-Jewish disturbances occurred in Kherson guberniia between April 15 and April 28 of 1881. Six took place in cities and towns, and forty-two, the clear majority of them, in villages and hamlets. These stark figures impressed the imperial government. The official view concerning the pogroms of 1881, that of the Minister of the

21 The analysis of this and the other Elisavetgrad-centered pogroms is based on the material in Admoni (especially pp. 1–34, 226–316, 468–79, 530–39). See also the appendix and the map at the end of this article. In the appendix, the Russian place names used by the tsarist administration, which are provided in parentheses in the text, are in the first column. The nineteenth-century form Elisavetgrad is used throughout for present-day Kirovohrad.

Interior, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignat'ev, was that they were essentially a rural phenomenon, provoked by Jewish economic exploitation of the illiterate peasantry. His view was shared by the contemporary Russian intelligentsia. The idea spread, due to the impact of populist theories, the blind disregard for the urban proletariat, and, above all, the superficial analysis of statistical data.

Contrary to the official statements, the disturbances of 1881 did not burst out spontaneously and simultaneously in different places. They were all imported from Elisavetgrad. Two incidents described in the official reports are typical. In the first case, three peasants from the village of Mala Mamaika (Malaia Mamaika) (10 km. northeast of Elisavetgrad) who had witnessed that neither the police nor the army had intervened in the beating of Jews and looting of their property, were persuaded by agitators that the tsar had issued an order (*ukaz*) to undertake a pogrom. Having arrived home (on the night of 16/17 April) these three peasants immediately destroyed the local Jewish tavern and, with some forty other villagers, proceeded to the neighboring village of Vysoki Bairaky (Vysokie Bueraki) (12 km. northeast of Elisavetgrad). There they mobilized some local people and vandalized the Jewish taverns. On the next day, April 17, peasants in the neighboring village of Mar''iivka (Mar'evka) (some 11 km. north of Elisavetgrad) demolished two taverns owned by Jews, one in their own village (Mar''iivka) and the other in Oleksandrivka (Aleksandrovka).[22]

In a second instance, a peasant from Sofiivka (Sofievka), in the Vitiazivka (Vitiazevka) *volost'*, on his way to the town of Brats'ke (Bratskoe), witnessed on April 21 anti-Jewish disturbances in the town of Vitiazivka (77 km. southwest of Elisavetgrad). Believing in the existence of an order from the tsar to beat Jews, he decided—under the influence of alcohol consumed in Vitiazivka—to take an active part in this patriotic activity. Continuing his journey to the village of Antonopil' (Antonovka/Antonopol) (some 90 km. southwest of Elisavetgrad), he assembled the village elders, treated them to vodka, and proclaimed that as the tsar's messenger and a member of the secret police, he was entrusted with the destruction of Jewish property in the region. He invited the local authorities to cooperate in his undertaking, assuring them that he was in possession of a copy of the tsar's decree (*ukaz*). The self-styled imperial agent failed to provoke a disturbance in Antonopil' because the local tavern owner had a reputation of being a ''good Jew.'' So the peasant from Sofiivka, assisted by the Antonopil' village authorities, proceeded to the villages located further out. In two of them, Katerynivka (Katerinovka) and Khutor Gavrilenkov, he was

[22] Admoni, pp. 23, 252, 477–78.

content to force the innkeeper to provide his party with vodka, but in the third, Kam''ianuvatka (Kamenovatka), the drunken ''crusaders'' destroyed the local Jewish tavern. The spree ended when the party arrived in Brats'ke, where the drunken adventurer was himself arrested.[23]

These two well-documented instances prove beyond any doubt that the pogrom-like disturbances in each locality were not spontaneous, snowballing peasant movements. The incidents occurred at the instigation of outside agitators claiming to be executing the tsar's will. An analysis of the chronology and geography of the Elisavetgrad-centered disturbances shows that the unrest was imported from the urban center along railway lines and then along water and land routes. Illiterate peasants participated in the disturbances, not due to an alleged traditional rebelliousness, but because misguided by agitators from the cities, they believed themselves to be faithfully implementing the orders of their patrimonial tsar.[24]

Disturbances in the countryside around Elisavetgrad were minor, and the number of both instigators (between one and eight) and ''fellow-travelers'' (between five and forty) was insignificant. There were, in fact, no real ''pogroms'' in the countryside, but rather forty-two relatively mild ''disturbances.'' In only a few of the villages in which disturbances occurred were there any resident Jews (and even then, usually only a few); in many of the villages, there were Jewish taverns but no resident Jews (see the appendix). Whereas in Elisavetgrad itself 418 houses and 290 shops, with a total value of 1,938,209 rubles, were destroyed, in the entire Elisavetgrad uezd of 619 villages and hamlets, only twelve houses, eleven shops, and twenty-three taverns were damaged, with a total value of 29,157 rubles. In the forty-two hamlets and villages located in the guberniia's three uezds (Elisavetgrad, Oleksandriia, and Anan'iv) that underwent turmoil, damage was also comparatively low: forty-three houses, nineteen shops, and thirty-two taverns, for a total damage claim of 59,665 rubles. These figures (see the appendix) confirm that the Elisavetgrad-centered disturbances had no home base in the villages. My detailed study—here and in the appendix—is limited largely to those waves of the pogroms that were centered in Elisavetgrad, because

23 Admoni, pp. 249–50, 475–77.

24 Mykhalevych cites one case in Elisavetgrad where peasants willingly spared an elderly Jew, but since they were afraid not to have obeyed the tsar's order, they pretended to have pillaged his home (Rybyns'kyi, p. 175; see also Admoni, p. 471). In some instances Christians willingly concealed Jewish property during days of crisis; see Rybyns'kyi, pp. 141–42. The peasants of Abramivka (Abramovka) (Kirovohrads'ka oblast') gave protection to Jews from the hamlet of Poklitarivka (Poklitarovka). Controversy arose around an army officer's excessively severe punishment of several of Poklitarivka's peasants for their attacks on Jews; see Admoni, p. 250.

only a microanalytic inquiry into the first instance of the phenomenon can facilitate the study of the whole.

IV

The Elisavetgrad region was still colonial territory during the first half of the nineteenth century. It came under Russian rule piecemeal during the second half of the eighteenth century, when the tsarist empire absorbed the former states of the Zaporozhian Sich (Host) and the Crimean Khanate. All cities, towns, and the great majority of villages were new settlements established there from the second half of the eighteenth to the first half of the nineteenth century. The city of Elisavetgrad was founded as a Russian military stronghold. Its first buildings were constructed between 1754 and 1757 as part of a line of fortification against the Turks. The region was called *Nova Serbiia* (New Serbia), since it was originally settled by Serbo-Croatian mercenaries from the Ottoman Empire.[25] Around the fortress there soon settled non-military people of various origins. By 1757 the town comprised 128 dwellings, and by 1788 that number had increased to 1,062 dwellings with 4,746 inhabitants. Between 1788 and 1823 these numbers doubled. In 1803 there were already 574 Jews listed in the municipal register, and by 1861 their number increased to 8,073 (out of a total population of ca. 23,000). The 1897 census records 23,967 Jews in Elisavetgrad, or about 39 percent of the total population of 61,488. Many other nationalities were also represented in the city: apart from Ukrainians and Jews, the inhabitants were Moldavians, Bulgars, Germans, Poles, Russians and others. The Ukrainians were clearly in the minority.

The comparatively recent origins of Elisavetgrad and the very mixed character of its population would argue against the importance of geographic or ethnic factors in explaining the outbreak of the pogroms.[26] Neither a traditional rebelliousness among the local "masses," nor an anti-Jewish hatred going back to the Khmel'nyts'kyi era (1648) and the Haidamak uprising (1768) existed in or around Elisavetgrad. Although repeated in many scholarly and popular books, this thesis is simply wrong.

[25] On the colonization of Elisavetgrad and the southern Ukraine, see E. I. Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v 1800–1825 gg.* (Moscow, 1970); idem, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma 1825–1860 gg.* (Moscow, 1981); D. S. Syvolap, ed., *Kirovohrads'ka oblast'*, Istoriia mist i sil Ukrains'koi RSR (Kiev, 1972), esp. pp. 81–93. On the pre–1897 history of Elisavetgrad, see also "Elisavetgrad" in *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, vol. 7, cols. 513–14; and Aleksei N. Pashutin, *Istoricheskii ocherk g. Elisavetgrada* (Elisavetgrad, 1897).

[26] Slutsky, "Ha-geografiya shel praot 1881."

The anti-Jewish excesses of July 1648, a time before Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi consolidated his power, occurred in the western part of the Cossack territories (the *polky*, or the districts of Bratslav, Kal'nyk, Bila Tserkva [Belaia Tserkov'], and Uman').[27] They did not extend to the territory of the later Kherson guberniia, the larger part of which was then included in the Chyhyryn (Chigirin) *polk* (the other part remained within the Crimean Khanate).

Chyhyryn was Khmel'nyts'kyi's home. If the traditions of the hetman and his slogans were preserved anywhere, it was in Chyhyryn. Small wonder that General Kutaisov, the imperial special investigator of the 1881 pogroms, was surprised to learn that in the town where, as he put it, "the soil was best prepared" for anti-Jewish excesses, no disturbances whatsoever occurred.[28]

The Haidamak rebellion was limited to the Ukrainian territories within the Polish Commonwealth; it did not extend to those under Russian rule, or to the lands then part of the Crimean Khanate.[29] The nineteenth-century uezds of Elisavetgrad and Oleksandriia in the Kherson guberniia were part of the Russian Empire in 1768 and the Anan'iv uezd was part of the Crimean Khanate until 1791.

The largest single group in Elisavetgrad was the Jews; other residents were, as mentioned, colonists varying in ethnic origin. In 1881 only some 55 percent of the city's inhabitants had been born in the city itself;[30] about 25 percent were immigrants, mainly from the neighboring Ukrainian and Central Russian territories.

27 Details in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 3 (Kiev and Vienna, 1922), pp. 28–50. Important is the opposition between the leader of the mob, whom the Cossacks called Maksym Kryvonos (according to a contemporary [1649] German account, *Gründliche und denkwürdige Relation der Newlichen Cosaken-Revolte wider die Cron-Polen unter Commando gen. Chmielnicki. . .*, p. 7, "der gen. Major Krziwanos" was a mercenary of Scottish extraction), and the nobleman (*szlachcic*) Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, who was only then emerging as the Cossack's leader. A new analysis of "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War" was undertaken by Bernard D. Weinryb, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (June 1977): 153–77.

28 Admoni, p. 416.

29 Aleksandr Lola, *Haidamats'kyi rukh na Ukraini v XVIII st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, ed. Ivan Butych and Fedir Shevchenko (Kiev, 1970); Władysław Serczyk, *Koliszczyzna* (Cracow, 1968); Serczyk, *Hajdamacy* (Cracow, 1972); Zenon E. Kohut, "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 3 (September 1977): 359–78; Omeljan Pritsak, "Ukraine as the Setting for the Emergence of Hasidism," *Israel and the Nations. Essays. . . in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger* (Jerusalem, 1987), pp. lxvii–lxxxiii.

30 *Kirovohrads'ka oblast'*, p. 86.

Several rallying cries chanted during Elisavetgrad's pogroms were noted and recorded; none refer either to Khmel'nyts'kyi or to the Haidamaks. The constant and most vehement cry heard in 1881 was contemporary, not historical, in nature: "The Jews killed the emperor. There is an order to beat them. The local authorities are hiding it."[31] This slogan was often combined with one giving vent to financial grievances: "The Jews are our bloodsuckers and predators."[32] Various versions arose: "Beat the Jew, and pillage his property,"[33] or "Why, it is Jewish-owned, therefore seize it."[34]

V

The historical-geographical explanation for the pogroms in the Kherson guberniia has been based on false premises. The pogroms and disturbances of 1881 were not a rural, but an urban phenomenon. They were not conditioned or facilitated by historical geography, since the territory in question knew neither the tradition of rebelliousness nor that of anti-Jewish hatred and persecution. Moreover, there was no spontaneity in the "waves" of pogroms. They were artificially instigated via a newly built communication network—the railroad—and they traveled from one city, and its adjacent towns, to the next. Elisavetgrad was probably chosen to be the starting point for the pogroms because it had a large Jewish population, was located centrally in relation to other centers of Jewry in the south, and was connected to them by rail. It may be that the disturbances (relatively mild) in rural villages and hamlets were a cover-up meant to strengthen the Russian intelligentsia's myth about the peasants' explosive, self-generated, anti-Jewish sentiments.

The published official data about the rioters arrested in Elisavetgrad and other places in Kherson guberniia are very incomplete. Of the 607 riot suspects arrested in Elisavetgrad, data on the social status of only 498 and on the occupation of only 363 are available.[35] Also, the official statistics say nothing about the young "visitors" from the capitals. Even so, the official documents contain vital information.

The majority of rioters arrested were Orthodox (562); among them were 181 townsmen, 130 "retired soldiers," 6 foreigners, 1 honorary nobleman, 3 "others," and 177 peasants. The unusually high number of "retired

31 Admoni, pp. 254, 481.
32 Admoni, p. 479.
33 Admoni, pp. 477–78, 481.
34 Admoni, pp. 244–45; see also 252, 476.
35 Admoni, pp. 536–37.

soldiers'' arrested is puzzling: who were they, and why were they among the rioters? The ratio of peasants to non-peasants is also surprising: 177 to 321. This figure alone contradicts the assumption that the pogroms of 1881 were essentially a peasant-perpetrated phenomenon.

Of the 181 townsmen, only 69 were local people from Elisavetgrad. Who were the other 112, and what was their place of residence? The official data give information about only eight rioters from outside Elisavetgrad, all of whom were residents of Ukrainian towns:

Kremenchuh	3
Kherson	2
Myrhorod	1
Tarashcha	1
Chyhyryn	1

The majority of arrested peasants were strangers in Elisavetgrad: 105 of the 117 peasants arrested claimed residence outside the city. There is official documentation for only 14 of the 105:

(a) Peasants from the Ukraine:	Kiev region	1
	Podillia region	1
	Chyhyryn region	1
		3
(b) Peasants from Russia:	Kaluga region	4
	Kursk	3
	Tula	2
	Penza	1
	Riazan'	1
		11

Of the eighty-four rioters arrested in the Oleksandriia uezd—for whom, surprisingly, detailed data are available—only about one-third were Orthodox Christians; the majority were Russian sectarians.[36] Of the 118 persons (including twenty females) arrested in the town of Anan'iv, ninety-two were townsmen, twenty were ''retired soldiers,'' and only five were peasants.[37] In the town of Berezivka, of the 120 persons arrested sixty-four were townsmen, sixteen were ''retired soldiers,'' and forty—or exactly one-third of those arrested—were peasants.[38]

36 Admoni, p. 538.
37 Admoni, p. 539.
38 Admoni, p. 538–39.

As noted, information about the rioters arrested in Elisavetgrad is incomplete; occupations are noted for only 363 people.[39] Strangely enough, large numbers of them were either unskilled workmen (102), day laborers (eighty-seven), or domestics (thirty-three)—all part of the incipient proletariat. There were also six prostitutes and thirteen unemployed people. The number of non-peasants was 288. That is, only seventy-five of the 363 rioters whose occupation is known were peasants, or only about one-fifth of the total number arrested.[40]

Fortunately, there were very few fatalities during the disturbances and pogroms—one elderly Jew[41] was found dead in Elisavetgrad and the mutilated bodies of two Jews were found in Berezivka.[42] The documents published by Krasnyi-Admoni give some details about the social status and the occupation of a number of Jews victimized in Elisavetgrad. It is clear that most of them belonged to the class of poor townsmen.

The pogrom did not touch Jewish financial potentates in Elisavetgrad; the twenty-one Jewish-owned industrial plants in the city were not disturbed at all,[43] nor were the fashionable villas of their owners harmed. The same situation prevailed in Anan'iv.[44] Apparently, the Elisavetgrad pogrom was not instigated with the aim of directly harming Jewish lives and/or financial interests in the cities, but rather to send a *message* (see p. 29), and to create the illusion of rural anti-Jewish popular ire.

VI

What was the attitude of the authorities?[45] The Elisavetgrad region was part of the guberniia of Kherson, in turn a component of the general-government of Odessa. As in all other parts of the empire, the maintenance of law and

39 Admoni, p. 537.

40 Mina Goldberg concludes: "... die ortsansässigen Bauern zu den Ausschreitungen gegen die Juden lediglich verleitet worden.... im Pogrom von Elisavetgrad waren die meisten Plünderer aus den großrussischen Gouvernements zugezogene Bauern und Arbeiterscharen.... Die innere Einstellung der Bauern Südrußlands zu den Pogromen läßt sich durch die erhobenen Proteste der einzelnen Bauerngemeinden gegen die Plünderer erkennen...." (Goldberg, pp. 38–39).

41 Admoni, p. 22.

42 Admoni, p. 92.

43 Admoni, p. 494.

44 Admoni, p. 255.

45 On the problem in general, see Nikolai P. Eroshkin, *Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii*, 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1983); P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978); F. Stein, *Geschichte des russischen Heeres* (Hannover, 1885).

order in the urban areas was the job of imperial police officers, whereas in hamlets and villages (after 1864) it was the responsibility of locally elected peasant officers, supervised by the police. The imperial police was headed by the chief of the Department of Police, a subdivision of the Ministry of the Interior. In 1881 the imperial police was understaffed[46] and unprepared to combat urban riots. The local peasant officers were usually uneducated and lacked professional training.

When suddenly confronted with a large-scale riot, the inexperienced *Politseimeister* of Elisavetgrad, Cavalry Captain I. P. Bogdanovich,[47] lost his head and failed to specify orders properly to the division commander, General Kosich. Kosich received muddled instructions, too, from his other superiors, especially from the governor-general of Odessa and the governor of Kherson. Kosich, inexperienced in urban unrest, remained more or less immobile for two crucial days. The result was two unrestrained days of looting and destruction of property. Only after the governor-general of Odessa dispatched several more experienced officers, including the governor of Kherson, to the town, and the commander of the Seventh Corps summoned additional troops—one battalion of infantry and three squadrons of ulans, which arrived in Elisavetgrad on the morning of April 17—were the riots quelled.

In general, peasant elders responded positively to the summons of their police officers. In some instances, however, an uneducated *starosta* fell prey to anti-Jewish agitators and led the rioters or otherwise cooperated with the instigators. In two cases, *starosta*s fled their villages. Punitive mounted patrols, usually one squadron of fifteen to eighteen men, were sent to quell village riots.

The imperial authorities—especially General Kosich, who came under the severe criticism of special investigator Kutaisov—were not very efficient in managing the Elisavetgrad events, but they did try to restore peace and order. To spare Odessa (and Kishinev), the governor-general of Odessa unhesitatingly called up a detachment of the awesome Don Cossacks; he also sent his chief of gendarmes to exposed Berezivka and Anan'iv. When word spread about the cooperation of military troops with rioters in Elisavetgrad, the matter was immediately put under police investigation.

46 In the trade and industrial center of Elisavetgrad (43,000 inhabitants in 1881) there were only six senior police officers and eighty-one policemen. The other uezd centers of the guberniia that experienced disturbances had even smaller police forces, each employing four senior officers and nine to twelve policemen. See Admoni, p. 488.

47 Pashutin, *Istoricheskii ocherk*, p. 33.

The imperial authorities were as surprised by the outbreak of the pogroms as were government officials on the local level. It is impossible to suspect them of organizing the pogroms or of complicity in them. But once the disturbances began, the authorities did their best to cover up the actions of the non-peasant ringleaders. Some blatant examples are discussed in the following section.[48]

VII

It has already been shown that the Elisavetgrad pogrom was neither a spontaneous movement nor a rural phenomenon. Nor was it conditioned or facilitated by so-called historical geography. The only explanation remaining to be considered is that the pogroms were the result of an urban conspiracy.

The historian Hans Rogger formulated the vital question well in 1971, giving it two components: "Who were those roving bands of young men from St. Petersburg or Moscow whose appearance in Ukrainian towns and cities supposedly presaged a pogrom, and who, if anyone, had sent them on their ugly missions?"[49]

The answer to both parts of Rogger's question may be found in the documents relating to the Zhmerynka pogrom which occurred at the end of April: first, the 1881 pogroms were apparently planned by Moscow merchants; second, the hired executors of their designs were demonstrably members of the artels of highly mobile railroad workers.

Zhmerynka (Zhmerinka), a regional center in the Vinnytsia oblast' of the Ukrainian SSR, is located in Podillia (Podolia), forty-seven kilometers from the city of Vinnytsia.[50] The town grew around a railroad station established in 1865, when the Kiev–Balta line was built. Due to its strategic location, the station became, over the next ten years, an important railroad junction of European Russia. In 1871 Zhmerynka became connected to the western frontier station of Volochys'k (Volochisk), and thus gained control over traffic to the Austrian Empire. But of still greater importance for Zhmerynka was the construction of the Odessa–Kiev rail line in 1866-1871, which meant that Zhmerynka was now linked on the one side to Odessa, and on the other to Kiev, and via Kiev–Konotip (Konotop)–Kursk, to Moscow.

48 A typical example: Governor A. E. Erdeli granted his permission for the organization of a relief committee to help the arrested rioters; Admoni, p. 281.

49 Rogger, "The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism," p. 45.

50 See A. F. Oliinyk, ed., *Vinnyts'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1972), p. 217; "Zhmerynka," in *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy* (hereafter *REIU*), vol. 2 (Kiev, 1970), p. 150.

On 27-28 April 1881, there was a pogrom in Zhmerynka.[51] It was perpetrated by an artel of railroad workers. The two main instigators were the technician Aleksandr Paderin, head of the fifth division of the Southwestern Railroad, and Ivan Glazkov, supervisor of the artel of carpenters working for the railroad. Of importance is Glazkov's statement to the local police officer (*uriadnik*) on April 27 that "the Moscow merchantry sent several hundred workers to beat Jews, and said that those who beat Jews would not be [held] responsible for their actions, since there is nothing against the government in it."[52]

Every time there was a lull in the rioting, Paderin would appear and rouse the looters once again, treating them to vodka with the cry: "Boys (*rebiata*), you do not work properly—you should have more vodka!" As a result, the railroad workers destroyed ninety-five Jewish houses and shops, valued at 95,000 rubles.[53]

On the night of April 28, the military arrived, and ninety-nine rioters were arrested, among them the two instigators. Early in the morning of May 1, the procurator of the Odessa juridical chamber, which had authority over Zhmerynka, arrived and started investigations. Of the ninety-nine persons arrested, sixty-three were sentenced. Paderin received a three-month prison sentence. But then a surprising thing happened: the governor-general of Kiev, General Aleksandr Romanovich Drentel'n, ordered that Paderin immediately leave the Ukraine ("the Southwestern territories").[54] Strange, too, is that General Drentel'n gave no details about the Zhmerynka pogrom or resulting trials in his telegrams and reports to the Minister of the Interior. Information about these matters comes only from the papers of Kutaisov.

Fastiv (Fastov), like Zhmerynka, owed its importance to the construction of the Kiev–Odessa rail line, whereupon it became a railroad junction.[55] In 1876, a line connecting Fastiv with Znam''ianka (Znamenka), near Elisavetgrad, was built. One of the stations on that line was the small town (*mestechko*) of Smila (Smela), which had a Jewish majority. No details are available about a pogrom known to have occurred at the Fastiv railroad station.[56] There is some information, however, about a violent pogrom that occurred in Smila on May 3-4; there some 6,000 people, mainly newcomers

51 Details in Admoni, pp. 292-95; 417-21.

52 Admoni, p. 292.

53 Admoni, p. 292. Compare the total damage claim of 59,665 rubles caused by the rural rioters in *all* Elisavetgrad-centered disturbances (p. 15).

54 Admoni, p. 420.

55 M. F. Rudych, ed., *Kyivs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1971), pp. 679, 683; *REIU* 4 (1972): 377.

56 Admoni, p. 12 (doc. 36).

from the Central Russian provinces, rioted, four people were killed, thirty-five wounded, and about 800 Jews suffered loss of property amounting to 200,000 rubles.[57] Three individuals were found to be the main instigators: Aristid Mikhailov Gievskii, secretary of the Fastiv railroad; Dr. Adolf L. Bernshtein, a Jewish convert and director of Smila's Sophia Hospital, belonging to the counts Bobrinskii (owners of several local sugar factories); and Ivan I. Monastyrskii, an official of the Fastiv railroad, whose father was in the service of the counts Bobrinskii.[58] The documents do not say whether the three instigators were punished.

On May 5-6, there was a pogrom at the frontier railroad station of Volochys'k.[59] Whereas telegrams to the Minister of the Interior repeatedly call the rioters "peasants,"[60] special investigator Kutaisov referred to them as "drunken railroad workers."[61]

Located at the other end of the Ukrainian territories, on the Kiev–Kursk line leading to Moscow, was the railroad junction of Konotip (Konotop).[62] On April 27, two hundred railroad workers, including some supervisors, staged a pogrom in Konotip.[63] Again government action was surprising: the governor of Kharkiv (Kharkov), General Sviatopolk-Mirskii, stated in a telegram of May 27 to the Minister of the Interior that most of the suspects were released because of lack of evidence against them.[64]

The danger coming from the direction of Kursk (Moscow) was fully realized by the director of the Kursk–Kharkiv–Azov railroad, who, in a letter to the governor of Kharkiv, dated May 7, informed him about a successful preemptive pacification of his work force of 1,325 (employees, masters, foremen, and workers). All these men, after having stated that they had no financial or other complaints, were induced to swear not to participate in any riots or anti-Jewish activities.[65] The texts of two supporting documents were appended to the director's letter, and are preserved among the papers of Kutaisov.[66]

57 Admoni, p. 28 (doc. 65), pp. 107–11, 208–19, 534.

58 Admoni, pp. 108–11. The other instigators were rich and influential townsmen, the brothers Grigorii and Amos Ivanov (alias Sysenkov, Sysoenko), the telegraphist (sic!) Aleksandr Ivanov Sergeev, and Efim Gusev, son of a rich merchant (sic!). Admoni, pp. 102, 112.

59 On Volochys'k, see M. I. Mekheda, ed., *Khmel'nyts'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1971), pp. 145–47.

60 Admoni, p. 31 (doc. 71), 32 (doc. 72), 35 (doc. 85), 36 (doc. 87).

61 Admoni, p. 421; see also p. 531.

62 On Konotip, see I. Makukhin, ed., *Sums'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1973), p. 252; *REIU* 2:462–63.

63 Admoni, p. 11 (doc. 35), pp. 13–14 (doc. 41).

64 Admoni, p. 17 (doc. 54).

65 Admoni, pp. 295–96 (doc. 26).

66 Another important railroad junction was Kremenchuh in Poltava guberniia. On that city, which had a large Jewish population, see I. T. Bulanyi, ed., *Poltavs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1967), pp. 463–70; *REIU* 2:501–502; *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, vol. 9, cols. 832–33. After the

The data assembled here prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the highly mobile railroad workers were the main executors of the pogroms in 1881. The data tell us also about the strange behavior of the imperial authorities and establishment. After a certain pogrom or disturbance occurred, the authorities did their best to wipe out all trace of the true ringleaders, usually the ''stars'' from the capitals (*stolichnye gosti*). True, the authorities did not initiate the pogroms, but they certainly were culpable of covering up and destroying the ''smoking guns.'' This was due mainly to their indoctrination and the brainwashing effect of the fashionable populist dogma that the pogroms were a rural phenomenon, allegedly the expression of ''popular ire'' against Jewish economic exploitation. The authorities not only subscribed to this artificial construct, but also sympathized with the pogrom activists and ringleaders. Seldom would they arrest such *persona grata*, and when they did, they would not persecute them seriously (see the case of Paderin, above).

It was also redundant: the lesser authorities conscientiously falsified their reports in order to mollify their superiors. Instead of naming the true culprits—the railroad workers and other representatives of the incipient urban proletariat—the reports included the usual face-saving formulas—''peasants'' and ''popular ire.''[67]

VIII

What was the role of the Moscow merchants in the 1881 riots? The Moscow merchants, the largest single group among the merchants of the empire (see the reference to the *moskovskie lavki*, above), were of the oriental, very conservative type. Even in the nineteenth century, they traded on the streets and in open air markets (the city of Moscow had forty-one such markets, varying in size); as in the Near East, ''trade rows'' (*lavki*), or separate passageways, concentrated on particular specialties. They vehemently opposed Western innovations, like banking or commercial exchange, until 1886,

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pogroms in Kiev and Konotip, the governor of Poltava, Bil'basov, summoned to Poltava the 35th Brians'k Infantry Regiment, despite the Jewish population's complaints about the inconvenience of having an occupying army in their city. See Admoni, pp. 29–30 (doc. 68). On the role of railroads and railroad workers in the 1881 pogroms, see Admoni, pp. 40–41 (doc. 99). Evidence about that role surprised the imperial administration, which expected peasants to be the main perpetrators.

67 See also the statement by Goldberg: ''Da die Spuren der Rädelsführer und die der Provokation der Beamten von den Behörden völlig verwischt wurden, ist es unmöglich, einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen einzelnen Urhebern der Pogrome zu rekonstruieren'' (Goldberg, p. 39).

when the government ordered the demolition of the *lavki* in the Moscow Kitai-gorod.[68]

In the century between 1750 and 1850–61, the Moscow merchants encountered three types of competitors.[69] Two types—the noble industrialist and the serf-peasant trader—were of domestic origin and therefore manageable. But the third competitor was foreign, and so posed a real danger. The foreign capitalist and producer of goods, the merchant of the new West European type, was a threat with which Moscow merchants, encountering them first through the Congress Kingdom of Poland, had to come to grips. The catalyst for conflict, which developed from the 1840s to the 1880s, was the activity of Polish-Jewish merchants and industrialists, centered in Warsaw/Łódź[70] and in Odessa, expanding into the Ukrainian territories of the Russian Empire, until then the preserve of the Moscow merchants.[71]

The Ukrainian territories that were part of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century comprised the following four zones. Each had a unique historical past before it was incorporated into the empire:[72] (1) Sloboda Ukraine/Left-Bank Ukraine, with its center of Kharkiv; (2) Malorossiia/Het'manshchyna, with centers in Chernihiv (Chernigov) and Poltava; (3) Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai, with centers in Kiev and Berdychiv (Berdichev); (4) Novorossiia/Southern Ukraine, with its center of Odessa.

The Sloboda Ukraine came into existence in the 1630s, as a colonial enterprise of Ukrainian Cossack and peasant refugees from the Polish Commonwealth who submitted to the tsar of Muscovy. It was incorporated (more or less) into the Muscovite economic system during the eighteenth

68 See Robert Gohstand, "The Shaping of Moscow by Nineteenth-Century Trade," in Michael F. Hamm, ed., *The City in Russian History* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1976), pp. 160–81, especially 163, 165, 171; idem, "The Geography of Trade in Nineteenth-Century Russia," in James H. Buter and R. A. French, eds., *Studies in Russian Historical Geography*, vol. 2 (London, 1983), pp. 329–72.

69 See Alfred J. Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), pp. 40–79.

70 This was especially true after the abolition in 1851 of the tariff border between the Kingdom of Poland and the rest of the empire.

71 On the competition between Polish and Russian merchants and industrialists in the Ukraine, see Oleksandr Ohloblyn, *Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabriki: Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika* (Kiev, 1925), reprinted in O. Ohloblyn, *A History of Ukrainian Industry* (Munich, 1971).

72 For general information, see: Volodymyr Holubuts'kyi, *Ekonomichna istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR. Dozhovtnevyi period* (Kiev, 1970); F. Los', ed., *Istoriia robitnychovo klasu Ukrains'koi RSR*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1967); Ivan Hurzhii, *Rozvytok tovarnoho vyrobnytstva i torhivli na Ukraini (z kintsia XVIII st. do 1861 roku)* (Kiev, 1962); idem, *Ukraina v systemi vserosiis'koho rynku 60–90kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kiev, 1968). See also A. Shevel'ev, ed., *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR*, vol. 3 (Kiev, 1978).

century. Even in the nineteenth century, despite the Ukrainian national revival in Kharkiv guberniia, for instance, 64 percent of the merchants were Russians.[73] The former Hetman State (1648–1785), or *Malorossiia*, was incorporated into the empire only between 1764 and 1785, but it started losing economic independence soon after the defeat at Poltava (1709). The imperial government assumed the right to regulate Malorossiia's imports and exports to the benefit of the Moscow merchants by means of prohibitions and special tariffs.[74] Beginning in the 1830s the Moscow merchants unexpectedly met with fierce competition there, coming from the Congress Kingdom of Poland.[75] This and the rebirth of the Ukrainian merchant class[76] changed the economic picture, so that by 1897 the role of Russian merchants in Malorossiia had decisively declined, to 25 percent in the Chernihiv and Kiev guberniias and 13 percent in the Poltava guberniia.[77]

The *Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai* (Polish: Podole, Wolyń, Ukraina; during the nineteenth century the general-government of Kiev, Podillia [Podolia], and Volhynia) became part of the Russian Empire as a result of the second and third partitions of Poland (1793, 1795). Consequently the imperial administration regarded it as a Polish territory until the Polish uprising of the 1860s. Only at that time, under the impact of Slavophile ideology, did the imperial bureaucracy change its policy and begin to de-Polonize the "aboriginal Russian" land. The urban and mercantile population of the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai was basically Jewish, centered in the *mestechki* (*shtetl*) or towns. The economic center for these *mestechki* was Berdychiv,[78] then the second largest Jewish community in the empire: in 1847, Jews numbered 32,761 out of a total population of 41,000. In 1855, the city's guild members numbered 2,812 Jews and 70 Christians. Berdychiv also housed a branch of the Polish State Bank.

[73] Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 93.

[74] See Konstantyn Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia: A History of Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917* (Milwaukee, 1958); Ohloblyn, *History of Ukrainian Industry*, esp. pt. 1: "Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabriki: Manufaktura v Getmanshchine" [originally published in Kiev in 1925]; idem, *Narysy z istorii ukrains'koi fabryky: Kripats'ka fabryka* (printed in Kharkiv and Kiev in 1931, then confiscated).

[75] See above, fn. 68.

[76] On the Ukrainian industrial region, see W. L. Blackwell, "The Historical Geography of Industry in Russia during the Nineteenth Century," in *Studies in Russian Historical Geography* 2: 402–10.

[77] Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 93.

[78] On Berdychiv, see O. S. Chornobryvtseva, ed., *Zhytomyrs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1973), pp. 164–67; *REIU* 1 (1969): 123.

Novorossiia became a colonial territory of the Russian Empire after the incorporation of the territories of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Crimean Khanate.[79] Economic leadership was soon assumed by the city of Odessa (built in 1794),[80] due to its extraterritorial status as a free port (since 1817). Until the 1860s Odessa's trade and commerce were dominated by Mediterranean merchants, mainly Greeks and Italians. Catherine II encouraged Jewish settlement in Novorossiia. Jews flocked there both from the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and from Austrian Galicia. By 1828, 4,226 Jews lived in Odessa, or 12 percent of the city's total population at the time. By 1855 their number had increased to 17,000 (21 percent, including 477 merchants and families). By the 1840s most of the bankers and moneychangers in Odessa were Jewish, and during the early 1870s Jews took control of grain exports, Odessa's main trade commodity. The Greek response was the pogrom that took place in Odessa in the spring of 1871.

The Kingdom of Poland, in union with the Russian Empire through the person of its tsar, was the product of the Congress of Vienna (1815). As a result of the initiative and vision of the kingdom's finance minister, Count Ksawery Lubecki-Drucki, the relatively small ethnic Polish lands, which had never before excelled in economic affairs, suddenly developed greater economic prowess than the immense Russian Empire.[81] By the mid-1880s, the Kingdom of Poland was producing one-fifth of all the empire's textiles, one quarter of its steel, two-fifths of its coal, and one-fifth of its sugar. Half the Polish production was sold in the empire, mainly in the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and in Novorossiia.[82] This development took place because Lubecki-Drucki, taking advantage of the Kingdom's status as a free-trade zone, encouraged foreign investors, mainly Germans (including many German Jews) and Frenchmen, and made daring use of West European technology and know-how. Thus, he established in 1828 in Warsaw the first State Bank in Eastern Europe. Within a few years this comprehensive economic program turned Congress Poland into the most industrialized country in continental Europe, second only to England.

79 On the colonization of Novorossiia, see Druzhinina, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v 1800-1825 gg.*; idem, *Iuzhnaia Ukraina v period krizisa feodalizma 1825-1860 gg.*

80 On Odessa, see L. V. Hladka, ed., *Odes'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1969), pp. 85–102; *REIU* 3 (1971): 264-65; Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794-1914* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).

81 Mieczyslaw Ajzen, *Polityka gospodarcza Lubeckiego (1821-1830)* (Warsaw, 1932). See also the English version of the classic study by Rosa Luxemburg, *The Industrial Development of Poland* (New York, 1977); I. I. Ianzhul, *Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti v Tsarstve Pol'skom* (Moscow, 1888); I. Edlickii, "Gosudarstvennaia promyshlennost' v Tsarstve Pol'skom v XIX v.," in *Genezis kapitalizma i promyshlennosti* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 278–304. See also W. L. Blackwell, "Historical Geography," pp. 390–96.

82 Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 66.

Soon the Kingdom's Jewish urban masses (in 1841 numbering 179,000, or 40 percent of the total urban population)[83] —newly emancipated, following the German *maskilim* ("enlighteners"), with whom they now entered into economic cooperation—took part in these exciting ventures. By 1897 Jews accounted for 73 percent of all those engaged in trade and industry in the Kingdom of Poland which by 1880 was steadily expanding into the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and Novorossiia.[84] Herein lies clear motivation for the Moscow merchants to resent Jewish economic activities in the Ukraine.

IX

From the 1840s, Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov was active in Moscow as a journalist, administrator, duma member, Moscow entrepreneur, and, interestingly, student of the Ukrainian markets.[85] His role in the militant Slavophile movement was unique: he was not a theoretician, but an eminent practitioner who, as a pan-Slavist crusader, enjoyed tremendous popularity.[86]

After his death in 1886, Aksakov's friends and admirers in Moscow collected and published his numerous articles in seven volumes. Volume three of the collection is entitled "The Polish Question and West Russian Affairs: The Jewish Question, 1860-1886."[87] The articles were originally published in the Moscow journals *Den'*, *Moskva*, *Moskvich*, and *Rus'*.

Connecting the Polish question with the Jewish question and the dates 1860 to 1886 were certainly not accidental. "Aksakov," writes Stephen Lukashevich, "at first, linked the Jewish problem with the problem of Polonism in the western region: [according to Aksakov, O. P.] the Poles were both exploiters and invaders of Russian nationality; the Jews were leeches who weakened the population by draining their economic vitality, thus creating favorable conditions for Polonization."[88]

83 *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, 15, col. 745.

84 *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia*, 15, col. 757. See Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 185.

85 It was Ivan Aksakov who wrote the basic description of the fairs (*iarmarki*) in the Ukraine: *Issledovanie o torgovle na ukrainskikh iarmarkakh* (St. Petersburg, 1858). On this figure see Stephen Lukashevich, *Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886: A Study in Russian Thought and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

86 S. Vengerov, *Kritiko-biograficheskii slovar' russkikh pisatelei i uchenykh*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1889), 335–36.

87 *Sochineniia I. S. Aksakova*, vol. 3: *Pol'skii vopros i zapadnorusskoe delo: Evreiskii vopros. 1860-1886* (Moscow, 1886).

88 Lukashevich, *Aksakov*, pp. 96–97.

Aksakov illustrated what he considered to be the rapaciousness of Jewish exploitation in forceful, vivid, and virulent terms. Struggle against exploitation became the main slogan of his anti-Jewish propaganda. Aksakov wrote:

One finds in the western provinces a degree of exploitation that cannot be compared to the exploitation of the worker by any factory-owner or landowner. There, [Jewish] exploitation, like a boa, is strangulating the population. It drains all the blood of the people and keeps them fettered in such a horrible bondage that no worker or peasant in Jew-free Russia can have an idea about it. . . .It is so much more insulating because the exploiters belong to another race and another creed.[89]

Aksakov's reaction to the pogroms of 1881 speaks for itself. In an article devoted to those events, he had not a word of compassion for the victims. "The man," he wrote, "who has visited even once our southern and western border provinces. . .[the Ukraine], where Jews live unhampered, and who has seen with his own eyes the oppression of the local Russian [Ukrainian] population by Jewry (we have been there many times) will know that the popular movement [sic!—O. P.] is not only natural, but even quite unsurprising."[90]

It is in Aksakov's Moscow circles that one can seek out the ideologists who stimulated the Moscow and St. Petersburg merchants to organize the "spontaneous," popular anti-Jewish pogroms in the Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai and Novorossiia in 1881.[91]

The pogrom in Odessa, masterminded by that city's Greek merchants, had occurred in the spring of 1871. The timing of the pogroms of 1881 was perhaps not accidental: it marked the tenth anniversary of the Odessa pogrom, and it had the same economic-religious background. One plausible hypothesis is that the Moscow merchants followed in the footsteps of

89 English translation quoted in Lukashevich, *Aksakov*, p. 97.

90 I. Aksakov, "'Liberaly' po povodu rozgroma Evreev" (*Rus'*, June 1881), in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1886), p. 719. Aksakov's work was continued by a symbolic duo, the Moscow merchant D. I. Morozov and the nobleman Prince D. N. Tsereteli. The latter was editor of *Russkoe obozrenie*, financed by the former. About that journal Rieber writes: "The journal championed the demands of Moscow's economic interests against all foreign and ethnic competitors along the periphery from the Pacific Maritime provinces to Persia and the Balkans. Its favorite targets were what was called 'the Lodzist nest' [referring to the Polish industrial city of Łódź] and 'the aggressive Jewish-Germany enemy.' Anti-semitic polemics reached a new height, culminating in such provocative comments as 'the Jews are stronger than the law.'" Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs*, p. 185.

91 An Odessa rabbi stated clearly in his memo to Kutaisov that the Russian merchants were the main instigators of the pogroms in 1881; Admoni, pp. 299–300. See also Rybyns'kyi, p. 179.

their Greek merchant co-religionists.[92] To implement their ugly ''program'' they employed roving bands of seasonal railroad workers, mostly from the Russian guberniias,[93] the incipient proletariat.

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92 Mykhalevych notes in his diary the connection between the pogroms of Odessa and Elisavetgrad. Rybyns'kyi, p. 179.

93 This has already been detected by Goldberg, pp. 22–23, 38–39: ''Resümierend ist zu sagen, daß judenfeindliche Intentionen vornehmlich der russischen Bourgeosie für den Ausbruch der Pogrome von großer Bedeutung waren. . . .'' (p. 23).

Abbreviations used in the appendix

c	= celler (of wine and/or whiskey)
d.	= *derevnia* (village)
dnl	= data not listed
E, W, N, S	= the cardinal points (usually from Elisavetgrad)
g.	= *gorod* (town/townlet)
h	= house(s)
inh.	= inhabitants
KO	= *Kirovohrads'ka oblast'*, ed. D. S. Syvolap (Kiev, 1972)
m.	= *mestechko* (formerly privately owned town/townlet)
MO	= *Mykolaiivs'ka oblast'*, ed. V. O. Vasyl'iev (Kiev, 1971)
mp	= movable property
obl.	= *oblast'*
OO	= *Odes'ka oblast'*, L. V. Hladka (Kiev, 1969)
Orth.	= Orthodox-Christian
s.	= *selo*/*selenie* (large village)
sh	= shop(s)
t	= tavern(s)
v.	= *volost'* (rural district)

Note to the map

The map of the Elisavetgrad-centered pogroms and disturbances (1881) is based on the map in *KO*, pp. 8–9.

In the documents published by Krasnyi-Admoni, the names of localities are often misspelled, making their identification and localization difficult. Examples:

2. misspelled Cherliakovk- (p. 23);
6. misspelled Poliktarovk- (p. 23);
7. misspelled Sisovk- (p. 477);
8. incorrectly named Semenovka (p. 530);
8. misspelled Dolivovk- (p. 477);
20. misspelled Kamenovodk- (p. 249);
24. misspelled Boeraki (p. 23);
25. misspelled Mardevk- (p. 478);
27. misspelled Adzanka (p. 5); Adzhlik (p. 23);
28. misspelled Krasik-Iar (p. 23);
32. misspelled Dolin-Kalilik- (p. 23), Dolina-Kamenka (p. 530);
34. misspelled Kalinovka (p. 530);
44. misspelled Strunov- (p. 256);
45. incorrectly named Berezovka (p. 530).

Appendix: List of Places with Disturbances
with Evaluation of Damages (in rubles)

No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h	sh and t	t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
	I. Elisavetgrad City										
1	Elisavetgrad, Kherson guberniia; 1881: 43,299 pop.; Jews 13,000	Kirovohrad; oblast' center; *KO*, pp. 81-124		15-17 April	1		418	290		1,938,209 (mp 1,897,077)	1-6, 20-26, 28, 31, 34, 226-32, 241-86, 299-301, 316, 468-79, 530, 536-37
	II. Elisavetgrad Uezd										
2	Cherniakovka, d., Oboznovka v. 838 Orth.	Cherniakhivka, Kirovohrad raion; *KO*, p. 366, map p. 329	4.3 S	night 16-17 April			4 (incl. 1 mansion)		1	6,500 (mp 2,117)	23, 24, 249 fn. 1, 474-75, 477, 530
3	Lelekovka, s., Oboznovka v., Railroad station; 3,540 pop.; Orth. 3,510, other 10	Lelekivka, Kirovohrad raion; *KO*, p. 349, map p. 329	5.3 W	17 April				3	6	3,120	23, 249 fn. 1, 474-75, 477, 530
4	Sazonovka, d., Oboznovka v.; less than 500 inh.	Sazonivka, Kirovohrad raion; *KO*, p. 349, map p. 329: Vysoki Bairaky	7.5 W	17 April					1	400	475
5	Gruzskoe, s., v. center; 4,216 pop.; Orth. 4,132, other 84	Hruz'ke, Kirovohrad raion; *KO*, p. 361, map p. 329	18 W	17 April			2	4	2	4,100	23, 249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530

No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
							h	sh and t	t		
6	Poklitarovka, d., Vladimirovka v.; 1881: 24 houses; 1897: less than 500 inh.	Poklitarivka, Kirovohrad raion; *KO*, p. 364, map p. 329: Osytniazhka	21.2 NW	17 April			1	1	1	1,752	23, 177-81, 249 fn. 1, 250, 278, 280, 475, 477, 530
7	Sasovka, d., Kompaneevka v.; 984 Orth.	Sasivka, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, p. 380, map p. 367: Hubivka	21.2 SE	17 April			1		1	4,086	23, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
8	Zelenovka, d., Kompaneevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Zelene, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, p. 380, map p. 367: Lozuvatka	20 SE	18 April					2	320	23, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
9	Grigor'evka, d., Kompaneevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Hryhorivka, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, nl	31.8 SW	18 April					1	460	23, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
10	Egorovka, d., Kompaneevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Iehorivka, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, nl	31.8 SE	18 April					1	500	249 fn. 1, 250, 475, 477, 530
11	Aleksandrovka, d., Nechaevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Oleksandrivka, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, nl	45 SW	18 April						dnl	249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530
12	Pustopol'e, d., Nechaevka v.; 568 Orth.	?, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, nl	45 SW	19 April					1	300	249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530

No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
							h	sh and t	t		
13	Rostovka, d., Nechaevka v.; less than 500 inh.	?, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, nl	45 SW	19 April						50	475
14	Petrovka, d., Lozovatka v.; less than 500 inh.	Petrivka, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, p. 382, map p. 367	46 SE	20 April					1	100	475
15	Miroliubovka, g., Erdelievka v.; 917 pop.; Orth. 897; other 20	Kirovka, Mala Vyska raion; *KO*, p. 411, map p. 384	81 W	20 April						dnl	249 fn. 1, 475, 477, 530
16	Vitiazevka, m., Vitiazevka v.; 687 pop.; Orth. 637, other 50	Vytiazivka, Bobrynets' raion; *KO*, pp. 138-45, map p. 125	77 SW	21 April			4	3	3	5,536	23, 24, 177, 249, 249 fn. 1, 250, 475-77, 530
17	Katerinovka, d., Vitiazevka v.; less than 500 inh.	Katerynivka, Bobrynets' raion; *KO*, nl	87 SW	21 April						700	476
18	Antonopol' Antonovka, d., Bratskoe v.; less than 500 inh.	Antonopil', Mykolaiiv obl., Brats'ke raion; *MO*, p. 285, map p. 256	ca. 90 SW	21 April						dnl	249, 249 fn. 1, 475-76, 530
19	Gavrilenkov Khutor, Bratskoe v.; less than 500 inh.	?, Mykolaiiv oblast', Brats'ke raion; *MO*, nl	ca. 95 SW	21 April					1	250	476

No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h	 sh and t	 t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
20	Kamenovatka, d., Bratskoe v.; 593 Orth.	Kam''ianuvatka, Mykolaiiv obl.; Brats'ke raion; *MO*, p. 256	ca. 100 SW	21 April					1	683	249, 249 fn. 1, 476-77, 530
	TOTAL (without Elisavetgrad)			16/17-21 April			12 (incl. 1 man-sion)	11	23	28,857	
	III. Alexandriia Uezd										
21	Aleksandriia, g., uezd center; 1881: 15,980 pop.; Jews 4,794	Oleksandriia, center of raion; *KO*, pp. 600-19	75 NE	19 April			1	1		600	24, 252 fn. 1, 479-80, 495, 530
22	Znamenka, Railroad station; 1,055 pop.; Orth. 1,013; other 42	Znam''ianka, center of raion; *KO*, pp. 286-305	40 NE	17 April			4 (incl. 1 hotel)	1	1	10,300	5, 23, 252, 478,530
23	Malaia Mamaika, d., Vysokie Bueraki v.; 590 Orth.	Mala Mamaika, Kirov. raion; *KO*, p. 349, map p. 329	10.6 NE	night 16/17 April					1	260	23, 477-78, 530
24	Vysokie Bueraki, s., center of v.; less than 500 inh.; 1972: 921 pop.	Vysoki Bairaky, Kirov. raion; *KO*, pp. 349-59, map p. 329	12 N	night 16/17 April					2	440	23, 477-78, 530


No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
							h	sh and t	t		
25	Mar'evka, d., Vysokie Bueraki v.; less than 500 inh.	Mar''iivka, Kirov. raion; *KO*, p. 349, map p. 329	ca. 11 N	17 April					1	383	23, 253, 478, 530
26	Aleksandrovka, d., Vysokie Bueraki v.; less than 500 inh.	? Kirov. raion; *KO*, nl	ca. 12 N	17 April					1	383	23, 478, 530
27	Adzhamka, s., center of v.; 9,745 pop.; Orth. 9,458, other 287	Adzhamka, Kirov. raion; *KO*, pp. 329-40	21 E	17 April				1		86	5, 23,479,530
28	Krasnyi Iar, s., Adzhamka v.; 2,077 pop.; Orth. 793, Old Believers 1,284	Chervonyi Iar, Kirov. raion; *KO*, p. 366, map p. 329	26 E	17 April			1			1,581	23, 479, 530
29	Klintsy, s., Adzhamka v.; 2,690 pop.; Orth. 1,333, Old Believers 1,353, other 4	Klyntsi, Kirov. raion; *KO*, pp. 361-62, map p. 329	12 S	17 April			4			1,867	23, 253, 479, 530
30	Subbottsy, s., Adzhamka v.; 3,828 pop.; Orth. 3,795, other 33	Subottsi, Znam''ianka raion; *KO*, p. 327, map p. 286	28 NE	17 April						no damage	479, 530
31	Pokrovskoe, s., Adzhamka v.; 3,267 pop.; Orth. 3,263, other 4	Pokrovs'ke, Kirov. raion; *KO*, p. 365, map p. 329	16 SE	17 April						no damage	479, 530


No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
							h	sh and t	t		
32	Donina Kamianka, s., Kazarnia v.; 799 Orth.	Donyno-Kam''ianka, Znam''ianka raion; *KO*, p. 327, map p. 286	ca. 20 N	18 April			1		1	3,316 (mp 2,629)	23, 477, 479, 530
33	Gubovka, s., Novgorodka v.; 5,287 pop.; Orth. 5,251, other 36	Hubivka, Kompaniivka raion; *KO*, p. 380, map p. 367	30 SE	18 April			4			1,661	479, 530
34	Kamenka, s., Novgorodka v.; 5,174 pop.; Orth. 5,093, other 81	Inhula-Kam''ianka, Novhorodka raion; *KO*, pp. 447-48, map p. 425	ca. 50 SE	18 April			5			173	479, 530
35	Ploskoe, s., Krasnosel'e v.; 1,396 pop.; Orth. 1,373, other 23	Ploske, Znam''ianka raion; *KO*, p. 311, map p. 286	ca. 60 NE	19 April						16	479, 530
	TOTAL			16/17-19 April			20	3	7	20,683	
	IV. Anan'ev Uezd										
36	Golta, s., Railroad station; 7,062 pop.; Orth. 5,307, Jews 1,245, other 510	(Holta) Pervomais'k, Mykolaiiv obl., raion center; *MO*, pp. 654-72	ca. 135 SW	17 April			34	19	5 (incl. 3 c)	45,846	14, 24, 254, 280-81, 480-81, 530, 538-39

No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h	sh and t	t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
37	Anan'ev, center of v., g.; 1881: 15,220 pop.; Jews 7,650	Anan'iv, Odesa oblast', raion center; *OO*, pp. 139-58	ca. 190 SW	26-27 April			164	14	19 (incl. 8 c)	38,498	14, 26, 34, 91-92, 254-55, 481-82, 487, 495, 538-39
38	Berezovka, bez''uezdnyi gorod; 6,154 pop.; Orth. 2,461, Jews 3,458, other 235	Berezivka, Odesa oblast', raion center; *OO*, pp. 249-59	ca. 220 SWS	26-27 April		2	159	17	11 c.	450,000	14, 26, 91-92, 255-57, 482-83, 487, 530, 538, 539
39	Gandrabury, s.; 4,845 pop.; Orth. 4,817, other 28	Handrabury, Odesa oblast', Anan'iv raion; *OO*, p. 180, map p. 139	7 W from Anan'ev	27 April			5			3,450	92, 255, 484, 530
40	Romanovka, m.; less than 500 inh.	Romanivka, Odesa oblast', Anan'iv raion; *OO*, p. 182, map p. 139: Shymkove	16 SE from Anan'ev	27 April					4 (incl. 1 c)	dnl	92
41	Zavadovka, d., 1,404 pop.; Orth. 1,315, other 89	Zavodivka, Odesa oblast', Berezivka raion; *OO*, pp. 279-80, map p. 249	9 NW from Berezovka	27 April			4		1	7,000	92, 256, 484, 530
42	Teftulova, d.; less than 500 inh.	?, *OO*, nl	ca. 30 from Berezovka	28 April			2			1,300	92, 256, 484, 530

No.	1881 Form of Name Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed			Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
							h	sh and t	t		
43	Sirotinka, d.; less than 500 inh.	Syrotynka, Odesa oblast', Mykolaiivka raion; *OO*, p. 683, map p. 662: Petrivka	ca. 27 NW from Bere-zovka	28 April			2			351	256, 484, 530
44	Strukovo, s.; 535 Orth.	Striukove, Odesa oblast', Mykolaiivka raion; *OO*, p. 683, map p. 662: Petrivka	32 SW from Berezovka	28 April			1			330	256, 484, 530
	TOTAL			26-28 April		2	371	50	40 (incl. 12 c)	546,775	
	V. Tiraspol' uezd										
45	Bernardovka/Berezovka, d.; less than 500 inh.	? Moldavian SSR		27 April				2	2 (incl. 1 c)	9,100	256-57, 484, 530, 538
46	Demidovo, s.; less than 500 inh.	? Moldavian SSR		27 April					1	100	257, 484, 530
	TOTAL			27 April				2	3 (incl. 1 c)	9,200	

No.	1881 Nameform and Administrative Jurisdiction Population in 1897	Present Name Jurisdiction Reference Map Location	Distance from Elisavetgrad or other Center in Kilometers	Date of Disturbances	Jews Found Dead	Jews Hurt	Immovables Destroyed h	sh and t	t	Total Value Claimed in Rubles	Admoni, pp.
	VI. Odessa Uezd										
47	Shpeier, s.; 2,135 pop.; Roman Cath. 1,983, other 197	? Odesa oblast'; *OO*, nl		4, 6 May			1			14	93, 485, 487, 530; cf. 539
48	Varvarovka/Mikhailovka, m.; 2,352 pop.; Orth. 1,562, Jews 781	Varvarivka, Odesa oblast', Ivanivka raion; *OO*, p. 32, map p. 412		10 May			1	1	1	80	485, 487, 530; cf. 539
	TOTAL			4-10 May			2	1	1	94	
	GRAND TOTAL (Kherson gubernia)			15 April–10 May	1	2	823 (incl. 2 mansions and 1 hotel)	357	74 (incl. 13 c)	2,543,818	


THE ELISAVETGRAD-CENTERED POGROMS (1881)
Balta—Elisavetgrad
Odessa—Balta
15
20
36
37
38
39
42-43
40-41
Berezivka
Odessa—Kremenchuh
УМАНЬ
ПЕРВОМАЙСЬК
ВОЗНЕСЕНСЬК


Kiev (Moscow)—Odessa
Fastiv—Znam''ianka
СМІЛА
Кам'янка
Чигирин
КРЕМЕНЧУК
СВІТЛОВОДСЬК
Знам'янка
Олександрія
КІРОВОГРАД
П'ЯТИХАТКИ
ЖОВТІ ВОДИ
Долинська
Бобринець
Новий Буг
Mykolaiv—Znam''ianka
20 0 20 40 60 km

The Lithuanian Prince-Monk Vojšelk: A Study of Competing Legends

DAVID M. GOLDFRANK

The political mythology of Rus' created heroes from a set of princes who dated back to pagan times. The earliest legends, focusing on military and political prowess, contained elements of folklore. Native writers also combined hagiographic motifs with information from chronicles and other sources to produce a corpus of lives of saintly princes whose outstanding traits were either martyrdom or defense of Rus' from religiously hostile foreigners. The concomitant political doctrines, supporting the rule of Orthodox princes, were simple, consistent, and cogent, and they remained constituent elements of East Slavic state ideology down to 1917.[1]

The advent of Lithuanian power in Western Rus' in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries added new clans of legitimate princes to the Rjurykovyči. The Lithuanian prince who converted to Orthodoxy and then promoted or defended Christian Rus' against "Pagan Lithuania" became a novel topic for Rus' princely biography and hagiography. The subsequent establishment of the polity of Lithuanian Rus' created a conceptual dilemma for Lithuania's ruling dynasty and for her Orthodox princes. After 1386 fidelity to Orthodox traditions clashed with the Lithuanian dynasty's Catholicism. However, the earlier association of some members of the dynasty and their predecessors with Orthodox Rus' allowed contemporaries to create a history in which the heroic Lithuanian Orthodox prince was a positive figure. Simultaneously, Muscovite political thinkers were faced with the challenge of incorporating the Lithuanian Rus' Orthodox past and present into their "all-" or "common-Rus'" polity in order to facilitate claims to the West Rus' heritage. They, too, could make use of the virtuous Lithuanian Orthodox prince.

The first Rus' literary treatment of such a figure was the life of Mindovg's son Vojšelk (Vaišvilkas; d. 1267 or 1268).[2] Although he was a monk, his father's murder caused Vojšelk to seize power, with help from

[1] N. I. Serebrjanskij, *Drevnerusskie knjažeskie žitija* (Moscow, 1915); also in *Čtenija v Obščestve istorii i drevnostej rossijskix*, vol. 3/4 (1915); M. Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven, 1961), pp. 5–100.

[2] Rus'ian forms of Lithuanian names are given as they appear in the sources; Lithuanian forms are given in parentheses the first time a name appears.

the West Rus', in at least part of Lithuania.[3] The original version of his life contained in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (GVC) gave rise to two other separate Vojšelk traditions, one Novgorodian–East Rus' and the other Lithuanian-Belorussian. These legends, about which this is the first special study, expressed several conflicting political views of the two main heir-competitors to Kievan Rus'. The Vojšelk traditions also illustrate one development of historical myths and the viability of the heroic monk-prince theme in late medieval and early modern Eastern Europe.

I. THE VOLHYNIAN VOJŠELK

The Volhynian Vojšelk tale (V-GVC) lies at the center of the nearly continuous Lithuanian entries in GVC for 1261/2–1277/8 (6770–6786),[4] but it is a complete composition in its own right.[5] The origin and development of V-GVC is difficult to determine, partially because the history of GVC itself is somewhat enigmatic, and also because the chronicle traditions concerning Vojšelk are contradictory. Hen'sors'kyj's reasoned scheme of hypothetical *svods* or redactions is adequate for the purposes of this study: 1266 (produced in Xolm, favoring Danylo Romanovyč), 1285/86 (Xolm, for Lev Danylovyč), 1289 (Ljubomyl', favoring Volodimer Vasyl'kovyč), and the final year 1292 (?Pinsk, for Mstyslav Danylovyč), as well as 1234 (Peremyšl', for Danylo).[6] However, the hypothesis concerning late thirteenth-century chronicle writing in Lithuanian Rus', and the question of the relationship between certain GVC entries, the Polish annals (*roczniki*), and the Northeast Rus' chronicles, demand some preliminary attention.

[3] The best historical accounts of Vojšelk are found in studies of Lithuania during the second half of the thirteenth century. These include Henryk Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*, vol. 1: *Litwa i Moskwa w XIII i XIV wieku* (Warsaw, 1933); V. T. Pašuto, *Obrazovanie litovskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 382–87; and Zenonas Ivinskis, *Lietuvos istorija* (Rome, 1978), pp. 196–99. Also reliable is S. Sužiedėlis, "Vaišvilkas," *Encyclopedia Lituanica* (hereafter *EL*), 6 vols. (Boston, 1970–78), 6:29–30.

[4] *Polnoe sobranie russkix letopisej* (hereafter *PSRL*), 37 vols. to date (St. Petersburg, Leningrad, Moscow, 1841–), 2nd ed. (cited throughout, unless otherwise specified): 855–78; trans. G. A. Perfecky, *The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle* (Munich, 1973), pp. 80–91.

[5] Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj was the first to consider V-GVC a separate work: *Istorija ukrains'koji literatury*, 5 vols. (Kiev and Lviv, 1923–27; rpt., New York, 1959–60), 3:186–88.

[6] A. N. Hen'sors'kyj, *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys: Proces skladannja, redakcii i redaktory* (Kiev, 1958). Supporting and opposing views are presented in Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, vol. 3, pp. 180, 188; V. T. Pašuto, *Očerki po istorii Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi* (Moscow, 1950), p. 109; and A. N. Nasonov, *Istorija russkogo letopisanija* (Moscow, 1969), pp. 234–42, among others. Hens'ors'kyj sometimes uses the Ukrainian *zvid* as an equivalent for the popular if imprecise Russian term *svod* to designate redaction or compendium of chronicle materials.

The Galician-Volhynian Chronicle and Lithuania

The notion of a Volhynian appropriation of Lithuanian Rus' chronicle writing first appeared in Pašuto's 1950 study of Galicia-Volhynia and then, in greater detail, in his 1959 work on early Lithuania.[7] His arguments were based chiefly, but not exclusively, on factual content; Hen'sors'kyj accepted at least the Lithuanian Rus' origin of some of the information about Lithuania.[8] Erëmin and Ochmański challenged Pašuto on the stylistic consistency of the entire Volhynian section of the chronicle, but they did not refute him.[9]

An internal analysis of GVC does, in my view, yield evidence that some person recorded events in Lithuania and Lithuanian Rus' during the latter thirteenth century within the framework of Rus' chronicle traditions. The successive or joint reigns of six princes in Lithuania or Lithuanian Rus' are recounted in order: Mindovg (Mindaugas) after 1252 to 1263, with Roman Danylovyč in Navahrudak up to 1259; Trenjata (Treniota), in this case explicitly in Lithuania and Samogitia, 1263–1264; Vojšelk alone, 1264–?, and with his Rus' brother-in-law Švarno, ?–1268; Švarno alone, 1268–1270; and Trojden (Traidenis), 1270–1282[10] (see appendix 1–A). Švarno, who succeeded Danylo in Xolm before reigning with Vojšelk, is treated as the genuine prince of Lithuania and ruler in Navahrudak, the center of what was then Lithuanian Rus'.[11] The GVC also includes events pertaining solely to Lithuanian affairs or to Lithuanian relations with lands beyond Rus'. In the former case, the chronicler reveals familiarity with Lithuania's internal divisions and its main Rus' cities, and even displays a local patriotism.[12] Finally, the recapitulation of Lithuanian names (including on two occasions the more native form *Vojšvolk* for *Vojšelk*) reveals some acquaintance with the Lithuanian language.[13]

How are we to account for the transmission of all the Lithuanian information in GVC? The fact that different entries focus on each of six leading contemporary Galician-Volhynian princes precludes stipulating any previously identified redaction as having incorporated all the Lithuanian

[7] Pašuto, *Očerki*, pp. 113–21, and *Obrazovanie*, pp. 37–42.

[8] Hen'sors'kyj, *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, p. 4.

[9] I. Erëmin, "Volynskaja letopis' 1289–1290 gg. kak pamjatnik literatury," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoj literatury* (hereafter *TODRL*) 13 (1957): 102–117; J. Ochmański, "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 12 (1967): 155; Pašuto, *Obrazovanie*, p. 38.

[10] *PSRL* 2: 815–78 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 62–91); cf. Pašuto, *Očerki*, pp. 113–20, and *Obrazovanie*, pp. 37–42.

[11] *PSRL* 2: 864–69 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 84–86).

[12] Under A.M. 6786: *PSRL* 2: 876 (trans. Perfecky, p. 91, misprinted as 6788).

[13] *PSRL* 2: 863. In the Xlebnikov and Pogodin manuscripts the form was changed to *Vojšelk*.

accounts. The entries concerning Danylo's and Lev's Lithuanian policies appear to have been written by Volhynian (Xolm) chroniclers. Others, which recount the Lithuanian succession, internal events, and specific foreign policies, betray a local outlook.

The inclination of Volhynian annalists to borrow from foreign chroniclers is evident in the relationship between GVC and the *roczniki*. The direct influence of a hypothetical earlier Kievan chronicle on Polish works has already been noted.[14] There is also one clear and pertinent example of parallel texts where the primacy of the Polish version is likely: the reports of Mindovg's raids on Mazovia in 1262.[15] No other GVC and Polish chronicle entries have such a close verbal relationship; apparently, however, starting with the 1266 redaction (*izvod/svod*), successive reworkings of the Volhynian Chronicle incorporated Polish and Lithuanian Rus' material and information.[16]

The Volhynian Vojšelk Tale

The V-GVC is presented in the entries from 1263 to 1268, that is, inside a section covered first by the 1266 redaction and its continuation and then integrated and reworked in 1286 and 1289/1290.[17] The GVC contains three other Vojšelk entries for an earlier period—(?)1252–1259. These, too, concern Danylo, lack indications from the 1289 redaction, and constitute the earliest known Vojšelk *gesta*. The first two, noting his acts of war, peace-making, baptism, and attempted trip to Mount Athos, seem to be a source for the first part of V-GVC.[18] The third records Vojšelk's capture of Danylo's son Roman during a Tatar-Volhynian invasion of Lithuania's lands in Rus'.[19] Although Roman's subsequent fate is not mentioned, the third notice hardly prepares the reader for the impending and different treatment of Vojšelk in the V-GVC—as a pious Christian, an ally of Švarno and Vasyl'ko.

A relatively long text for a chronicle report, V-GVC is a unified literary work, albeit interrupted by other entries. It begins with the story of Mindovg's murder by his brother-in-law Dovmont (Daumantas) and

14 Franciszek Sielicki, "Kroniki staroruskie w dawnej Polsce," *Slavia Orientalis* 13 (1964): 134–38.

15 Compare *PSRL* 2: 855; *Monumenta Poloniae historicae / Pomniki dziejowe Polski* (hereafter *MPH*) (Lviv, 1864–91; rpt., Warsaw, 1960–61; n.s. Warsaw, 1946–), 2: 807; cf. *MPH* 3: 362; 8: 116–17.

16 See the entries for A.M. 6787, 6791, and 6794; *PSRL* 2: 880, 895, 897 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 91, 98, 99).

17 *PSRL* 2: 858–70 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 83–99).

18 *PSRL* 2: 819, 830–31 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 64, 69).

19 *PSRL* 2: 847 (trans. Perfecky, p. 77).

nephew Trenjata, and with a retrospective section relating Vojšelk's moral progress from bloodthirsty pagan to Orthodox monk. Related next are Trenjata's succession and the murder of his rival Tovtivil (Tautvilas) of Polock, followed by Trenjata's murder by Mindovg's former servitors. Then Vojšelk, who had fled to Pinsk, returns to Lithuania with forces from that city and Navahrudak, seizes power, and, with the aid of Švarno and of Vasyl'ko's troops, subdues enemy provinces. After a successful Lithuanian invasion of Polish Mazovia, Vojšelk turns full power over to Švarno and returns to the monastic life under his original mentor, Gregory of Polonyna. A short time later, with Vasyl'ko's assurances of safety, Vojšelk accepts an invitation to Volodymyr-Volyns'kyj to confer with Lev; there he is killed by Lev and buried in a monastery. Švarno continues to reign in Lithuania, but soon dies and is succeeded by the apparently unrelated pagan Trojden.

The tale is not without interest from a purely literary standpoint, for it contains elements of both folklore and hagiography (or homiletics). The entire structure of Vojšelk's life, with its adventures and endeavors, has a heroic quality. He makes five major journeys: an initial move from the princely throne of Navahrudak to the Polonyna Monastery, a second from Polonyna to Mount Athos and then back to Navahrudak, a third from Navahrudak through Pinsk to Lithuania, a fourth to the Monastery of St. Daniel at Uhroves'k, and finally one to Volodymyr-Volyns'kyj. Each of the first four journeys includes a major feat or deed: adopting Christianity and monasticism, founding a monastery upon his return to Navahrudak and so defying his angry father, exacting revenge and establishing order over rebellious Lithuania, and reassuming the habit. The last trip, to Volodymyr-Volyns'kyj, results in Vojšelk's death. The hagiographic elements include his quarrel with his pagan father, his discipleship to Gregory, and his return to the cloister prompted by a feeling of having "sinned greatly before God and man." Yet the chronicle does not treat him as an Orthodox prince-martyr, in spite of his violent death. After Švarno's passing, Lev was undisputedly the senior prince of Galicia-Volhynia, which precluded the rise of a cult honoring his victim.[20] The folkloric motifs in the tale are as striking as the Christian ones. Vojšelk begins his career as a daily practitioner of human sacrifice in Navahrudak (in Lithuanian *Vaišvilkas* means "hospitable wolf"). Dovmont murders Mindovg as an act of revenge: they were married to sisters, and when Mindovg's wife died and her sister came to mourn, Mindovg seized Dovmont's wife for himself. Trenjata does not simply assassinate Tovtivil; the two try to kill each other,

[20] Whether a local cult of Vojšelk arose near Navahrudak is an open question. On some possibilities, see below, pt. 3.

and Tovtivil dies because he is betrayed by his own men. Mindovg's former grooms kill Trenjata as he is leaving his bath. Then, out of jealousy towards Švarno, Lev kills Vojšelk, after they have been drinking together as common guests of "Markholt the German" in the company of a mediator and father figure, Vasyl'ko Romanovyč. These motifs have parallels in a variety of traditions, including Greek mythology and the *Pověst' vremennyx lět*.[21]

The story is also significant from the standpoint of political ideology. The text berates Mindovg as a pagan and as a murderous "autocrat." His assassination is manifestly understandable, but Vojšelk is just as clearly the legitimate ruler: "All the Lithuanians welcomed their crown prince (*gospodičič*)." Yet, Vojšelk the monk does not wish to rule forever, so he installs Švarno as coruler and successor. Significantly, Vojšelk recognizes his uncle Vasyl'ko as overlord from the start; Vasyl'ko remains Vojšelk's "father" after the return to the monastery. Švarno's succession, with the chronicler's condemnation of Trojden's paganism and praise of his four brothers' Christianity (independently of their wars against Vasyl'ko),[22] imply that Lithuania should be Christian and that Rus' suzerainty or direct rule there is proper. All the same, this tale, along with the other Lithuanian entries, reveals a grudging respect for the legitimacy of the native Lithuanian princes, even as pagans, and for Lithuanian rule over the lands of Rus'. The V-GVC thus paves the way conceptually for the peculiar Lithuanian-Rus' symbiosis of the three subsequent centuries.[23]

The GVC Vojšelk Information and Other Chronicle Traditions

Hruševs'kyj believed that the V-GVC was a separate composition, written under Švarno before he died.[24] Its general accuracy, in light of the analogous information contained in the unrelated Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, supports the hypothesis that V-GVC was composed soon after Vojšelk's

[21] Note, for example, the Agamemnon cycle. A parallel murder in the bathhouse is found in "Nesčastnyj Danila," *Ivan-Bogatyr': Ukrainskie volšebnye skazki*, ed. N. Zabila (Kiev, 1960), pp. 57–65. Ja. S. Lur'e, without referring to these entries, stated that the GVC as a whole contains more epic-folkloric motifs than other Old Rus' chronicles: "K izučeniju letopis'nogo žanra," *TODRL* 27 (1972): 87.
[22] *PSRL* 2: 869, 871 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 86, 87).
[23] Incidentally, M. V. Malevskaja claims that architectural techniques also migrated from Navahrudak to central Lithuania in the latter half of the thirteenth century: "Arxitekturnyj kompleks Novogrudskogo detinca XII–XIV vv.," *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i slavjane*, ed. L. D. Pobol' et al. (Minsk, 1983), pp. 122–25.
[24] Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, vol. 3, pp. 188–89.

murder.[25] On the other hand, the existence of differing reports in the Polish and East Rus' chronicles raises the question whether the surviving version is the original GVC entry for the events of 1263–1267/1268.

The early surviving *roczniki* can aid us in determining which information for 1263–1267 is likely to have been found in the 1266 redaction and its continuation, and to have formed the basis of the earliest reports of neighboring chronicles, both Polish and Rus'.[26] One claims that "Trenjata and the Lithuanians" killed Mindovg and that Vojšelk and Tovtivil ("Theophilus") killed Trenjata.[27] Another, which is closer to the V-GVC, states that Trenjata hatched a conspiracy, killing Mindovg and two of his sons, and that Vojšelk left a Rus' monastery to avenge his father and kill "Trenjata and other princes."[28] A third simply records that Lev killed Vojšelk.[29]

The fifteenth-century Polish annalist Jan Długosz appears to have combined the extant *roczniki* notices concerning the murders of Mindovg, Trenjata, and Vojšelk with a characterization of Mindovg's tyranny. The latter was possibly derived from the GVC or one of the earlier Volhynian redactions. Długosz also advanced a seemingly rational motive for Vojšelk's murder—he was attempting to sieze Rus' lands.[30] Did Długosz find this motive, contradicting the V-GVC, in a Volhynian redaction, or did he use his imagination, as he most certainly had in assigning Mindovg a specific role in the 1262 campaign against Mazovia?[31] Whatever the case here, the GVC (?)1252–1259 and *roczniki* entries on Vojšelk provide evidence that the continuation of the 1266 redaction contained passages that were themselves sources for V-GVC and may have been written before Lev succeeded Švarno in Xolm in 1270.[32] The East Rus' chronicles help confirm

[25] *The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle*, ed. and trans. J. C. Smith and W. L. Urban (Bloomington, 1977), pp. 88–89.

[26] See Gerard Labunda, "Główne linie rozwoju rocznikarstwa Polskiego w wiekach średnich," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 78, no. 4 (1971): 804–837.

[27] *Rocznik kapitulny krakowski, MPH* 2: 807–808; cf. *Katalog biskupów krakowskich* 5, *MPH* 3: 362–63.

[28] *Rocznik Krasińskich, MPH* 3: 132.

[29] *Rocznik traski, MPH* 2: 840.

[30] Jan Długosz, *Historiae Poloniae libri XII: Annali seu cronicae incliti regni Poloniae*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1711), 1: 773–76. Also *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Przezdziecki (Cracow, 1863–87), 9: 387–88, 392, 404–405. Polish translation: *Roczniki cyli kroniki, sławnego Królestwa Polskiego* (Warsaw, 1961–74), 7/8: 176, 182, 199); cf. *PSRL* 2: 858 (trans. Perfecky, p. 82).

[31] Cf. Długosz and the *rocznik* tradition: *MPH* 2: 588–808; 3: 75, 206, 308, 363; 8: 117–18; Długosz, *Roczniki*, 7/8: 171–72. Hen'sors'kyj believes that Długosz obtained all of his information from the 1285/1286 redaction: *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, pp. 58–62. See below, fn. 49.

[32] See below, pt. 2. The V-N1C, however, only mentions Mindovg, his kinsmen-assassins, his covictim Tovtivil, and the avenger Vojšelk: A. N. Nasonov, ed., *Novgorodskaja pervaja letopis'* (hereafter *NPL*) (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), p. 84.

this thesis. All East Rus' versions stem in part from the Novgorod 1 Chronicle (N1C), whose Vojšelk Tale (V-N1C) is clearly dependent on V-GVC. The fifteenth-century Rogožsk Chronicle (RC), however, is also peculiarly related to a Pskov reworking of Novgorodian traditions. RC names Trenjata, who is not mentioned in any other East Rus' chronicle, and states a fact otherwise found only in the *roczniki*: that he was killed by Vojšelk. Whatever the textual convoy of the RC's "Trenjata," the evidence from the *roczniki* and RC is that at least one early West Rus' account of these events different from the V-GVC was circulated.[33]

The known historical situation explains the role of Dovmont in the surviving V-GVC: Dovmont fled to Lithuania, served as prince of Pskov from 1265 until his death in 1299, and was an agent of East Rus' designs on Polock and Lithuania.[34] The V-GVC's hostility to Dovmont could easily have derived from Lithuanian or Lithuanian Rus' enmity toward him as an actual rival. The distinct treatments of Tovtivil in the *roczniki* (and by Długosz) probably reflect an entry in the 1266 redaction or its continuation. This would have associated Tovtivil with Vojšelk because of their past connections and similar, if separate, attempts to rely on Rus' forces to oust Trenjata and take over Lithuania.[35] Under what circumstances, then, did V-GVC arise?

The Volhynian Vojšelk and the GVC Redactions

An internal analysis of the V-GVC indicates a reworking of entries in the 1289 redaction that focus on Švarno and might well be the work of his chronicler.[36] Švarno is very much at the center of the recounting of Vojšelk's rule in Lithuania and most of his subsequent fate, while Vasyl'ko is sometimes added as an afterthought. Vojšelk's respect for Vasyl'ko following the return to monasticism is somewhat suspect. St. Daniel's Monastery in Uhroves'k is close to Švarno's Xolm, not to Vasyl'ko's Volodymyr-Volyns'kyj, but the V-GVC has Vojšelk say: "Close by are my

33 Cf. *PSRL* 15: 33; A. N. Nasonov, ed., *Pskovskie letopisi* (hereafter *PL*), 2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1941–55), 1: 13; cf. also the schema noting the dilemma concerning RC in V. I. Oxotnikova, *Povest' o Dovmonte* (Leningrad, 1985), p. 100.

34 The earliest Dovmont sources are *NPL*, pp. 85–86, 90; *PL* 2: 16–18, 21–22. His chief rival and target of attack from Pskov in 1266 was Jerden (Gerdienis/Erdanas) in Eastern Lithuania, who controlled Polock and Vitebsk in December 1264 but not during 1265: Friedrich George von Bunge, *Liv-, Est und Curländisches Urkundbuch nebst Regesten*, 6 vols. (Reval and Riga, 1853–71), 6: nos. 336–37. Later Lithuanian-Belorussian traditions claimed that Dovmont subdued Polock from Pskov and then attacked a Vojšelk-like figure: see below, pt. 3. A genuine mystery is the "Dovmont" recorded in the Laurentian Chronicle as having been killed while leading a Lithuanian army against Toržok and Tver in 1285: *PSRL* 1: 483.

35 *PSRL* 2: 847, 860–61 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 77, 83).

36 Cf. Pašuto, *Očerki*, pp. 116–17; Hen'sors'kyj, *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, pp. 39–40.

son (*sn''*) Švarno and my other lord (*gsn''*) and father, prince Vasyl'ko (*Vasilko*).''[37] Švarno is also the chief figure in the war of 1265 with Poland.[38] The account enumerates his losses and condemns his conduct, while praising Vasyl'ko and his son Volodimer. Nevertheless, the tale has Vojšelk immediately relinquish the throne to Švarno and say to him: ''This land has been secured (*opasena*) for you.'' Vasyl'ko's name is also appended to Danylo's in the V-GVC's retrospective entry under 1263 about Vojšelk's peace-making in Xolm, whereas in the earlier flashback report of this event, under 1253/1255, no mention is made of Vasyl'ko.[39]

What about the two stories in the V-GVC that highlight Lev together with Vojšelk? The first, in contrast to the earlier narrative, states that Vojšelk made peace with Danylo in Halyč (not Xolm), and then served as godfather to Lev's son Jurij.[40] The second concerns Vojšelk's fear of Lev, need for Vasyl'ko's surety, evening of revelry, and murder. A rational Lev certainly would not have wanted the second set of events recorded as they stand. He could only have been helped by the first, if it had been coupled with a more explicit rendition of Vojšelk's betrayal of Danylo and his seizure of Roman than is found earlier, under 1259. The author of the 1289 redaction probably distorted Lev's motives for killing Vojšelk, but this is hardly evidence for the thesis that Lev's chroniclers—presumably those who continued and edited the 1266 redaction for the period from 1270 to 1286—composed an earlier story about his Lithuanian victim that is anything like the V-GVC.[41]

The contents of the surviving tale thus do not indicate that Lev's chronicler(s) edited any of the Vojšelk notices connected with Švarno. On the other hand, Archimandrite Gregory of Polonyna is mentioned most favorably in the accounts of Vojšelk's tonsure (1253/1255) and his return to monasticism (1268). This would indicate that Gregory or an ally of his played a role in unifying the chronicle material relating to Vojšelk.[42] The author appears to have put together information about both Vojšelk and the rise of Christian and Rus' influence in Lithuania, and yet to have stood outside princely rivalries. A writer close to Gregory and representing the Rus'

[37] *PSRL* 2:867. Could an original *gsn''* for Švarno explain why Vasyl'ko is *drugii gsn'' moi*? Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija*, vol. 3, p. 187, transmits the original logically as follows: ''ot tut kolo mene syn mij Švarno, a druhyj—hospodyn mij otec' knjaz' Vasylko.''

[38] *PSRL* 2:864–67 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 84–86); cf. *MPH* 2:592, 80, 75, 206. The *roczniki*'s 1266 is sounder than the GVC's A.M. 6776/A.D. 1268.

[39] *PSRL* 2:830–31 (trans. Perfecky, p. 69).

[40] *PSRL* 2:859 (trans. Perfecky, p. 82).

[41] Hen'sors'kyj, *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, pp. 60–61. The earlier entries could be from the 1266 or the 1286 redaction.

[42] Cf. Hen'sors'kyj, *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, pp. 63–66.

church in Lithuanian territory and its connections with Xolm and/or Volodymyr (but not explicitly partial to either Volhynian diocese) is the most likely author or editor of the version of the Vojšelk tale that survives in the GVC.

Hruševs'kyj's hypothesis concerning Švarno's connection to the V-GVC, on the other hand, is probably correct. Gregory's presence in Uhroves'k near Švarno's Xolm lends credence to it. Also, the Gregory-oriented redaction of previous Vojšelk material may have been produced parallel to, if not as part of, the 1289 redaction.[43] This work could have been done under the direct influence of Vasyl'ko's son Volodimer or daughter-in-law Ol'ha Romanivna of Brjansk. They were both copyists, if not writers;[44] their marriage is one of the events that interrupts the flow of V-GVC;[45] and similar sobriquets are used for Vasyl'ko and Gregory.[46] The mention of Vojšelk's baptism of Jurij L'vovyč, then, should be seen as a prelude not to Vojšelk's betrayal of Danylo and abduction of Roman to justify Lev's urge for vengeance, but rather to Lev's diabolically inspired murder of his Lithuanian *compater*.[47] Moreover, not Lev, but rather Vasyl'ko and his son Volodimer were constant rivals of Trojden, Švarno's successor in Lithuania,[48] and thus had a greater interest in promoting Volhynian control over Lithuania's Rus' lands.[49]

II. THE NOVGORODIAN PROTOTYPE OF THE EAST RUS' VOJŠELK

The V-N1C is the basic East Rus' revision of V-GVC. Originating in the context of the struggles of Novgorod and Pskov against Eastern Lithuania and Livonia, and sandwiched between the accounts of real events in

[43] Cf. Pašuto, *Očerki*, p. 114.

[44] Ja. D. Isajevyč (Isaevič), "Iz istorii kul'turnyx svjazej Galicko-Volynskoj Rusi s zapadnymi slavjanami v XII-XIV vv.," in *Pol'ša i Rus'*, ed. B. A. Rybakov (Moscow, 1974), pp. 265–66.

[45] *PSRL* 2: 861–62 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 83–84).

[46] "...jakože ne bys(t) pered nim/po vsej zemli, i ni po nem ne budet": *PSRL* 2: 859, 913.

[47] Pašuto and Hen'sors'kyj presume that Vojšelk killed Roman Danylovyč, who disappears from the GVC after the abduction: *Očerki*, pp. 113–14; *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, pp. 60–61.

[48] Note the entries for A.M. 6770, 6772, 6782, 6784, and 6790: *PSRL* 2: 855–56, 862–63, 871, 874–76, 888–89 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 80–81, 85, 87, 89, 96). Perfecky's reading of the entry for A.M. 6784 is misleading. The original states that after consulting with Lev, Volodimer alone sent troops to oppose Trojden's settling of Prussian refugees in Hrodna and Slonim.

[49] Hen'sors'kyj also sees the hand of Gregory in the GVC Vojšelk tradition, but, due to the presence of Jurij L'vovyč and the archimandrite in the same entry, considers the integration to have taken place in the 1285/1286 redaction: *Halyc'ko-Volyns'kyj litopys*, pp. 63–64.

Novgorod's relations with Lithuania,[50] V-N1C is part of a Novgorodian and Pskovian cycle that also includes the chronicle tales and the lives of Aleksandr Nevskij and Dovmont.[51] Obviously, the V-N1C has not received the same scholarly attention as the other two lives have.

The V-N1C omits the folkloric elements, Vojšelk's fate after he subdued Lithuania, and his ties to the Volhynian princes.[52] Otherwise this version follows the heroic-hagiographic structure of the V-GVC and further emphasizes the religious didactic, fantastic, and crusading elements. Vojšelk is now "chosen" by God as "His champion" who "recognizes the true faith" and journeys all the way to Mount Sinai—the site of the first dispensation.[53] He is baptized there and receives the New Law and then goes to Mount Athos for tonsure. He finally returns to the Christian parts of Lithuania, where he founds his monastery and quarrels with his father. The V-N1C specifies that Vojšelk retained the monastic rule during his punitive attack on Lithuania and vowed to return to the monastery after three years. Throughout this venture he is "armed with the power of the cross, ... glorifying the Holy Trinity, ... avenging Christian blood." Brief, tight, and consistent, the V-N1C forms a "verbal icon."

The local origin of N1C's 1261–1266 entries about Lithuania is incontestable, but the date of the V-N1C's composition is problematic. The *terminus ante quem* for the protograph of the oldest N1C manuscript is 1333.[54]

[50] *NPL*, pp. 83–85.

[51] On the role of these lives in the development of the Pskov Chronicles, see the conflicting views of H.-J. Grabmüller, *Die Pskover Chroniken Untersuchungen zur russischen Regionalchronistik* (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 102–123; and Oxotnikova, *Povest' o Dovmonte*, esp. p. 70. The Life of Aleksandr did not enter N1C until the mid-fifteenth century: V. L. Janin, "Cerkov' Borisa i Gleba v Novgorodskom detince: O novgorodskom istočnike 'Žitija Aleksandra Nevskogo,'" in *Kul'tura srednevekovoj Rusi*, ed. A. N. Kipričnikov and P. A. Rappoport (Leningrad, 1974), p. 92.

[52] The V-N1C's interest in the "good" Tovtivil, on the other hand, was natural: in 1262, as the (Christian) prince of Polock, he joined the Northeast Rus' forces in an attack on the Jur'ev: *NPL*, pp. 82–83.

[53] The inclusion of Sinai here may not be accidental. A *bylina* based on a twelfth-century Novgorod pilgrimmage to the Holy Land mentions Sinai, and the archbishop Vasilij Kalika (1329–52), under whom the earliest known recension of N1C was written, propounded the Sinai-influenced Hesychastic doctrine concerning Paradise: "Sorok kalik so kalikoju," in *Byliny*, ed. V. I. Cicerov (Moscow, 1957), pp. 375–83, 497–98; A. A. Šaxmatov, "Account of the Text," in *The Chronicle of Novgorod*, trans. R. Michael and N. Forbes (London, 1914; rpt., Hattiesburg, 1970), p. xxxviii; A. I. Klibanov, *Reformacionnye dviženija v Rossii v XIV–pervoj polovine XVI v.v.* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 138–45. I am indebted to Professor Ihor Ševčenko for pointing out a possible significance of this surprisingly early reference to Sinai along with Athos.

[54] *NPL*, pp. 5–6, 99–100. Šaxmatov does not note any distinctly Novgorodian redaction between 1167 and 1333; *Razyskanija o drevnejšix russkix letopisnyx svodax* (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 379–80.

The close textual connection between the V-N1C and the Dovmont Cycle offers some more useful clues.[55] It appears that the Novgorod chroniclers edited an account of Dovmont's wars of 1265–1266 together with the V-GVC and that these two related texts then served as sources for the Dovmont *Vita* (DV) in the original Pskov Chronicle (PC).[56] This work could have commenced as early as the late thirteenth century, when Dovmont was still alive, but more likely occurred in the early fourteenth century. Curiously, the initiation of local Pskov chronicle writing coincided roughly with the "all-Rus'" endeavors of the metropolitan Peter (a Volhynian, he served from 1308 to 1326), which influenced the N1C redaction of 1333.[57] Peter or one of his entourage may even have been the transmitter of V-GVC to Novgorod as well as of the source for the RC's "Trenjata." Accordingly, V-N1C ought to be dated to the middle years of the 1289–1332 period.

This version expresses one chief theme of the Lithuanian entries in the more open-minded GVC, namely, that the only good Lithuanian is a Christian. In the case of Novgorod, given the experiences there with the Livonian Knights, the only real Christian is Orthodox. The essential function of V-N1C was to bolster local ambitions toward Lithuania, just as the original V-GVC furthered Volhynian claims. In this connection the Dovmont sequel to V-N1C was suitable, since Dovmont served Pskov in the same way as Vojšelk and Švarno served Volhynia and Lithuania's Rus' lands.

The V-N1C remained the basic East Rus' Vojšelk legend for over four centuries. The presumably Novgorodian author had no reason not to lionize him and good reason to do so, since Novgorod and Pskov needed Orthodox Lithuanians to fight for Rus' against Lithuania in the latter thirteenth century. It was only necessary to remove him from his specific West Rus' environment and allegiances and transform him into a politically unattached Orthodox hero, struggling for the true faith. Such a Vojšelk would have been an ideal candidate for inclusion among the saintly, if not beatified, princes of Rus'. The East Rus' "all-Rus'" chronicles, which flourished after the mid-fifteenth century, and their sixteenth-century derivatives, quite

55 Grabmüller and Oxotnikova miss this connection.

56 This is found or reflected in the Pskov 2 or 3 Chronicle: cf. *NPL*, pp. 84–85; *PL* 1: 13, 2: 16, 82–83.

57 For questions about the first real DV and the development of the Pskov cycle, note the opposing theories of Grabmüller, *Pskover Chroniken*, pp. 114–68, and Oxotnikova, *Povest' o Dovmonte*, pp. 1–70. For Peter and the relationship between his "all-Rus'" chronicle writing and N1C, see Šaxmatov, *Razyskanija*, pp. 245, 380, and his "Account," p. xxxviii.

naturally appropriated Vojšelk and Dovmont together.[58] They found the "verbal icon" of the V-N1C suitable for several purposes, as we shall see.

III. RYMONT–LAVRYŠ–VASILIJ: THE TRANSFORMED WEST RUS' VOJŠELK

The Lavryš Tale (V-Lav) occurs at a crucial turning point in the initial, mythological section (L-myth) of the Lithuanian-Belorussian 2 Chronicle (LB2), at the end of Lithuania's second legendary dynasty, i.e., the line of Viten (Vytenis), and at the beginning of the reigning one, i.e., the line of Gedimin (Gediminas).[59] Justifying the accession of the Gediminids, this story is a fundamental statement of Lithuanian political-historical mythology. The genesis of V-Lav is difficult to determine due to scant evidence about the origin of LB2. The dating of LB2 and the origin of the separate parts of L-myth, among them V-Lav, remain moot issues.[60]

The Genesis of the Lithuanian-Belorussian 2 Chronicle

Lithuanian chronicle writing commenced in the 1380s with an account of Gedimin's sons. By about 1432, it had created a record of the period 1341–1431 that glorified Olgierd (Algierdas) and Vitovt (Vytautas). This was appended to a Smolensk (Belorussian) "all-Rus'" redaction of 1446 to produce what has been termed the Lithuanian-Belorussian 1 Chronicle

[58] The inclusion of the V-N1C was part of a process whereby tales of Batu's invasion; of the martyr-princes Mixail Jaroslavič and Mixail Aleksandrovič of Tver; of the cycle of Dmitrij Donskoj, the Battle of Kulikovo, and Toxtamyš's revenge; and of Dovmont (from a Pskov chronicle) were inserted among the more normal, laconic entries: Lur'e, *Obščerusskie letopisi,* pp. 67, 77–78, 116–21. Lur'e does not refer to the Vojšelk entries, which actually confirm his conclusions. Cf. Oxotnikova's chart, *Povest' o Dovmonte,* p. 100.

[59] The five known versions are found in *PSRL* 35:94, 150–51, 178, 198–99, 219–20; a sixth is indicated by the variant Patriarchal Codex readings for the Archaeological recension, *PSRL* 17:253–56.

[60] Earlier studies include I. Tixomirov, "O sostave zapadnorusskix tak nazyvaemyx litovskix letopisej," *Žurnal Ministerstva narodnago prosveščenija* (hereafter *ŽMNP*), 1901: March, pp. 8–36, and May, pp. 79–119; also J. Jakubowski, "Studia nad stosunkami narodowościowymi na Litwie przed Unią Lubelską," *Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego,* 1912, no. 7, pp. 1–98; and F. P. Sušyc'kyj, "Zaxidn'o-rus'ki litopysy jak pam''jatky literatury," pt. 1, *Zbirnyk ist.-filol. viddilu Ukrajins'koji akademiji nauk,* vol. 2 (Kiev, 1921; Russian trans., Kiev, 1927). Among later ones are Ochmański, "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," pp. 155–62; B. N. Florja, "O 'Letopisce Byxovca,'" in *Istočniki i istoriografija slavjanskogo srednevekov'ja,* ed. S. A. Nikitin (Moscow, 1967), pp. 135–44; M. A. Jučas, *Lietuvos metraščiai* (Vilnius, 1968); idem, "Xronika Byxovca," in *Letopisi i xroniki,* ed. B. A. Rybakov (Moscow, 1974), pp. 221–24; V. A. Čamjarycki, *Belaruskija letapisy jak pomniki literatury* (Minsk, 1969); N. N. Ulaščik, "Belorussko-litovskoe letopisanie," *Voprosy istorii,* 1984, no. 12, pp. 63–72; idem, *Vvedenie v izučenie belorusskogo-litovskogo letopisanija* (Moscow, 1985), pp. 1–172.

(LB1).[61] The various recensions of LB1 and its constituent parts go no further than 1446, which is thus the *terminus post quem* for the original.[62] Genuine Lithuanian-Belorussian chronicle writing does not seem to have been done from the latter 1440s to the end of the century.[63]

The first true "Lithuanian Chronicle" is LB2, which extends into the early sixteenth century. Eight recensions survive, all of them roughly identical for the period up to 1446 (not all continue that far).[64] The creative core of the LB2 is thus the L-myth, which runs to the death of Gedimin (1341), as well as the revision of the post-1341 LB1 material.

The sole "early recension" of LB2 (textually closest to LB1) breaks off before 1446 and gives no post-1446 clues about its composition.[65] Two of the five closely related "intermediary" recensions recount events with traditional Rus' dating from A.M. 7000 to 7022–7023 (A.D. 1514–1515), and conclude with another set, which uses a Western chronology from the fourteenth century down to 1567.[66] Accordingly, an original LB2 may have been composed soon after 1515. Another Polish-language "intermediary" recension is found in a manuscript containing Polish versions of the Lithuanian Privilege of 1447 (1457), the Lithuanian Statute of 1529, and an encomium of that year to King Sigismund I by Albrecht Gaštol'd (Gostautus), the chancellor of Lithuania (1522–1539) whose ancestors figure prominently in LB2.[67] Most likely, then, an original official "intermediary" version of LB2 was part of a package of historical and legal works representing the Lithuanian "establishment" at the end of the 1520s or the

61 See Čamjarycki, *Belaruskija letapisy*, pp. 11–118; Lur'e, *Obščerusskie letopisi*, pp. 38–42

62 Examples are the Suprasl', Nikiforov, and Academy recensions: *PSRL* 35:19–67, 103–114.

63 For internal evidence of this gap between the "late" recensions of LB1 and LB2, see *PSRL* 35:79, 122–25, 166–67, 192, 212–13, 233–34.

64 *PSRL* 35:90–102, 128–66, 173–91, 193–211, 214–33; *PSRL* 17:152–90, 247–93 (variant readings for "Patr.").

65 This recension, called the Krasiński, may well have been a first working draft of LB2, but is found in a late sixteenth-century manuscript: A. Brückner, "Die Visio Tundali in böhmischer und russischer Uebersetzung," *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 13, no. 1 (1891):201; Ochmański, "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," p. 160; *PSRL* 35:10–11, 128–44: Cf. Čamjarycki, *Belaruskija letapisy*, pp. 136–37.

66 The Rumjancev and Patriarchal-1 recensions: *PSRL* 35:212–13; *PSRL* 17:185–90. The *PSRL* reproduces as footnoted variants two incomplete "intermediary" versions of LB2, which were taken from the same Patriarchal manuscript, the late seventeenth-century *Sinod.* no. 790, which the editors of *PSRL* omitted: *PSRL* 17: v-vii, 152–90, 247–93.

67 The Olszewski recension: *PSRL* 35:12, 173–92.

early 1530s.[68] The convergence of influence for the prominent families mentioned in LB2 points to the years 1510/1522–1527,[69] a period consistent with the other data presented here.[70]

The Lithuanian Historical Myths and the Lavryš Tale

The structure of L-myth is rather simple. It begins with the flight of Palemon (Palemonas) and other Roman nobles from Nero's tyranny—they journey to the mouth of the Nieman—and then gives a narrative, consistent in style, about the fictional and historical princes of the Lithuanian lands and their expanding territory in Rus' down through the reign of Gedimin.[71] Besides V-Lav, several legends about place-names, clans, pagan practices, and cities are inserted into the account, sometimes with a characteristic connective clause, such as *vozvratimsja vospak* ("let us resume"),[72] evidence of a layered compilation.

A key source for names and events in this fanciful account, which reflects the actual significance of thirteenth-century Navahrudak, is GVC.[73] The V-Lav is more dependent on GVC than is any other part of L-myth, and thus should have formed part of the original, in spite of the fact that the surviving "early" recension of LB2 does not contain this particular legend.[74]

The V-Lav has four sections. They relate: (1) the succession of the (fictional) Narymont (Norimantas) and his four brothers, followed by his quarrel with the second, Dovmont; (2) the career of the youngest, Trojden,

[68] The "Chronyczka" that follows the Olszewski LB2 text and ends in 1446 appears to have been added around 1535, rather than when the initial "intermediary" version was written: *PSRL* 35: 192–93.

[69] Ochmański made note of the career of the last Monivid (Manivydis), who was *voevoda* of Eišiški (Eisiskes) during 1510–27, and Albrecht Gaštol'd, chancellor during 1522–39: "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," p. 159. According to L-myth, however, Eišiški was associated with the Dovoinovič clan, not the Monivids: *PSRL* 35: 129. Earlier Jakubowski pointed to a Gaštol'd and a Gedroickij who studied in Cracow in the late fifteenth century: "Studia," pp. 31–32.

[70] There are two other surviving recensions of LB2. The "late" Račinskij and "combined" Evreinov recensions add material for the early fifteenth century, some of which is also found in LB1: *PSRL* 35: 162, 230. The Evreinov recension integrates material from the "early" and "late" recensions and is not simply "early" (or "first"), as Ochmański claims: "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," pp. 155–56.

[71] *PSRL* 35: 90–97, 128–32, 145–53, 173–81, 193–201, 214–22; *PSRL* 17: 247–53.

[72] *PSRL* 35: 91, 129, 130, 131, 174, 175, 176, 195, 197; *PSRL* 26: 250.

[73] See Jučas, *Lietuvos metraščiai*, p. 58.

[74] In the "early" recension, L-myth simply breaks off after the beginning of Trojden's reign in the middle of page 72 obverse, without reaching the succession of Gedimin, and is followed on page 73 with the section for 1341–1446 (incomplete): *PSRL* 35: 132. Ochmański believes that this recension lacked V-Lav, which he sees as a special work with a supplementary justification of the Gediminid/Jagellonian dynasty, but he does not discuss V-Lav per se: "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," pp. 155–56, 160.

and the early life of his (fictional) son Rymont (Rimantas), who becomes the Orthodox monk Lavryš-Vasilij;[75] (3) the murder of Trojden by Dovmont, followed by the revenge of Lavryš; (4) the succession of Viten. The four sections are analogous to the GVC's stories about: (a) Mindovg's quarrel with Dovmont; (b) Vojšelk's career up to the time of the founding of his monastery; (c) the murder of Mindovg followed by Vojšelk's revenge; and (d) Vojšelk's renunciation of his princely rights to Švarno. Dovmont's quarrel with Narymont and the assassination of Trojden reproduce the folkloric aspects of Mindovg's seizure of his sister-in-law and the bathhouse murder. Rymont-Lavryš's sojourn with the fictional "Lev Mstislavič" and the founding of the Lavryšev Monastery on the Nieman near Navahrudak follows Vojšelk's early period, but without his pagan butchery.[76] Aristocratic genealogy, heavily dependent upon GVC, is prominent in V-Lav. Roman's third and fourth sons, Gedrus and Gol'ša, are explicitly described as sires of the historical Gedroickij (Giedraitis) and Golšanskij (Galšan) princes (the latter had a semi-Orthodox heritage), who belonged to the two most prominent, purely Lithuanian princely clans of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.[77] The rather prolific Svirskij (Svirskis) princes claimed descent from Dovmont[78] (whom, incidentally, V-Lav represents as having been "good, noble, and intelligent," and thus worthy to be chosen "Grand Prince of Pskov," in spite of his treachery toward Narymont). Roman, clearly a resurrection of Lev and Švarno's lost brother, is here a descendent of Palemon's companion Dovsprunk (Dausprungas), whose very name is taken from that of Mindovg's "brother" in GVC.[79] These family legends, moreover, parallel the myths of the aristocratic Roman origins of the patriarchs Gaštol'd, Dovoin (Davainis), and Monivid.[80] In fact, almost all of

75 Lavryš is said to be his Lithuanian name, and "Vasilij" (from Vojšelk?) his Rus'ian name.

76 Jakubowski supposed that the authors wrote about real people, but used tales from GVC as literary sources: "Studia," pp. 51–52.

77 See *PSRL* 35: 132; W. W. Kojałowicz (Kajalovicius), *Herbarz rycerstwa W. X. litewskiego (1658)*, ed. Franciszek Piekosiński (Cracow, 1897), pp. 7–8, 23; J. Wolff, *Kniaziowie litewsko-ruscy od końca XIV wieku* (Warsaw, 1895), pp. 65–76, 94–115, 505–518; Oswald Backus, *Motives of West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscow, 1377–1514* (Lawrence, 1952), pp. 137–140, 145, 153–54.

78 Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, pp. 505–518.

79 *PSRL* 2: 847 (trans. Perfecky, p. 77); 35: 145. This could be another incarnation of the historical Vojšelk, whose monastic name, according to an unattributed source, was Roman: N. Elagin, "Pervye xristianskie mučeniki v Litve," *ŽMNP* 38, pt. 2 (1843): 113. Vojšelk was, after all, the historical Trojden's immediate Lithuanian predecessor. The historical Roman disappeared from the scene after his capture by Vojšelk; he may have died a violent death in Lithuanian Rus'.

80 For the non-princely Gaštol'd, Dovoinovič, and Monivid (Manvydas) clans, see Backus, *Motives*, pp. 137, 138, 145.

the other Lithuanian families, which J. Wolff considered to be "pseudo-princes," pretended descent from Gedrus or Dovmont[81] (see appendix 1–B).

The historical Lavryšev Monastery, which was most probably the restored cloister of Vojšelk,[82] also has a special role. Some traditions having a quasi-hagiographic foundation are presented in the account of Rymont's progress from pagan to Christian to renunciatory monk, his petition to Narymont for a place to build a monastery, and his first act there, that is, building the Church of the Holy Resurrection. Once the original founder, Vojšelk, was killed following a rather non-ascetic drinking bout and was buried in Volodymyr, a revised legend, giving him a new name and (presumably) interring him on the spot, made perfect sense for the cloister.

The V-Lav is thus an integral part of the completed L-myth, but with a particular connection to the Lavryšev Monastery and Orthodoxy in Lithuania, as well as to the Gediminid-Jagellonian, Gol'šanskij, Gedroickij, and many other purely Lithuanian family legends. The overall structure of the recorded life of Lavryš constitutes another "verbal icon," somewhat similar to the V-N1C. In addition, the story of Lavryš's campaign reveals a familiarity with Pskov traditions concerning Dovmont's attempts to take over Polock and Eastern Lithuania. An East Rus' chronicle connection to V-Lav is thus also a possibility.

[81] Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, p. 665.

[82] To my knowledge, archaeology in the Navahrudak/Nieman region has not turned up any other late thirteenth-century sites that could have been Vojšelk's monastery: D. Gurevič, *Drevnosti belorusskoj Ponemanii* (Minsk, 1962), p. 199; S. A. Tarakanova, "Arxeologičeskaja razvedka po Nemanu," *Kratkie soobščenija Instituta istorii material'noj kul'tury* 57 (1954): 105. The Lavryšev Monastery first appears, in a source from 1386, as supported by the Orthodox Gediminovyči, and around 1524 was sufficiently important for its archimandrite to be appointed head of the Trinity Monastery in Vilnius: Amvrosij, *Istorijā Rossijskoj ierarxii*, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1807–1815), 5: 1; P. M. Stroev, *Spiski ierarxov i nastojatelej monastyrej Rossijskoj cerkvi* (St. Petersburg, 1877), p. 545; (Metropolitan) Makarij, *Istorija russkoj cerkvi*, 13 vols. in 12 (St. Petersburg, 1857–83; 2nd and 3rd eds., 1883–1903), 5: 171; *Akty otnosjajščiesja k istorii Zapadnoj Rossii*, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1846–53), 2: no. 125. As early as 1709, after the cloister had been Uniate-Basilian for ninety-two years, its fathers considered both Vojšelk and Lavryš to have been the monastery's founders: *Arxeografičeskij sbornik dokumentov otnosjajščixsja k istorii Severno-Zapadnoj Rusi*, 14 vols. (Vilnius, 1867–1905), 12: 162–63. It was suppressed around 1837. Recently the village Lauryšava, a kilometer or so west of where the Vaouka rivulet flows into the Nieman and about 25 km. northeast of Navahrudak, was the site of the collective farm Zorka, a library, a hall of culture, and a monument to 187 partisans slain in World War II: *Belaruskaja saveckaja encyklapedyja*, 11 vols. (Minsk, 1968–75), 7: 352.

Political Tendencies and Authorship

The political ideas of V-Lav represent a development and deviation from V-GVC. Some popular participation along with hereditary succession is assumed by the original, in the way that Vojšelk acquires power with the approval of "all the Lithuanians," but his right to hand power over to his brother-in-law is assumed, too.[83] V-Lav shows a similar interplay of political forces, but the concept of an elective principle within a narrow dynastic group is more pronounced, and the role of aristocrats is stipulated even more clearly than in other parts of LB2. When Narymont dies, "the Lithuanian and Samogitian lords" select Trojden. After Lavryš defeats Dovmont, the victors return to the new capital, Kernov (Kernave). Lavryš renounces any desire to rule and nominates Viten. The prince-monk reasons that his surviving nephews are disqualified by their youth and, implicitly, by the design of their father Narymont, who had given his own coat-of-arms, the centaur, to his brothers and fashioned a new one for himself, the *pogon/vytis*—a man mounted on a rearing horse with a sword extended from his outstretched arm, symbolizing the ability to defend the realm. The candidate possessing such strength is Viten, Trojden's former marshal (*konjušij*) from Samogitia, descendant of the two ancient Roman clans that bear the "Rose" and "Columns" coats-of-arms. The lords thereupon elect him, because they do not wish to disobey their "hereditary sovereign" Trojden, who had singled out the young Viten for his exemplary physical and mental qualities and elevated him to high office. Lavryš, the transformed Vojšelk, is now an instrument of the semi-elective succession of Gediminids rather than of the claims of the Volhynian Rjurykovyči to Lithuania.

The contents of V-Lav can shed some light on the authorship of the completed L-myth and LB2. Scholars so far have focused chiefly on the closely connected Catholic Gedroickij and Gaštol'd families and on the mixed Orthodox/Catholic Gol'šanskij family, whose outstanding representatives were both educated and very powerful in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. These are the most prominent non-ruling clans in the chronicle.[84] The Roman orientation of at least one Orthodox legend of L-

[83] *PSRL* 2: 861, 867 (trans. Perfecky, pp. 83, 86).

[84] Jakubowski, "Studia," pp. 31–32; Ochmański, "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," pp. 158–59; Čamjarycki, *Belaruskija letapisy*, pp. 156–58; Jučas, "Xronika Byxovca," pp. 223–34; G. Ja. Golenčenko, "Studenty Velikogo Knjažestva Litovskogo v Krakovskom universitete v XV–XVI vv.," in *Kul'turnye svjazi narodov Vostočnoj Evropy v XVI v.*, ed. B. A. Rybakov (Moscow, 1976), pp. 228–40; cf. Michał Giedroyć, "The Rulers of Thirteenth-Century Lithuania: A Search for the Origins of Grand Duke Traidenis and his Kin," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s. 17 (1983): 13.

myth, the Catholic traditions contained in the second half of LB2, and the Catholicism of almost all Lithuanian families that figure in the chronicle point to a Roman Catholic author.[85] At the same time, the use of the Orthodox chronology, the retention by the "early" recension of LB1's characterization of Vitovt's Polish garrison in Smolensk as "infidel" (*nevernyi*), and the central place of V-Lav in L-myth all indicate a significant Orthodox role.[86] A new argument in favor of a Gaštol'd is that the previously noted Albrecht was *namestnik* of Navahrudak during 1503–1505 and 1508–1509, and *voevoda* of Polock in 1514. He was thus in a position to learn local Orthodox lore and to integrate it with other Lithuanian traditions.[87] As chancellor, moreover, he must have known all of the Lithuanian nobility's interests and thus those genealogical claims that L-myth and especially V-Lav furthered.

The V-Lav, then, is an Orthodox-based legend used by part of the Lithuanian elite to introduce the elective principle and to elevate a Catholic dynasty and the mainly Catholic families in LB2 without slighting the Orthodox. The author of V-Lav, probably a Catholic, was a tolerant partisan of Lithuania's mixed aristocratic-monarchial polity.

Excursus: The Lost Elisej Vita

According to the Hustyn' Chronicle of the mid-seventeenth century, Lavryš's name in Rus' was not Vasilij, but Elisej.[88] A Polish source from the same time also indicated that there was a lost Rus' life of "Elisej Lavryševskij" that centered on a miracle from the time of "King" Alexander. Alexander became Grand Prince (*Velikij knjaz'*) of Lithuania (Samogitia and Rus') in 1492, and also King of Poland in 1501. Elisej was a Lithuanian noble who had achieved a high position at court, but then fled to solitude. He was tonsured by another monk, attracted disciples, founded the Lavryšev Monastery and became its first archimandrite, but after an arduous ascetic life was murdered by a young man. For purposes of ritual,

85 The L-myth contains a legend about Princess Prakseda/Paraskeva (Evfrosinija) of Polock according to which she dies in Rome (instead of in Jerusalem, as in the sixteenth-century East Rus' version), so that afterwards the Church of St. Praxedis was built there in her honor: *PSRL* 22:206–220; *PSRL* 35:130, 147, 175, 195, 216. V. Ključevskij was certain that a much older *vita* underlies the extant East Rus' one (*Drevnerusskija žitija svjatyx kak istoričeskij istočnik* [Moscow, 1871], p. 262), which would imply another divergent Muscovite and Lithuanian-Belorussian development, analogous to that of the V-GVC.

86 *PSRL* 35:73, 140, *PSRL* 17:281.

87 Backus, *Motives*, p. 138. The unique Brief Volhynian Chronicle of ca. 1515 represents a more authentic, purely Orthodox, and Rus'-oriented work that focuses on the Ostrožskij family: *PSRL* 35 125–27.

88 *PSRL* 2 (1843 ed.): 345–46.

the date October 23 was given, but no year was specified.[89] While this differs from the time of Vojšelk's death given in GVC, the thematic parallels are obvious. At the present state of our knowledge, the origin and interrelationship of both Vasilij and Elisej are a mystery, as is the October date.[90] Nevertheless, it is clear that in Western Rus' the original Vojšelk legend split into two, whereby Lavryš became heir to the political element and Elisej to the religious one. Curiously, the historical monk Vojšelk was much closer in spirit to the violent prophet Elisha than to the martyr Laurus.[91]

IV. MUSCOVITE-LITHUANIAN COMPETITION AND RIVAL VOJŠELKS

A curious phenomenon of late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century East European propaganda warfare is that the East Rus' began to use the V-N1C to counter Lithuanian dynastic claims and Polish power, while Lithuanians and the West Rus' further developed both V-GVL and V-Lav for domestic and international reasons. This can be seen especially in the development of a variety of politicized literary endeavors: Muscovite chronicles, the later redactions of the Pskov DV, and Lithuanian historiography.

The Novgorodian Vojšelk at the Service of East Rus' Ideologists

Early sixteenth-century Muscovite genealogical tales claim that Viten descended from the Smolensk princes, fled from Tatar captivity, settled in Samogitia, married a beekeeper's daughter, and was killed by lightning before he could sire any children. Thereupon Viten's slave and marshal (*konjušij*) Gedimin married his widow, sired seven sons by her to found a new dynasty, and set about to increase his wealth and power as the agent of the Grand Prince of Vladimir. These stories also claim that Rjurik de-

89 Makarij, *Istorija russkoj cerkvi*, 9: 176–77.

90 Cf. Michał Giedroyć, "The Arrival of Christianity in Lithuania: Early Contacts (Thirteenth Century)," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s. 18 (1985): 18–19; the author kindly suggested that I investigate the connection between Elisej and the Vojšelk myth. Makarij's and Golubinskij's dates for the founding of Elisej's abbey (1225) and for his death (1250) and canonization (1514) are interesting guesses; however, they are not based on early or reliable sources: Makarij, *Istorija russkoj cerkvi*; E. Golubinskij, *Istorija kanonizacii svjatyx v russkoj cerkvi* (Moscow, 1903), p. 217; and *Akty izdaemye Vilenskoju arxeografičeskoju komissieju*, 39 vols. (Vilnius, 1864–1915), 1: 39–41.

91 The original, second-century Laurus and his twin brother Florus were stone-cutters and martyrs from Dalmatia: *Acta Sanctorum*, Augustii, 3: 521–24.

scended from Prus, the brother of Emperor Augustus of Rome.[92] The connections to LB2 are obvious: Roman origin of princes, succession in Lithuania of the "marshal" from Samogitia, and Gedimin's seven children. Now, however, the Rjurykovyči are of royal blood, Gedimin is a commoner, and Lithuania and West Rus' are historically subordinate to the senior princes of Rus'.

The actual relationship of the East Rus' fabrications to LB2 is harder to establish. The most logical event for the first known crystallization of the Prus legend, the *Čudov povest'*, is the coronation of Ivan III's grandson Dmitrij in 1498.[93] The claim of Roman origin, however, was already current among Lithuanians by the 1470s,[94] and the Moldavian court produced in the 1480s or 1490s a similar myth for Dmitrij and his mother Helena.[95] Still earlier, by 1412/13, Prussian Germans recorded the assertion that Gedimin had been Viten's *Pferdemarschalk*,[96] while other Prussian sources said that Gedimin was Viten's brother or son.[97]

To determine on the basis of all this information which Roman-origin or marshal legend influenced the other(s) is impossible.[98] It is clear only that the purely Lithuanian section of LB1, which goes back to ca. 1380–1432, influenced the Lithuanian genealogies of the East Rus' tales. With their tendentious and greatly falsified synopsis of Lithuanian history, the tales

92 R. P. Dmitrieva, *Skazanie o knjazjax vladimirskix* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), pp. 16–70, 178. See M. E. Byčkova (Byczkowa), "Legenda o pochodzeniu wielkich książąt litewskich: Redakcje moskiewskie z końca XV i z XVI wieku," *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 20 (1976): 183–99; and her "Obščie tradicii rodoslovnyx legend pravjaščix domov Vostočnoj Evropy," in *Kul'turnye svjazi*, pp. 292–98.

93 This work underlies the better-known *Poslanie o Monomaxovom vence* and *Skazanie o knjaz'jax vladimirskix.* Variants from the *Povest'* are given by A. A. Zimin, who links this one directly to Dmitrij's coronation: "Antičnye motivy v russkoj publicistike konca XV v.," in *Feodal'naja Rossija vo vsemirnoistoričeskom processe*, ed. L. V. Čerepnin (Moscow, 1972), pp. 128–38; so does L. V. Čerepnin in *Obrazovanie russkogo centralizirovannogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1960), p. 16. Cf. Ja. S. Lur'e, *Ideologičeskaja bor'ba v russkoj publicistike konca XV–načala XVI veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), p. 388.

94 Jakubowski, "Studia," pp. 32–34; Čamjarycki, *Beloruskija letapisy*, p. 146.

95 A. B. Boldur, "Slavjano-Moldavskaja Xronika v sostave Voskresenskoj letopisi," in *Arxeologičeskij ežegodnik za 1963* (1964), pp. 76–78; *PSRL* 7: 256–59. An interesting coincidence is that Marija (Marinka) Ivanovna Gol'šanskaja was married to the Moldavian *voevoda* Iliaş (1432–33, 1435–42), a probable ancestor of Dmitrij through his maternal grandfather Stefan çel Mare: Wolff, *Kniaziowie*, pp. 96–97; N. Iorga, *Histoire des roumains et de la romanité orientale*, 9 vols. (Bucharest, 1937–), 4: 108–130; *PSRL* 7: 257–58.

96 *Scriptores rerum prussicorum* (hereafter *SRP*), 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1861–74), 5: 223.

97 Petrus von Dusberg, *Chronika terrae Prussiae, SRP* 1: 15. *Russko-Livonskie akty* (St. Petersburg, 1868), no. 531; Je. Ochmański (Oxmans'kij), "Gediminoviči—'Pravnuki Skolomendovy,'" in *Pol'ša i Rus'*, p. 358.

98 Čamjarycki sees the origin of this marshal legend as a Prussian reaction to the defeat at Grünwald in 1410: *Belaruskija letapisy*, p. 146.

constitute an East Rus' response to LB1, a response which challenges the Lithuanians with assertions of their dynasty's plebeian origin and original fidelity to Orthodoxy. At this point Vojšelk enters the picture.

The Muscovite genealogical reworking of the Lithuanian chronicles continued with the little-studied sixteenth-century genre known as the Abbreviated Lithuanian Chronicle (ALC). One exemplary copy from 1526–1533 has been published.[99] It is based on a "late" LB1[100] and is followed by a recension of the Muscovite genealogy of the Lithuanian princes.[101] A hagiographically embellished version of V-N1C and a new recension of DV introduce the work,[102] and therefore they play the same role in ALC as L-myth and specifically V-Lav do in LB2—namely, they introduce Gedimin's descendants, who now have princely blood due solely to intermarriage. Vojšelk, whose home monastery is placed at Mount Athos and who is given the monastic name of the warrior-prophet David, initiates the obvious heroes of the Muscovite version of Lithuanian history—the putative and real Orthodox Lithuanian princes.[103]

Simultaneously (about 1527–1531) the Muscovite genealogies took a slightly different road, fabricating a Rus' origin for all the Lithuanian princes from the line of Rogvolod Borisovič of Polock.[104] This parallels the purported descent of the Polock princes from the Lithuanians in L-myth.[105] According to the Muscovite version, which first appears in 1538 in the Voskresensk Chronicle and there reveals familiarity with at least the names in the GVC, Vojšelk and Dovmont were both the sons of Mindovg, whereas Trojden ("Projden") was his nephew. Gedimin was no *konjušij,* but

99 G. Boguslovskij, "Soskraščennaja litovskaja letopis'," *Smolenskaja starina* (Smolensk), 1, no. 2 (1911): 1–19.

100 Cf. Boguslovskij, "Sokraščennaja. . .letopis'," pp. 7, 8, 14, 15; *PSRL* 35: 57, 61, 65, 71, 75–76, 132–33 137, 140–41.

101 The genealogical source is of the *Poslanie* type.

102 V. I. Oxotnikova corrects Čamjarycki's linking of the ALC's Vojšelk to V-GVC: "Povest' o pskovskom knjaze Dovmonte: K voprosu ob istočnikax i avtore Rasprostrannoj redakcii," *TODRL* 33 (1979): 266, 128; cf. *Belaruskija letapisy,* p. 128.

103 The other two are Narymont Gediminovyč, coprince of Novgorod in 1333–36, and his brother, Grand Prince Olgierd (1343–77); their alleged Orthodoxy is underscored to set the stage for Jogaila's "apostasy": Boguslovskij, "Sokraščennaja. . .letopis'," pp. 9, 14, 17. ALC may also have initiated a characteristic feature of the creative sixteenth-century Vojšelk tales, all of which, in conformity with standard hagiographic taste, specifically have the hero return from his punitive expedition to his monastery.

104 *PSRL* 7: 256–59, 30; also *PSRL* 17: 593–95, 601–602; Byčkova, "Legenda," pp. 188–89; idem, "Otdel'nye momenty istorii Litvy v interpretacii russkix genealogičeskix istočnikov," *Pol'ša i Rus',* pp. 370–71; B. M. Kloss, *Nikonovskij svod i russkie letopisi XVI–XVII vekov* (Moscow, 1980), pp. 177–80.

105 *PSRL* 35: 130, 147, 175, 195, 216. Some versions insert Rogvolod between Ginvil/Boris, the first alleged Christian Lithuanian prince of Polock, and his children.

Vojšelk's second cousin twice removed[106] (see appendix 1-C). A religiously embellished if brief version of the V-N1C, along with special notes concerning Olgierd and Narymont Gediminovyč (as Christians), now went into the chapter on Lithuanian princes of the official "Sovereign's Genealogy." These served to fortify the place of the Gediminovyči within the Muscovite aristocracy, as well as Moscow's active claim to hegemony over Lithuanian and Western Rus'.[107]

At roughly the same time, Muscovite political hagiography concerning Vojšelk reached its pinnacle with the highly influential, official, and ecclesiastical Nikon Chronicle.[108] The authors, who apparently were aware of V-GVC, developed a saintly and politically relevant Vojšelk out of V-N1C. As if presaging one of Ivan IV's foreign policy goals, the Nikon Chronicle says that Vojšelk occupied both Lithuania and Estonia during his year of reprisals, and that there he founded churches and monasteries and then installed his "chief general Andrej Danilovič" (Švarno?) as "grand prince."[109] Vojšelk returned to his monastery, where he "endeavored to do severe and greatly virtuous labor, and after much exertion and at a very great age died in the Lord."

A different hagiographical development associated with Novgorod and Makarij (archbishop there, 1526–1542, and then metropolitan of Moscow, 1542–1563) made use of the official genealogies and started to treat Vojšelk and Dovmont as brothers. As such, these two found a special place in the capital and in the *Stepennaja kniga*, a popular, mid-sixteenth-century work of "all-Rus'" sacred historiography, where Vojšelk and his "brother" were the only Lithuanian princes whose lives were recounted.[110]

106 *PSRL* 7: 164–65, 253–54. Vojšelk may appear twice: as himself (*Vyšleg*) and as "*Vid*, ego že ljudi *volkom* zval" (*Vid*, alias "Wolf").

107 *Rodoslovnaja kniga knjazej i dvorjan rossijskix i vyežix (Barxatnaja kniga)*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1787), 1: 28–30. Byčkova notes that some version of the Lithuanian genealogy is present in almost all of the genealogies: *Rodoslovnye knigi XVI–XVII vv., kak istoričeskij istočnik* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 175–97. Apparently unaware of V-N1C, she linked what she saw as a fifteenth-century reworking of the Volhynian Vojšelk legend to the Muscovite cult of the Trinity: "Legenda," pp. 195–96: cf. *NPL*, p. 84.

108 *PSRL* 10: 144–45. Cf. Pašuto, *Očerki*, p. 144. The Nikon Chronicle's version is slightly closer to those of the 1497 and 1517 *svods* (*ne zaby*) than to the Ermolin Chronicle (*ne izmeni*); cf. Kloss, *Nikonovskij svod*, p. 180; *PSRL* 23: 85–86; *PSRL* 27: 58–59.

109 Kloss does not list GVC as one of the sources for the Nikon Chronicle, but where else could one have found "Andrej Danilovič" as Vojšelk's successor? *Nikonovskij svod*, pp. 139–99, esp. 180.

110 *PSRL* 22, pt. 1: 301–302. A transitional "Middle Redaction" DV is preceded by an ALC-influenced rendition of V-N1C which concludes with a doxology and also presents Vojšelk and Dovmont as brothers: Oxotnikova, "Povest'," pp. 264–65. From Oxotnikova's discussion of the chronicle sources for the "Middle Redaction" DV, it is clear that the com-

The ultimate East Rus' literary development of the Vojšelk motif was the Extended DV, which was composed after Stefan Batory's seige of Pskov, 1581, and which is connected specifically with that city's role on the northwest frontier and with Muscovy's struggles against Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. Adopting material from several of the variant East Rus' sources for Vojšelk and Dovmont, this version replaces the formulary description of Dovmont's youth with Vojšelk's life and transfers some of the earlier DV characterizations to Vojšelk. The Extended DV emphasizes Vojšelk's break with his ancestors, "divine illumination," monastic path to purification, obedience to his superior, enjoyment of divine protection, continuous piety, and courage. Once more a monk residing at Mount Athos, Vojšelk travels to Lithuania twice, the first time to convert his "brother" Dovmont and to attempt the same with "their father," and the second time to exact revenge "for Christian blood."[111]

The "all-Rus'" chronicles, the official genealogies, and the *Stepennaja kniga* reached a substantial audience among the elite into the late seventeenth century, if not beyond.[112] Thus the original Novgorodian *Vojšelk,* conceived around 1300, had a four-century history; the legend began as an expression of the local struggle against Baltic neighbors and developed into a component part of the East Rus' claim to the Kievan Rus' legacy and of the accompanying rivalries with Poland-Lithuania and Sweden. The sixteenth-century East Rus' Vojšelk, with his devotion to the "divine writings," monasticism, and militant propagation of Orthodoxy—the perfect monk and the perfect Christian warrior—was a typical creation of Muscovy's regional hegemonic nationalism and yet was conceptually true to the original Novgorodian prototype.[113]

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mon denominator is the Novgorodian (*Sofija*) rather than another "all-Rus'" chronicle subfamily.

111 Compare Serebrjanskij, *Žitija*, "Teksty," p. 143; *PL* 2: 16. It is based on the ALC and "Middle" DV Vojšelk tales as well as the standard East Rus' chronicle version: Serebrjanskij, *Žitija*, p. 278; Oxotnikova, "Povest'," pp. 274–78. Oxotnikova claims that a common source from about the 1520s underlies both ALC and the Extended DV: "Povest'," pp. 267. Her arguments and evidence, however, do not indicate why the fusion of various Dovmont traditions should have occurred in such an unknown source rather than during the composing of the Extended DV with the Vojšelk tale.

112 Serebrjanskij, *Žitija*, "Teksty," pp. 143–44. Even the locally important Extended DV survives in at least seven copies: Oxotnikova, "Povest'," p. 262.

113 Cf. H.-J. Grabmüller's review of Werner Philipp, "Heiligkeit und Herrschaft in der Vita Aleksandr Nevskijs," *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte* 18 (1973): 55–72, in *Russia medievalis* 4 (1979): 132.

The Volhynian Vojšelk, Lavryš, and Lithuanian Politics

Lithuanian chronicle writing and historiography had their own peculiar development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. First came a revised and expanded version of the LB2 known as the Lithuanian-Belorussian 3 Chronicle (LB3). At present represented only by the Byxovec Chronicle (BC) which breaks off at about 1506/1508,[114] the revision was begun in the 1520s or 1530s and completed in the 1550s; it circulated in a slightly different version in the 1570s.[115] Displaying blatant anti-Polish sentiments,[116] as well as an awareness of Muscovite-Lithuanian genealogies,[117] it is ultimately the work of an Orthodox patriot with ties to Navahrudak and the cultural revival centering around Sluck and, perhaps, the newly established Suprasl' Monastery.[118] The LB3 was followed in 1582 by the publication of the *Kronika* of the erudite Polish immigrant canon and court official, Maciej Stryjkowski, who utilized a variety of Rus', Polish, and other sources in expressing a republican and pro-Polish, patriotic attitude.[119]

The chroniclers' first creative manipulation of the prince-monk motif after LB2 was to rediscover the West Rus' (Volhynian) Vojšelk—not only the name, which is found in LB2, but also the legend.[120] Sometime between

[114] *PSRL* 32:128–73. It is also published in Russian and Lithuanian translation: M. N. Tixomirov, *Xronika Byxovca* (Moscow, 1966); R. Jasas, *Lietuvos Metraštis: Bychovo Kronika* (Vilnius, 1971).

[115] N. N. Ulaščik, "'Litovskaja i žmojtskaja kronika' i ee otnošenie k xronikam Byxovca i Stryjkovskogo," in *Slavjane i Rus'*, ed. E. I. Krupov (Moscow, 1968), p. 360. Also Sušyc'kyj, "Zaxidn'o-ruski litopysy," pp. 99–100; Čamjarycki, *Belaruskija letapisy*, pp. 180–88; and B. N. Florja, "O 'Letopisce Byxovca,'" pp. 135–44. For alternative views that discount evidence from the "combined" LB2 or Stryjkowski, see Ochmański, "Nad Kroniką Bychowca," pp. 158–60; Jučas, "Xronika Byxovca," pp. 220–31. Note, however, *PSRL* 35:234–38; and Maciej Stryjkowski, *Kronika polska, litewska, żmódska i wszystkiej Rusi*, ed. Mikołaj Malinowski, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1846; orig. Königsberg, 1582), vol. 1, pp. 331ff.

[116] *PSRL* 32:139–40, 151, 153, 160–62.

[117] LB3 claims that Viten was killed by thunder, a fact that could have been found in genealogies with or without V-N1C: *PSRL* 32:136; Dmitrieva, *Skazanie*, pp. 166, 179; Boguslovskij, "Sokraščennaja . . . letopis'," p. 16. *PSRL* 17:589, 601.

[118] *PSRL* 32:168–73; Čamjarycki, *Belaruskija letapisy*, pp. 184–85; A. I. Rogov, "Suprasl' kak odin iz centrov kul'turnyx svjazej Belorussii s drugimi slavjanskimi stranami," in *Slavjane v èpoxu feodalizma*, ed. L. V. Čerepnin (Moscow, 1978), pp. 324–27.

[119] Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, 2:97, 173, 232ff. In certain places he is consciously opposing what we now know to be LB3: *PSRL* 32:57, 75. Cf. A. I. Rogov, *Russko-pol'skie kul'turnye svjazi v èpoxu Vozroždenija* (Moscow, 1966), pp. 123–56.

[120] The "intermediary" recension of LB2 had already interpolated Vojšelk's name at the end of the first legendary Roman dynasty as one of the three sons of "Ringolt," but contained the qualification: "Nothing further is written about that Vojšvilak." The addition, which could have derived from an awareness of the West Rus' Vojšelk, does not appear to have served any particular political purpose: *PSRL* 35:92, 131, 149, 176, 197, 218. The interpolated nature of

1520 and 1570, one of the authors of the LB3 injected a reworking of the GVC's stories about Mindovg and Vojšelk into the mythological history at the appropriate place, between the demise of the first reigning "Roman" clan (Palemon's) and the accession of the second (Centaur).[121] Two of the themes from LB2 further developed in LB3 are the progress of Christianity in Lithuania and its historical sovereignty. The Volhynian Mindovg and Vojšelk, with their paganism intact, were useful figures for the development of both motifs. The natural editorial approach of the author of LB3 was to remove Vojšelk's subordination to the Volhynian princes and to make him an independent rival—which explains his murder—rather than to imply any Rus' right to control Lithuania.[122]

The fact that BC breaks off temporarily before Vojšelk's death complicated any further deductions about the intentions behind the LB3 revision. The resurrection of the Volhynian Vojšelk may have been prompted by the Muscovite manipulation of the Novgorodian Vojšelk. It also could have been conceived in response to contemporary West Rus' interest in the GVC,[123] a native history that is often less than kind to Lithuania.

Stryjkowski, who relied on both LB3 and the works of Polish historians for his "facts,"[124] made a politically imaginative addition concerning the politics of succession after the murders of Mindovg and Trenjata.[125] According to him, the realm was shaken by internecine strife. The Lithuanian "Grand Principality and *Rzeczpospolita*" required one true sovereign to deal with the realm's chief enemies, Livonia and Prussia, and also with Rus'. The nobility assembled to elect a prince, and the native Rus' called for one of their own. The ethnic Lithuanians and Samogitians,

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the Vojšvilak insert is clear from what follows: "After the death of Ringolt. . . ." Ringolt is an obvious equivalent of the last phase of the GVC's Mindovg: both survive a combined Mongol-Rus' invasion of Lithuania and have three known sons, among whom Vojšelk is the legitimate successor.

121 The Lithuanian statesman and scholar Rotundus (ca. 1520–84) noted the existence of three versions: one close to the "early" and "combined" LB2 ("Ringoltum sterliem decessesse"); one close to BC ("regno filio Mendago. . .reliquit"); and one which appears to be a variant of the "intermediary" and "late" LB2 ("filium Volsuincum reliquisse. . .sed eum imbellum fuisse, itaque Novogrudios comtempta eius agnavia, ad Suintarum Lituanis et Samogitis imperatem defecisse"): Jakubowski, "Studia," p. 97; cf. *PSRL* 35:92, 131, 149, 176, 197, 218; *PSRL* 32:132.

122 Cf. *PSRL* 35:147, 149, 154, 157; *PSRL* 32:132–34, 138–41, 143–45, 151, 153.

123 Cf. Šaxmatov, "Predislovie," *PSRL* 2:viii–ix.

124 Stryjkowski presents both the GVC-LB3 and the Polish historiographic tradition (Długosz, et al.) concerning the murder of Trenjata: *Kronika*, p. 299.

125 Stryjkowski, *Kronika*, pp. 299–304. The version of his history written completely in verse but never published was even more imaginative, poetic, and colorful: *O początkach, wywodach, dzielnościach sprawach rycerskich i domowych sławnego narodu litewskiego, żemojdskiego i ruskiego*, ed. Julia Radziszewska (Warsaw, 1978), pp. 200–202.

on the other hand, pointed to their Roman ancestry, as well as to the fact that they ruled over the Rus' and were never ruled by others. Once elected, a Rus' would favor his more numerous countrymen, who would then take over Lithuania. Therefore Vojšelk, as an adult heir, had to be forced to take the throne. He does so and becomes a warrior-prince who tries to seize Volodymyr-Volyns'kyj when Lev invites him there for peace talks. Stryjkowski ends with Vasyl'ko and Švarno reproaching the murderer of Lev for defying "the law of all nations," breaking the code of guest-friendship, and thereby bringing shame upon the Rus'.

These anti-Rus' motifs may be linked to three specific events: the actual Muscovite-Lithuanian War of 1563–1582, Moscow's control of a goodly part of Belorussia during this period, and Lithuanian Orthodox support of a Muscovite candidate for the throne during the *interregna* of the 1570s, after the line of Gedimin had died out. Stryjkowski was in principle not anti-Rus' at all,[126] but for political reasons he transformed a story that promoted Rus' domination of Lithuania into one that reasserted Lithuanian rule over Rus'. The nobility also displays statesmanship in these renditions of Vojšelk and Lavryš, the latter calling a *sejm* or assembly to elect his successor.[127] Stryjkowski's accounts of Vojšelk and Lavryš subsequently went almost verbatim into the early seventeenth-century Belorussian Lithuanian-Samogitian Chronicle, which on the whole was narrower in scope and anti-Polish.[128] Stryjkowski's renditions also influenced the very pro-Polish *Historia* by the moralizing Jesuit genealogist, Albert Kojałowicz.[129] Understandably, there the dangers of electing a Rus' grand prince are emphasized even more. At the same time Vojšelk takes on a somewhat tragic hue, as his desire for bloody vengeance displaces his former monastic morality. Although he continues to wear the habit, "philosophy" no longer penetrates it. His own murder, however despicable, is thus a result of this fallen state.

Stryjkowski's Vojšelk and Lavryš—Orthodox Lithuanian prince-monks with quasi-republican sentiments and crucial roles in the nation's pre-Catholic period—passed as real historical entities into later Lithuanian,

126 Stryjkowski, *Kronika,* pp. 80–82.

127 *Kronika,* pp. 300–301, 329–30. On the intellectual context of Stryjkowski's political views, see S. F. Sokol, *Političeskaja i pravovaja mysl' v Belorussii XVI–pervoj poloviny XVII v.* (Minsk, 1984), esp. pp. 71–105, where a (despotic) *knjaz'* is contrasted to the (lawful) *korol'*.

128 *PSRL* 32:27–30, 32–34; cf. N. N. Ulaščik, "'Litovskaja i žmojtskaja kronika,'" pp. 367–72.

129 Albert Wijuk-Kojałowicz, *Historiae Litvanae pars prior* (Gdansk, 1650), pp. 93–130; cf. Zenonas Ivinskis, "Kojałowicz-Wijuk, Albrecht," *EL* 3: 150–52.

Belorussian, and Polish writings. The Ukrainian Hustyn' Chronicle, on the other hand, restored the Volhynian orientation of Vojšelk.[130]

So long as both the princely-military and monastic ideals flourished in Eastern Europe, the Vojšelk legends retained vitality. Only in the nineteenth century did critical scholarship start seriously to separate fact from fancy.[131]


Georgetown University

130 The Hustyn' Chronicle synthesized the GVC, V-N1C, LB2 and Stryjkowski in rendering brief versions of both Vojšelk and Rymont (-Elisej, not Lavryš): *PSRL* 2 (1843 ed.): 343–46.

131 T. Narbutt, for example, expressed the highest degree of romanticism and credulity: *Dzieje starożytne narodu litewskiego,* 9 vols. (Vilnius, 1835–41). Eighty more years passed before Šušyc'kyj demonstrated the essentially fictional nature of L-myth: "Zaxidn'o-rus'ki litopysy," pp. 167–223. For another view, see Giedroyć, "The Rulers of Thirteenth-Century Lithuania."

APPENDIX 1: Historical and Mythological Genealogies


A) *Princes of Galicia-Volhynia and Lithuania (from GVC)*



APPENDIX 1: Historical and Mythological Genealogies


B) *Mythological Lithuanian Genealogy (from LB2 and LB3)*

(* = Coat of Arms)




APPENDIX 1: Historical and Mythological Genealogies

C) *Official Muscovite Genealogy of the Lithuanian Princes*



APPENDIX 2: The Vojšelk and Genealogical Traditions



APPENDIX 3: Abbreviations of Chronicles and Texts

ABL	Abbreviated Lithuanian Chronicle
BC	Byxovec Chronicle
DV	Dovmont Vita (Life of Dovmont)
GVC	Galician-Volhynian Chronicle
LB1	Lithuanian-Belorussian 1 Chronicle
LB2	Lithuanian-Belorussian 2 Chronicle
LB3	Lithuanian-Belorussian 3 Chronicle
L-myth	Mythological sections of LB2
N1C	Novgorod 1 Chronicle
PC	Pskov Chronicle
RC	Rogožsk Chronicle
V-GVL	Volhynian Vojšelk tale
V-Lav	Lavryš tale
V-N1C	N1C Vojšelk tale

The "Psalter" of Feodor and the Heresy of the "Judaizers" in the Last Quarter of the Fifteenth Century*

CONSTANTINE ZUCKERMAN

In 1478 the boyar republic of Novgorod was finally occupied by Muscovite troops. The annexation, which came after years of Moscow's growing sway over Novgorod, constituted one of the greatest achievements of the expansionist policy of Grand Prince Ivan III (1462–1505). The subsequent integration of the former republic into the autocratic Grand Principality of Moscow was expectedly painful.[1] To eradicate real or imagined seditions, Ivan III initiated a long series of confiscations, deportations, and executions. Yet it was not until the city was virtually ruined by his grandson, Ivan IV (the "Terrible"), that the sin of Novgorod's bygone liberty was fully expiated.

Politics aside, the conquest of Novgorod had another, quite unexpected sequel. Archbishop Gennadii, appointed to the Novgorod see in 1484, was soon to discover that his eparchy was infested with a heresy which he initially defined as a mixture of Judaism with "Marcionism and Messalianism." The only analogies he could find between "the chapters against the Messalians (Bogomils)" in the *Kormchaia* book and the practices of the Novgorod heretics, however, were the non-observance by the heretical priests of abstinence from food and drink before a mass, and the heretics' readiness to deny under oath all their unorthodox beliefs. For lack of better evidence, he eventually abandoned the second part of his accusation.[2] The

* I express my gratitude to my teacher, Professor V. D. Levin, who supervised the writing of this study; to Professors M. Altbauer and S. Pines, who read its initial version and shared with me their valuable remarks; and to Miss H. Zuckermann for her helpful comments.

1 V. Bernadskii, *Novgorod i Novgorodskaia zemlia v XV veke* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1961), p. 200ff.; J. L. I. Fennell, *Ivan the Great of Moscow* (London, 1961), pp. 29–65; A. Zimin, *Rossiia na rubezhe XV–XVI stoletii* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 76–82.

2 The sources are collected in N. Kazakova and Ia. Luria (Lur'e), *Antifeodal'nye ereticheskie dvizheniia na Rusi XIV–nachala XVI veka* (Moscow, 1955) (hereafter *AED*). The accusation of Messalianism appears in Gennadii's letters in 1487 to Bishop Prokhor of Sary and in 1489 to Ioasaph, the former archbishop of Rostov (*AED*, pp. 310, 316–17). However, in a subsequent letter to Metropolitan Zosima (sent at the beginning of October 1490), he concentrated on the accusations of Judaism, and the charge of Messalianism was not brought up at the church council of October 1490, which condemned the heretics on his instigation (*AED*, pp. 379–86).

main charge against the heretics remained their alleged Jewish leanings, and here, indeed, their persecutors could present a better case.

Contacts with the Jews

In a letter to the newly appointed Metropolitan Zosima (1490–1494), Gennadii traced the emergence of the heresy to a certain Jew who came to Novgorod from Kiev with Prince Mykhailo Olel'kovych (1470): "And from that Jew," claimed the archbishop, "the heresy spread in the land of Novgorod."[3] The name of this Jew was given as Skharia in the "Story of the Recently-appeared Heresy" written by Iosif, abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery. Iosif blamed Skharia for the seduction into Judaism of two Novgorod priests, Denis and Aleksei. Both priests, according to the "Story," used the subsequent arrival at Novgorod of the Jews Osiph Shmoilo Skariavei (probably *Skharia-bey*) and Mosei Khanush to learn more about Judaism, and even expressed the wish to have themselves circumcised. The Jews are said to have dissuaded Denis and Aleksei from taking a step that could result in their exposure by the Christians, but they did change Aleksei's name to Abraham and his wife's to Sarah and advised both priests to practice Judaism secretly.[4]

There is no reason to assume that this story was invented by Iosif, who could hardly know that in the Jewish tradition the names of Abraham and Sarah, the first gentiles converted, are those most commonly given to proselytes. The tale's most probable source was the priest Denis himself. Arrested in Moscow in October 1490 together with a group of other heretics, Denis was tried by the assembled church council and declared his full repentance.[5] Having renounced the heresy, he was not in a position to refuse his interrogators information on its origins. Nor, apparently, did he resist the temptation to diminish his own guilt by denouncing Aleksei, already dead by the time of the council, as the only quasi-convert to Judaism. Confidential details on the Jewish contacts of the first heretics would not have been available to Gennadii, who wrote before Denis's arrest and interrogation. Thus, the fact that these details first appeared in Iosif's "Story" by no means undermines their authenticity.

[3] *AED*, p. 375.

[4] *AED*, pp. 468–69.

[5] *AED*, pp. 382–86; 388. An excellent survey of the Novgorod stage of the heresy is given in Zimin, *Rossiia na rubezhe*, pp. 82–92. See also E. Hoesch, *Orthodoxie und Haeresie im alten Russland* (Wiesbaden, 1975), especially for the comprehensive bibliography.

The "Six Wings" and the "Jewish Psalter"

Personal contacts with Jews, restricted as they were to the two heresiarchs Denis and Aleksei and to the period before the heresy's actual dissemination, were never considered by its persecutors to be more than circumstantial evidence. The real issue was to expose the actual beliefs and practices of the accused as a deviation from Orthodoxy—to prove, as Gennadii reiterated in his letters, that the entire body of the heretics were "of Jewish mind."[6]

The archbishop provided two specific grounds for the allegation. The first concerned the heretics' use of the Jewish system of chronology, with which they became acquainted through a translation of the "Six Wings," a fourteenth-century Hebrew astronomical treatise by Immanuel ben-Jacob.[7] Interest in the "Six Wings" in the Ukraine and, later, in Novgorod was generated by the failure of the world to end at the close of the seventh millennium—i.e., in September 1492, according to Orthodox chronology. The Jews, on the other hand, who put the creation of the world at a much later date, were, by their counting, still safely in the third century of the sixth millennium. Gennadii himself admitted in 1489 that if the end of the world did not come as expected, it would further embolden the heretics "and put a great strain on Christianity." Thus "the heretics of Jewish mind... having studied the 'Six Wings,'" could use it all the more successfully "to seduce the Christians."[8]

6 *AED*, pp. 310, 316, 318; cf. pp. 375–76, 383.

7 A. Sobolevskii, *Perevodnaia literatura Moskovskoi Rusi XIV–XVII vekov* (=*Sbornik ORIaS* 74) (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 413–19, provides a partial edition of the text; cf. V. Kuzakov, *Ocherki razvitiia estestvennonauchnykh i tekhnicheskikh predstavlenii na Rusi v X–XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 78–81.

8 *AED*, pp. 318–19. Cf. a parallel text: "And as to the years that the heretics have stolen from us using the Jewish chronology (*ukrali u nas eretiki zhidovskimi chisly*)—in (all) these years, kings and popes and patriarchs are written by name, and where should one put them? And as to the 'Six Wings' that they studied and with which they seduce the Christians imagining that they bring an omen from heaven, it is not their invention" (*AED*, p. 311). Ia. Luria, in his "Unresolved Issues in the History of the Ideological Movements of the Late Fifteenth Century," in *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. H. Birnbaum and M. Flier (= *California Slavic Studies* 12 [1984]), pp. 156–67, following the unpublished thesis of J. Howlett, claims that "it is absolutely impossible to confirm that the reference to *zhidovskie chisly* 'the Jewish calender', belongs to the heretics themselves and was not reconstructed for them by Genadij" and concludes that "it is apparently unjustified to include *Shestokryl*" among books read by the heretics. Luria does not cite Gennadii's more explicit reference to "the heretics of Jewish mind" who "have studied the Six Wings," but he probably does not consider it sufficiently confirmed either; also, he does not hesitate to dismiss as "legendary" (p. 62) the Jew mentioned by Gennadii and identified as Skharia by Iosif from Volokolamsk. However, Luria's hypercriticism loses much in conviction because it is so strikingly selective. In spite of the fact that none of Gennadii's statements can be in any way "confirmed," Luria accepts his letters as a generally

No wonder, then, that Gennadii stressed the other evidence for the Jewish character of the heresy. The repented heretic Naum, who denounced his former fellows before the Novgorod archbishop, supported his accusations with a written *corpus delicti*: "the booklets (*tetradi*) according to which they prayed in a Jewish manner."[9] Gennadii identified the contents of these booklets as psalms, and explained the emergence of this Jewish version of the Psalter in a special excursus.

As punishment for the crucifixion of Christ, God let the Jews be exiled and their holy books destroyed. The Christians alone preserved an authoritative translation, procured 300 years before Christ by King Ptolemy. Yet the Jews made up for their loss by adopting the texts "expounded" for their sake by the heretics and renegade Christians Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. "Thus the Jews of our times," concluded Gennadii, "hold to the heretical tradition, having distorted the psalms of David and the prophecies according to what the heretics transmitted to them."[10]

The use of this Jewish Psalter by the Novgorod heretics appeared to present such a manifest divergence into Judaism that Gennadii sent "the booklets" to Metropolitan Gerontii and to Ivan III as material evidence supporting Naum's testimony.[11] To Gennadii's disappointment, his request for a full-scale condemnation and execution of the heretics met with little response: the entire matter was considered of little importance, and the Psalter itself seems to have made no impression in Moscow at all.[12] But the Novgorod archbishop did not give up. About three years later, he urged the new metropolitan, Zosima, to follow the apostolic rules against intercourse with Jews and Judaizers and to take measures that "no Orthodox Christian

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reliable source (see Ia. Luria, "L'hérésie dite des judaisants et ses sources historiques," *Revue des études slaves* 45 [1966]: esp. p. 56); he starts requiring some unspecified "confirmations" only when the archbishop happens to mention the Jewish aspect of the heresy.

9 *AED*, pp. 310, 316.

10 *AED*, p. 319. In Luria's opinion, Gennadii's excursus was directed exclusively against Jews and did not imply the identification of the psalms used by the heretics ("*mirskie psalmy*," in Luria's definition) with the distorted Jewish Psalter; see Ia. Luria (Lur'e), *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v russkoi publitsistike kontsa XV–nachala XVI veka* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 190–92. However, this fine distinction is not only illogical, but also contradicts the text. In the description of the translation procured by Ptolemy, Gennadii stressed that it included "the entire Holy Scripture and these psalms (*siia psalmy*), that is, the Psalter, as well." The phrase "these psalms" can only refer to the heretical psalms mentioned at the beginning of the same letter (*AED*, p. 316), which means that Gennadii did consider them to be a distorted version of the biblical Psalter. It is obvious that Gennadii created his peculiar theory on the origin of the Jewish Psalter not because of an interest in it per se, but in order to explain the origin of the Psalter used by the heretics.

11 *AED*, pp. 310, 316.

12 See Gerontii's and Ivan III's answers to Gennadii, in *AED*, pp. 313–15; cf. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, vol. 4, p. 238 = ibid., vol. 20, p. 253.

may associate himself with heretic or Jew, especially if [the latter] has the dignity of priest and may associate [the Christian] in their impure prayer and make him follow the Jewish custom."[13] That letter provoked the aforementioned arrest and trial of Denis together with about thirty other heretics.

Gennadii's description of the Psalter used by the heretics notes a number of peculiar features that suggested its identification with the curious contemporary treatise entitled "Knigy glagolemya Psaltyr'," described in a short introduction as the "twenty kathisma(s) of the Psalter of David the prophet" translated "from the Jewish language into the Rus' language of the Orthodox Christians" by Feodor, "the newly baptized."[14] This passage explains why Gennadii was ready to recognize a text which evidently differed from the Orthodox Psalter as a certain—though heretical—version of the Psalter of David. The self-professed Jewish origin of Feodor and his "translation" allowed Gennadii not only to attribute the discrepancy between the heretical and the Orthodox Psalter to a Jewish intrigue, but also to consider the use of the heretical version as a major proof for the Jewish character of the Novgorod heresy.

Gennadii proved to be more right, in a sense, than he himself could have suspected. In spite of its perfect structural conformity with the Orthodox Psalter of the *Sledovannaia* type—Feodor's "psalms" are divided into twenty "kathisma(s)" and followed by nine "odes"—the contents of the self-styled "Psalter" have very little in common with the Psalms of David. N. Tikhonravov was the first to identify some of the "psalms" as translations of certain Jewish prayers, and more were recognized as such subsequently.[15] In view of these findings, the conclusion that the "Psalter" of Feodor is in reality a translation of the Jewish prayer-book *Maḥazor* became commonplace.[16] Gennadii's concept of the "Psalter" was revised accordingly, yet the heretics' use of it remained the main argument of scholars

13 *AED*, p. 376.

14 Edited by M. Speranskii, "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh v perevode Feodora evreja," *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (hereafter *ChOIDR*), 1907, bk. 2; see p. 53, cf. pp. 13–19.

15 Speranskii, "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh," pp. 11–12, 44–51; cf. S. Ettinger, "Jewish Influence on the Religious Ferment in Eastern Europe at the End of the Fifteenth Century" [in Hebrew], in *Yitzhak F. Baer Jubilee Volume* (Jerusalem, 1960), pp. 228–47, p. 231, fn. 15. In order to avoid confusion with the biblical Psalter, Feodor's "Psalter" is hereafter referred to in inverted commas.

16 N. Meshcherskii, in *Istochniki i sostav drevnei slaviano-russkoi perevodnoi pis'mennosti IX–XV vekov* (Leningrad, 1978), p. 29, citing P. Kokovtsov, describes Feodor's "Psalter" as a translation of "65 Talmudic prayers"; Luria, in his various publications, defines its source as a "medieval Jewish psalter" (whatever that may be). These slight aberrations do not violate the general consensus, however.

who considered the influence of Jews and Judaism to be the predominant factor in the shaping of the Novgorod heresy.[17]

The aim here is to take a fresh look at the text and to check the validity of its accepted interpretation and the historical conclusions it has engendered. In fact, some of the problems inherent in identifying Feodor's "Psalter" with the Jewish *Maḥazor* were apparent already to those who propounded the view. In an introductory note Feodor proclaimed his newly found Christian faith, while in a short colophon he dedicated the "translation" to Grand Prince Ivan III and asserted that it was executed "with the blessing and at the request" of Metropolitan Philip (1464–1473).[18] Feodor was also the author of an epistle "to the entire kin of Judah," in which he described his baptism "with the blessing" of Metropolitan Iona (1448–1461) and urged all Jewish people, and especially his own community of origin—it was Ruthenian-speaking and must have been one of the numerous Jewish communities in the Ukraine or Belorussia—to follow his example and embrace Christianity.[19]

Why should such a devout Christian translate the Jewish prayer-book? The explanations provided so far have taken the character of spy stories featuring Feodor as the secret agent of the Jewish mission whose baptism was a ploy from the very start, or Feodor as the renegade Christian who betrayed his newly adopted faith and (being in Moscow!) produced a prayer-book for the future use of Skharia "and his collaborators" in Novgorod.[20] Such speculations bring us no closer to an understanding of the text and its historical background.

A systematic collation of Feodor's text with its sources reveals a very different picture. An exposition of the findings is complicated by the fact that most Slavists do not know Hebrew. I hope that the singularity of the text will command the interest of the reader in spite of this major obstacle.

[17] See, especially, Ettinger, "Jewish Influence," pp. 230–32, who cites the earlier literature.

[18] Speranskii, "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh," pp. 53 and 72.

[19] M. Sokolov, "Poslanie Feodora zhidovina," in *O eresi zhidovstvuiushchikh = ChOIDR*, 1902, pt. 2, p. 109; it is remarkable that Feodor claims to have been "strengthened in the Christian faith" by "my Grand Prince Vasily Vasil'evich, the Tsar of Russia, the pillar of the Christian faith." Feodor's Ukrainian or Belorussian origin is indicated by dialectical traces in his language (Speranskii, "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh," p. 36), as well as by the Ashkenazi-Polish recension of his prayers, which contains such characteristic passages as "'Adir 'adirenu (psalm 9)"; "My yidme lakh umy yishwe lakh" at the end of "Nishmath kol ḥay" (psalms 55–56); and "Zakhor brith 'Abhraham" after "Shopheṭ kol ha'areṣ" (psalms 11–12).

[20] See, especially, Speranskii, "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh," pp. 13–19, 37–39, who cites the speculations of Tikhonravov and the others. Also see Ettinger, "Jewish Influence"; A. Konrad, *Old Russia and Byzantium* (Vienna and Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 167–69.

Translation from Memory

In most of Feodor's psalms, the main part of the text is a passage from a Jewish prayer or a combination of passages from one or several prayers. This free merging of elements from different liturgical texts, as well as the abundance of minor and apparently unconscious deviations from the original in the translated passages, indicate that Feodor was translating from memory.

An instructive example of one such minor deviation occurs in a passage Feodor derived, and somewhat abridged, from the prayer "Unetanneh Tokef" for the High Holidays:

> You judge who shall live and who shall die: who [shall perish] by water and who by fire, who by hunger and who by satiation, who shall be struck dead and who shall be strangled . . . . [psalm 44]

The reference to satiation—rather unusual as a cause of violent death—is due to a memory failure brought about by confusion of two liturgical contexts and possibly facilitated by the slight resemblance in pronunciation of *śoibha'* (satiation) and the original *ṣomo* (thirst).[21] By way of contrast, in Hebrew transcription the two words do not have a single letter in common. So the error could hardly have occurred if Feodor had had a written text before him.

A combined text like psalm 36 can hardly be explained except as the result of translation from memory. It consists of supplications from different prayers for the High Holidays, supplemented with a few lines of Feodor's own. The translated part reveals characteristic slips of memory: "You look (*hliadish' = ro'eh*) in [sic!] the repentance of the repentant ones (*kaiushchikhsia = hashavim*)," rather than "You have concern (*roṣeh*) in the repentance of the wicked ones (*haresha'im*)"; and, below, "And your right hand is stretched out to accept the wicked ones (*hreshnia*)," rather than "the repentant ones" of the original.

Even more instructive is the transformation of the first passage of the prayer "Geula," due this time not to Feodor's failing memory, but to the peculiarity of the oral liturgical tradition that he followed in his translation. "Geula" is preceded in the morning liturgy by a text from the Bible which ends with the confirmation "I am the Lord your God; Numbers

21 The combination of hunger-plenty (satiation) appears in one of the "Zikhronot," also part of the High Holidays liturgy, in a rather similar context: God judges among the countries "which to hunger and which to plenty."

15: (37–)41," and the first passage of the prayer was originally conceived as praise of this divine reminder and promise:

True and firm and established and enduring and right and faithful and beloved and precious and desirable and pleasant and revered and mighty and well-ordered and acceptable and good and beautiful is this word unto us forever and ever.[22]

In the later liturgical tradition, however, this list of attributes was immediately attached in pronunciation to the word God from the preceding biblical quotation. The praises of God's word were as if transferred to God himself, and since the list is long enough, the violation of the formal syntax thus created could not be caught by ear. In the written text of the prayer-book, of course, the biblical text and the "Geula" remain perfectly separate. Feodor, however, followed the oral interpretation and adapted the text accordingly:

God is true and firm and established, etc. It is good and beautiful and proper to praise him forever and ever, halleluja. [psalm 59]

In this case we cannot ascribe to Feodor a conscious alteration of the text: he just translated what he heard, trying to do so in a syntactically coherent way.

He was not always so successful, however. The absence of a written text to consult explains the abundance of errors such as lack of word agreement in number, case, and gender: in recalling the prayers line by rhythmical line, Feodor did not always remember to coordinate the grammatical forms of each translated line with the rest of the sentence.

Of special interest are the cases where the disintegration of the syntax is complete, such as in psalms 11 and 58. The opening lines of both psalms are quite comprehensible and allow identification of their respective sources; afterwards, however, only some *membra disjecta* of the original text can be traced, in a context which makes no sense at all. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that unlike the other psalms, in which Feodor used prayers said every day or at least several times a year, he chose for psalms 11 and 58 some rare odes (*pizmonim*) recited only once or twice a year.[23] In both cases he could remember clearly only the first lines, and the disintegration of syntax that follows seems to reflect his

22 There are numerous English translations of the Jewish prayer-book; cf., e.g., *Avodath Yom Hazikaron. Holiday Prayers. A New Ritual for New Year and Day of Atonement*, 16th ed. (New York, 1945). In the transliterations of Hebrew passages I usually did not attempt to reconstruct Feodor's Ashkenazi pronunciation.

23 "Shopheṭ kol ha'ares" and "'Atah hu' 'eloheynu bashamayim."

agonizing—and vain—attempt to recollect more. If this observation is correct, it provides us a rare insight into the very process of Feodor's toils as translator.

The Composition of Feodor's "Psalter"

The names of both main versions of the Jewish prayer-book—*Siddur*, the "orderly arrangement" of the daily prayers, and *Maḥazor*, the "(liturgical) cycle" for each of the big holidays—reveal its essential purpose: to determine not ony the texts for each liturgy, but also their proper order. Thus every separate text becomes functionally void when removed from its appropriate liturgical context, and halakic rules determine how much of the prayer must be reiterated if its sequence is at some stage violated.

Feodor's text dispensed with the order of the synagogal liturgy. Of the three daily prayers, not one can be recovered in the "Psalter" in its entirety. Where we do possess nearly all the components of a certain segment of the Saturday morning prayer, the reconstruction of its proper sequel would require the following arrangement of the psalms: 50–56, 27, 18–23, 29–34, 6, 59–64, 66–67. On the average, Feodor switched from one liturgical context to another every two or three psalms: in only a relatively few cases does a more considerable group of five to seven psalms follow the order of one and the same prayer. Thus in the text of the "Psalter" nothing is left of the functional structure of the Jewish prayer-book.

The explanation is not that Feodor did not care about the composition of his work, but that he structured it according to a different principle. Abandoning the triple division of the synagogal liturgy into the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers, Feodor conceived his entire "Psalter" as one liturgical unit. The prayer "'Aleynu Leshabeaḥ," which concludes each of the three daily prayers, constitutes the last two psalms of the closing twentieth kathisma of the "Psalter." The benediction "Qadish Yatom," said after each prayer, is divided between "odes" 1, 3, and 4, which "follow" Feodor's "Psalter" in imitation of the Orthodox Psalter of the *Sledovannaia* type. And just as Feodor's first five psalms reproduce the beginning of the opening prayer of the Day of Atonement, his last three "odes" are clearly influenced by the so-called *psuqey de-zimra*, verses pronounced at the closing of the ark, that is, at the very end of the last liturgy of the same holiday.

Applying this unified concept, Feodor entirely eliminated the numerous textual repetitions that characterize the Jewish liturgical cycle: no single passage appears in the "Psalter" twice. Ignoring the normative order of the Jewish prayer-book, Feodor arranged his psalms according to the association of ideas and images. His sequence of prayers, most absurd from the

viewpoint of the Jewish liturgy, can often be explained by this new structural principle. Thus Feodor switched from the Saturday morning prayer ("Yoṣer 'Or," psalms 18–23) to the preceding evening prayer ("Ma'aribh 'Arabhim," psalms 24–25), since both texts treat the creation of the luminaries. He merged the "Prayer of Rabbi" with the "Prayer before a journey" (psalm 41) and joined them to the "Benediction for the new moon" (psalm 42), because all three contain similar pleas for success in daily life. The translation of the prayer "Geula" (psalms 59–64 and 66–67) is interrupted at the exclamation "Who like you [God]... makes wonder" with some of the "Benedictions at dawn," providing an elaborate illustration of the marvels of God "who does his deed in a wonderful way" (psalm 65). There are many examples of this kind, and while not every transition in the "Psalter" lends itself to such an explanation, the associative connections between the different components of the text endow it with a certain literary unity, which is entirely absent from the functionally structured Jewish prayer-book.

Not only Feodor's approach to the order of the prayers, but also his free treatment of their text can often be explained by compositional considerations. For example, when breaking up some prayers into several psalms, he modified the text to join the loose ends better. Thus the benediction:

> Blessed you are, our Rock, our King, our Redeemer, the creator of the holies [i.e., angels]. May your name be praised forever, our King, who creates his servants

was not just divided between two psalms, but adapted as the ending of one of them:

> Blessed you are, our Creator,[24] our King, our Redeemer, the creator of the holy angels who praise your name, our King, forever. [psalm 29, *fine*]

and retranslated as the opening of the other:

> Praised is your name, Lord, who creates .... [psalm 30][25]

Having dissolved all established liturgical contexts in the "Psalter," Feodor scrupulously removed from the texts he had chosen every reference to the specific times and festivals they were instituted to honor. The creation of a single, recycled, and time-detached sequel of texts left no place for this kind of specificity. Thus, from the benedictions for the new moon

[24] Feodor followed the erroneous interpretation of *ṣur* (rock) as *yoṣer* (creator); cf. the instance marked by fn. 28, below.

[25] Cf. a similar adaptation at the transition between psalms 28 and 29.

(psalm 42) and for the full moon (ode 2) he excluded the lines containing the blessing for the moon itself. The Saturday evening prayer (psalm 47) required a more thorough purification: having omitted the word "Saturday," a few lines directly referring to the "seventh day," and a short supplication about resting on the Sabbath, Feodor concluded his revision by replacing the final benediction for Saturday with a general one taken from the "Benediction for the three festivals." The latter also replaced the original benediction for the New Year in psalm 57.[26] Finally in the text of the evening prayer "Ma'aribh 'Arabhim" (psalm 24), the author turned "night" into "day and night" and "evening" into "morning or evening," even though the latter addition rendered its context barely intelligible. These two minor alterations reduce Feodor's intent to break off with the times and festivals of the synagogal liturgy almost to an absurdity, making its conscious character all the more evident.

The accepted view of the "Psalter" as a translation of *Maḥazor* thus proves to be misleading: Feodor did not conceive his work as a translation of any existing form of the Jewish prayer-book, nor indeed could it be used as such in any Jewish liturgy. The translated prayers, or passages from prayers, served Feodor as raw material for his own composition. We will now look at the religious experience and ideas underlying this unique remaking of the traditional liturgical texts.

The Transformation of Prayers into Psalms

The biblical Psalter, like the medieval *Maḥazor*, comprises a collection of prayers. If we set aside all the differences in background, structure, style, etc., between the two texts and simply compare them as two ways of self-expression in prayer, the discrepancy in the "praying ego" becomes striking. The psalms, with relatively few exceptions, are personal prayers composed in the first person singular. The prayers of the *Maḥazor*, intended for the common worship of a congregation, speak, with even fewer exceptions, in the name of the entire Jewish people, that is, in the first person plural. In the "Psalter" created by Feodor, the texts from the *Maḥazor*, for all they lose as prayers in the formal halakic sense, acquire the character of a personal, individual prayer. For Feodor not only titled, but also conceived his composition as a psalter.

[26] Cf. the passage from psalm 44 that in the original contained a specific reference to the High Holidays: "In the New Year it is written, and in the Day of the fast of Atonement it is signed, who shall live ..."; Feodor replaced the entire introductory passage with the short: "According to your judgment, [it is decided] who shall live ..." (cited above, p. 83).

This effect is most commonly achieved by augmenting the prayer, or passage from a prayer, designated by Feodor to become a separate psalm with one or more introductory lines containing a personal appeal to God. About a third of the psalms are provided with such an opening, which can easily be identified in most cases by the contrast between the "I" it features and the "we" in the rest of the psalm. Some of these appeals are quite unsophisticated, like "God, pardon my soul" (psalm 51), "God, pardon me and bless me every day and hour" (psalm 69), or "Praise the Lord, my soul" (psalm 29), borrowed from the Psalter of David and used in a similar capacity in synagogal prayer.

Some other introductory passages are more elaborate and require a closer integration in the main body of the psalm. Thus the first line of the prayer "Blessed is he who spoke and there was the world" appears enclosed in a personal supplication: "Bless God, O my soul! God, strengthen my thought and assuage my heart, illuminate my eyes, keep me from a transgression before you, God. Blessed are you, my God, [who] spoke and there was the world..." (psalm 72). In psalm 57 Feodor introduced a passage which in the original begins with the supplication "Fill us with your goodness and make us happy by your redemption," with the following lines:

> O my soul, bless my God and Lord! You are my procreator and my consoler who filled me with bread at day and with sleep at night....

This statement of fact necessitated a corresponding alteration of the supplication, and so Feodor continued: "...and our fullness is in your goodness, and our happiness is in your support...."[27] Not all the introductory passages are equally well formulated, yet their general sentiment is always the same.

Such intrusions of personal prayer are not restricted to the opening lines. They may appear after the initial benediction (psalm 24) or in the middle (psalm 21) of the translated text. In psalm 41, originally a prayer for common welfare at the celebration of the new moon, Feodor not only excluded the reference to this particular festival, but also turned the plea "and may you give us a long life" into "and may you give me a long life," so that the entire prayer acquired the character of a personal appeal to God.

[27] Feodor eliminated from his Psalter every reference to future redemption expected by the Jews; see below, pp. 89–91, 93.

The sixteenth of the so-called "Eighteen Benedictions" appears in the "Psalter" in two versions, which together provide probably the most graphic illustration of the transformation of a common prayer into a personal one. In the first version, Feodor translated this text almost word for word:

> Hear our voice, Lord our God! Have pity and mercy on us, God our Lord and King! Accept with good grace our prayers, for you are the Lord our God who hears the prayers of your people. [psalm 16]

At its second appearance, however, this prayer underwent a characteristic metamorphosis of the "praying ego":

> Accept my prayer, O God! Hear my voice, O God! Purify my thought, O God, and have mercy on me! Accept with pity our [*sic*] prayers, for you are Lord God who hears (with) grace. [psalm 68]

Contrary to Christianity, in which prayer is a matter of personal piety, in Judaism the common prayer constitutes the climax of community life; its contents are the greatest expression of the unity of the Jewish people. For Feodor this bond is all but lost, and though he prays basically the same prayers, he adapts them to reflect his individual experience, his aloneness and detachment.

The Ideological Emendations in the "Psalter"

One of the prayers chosen by Feodor for his "Psalter" bases the plea for the return of the Jewish people to Zion on a prophecy of Zephaniah:

> At that time I will bring you home, at the time when I gather you together; yea, I will make you renowned and praised among all the people of the earth, when I restore your fortunes before your eyes, says the Lord [III,20].

Feodor reproduced this quotation in a version of his own:

> I will make you renowned and praised when I gather your gone astray (*zabludshikh*) before your eyes, says Lord God. [psalm 71]

The famous appeal of Moses to God on Mount Sinai recurs in prayers as a testimony of God's commitment to the future of the people of Israel:

> Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, thy servants, to whom thou didst swear by thine own self, and didst say to them, "I will multiply your descendants as the stars of heaven, and all this land that I have promised I will give to your descendants and they shall inherit it forever." [Exodus 32:13]

Feodor modified this commitment as follows:

As you say to our father[s] Abraham, Isaac, Jacob: [I] will shelter your children under my hand and save you by my grace and by my holy presence. [psalm 68]

A number of passages which underwent similar treatment are scattered throughout the entire "Psalter." Originally they all contained supplications for the restitution of the ancient glory of the Jewish people, yet their contents were modified by Feodor to such an extent that the remains of the original wording are barely sufficient for the identification of their sources. Together they provide us with an explicit indication of Feodor's own view on the subject.

From the closing supplication of the prayer "Geula" (the right-hand text below), Feodor retained only the bare framework of the initial appeal and the final benediction:

Creator[28] of Israel, accept	Rock of Israel, arise to
the prayers of Israel,	the help of Israel
do not deprive their children	and deliver, according to
of the thought and sense	your promise, Judah and
that knew [or: would know]	Israel, our Redeemer, the
your graces and your deeds eternal	Lord of hosts is his name,
and your holiness	the Holy One of Israel.
and your presence on Mount	
Sinai and [your] praise from your	
people, the holy city Jerusalem.[29]	
Praised are you, Lord God, halleluja. [psalm 67]	Blessed are you Lord, who redeemed Israel.

Feodor reinterpreted the plea for national deliverance as a plea for knowledge of God and his grace, the grace which in Feodor's paraphrase of the verse from Exodus is presented as the pledge for the survival of the Jewish people. The same quest for knowledge was introduced by Feodor into his version of an ode pronounced in Polish-Lithuanian communities after the "Musaf" prayer of the Day of Atonement if a circumcision was performed that day:

28 See fn. 24 above.

29 The concluding portion of the psalm (cf. psalm 5) is appended rather loosely to the initial appeal.

Remember the covenant of Abraham
and the offering of Isaac

and the grace of Jacob to admonish your people properly for the sake of those who knew your holy name.[30]	and bring home the tents of Jacob and deliver us for the sake of your name.
	Who bears the seal of distinction, the sign of covenant between us and you, our father, if not we in our flesh? . . .
And do not bereave our hearts of the thought that knew [or: would know] your name and your deed and the force of appeal.	Remember, do not violate your covenant with us and return with pity to the remainder of Israel and deliver us for the sake of your name. . . .
Make happy your mankind endowed with reason, your proper creation. [psalm 12]	

Again the fulfillment of the covenant is identified with the knowledge of God, once granted and now all but lost; the request to "bring home the tents of Jacob" is replaced with a reminder of the latter's "grace." No trace remains of the main topic of the original text: the symbolic meaning of circumcision as a token of everlasting covenant between God and his people.[31]

In all the passages cited, the notion of knowledge emerges as Feodor's alternative to the traditional vision of national deliverance so deeply embodied in Judaism. The gathering of the "gone astray" is evidently connected with their illumination by "the thought and sense that knew (*poznavshi*)" God's graces, with the supplication not to "bereave our

[30] The last words of the phrase "ulichati podobno liudi tvoia delo poznavshi imia tvoje sviatoie" are evidently corrupted, as are many other passages in the text. "Delo" should be read "delia" (cf. "delo imeni eho" which should be "delia imeni eho," psalm 1), and "poznavshi" should be read "poznavshikh": in the latter, the final "kh," often written above the line, was evidently omitted. "Those who knew your holy name" are the patriarchs mentioned at the beginning of the psalm.

[31] Against this background, it was only to be expected that Feodor would eliminate from the prayer "Rṣeh" every reference to the restitution of the fire-offerings in the temple:

Accept, O Lord God, your people and bring near you our will and our prayers, to say properly morning and evening praise and adoration to you, God	Accept, O Lord our God, thy people Israel and their prayer; restore the service to the oracle of thy house; receive in love and favor both the fire-offerings of Israel and their prayer, and may the service of thy people Israel be ever acceptable unto thee.

[psalm 10].

hearts of the thought that knew (*poznavshi*) your name and deed.'' And it is hardly a coincidence that this notion of knowledge reappears with the same persistence in the description of Feodor's conversion to Christianity and in his missionary appeals to his former coreligionists. In the introduction to his ''Psalter,'' our author presents himself as ''Feodor, the newly-baptized, who knew (*poznavshi*) light from darkness, good from bad, and who knew holy baptism.'' In the Epistle already mentioned, Feodor, after a very similar description of his own baptism, directly summons ''the entire kin of Judah. . . to know (*poznati*) the true light'' of the Christian faith: ''May your blind eyes get opened and may you know (*poznali by este*) the true light. . . .''[32]

The Idiosyncratic Christianity of Feodor the Jew

The contents of the work that Feodor presented to his high patrons, Metropolitan Philip and Grand Prince Ivan III, as ''the Psalter of David'' led scholars to accuse him of a hidden adherence to his old faith. The fact is, however, that this text not only reveals Feodor's alienation from the Jewish religion, but also contains a curious test-case for the sincerity of his Christianity. In the famous ''anti-Christian'' passage of the prayer '' ʿAleynu Leshabeaḥ,'' originally directed against heathens, the worshipers render praise to the Lord

> since he has not made us like the nations of the lands and has not placed us like the families of the earth, since he has not made our portion like theirs, nor our lot like that of all their multitude, for they prostrate themselves before vanity and before emptiness and pray to a god that saves not.

For medieval Jews, this passage had an additional, hidden meaning. The numerical value (*gimatriya*) of the letters in Hebrew constituting ''and before emptiness'' was found to be identical with the *gimatriya* of ''before Jesus,'' and so it was interpreted by the worshipers. Hence the custom to spit at the pronunciation of ''and before emptiness.''[33]

One could hardly imagine a better opportunity for Feodor to indicate his hidden disdain for Christianity—if that were his true attitude—than by simply translating the words in question as they are and spitting at the appropriate moment, perhaps. For he translated ''the nations of the lands'' as ''heathens,'' and ''the families of the earth'' as ''the sinners of the earth''; also, who in Moscow could suspect that in this passage ''emptiness'' would

32 Sokolov, ''Poslanie Feodora zhidovina,'' p. 107.

33 See *Aleinu Le-shabbe'ah*, in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1972), cols. 555–58.

refer in fact to Jesus? Feodor rewrote the problematic lines, however, in his usual manner:

> . . . for they did not know (*ne poznasha*) the strength of their creator [in] their prayer just as [in] their deed. [psalm 73]

It is obvious that Feodor was aware of the popular interpretation of the original text of the passage and wanted to avoid it by all means.

Yet Feodor used extreme discretion in introducing his Christian beliefs into the text of the "Psalter," as two more examples will indicate. Contrary to the Christians who recognized the messiah in the person of Christ, the Jews still await their messiah and pray for his coming. Feodor left most of the prayers pertaining to this out of the "Psalter," but the texts he selected do contain two short references to the messiah still to come. Both were meticulously emended. According to the first of the "Eighteen Benedictions," God "remembers the graces of fathers and will bring a redeemer (*go'el*) to their children's children." Feodor reduced this to "will bring joy. . ." (psalm 1). The exclamation in the Saturday morning prayer "None but you [God] is our redeemer for the days of messiah" became "None but you redeemed (*iskupil*) us for the final days" (psalm 19). The expectation of the future messiah disappears, and the act of redemption is placed in the past in accordance with Christian belief. These emendations betray the Christianity of the author, yet they are hardly discernable to those unacquainted with the Hebrew text of the passages adapted.

Though proclaiming his Christianity, Feodor turned to the Jewish liturgy for the source of his prayers; though praying Jewish prayers, he insisted on making them fully compatible with his newly acquired Christian faith. Moreover, a close scrutiny of Feodor's prayers reveals clear traces of the Orthodox liturgy as well, especially of the appendix of nine "following" odes peculiar to the *Sledovannaia* Psalter, read in the church and absent, of course, from the Hebrew original. Be it just an idiom from the ninth ode clumsily installed by Feodor into one of his psalms,[34] or the interlacing—this time equally successful in style and substance—of the first following ode of the Orthodox Psalter with a passage from the benediction "Qadish

[34] In Feodor's text: "Boh vyshnii daet' milost', s''tvorivyi vsia, pomianuti milost' otets' i prizovet' radost' chadom' " (psalm 1); the use of the infinitive *pomianuti*, which violates the syntax of the sentence, can be explained only as an imitation of "pomianuti milosti, iakozhe hlahola ko ottsem nashim. . ." in the ninth "following" ode of the Orthodox Psalter (Luke 1:54).

Yatom,"[35] all testify to the gradual penetration of the Christian liturgy into Feodor's religious consciousness. Feodor's efforts to adorn his text with Old Slavonic forms reveal another aspect of the same process. Although this stylization can at times become ridiculous—for example, when Feodor, using obsolete aorist forms, appeals to God in a strange mixture of second person singular and plural[36] —it reflects Feodor's will to put his prayers into the proper "Rus' language of the Orthodox Christians,"[37] and his gradual assumption of his new Christian identity.

An outstanding example of this fusion of Jewish and Christian elements is psalm 38, one of the very few in Feodor's text that appear to be entirely original:

> Great is your grace and the fear of you in heaven and on earth in the heart of each creature. And the heavenly forces, Kherubim and Ophanim, Ajasim, Seraphim, Igrilim, Akhasim and Asmalim and Mulim and Malakhim, mankind endowed with reason, all animals and birds and reptiles and trees and herbs, mountains and valleys, fire and water, sun and moon and stars in their (full) strength, (all) shall praise their God with awe and obey your commandments. (They) long for your grace morning and evening, kneel and reach out their hands before you. High are the ears of you, (who) hears prayers properly, and the grace of your love.

The image of all creation worshipping God has certain Hebrew parallels, yet none of them approaches Feodor's radical anthropomorphism in the description of nature.[38] The only literary influence detectable in the text of the psalm is of the apocryphal ode of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed'nego known to Feodor as the eighth ode of the *Sledovannaia* Psalter. The ode is composed of a series of appeals to angels, mountains, birds, animals, etc., to bless and elevate God, and it features, among many others, most of the creatures listed in Feodor's text.[39]

[35] The first part of Feodor's ode 3 is a short summary of the ode of Moses after the crossing of the Red Sea (Exodus 15), which constitutes the first "following" ode of the Orthodox Psalter; cf. Feodor's "Pesn' Bohu poite emu, slava eho nad tvaren'em' svoem'" to "Poem Gospodevi, slavno bo proslavisia," or Feodor's "tsari i kniazi ehipet'skia potopi v mori," to "izbrannia vsadniki. . . potopi v Chermnem mori" in the Slavonic original. On the significance of "Qadish Yatom" in Feodor's "following" odes, see above, p. 85.

[36] "Blahosloven ty Hospod' Boh, nah be odeste, zhazhden be napoiste, alchen nakormiste" (psalm 65).

[37] This is how the Rus' language is defined in Feodor's introduction to his Psalter (see fn. 14, above).

[38] The closest Hebrew parallel to Feodor's psalm, the so-called "Pereq Shira," as well as other descriptions of creation worshipping God, were studied by M. Beyth-Aryeh, "Pereq Shira" (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, 1967).

[39] Cf. "blahoslovite vsia ptitsy nebesnyia, zveri i vsi skoty" in ode 8 to Feodor's "vsiaky zveri i ptitsa i hadi," or "blahoslovite solntse i mesiats, zvezdy nebesnia Hospoda" in the ode to Feodor's "i ospod' ikh solntse i luna i zvezdy v ikh sile strakhom pokhvaliat."

This Christian "source of inspiration"—the similarity of certain formulations still does not justify calling it a source—appears to be matched by the Hebrew ranks of heavenly forces as if directly transferred from one of the Hebrew lists of the celestial hierarchy. Indeed, Feodor's ranking consists, for the most part, of names well represented on these lists. However, it does not follow the same order as any of them, and it features only nine ranks instead of the usual ten; moreover, it contains certain Akhasim and Mulim which are not known in the Hebrew angelology. Surprisingly enough, these Akhasim and Mulim prove to be the qualities of *ashmalim* (Feodor's Asmalim) who are, according to the Talmudic etymology, animals of fire who move hastily, *(ha)ḥash(im)*, and talk, *memalel(im)* (Feodor's Mulim).[40] The reason for introducing these nonentities seems to be that Feodor, having forgotten some of the accepted names, wanted nevertheless to bring the number of the angelic ranks to nine, which is their number in the Christian tradition. Thus the transcription of their Hebrew names is but a stylization, inspired, no doubt, by names for cherubs and seraphim retained in Christian literature in their Hebrew form.

The heterogeneity of Feodor's text is quite revealing of the ambiguous religious consciousness of the author, torn between his old and new identities. He gave up all hopes for the restoration of the ancient glory of the Jewish people by the future messiah, yet he continued to pray for restitution of the old "knowledge" to those "gone astray" and to believe in the survival of the children of Abraham by God's grace and presence. Feodor's ambivalent attitude to his Jewish past may also explain the emergence of his pseudoepigraphic "Psalter." Commissioned by the metropolitan to translate the Psalter of David utilized by the Christians in liturgy and prayer, Feodor presented his patron with the prayers he prayed himself, still borrowed for the most part from the Jewish liturgy, yet with all the modifications discussed above. One may wonder why he did not make his work more explicitly Christian, yet this is not a question that textual analysis can answer. With the limited data available, it seems precarious to go any deeper into the evasive psychology of this "echte religiöse Pseudoepigraphie."[41]

40 Babylonian Talmud, *Ḥagiga* fol. 13, p. a–b. I owe this crucial reference to my friend, Mr. M. Kister.

41 Cf. W. Speyer, "Fälschung, pseudoepigrafische freie Erfindung und 'echte religiöse Pseudoepigraphie,'" *Pseudoepigrapha I* (= *Entretiens Hardt*, 18), pp. 331–72.

The Reception of the "Psalter" by Contemporaries

Feodor's "Psalter" is preserved in two manuscripts, both miscellaneous collections put together ca. 1490 by one of the best-known contemporary *literati*, the monk Ephrosin from the Monastery of St. Cyril on the White Lake.[42] As is often the case, "the literary convoy" of the work contains a clue to its perception by readers. In one of the manuscripts, aptly defined in recent research as an "encyclopaedic" collection,[43] the "Psalter" appears along with such heterogenous texts as the *Khozhdenie* of the abbot Daniel and the *Zadonshchina*, as well as numerous other historical and theological entries.[44] The other manuscript is much more homogeneous. This collection consists of liturgical texts, special prayers, remarks on church discipline, etc., and it was identified accordingly as Ephrosin's *trebnik* (a handbook of church rites used by a priest) mentioned in a late fifteenth-century catalog of the monastery library.[45]

The fact, in itself exceptional, that Ephrosin included the same text in two different collections indicates not only his interest in the "Psalter," but also a certain divarication in his estimation of it. On the one hand, Ephrosin considered it a text worthy of reading and placed it in a *chetii sbornik*; on the other, he placed the "Psalter" in his *trebnik* as well, for possible use in prayer. The apocryphal character of Feodor's "Psalter" was, no doubt, clear to Ephrosin, yet his collections reveal a distinct taste for this kind of literature.[46] The fact that there was another version of the Psalter of David bothered neither him nor other contemporary readers, as long as they liked the text itself.

Ephrosin's Orthodoxy is beyond any doubt, and his attitude to Feodor's "Psalter" must be considered representative of its initial reception. Exactly as described by Gennadii, the "Psalter" originally spread in separate "booklets." Each of the two copies incorporated by Ephrosin in his collections had lost the first folio before it reached his hands. Nevertheless, there seems to have been a complete text in the monastery library, for in the

42 See Ia. Luria (Lur'e), "Literaturnaia i kul'turno-prosvetitel'naia deiatel'nost' Efrosina v kontse XV v.," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* (hereafter *TODRL*) 17 (1961): 130–68.

43 R. Dmitrieva, "Chet'i sborniki XV v. kak zhanr," *TODRL* 27 (1972): 150–80.

44 M. Kagan, N. Ponyrko, and M. Rozhdestvenskaia, "Opisanie sbornikov XV v. knigopistsa Efrosina," *TODRL* 35 (1980): 1–300; the manuscript in question, КБ-9, is described by M. Kagan on pp. 105–144. Ms. Kagan is wrong, however, in her statement (p. 144) that both manuscripts of Feodor's "Psalter" are written in the same hand; cf. the facsimile samples appended by Speranskii to his edition in "Psaltyr' zhidovstvuiushchikh," tables following p. 72.

45 КБ-6, described by N. Ponyrko in Kagan et al., "Opisanie sbornikov."

46 Luria, "Literaturnaia i kul'turno-prosvetitel'naia deiatel'nost' Efrosina," passim.

trebnik the lost introduction to the "Psalter" could be restored on the reverse side of the preceding folio. The abundance of scribal errors, some of them evidently attempts to make sense of passages corrupted by a preceding copyist, may also testify to the initial popularity of Feodor's text.

What requires an explanation, then, is not the use of the "Psalter" by the Novgorodians—which in itself does not make them heretics any more than it did the venerable fraternity of St. Cyril—but rather the inquisitional zeal it inspired in the Novgorod archbishop. And indeed, it proves to be not the only lapse in Gennadii's argumentation against the heretics. A recent study has shown that the "heretical" icon discovered by Gennadii, in one of the episodes in which St. Basil of Caesarea is depicted as cutting off a hand and a leg of Christ, in fact represented a rare but perfectly canonical interpretation of the so-called eucharistical miracle.[47] Some witchcraft practices which Gennadii also attributed to heretical intrigue,[48] albeit interesting as vestiges to heathen beliefs, are equally irrelevant to the main subject of his accusation. Thus it is not surprising that the Council of 1490, though gathered at Gennadii's instigation, retained only a small portion of the latter's charges against the heretics. Neither the fathers of the council, nor Iosif of Volokolamsk, who subsequently recast the accusations against the "Judaizers" in a scholarly and systematic manner,[49] made any mention at all of Gennadii's main evidence for the "Judaism" of the heretics: their use of the "heretical Psalter."

* * *

The religious ferment in Novgorod in the last quarter of the fifteenth century was bred by a combination of different factors. Frustrated expectation of the end of the world undermined the authority of the church tradition. The elimination of the relative autonomy of the Novgorod church, especially the introduction of the cult of saints venerated in Moscow, provoked opposition among the local clergy.[50] The appointment to the Novgorod see

47 N. Goleizovskii, "Dva epizoda iz deiatel'nosti novgorodskogo arkhiepiskopa Gennadiia," *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 41 (1980): esp. 125–30.

48 In a letter of 1488 to Bishop Nifont of Suzdal'; *AED*, pp. 312–13.

49 Cf. Luria, "L'hérésie," pp. 49–67, with its references to Luria's earlier studies of Iosif's polemical writings.

50 One of the main accusations raised against the Novgorod heretics at the Council of 1490 was that they "reproach with abusive words, defame and do not venerate the great Rus' saints Petr, Aleksii and Leontii and Sergii, the wonder-workers, and other sainted reverend fathers"; *AED*, p. 384, cf. p. 385. However, before the conquest of Novgorod by Moscow, it was not at all obvious that Novgorodians should venerate Petr, Aleksii and Sergii, who were closely associated with Moscow, or Leontii, locally venerated in Rostov (which belonged to Moscow), as "great Rus' saints." (On the introduction of the cult of Sergii to Novgorod as a means to

of Gennadii Gonzov, a henchman of Moscow and an inveterate simoniac, aggravated the situation.[51] Yet, whatever other factors were involved, the first heretics' encounter with the Jews and their subsequent interest in Judaism gave their confrontation with Orthodox dogma a peculiar coloring. According to the metropolitan Zosima, the Novgorod heretics not only attacked the official doctrine of the church, but also "praised among them the rejected Old Testament and praised the Jewish faith."[52] We know, indeed, that the heretics obtained a complete Slavonic translation of several Old Testament books previously known in Rus' mostly in compilations.[53] On the margins of one such compilation, a Moscow follower of the Novgorod heretics, Ivan Chernyi, left a series of notes in which he praised certain Old Testament prescriptions; similar notes discovered in two other Old Testament collections belong either to Ivan Chernyi or to some like-minded reader.[54] It was not for nothing, then, that of all the labels current in the history of heresies, the one that stuck to the Novgorod heretics was that of *zhidovskaia mudrstvuiushchii* (ʼιουδαιόφρονες).

On the other hand, there is very little evidence that the Novgorod heretics actually tried to imitate the Jewish way of life or adopted any Jewish religious practices. The desecration of icons and the biting of the Holy Cross, attributed to them in the verdict of 1490, cannot be considered such, despite the fact that for the fathers of the council everything "contradicting the divine law and the Christian faith" was *ipso facto* "according to the Jewish custom." The only accusation indicative of Jewish influence was that all heretics "venerated Saturday more (*pache*) than the day of Christ's resurrection [Sunday]";[55] we do not know what form this preferential veneration took. Nevertheless, none of the heretical clerics renounced his position in the church, and no heretic performed circumcision, not to speak of the more elaborate elements of the Jewish ritual. Indeed, one could hardly expect that a few encounters with the Jews in the early 1470s, restricted as they were to Denis and Aleksei, could provide them with enough knowledge of Judaism so as to impart a distinctly Jewish character to the

appease Moscow on the eve of the final conquest, see A. Khoroshev, *Tserkov' v sotsial'no-politicheskoi sisteme Novgorodskoi feodal'noi respubliki* [Moscow, 1980], pp. 178–80.)

51 A certain monk Zakhar went so far as to accuse Gennadii himself of heresy and to reject the entire church hierarchy for buying and selling church dignities; *AED*, p. 380. Cf. E. Golubinskii, "Istoriia russkoi tserkvi," vol. 2, pt. 1, *ChOIDR*, 1900, p. 617. Curiously, this Zakhar, whose entire activity seems to exclude any Jewish influence, was condemned as "eresem nachalnik" by the same council of 1490, together with Denis's and Aleksei's group.

52 *AED*, p. 384.

53 *AED*, p. 320.

54 *AED*, pp. 280–99.

55 *AED*, p. 383.

entire movement in the quarter century to come. The interest in Judaism, whether in the Old Testament, in the Six Wings, or even in Feodor's "Psalter" translated from Hebrew, did not disappear, but the Novgorod heretics seem to have been more eager "to praise" it in their controversy with the official church than to implement it in practice.[56]

There is irony in the fact that Feodor's "Psalter," so meticulously adapted by the author to his new Christian beliefs, was used, along with Orthodox readers, by Christian dissenters who had a soft spot for Judaism. But whatever use was made of it subsequently, the "Psalter" is interesting first and foremost as a personal document which offers us a rare chance to look into the turbulent religious consciousness of its author. And in this respect, the phenomenon it reflects may not be as isolated as it appears. At about the same period, the Jewish-Ukrainian milieu from which Feodor came produced the well-known translations, or rather adaptations, from Hebrew that later penetrated Muscovite Russia. To what extent was this literary activity the work of the Jewish converts to Christianity, who were numerous at the time? And was it not these translations which were instrumental, in turn, in attracting the Christians whose conversion to Judaism provoked the expulsion of the Jews from Lithuania in 1495? A further study of these texts will no doubt contribute to a better understanding of this inadvertent symbiosis of "Christianizers" and "Judaizers" that left a peculiar mark on Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian religious and intellectual history.

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[56] For possible structural parallels between the Novgorod heresy and certain pre-Reformation and Reformation movements that drew inspiration from the Old Testament and from contemporary Judaism, cf. L. Newman, *Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movement*, Columbia University Oriental Series, 23 (New York, 1925). No direct influence from this direction can be ascertained, however.

''Povest' o Esfiri'': The Ostroh Bible and Maksim Grek's Translation of the Book of Esther

MOSHE TAUBE and HUGH M. OLMSTED

A certain ''Повесть о Есфири'' (hereafter PE) has long been known to be associated in some manuscripts with the compositions of Maksim Grek, but the text itself has never been published or even summarized in detail.[1] It has been repeatedly identified in manuscripts of Maksim's collected writings (most recently and reliably in Sinicyna 1977, 237-42, and Bulanin 1984, 223-27). When A. I. Ivanov lists it in his extended register of works attributed to Maksim,[2] he implicitly ascribes the translation to Maksim, though he does not discuss the issue and it remains unclear just what he means by the words ''Maksim's translation.''[3]

Scholars concerned with the history of the Slavonic Bible have paid little attention to PE,[4] the most extensive comment being in a footnote by I. E. Evseev (1912–13 II, 1343 fn.). Referring to PE as simply one of a series of ''minor fragmentary commentaries on individual Biblical loci,'' attributed to Maksim Grek, Evseev clearly neither wanted to associate himself with

[1] The earliest three references are based on the same manuscript (GBL Rum. 265), characterized by A. V. Tereščenko (1834, 265) as ''a seventeenth-century Belorussian manuscript''; cf. Archbishop Filaret (Gumilevskij), 1842, 69 fn., and A. X. Vostokov's description of the Rumjancev manuscript collection (1842, 380). Tereščenko's reference, ''Повесть *от* Есфири'' (emphasis added), gives the impression that the text may be an extract or a retelling, but he declares that the translation resembles the version in the printed Bible of 1633 [sic!—i.e., 1663], with the inclusion of a quantity of Russian words. Vostokov repeats Tereščenko's description verbatim (but with the correct date 1663), adding that PE is divided into 30 chapters instead of the 9 in the 1663 Bible. We follow the usage of *TODRL* for standard abbreviations of manuscript collections and published sources; see also the list of References and Abbreviations, below.

[2] Ivanov 1969, s. n. 70. Citations according to Ivanov's list will be prefixed *Ivc-*, thus here Ivc70. For some cautionary notes with respect to this book, see Olmsted 1971, with further corrections *passim* in Bulanin 1984 and Sinicyna 1977.

[3] Tereščenko: ''Перевод вообще сходный с печатною 1633 [!] Библиею; только у Максима вмешано много русских слов.'' Vostokov: ''Перевод вообще сходен с печатным. Только здесь вмешано много русских слов и оборотов.'' Ivanov: ''Перевод Максима сходен с печатным церковнославянским но имеет много русских слов и оборотов.''

[4] Ivan Roždestvenskij, in his 1885 monograph on Esther, does not mention PE; it was apparently unknown to him.

the attribution to Maksim nor to credit Maksim with a role in the history of the East Slavic Bible.[5]

We submit that Maksim Grek did play a direct and important role in the Slavic translation of the Bible, for (1) PE is a complete translation of the Greek book of Esther,[6] and (2) the translation most probably was made by Maksim himself. We further intend to show that the PE was used by the compilers of the Ostroh Bible of 1581 (hereafter OB) as their primary text in creating their Esther; they also referred to a copy of the 1499 manuscript Gennadij Bible (hereafter GB), and edited their revised text against a Greek version of the LXX different from Maksim's original. The similarity of PE to the 1663 **Библия**, noted by Tereščenko, Vostokov, and Ivanov, is explained by the fact that that Bible essentially reproduced the OB.[7] For the book of Esther, then, the PE was also largely the source of the 1663 Bible text.

The PE follows the full LXX text of Esther. It is thus very different from the GB, where the parts of Esther that correspond to the Hebrew Masoretic Text (MT) generally reproduce an older Slavonic translation,[8] while the additions, newly translated from Latin, are gathered, as in Jerome's Vulgate, at the end. PE contains the full LXX text with the additions to MT appropriately distributed according to the Greek tradition.[9]

PE differs from the OB Esther in the following particulars: (a) The title, **Повесть о Есфири**, is found only in the Maksim Grek tradition, as opposed to the standard **Есфирь** of all other traditions; (b) The text is divided into thirty chapters, in contradistinction to the nine of OB and the 1663 **Библия** or the ten of MT and the 1751 Elizabeth Bible.[10]

[5] In the same article (1912–13 I, 1285), Evseev categorically states: "**На состав Библии, на характер ее славянского текста переводы Максима Грека не могли оказать влияния. Они стояли вне Библии.**"

[6] More specifically, it represents a Septuagint (LXX) version belonging to recension *b*, according to the classification represented in Hanhart 1966, esp. 84–87.

[7] See for example the discussion in Avtokratrova–Dolgova 1985.

[8] This translation is controversial both as to age and as to place of origin, but in scope it agrees with the MT. It is known only from East Slavic manuscripts, the oldest of which dates to the late fourteenth century. Vostokov (1842, 35), Gorskij–Nevostruev (I, 53–57), Roždestvenskij (1885), Meščerskij (1956, 198–209), and Alekseev (1987) believed it was translated directly from the Hebrew. Sobolevskij (1903, 433–36) and more recently Altbauer–Taube (1984) and Lunt–Taube (1988) have argued that it was translated from a Greek version, now lost, that differed significantly from the LXX.

[9] Thus A precedes 1:1, B comes between 3:13 and 3:14, C and D replace MT 5:1–2, E is between 8:12 and 13, and F follows 10:3.

[10] In MT, chapter 10 has only three verses, while in LXX it also contains addition F. The full text is included in PE (excluding the colophon, so that the final verse begins "Ἔτους τετάρτου

The PE is known in two "types" of the collections of Maksim Grek's works, the so-called Burcev and Nikiforov types.[11] The former arose late in the sixteenth century. Much of its reception and dissemination was in Belorussia and the Ukraine, where it was actively used by Orthodox believers in their struggle against the encroachments of Western religious currents on Orthodoxy. The Nikiforov type is of less relevance here, for not only are its origins later (seventeenth century), but its version of the PE is believed to derive from the Burcev type.[12]

The Burcev collection, like many other collections of Maksim's works dating from the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, includes what could summarily be described as two categories of compositions: those that are found in and inherited from the oldest, most authoritative manuscripts contemporary to Maksim, and whose attribution to him causes few questions; and those that are "added" compositions, like the PE, which join the manuscript tradition only after Maksim's lifetime. The authority of the Burcev collection is such that one has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the additions may also originate with Maksim himself.[13] Our discussion will be based on a single copy, KUL 378, which we believe to be a good representative of the text.[14]

We ascribe the translation of the PE specifically to Maksim Grek. In general, in its fidelity to the sense and syntax of the Greek text and in its non-standard Russian Slavonic features, it betrays a translator more familiar with Greek than with Slavonic. More especially its linguistic and stylistic features mark it specifically as the work of Maksim Grek. It is clear that the translator has no difficulty in understanding the Greek text, a feature that is especially highlighted in cases where the OB version differs from the PE

βασιλεύοντος Πτολεμαίου καὶ Κλεοπάτρας"), but the different divisions misled Vostokov to state that chapter 10 is missing from the PE in Rum. 265.

11 The basic types of Maksim's manuscripts were identified and named by N. V. Sinicyna, first in a series of articles in which her typological conclusions were originally detailed (e.g., 1971, 262 and fn.), then in a more comprehensive survey in her monograph on Maksim Grek (1977, 223–79). For the Burcev and Nikiforov collection types, see Sinicyna 1977, 237–42.

12 The Burcev type's links to the Ukraine and Belorussia are discussed by Olmsted (1977, 201–208, 379–80) and Bulanin (1984, 220). For the derivation of the Nikiforov type, see Olmsted (1977, 208–27, 380–84) and Bulanin (1984, 132). In particular, the entire section of the Nikiforov type containing the PE is probably derived from the Burcev type.

13 The presumption of Maksim's authorship must, of course, be bolstered by detailed textual, linguistic, and other evidence, as we undertake to provide for the PE below.

14 KUL 378 is early among Burcev manuscripts (see Appendix, no. A-1). Variation is largely expected to be restricted to phonetic and orthographic Ukrainianisms and Belorussianisms, such as: 2:2, A:3, etc. цару (standard RCS царю, BR hardening of palatalized *r*); 2:3 добрих (standard RCS добрых; Ukr loss of distinction between [i] and [y]); D:7 примини ся (standard RCS премѣни ся; Ukr syncretism of [ě] and [i]).

text (presumably as a result of the OB compiler's editorial decisions). In many such cases, the PE text agrees with the Greek against the OB:[15]

1:18 LXX: τυραννίδες 'rulers' wives'
PE: властели жены
OB: мучителницы жены

2:15 LXX: οὐδὲν ἠθέτησεν 'she neglected nothing'
PE: ничтоже преступила (i.e., verb correctly taken as deriving from ἀθετέω 'set aside, reject, neglect')
OB: ничтоже приложи (i.e., mistakenly from τίθημι 'put')[16]

C:12 LXX: ἐν ἀγῶνι θανάτου
PE: боязнию смертною
OB: смерти ради родителей (mistakenly from γονεῖς?)

D:3 LXX: ἐπηρείδετο
PE: опирашеся (from ἐπερείδειν)
OB: презрящи (mistakenly from ἐπιδεῖν?)

Certain peculiarities in the Slavic style are unlikely to be the work of a native Slav. This fact, too, suggests that the translator was more comfortable with the Greek than with the Russian Church Slavonic, and even, perhaps, that he may have been a native Greek. This is bolstered by the presence of many features typical of translation from Greek, such as participles as complements of verbs of perception, substantivized neuter plurals, and the like.

Of greater interest, many of the pecularities are precisely of the type that are already well known as characteristic of Maksim Grek's style, such as the choice of case-endings, and use of prepositions. The following inventory is only a sampling; other features could be adduced as well.

Genitive plural nominal forms in *-x* are surely the best-known idiosyncracy of Maksim's style; their presence has repeatedly served researchers as reliable supporting evidence for attributing compositions to Maksim.[17] This usage is prominent in the PE and provides a strong argument in favor of our attribution. As in Maksim's original works, in the PE the locative

15 Other classes of disagreement will be described below. For a similar range of examples taken from the printed 1859–62 Kazan' edition of Maksim's works (hereafter KI), see loci adduced by Baracchi (1971–72 II, 251–55). Our citations from the standard LXX text are taken from Hanhart 1966.

16 Roždestvenskij (1885, 212) also noted this example as among the mistranslations in OB.

17 Cf. Sobolevskij 1910, 263; Ržiga 1936, 85, 95; Denissoff 1943, 76; and Baracchi 1971–72 I, 267–70, and II, 252–53. Maksim's syncretism of genitive and locative plural forms is realized in both directions, as Olmsted has shown (Olmsted 1977, 257–58; 401–404; 1981; and forthcoming, *a*), particularly in the early manuscripts, before it has been normalized out by successive generations of Russian scribes. Thus genitive forms function for syntactic locative as well as the reverse.

forms occur in alternation with the standard genitive plural endings in a whole range of uses of the genitive: as complement of prepositions or verbs, in negation, possession, and with animate nouns in the "genitive-accusative" construction. We cite only selected examples:[18]

2:7 LXX: ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταλλάξαι αὐτῆς τοὺς γονεῖς
PE: по преставлении же родителех ея
OB: по преставлении же родителей ея
3:8 LXX: ἔθνος ... τῶν δὲ νόμων τοῦ βασιλέως παρακούουσιν
PE: язык ... царских же законѣх не слушает
OB: люди ... и закона царска не слушают
4:13 LXX: παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Ἰουδαίους
PE: паче всѣх иудеех
OB: паче всѣх иудеи
C:1 LXX: μνημονεύων πάντα τὰ ἔργα Κυρίου
PE: воспоминая всѣх дѣлѣх господних
OB: поминающе дѣла господня
8:5 LXX: πεμφθήτω ἀποστραφῆναι τὰ γράμματα τὰ ἀπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ Ἀμὰν, τὰ γραφέντα ἀπολέσθαι τοὺς Ἰουδαίους
PE: повели да возвратятся писания
посланая от Амана имиже повелѣл погубити Иудеех
OB: повели да возвратят писания
посланая от Амана имиже повелѣл погубити Иудеа
9:16 LXX: καὶ ἀνεπαύσαντο ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων
PE: и почиша от бранех
OB: и почиша от браней

The mixture of animate and inanimate noun-endings in a single syntagma was identified by Sobolevskij (1903, 264 fn.) as typical of Maksim's original works. It is found in PE:

2:3 LXX: καὶ ἐπιλεξάτωσαν κοράσια παρθενικὰ καλὰ τῷ εἴδει
PE: да изберуть отроковици дѣвы добрих видом
OB: да съберут дѣвицы дѣвъствении, доброзрачны

The confusion of accusative and locative in directional expressions is typical of Maksim's style, although it has been little mentioned in works about him. As part of his whole stylistic profile, it is a good diagnostic feature (cf. Olmsted 1977, 257–58, 401–404; and 1981).

[18] At least five other instances can be found, in 2:17 (дѣвах), 6:1 (днех), and 8:7, E:15, and 10:3 (Іудѣех or Іудеех). A measure of the form's unacceptability in standard Russian Slavonic is that all occurrences have been eliminated in favor of normal genitive forms in the OB.

1:22 LXX: καὶ ἀπέστειλεν εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν βασιλείαν κατὰ χώραν
PE: и посла во все царство и странах
OB: и посла книги къ всѣм властелем своим,
къ власти и власти (=GB)

D:12 LXX: ἐπέθηκεν ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον αὐτῆς
PE: положи на выи ея
OB: возложи на выю ея

Some other idiosyncratic uses of case–forms, mostly with prepositions, are typical of Maksim's style:[19]

1:15 LXX: καὶ ἀπήγγειλαν αὐτῷ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους
PE: и сказаша ему по законех
OB: и възвѣстиша ему по закону

C:7 LXX: ἵνα μὴ θῶ δόξαν ἀνθρώπου ὑπεράνω δόξης θεοῦ
PE: да не положу славу человѣчу паче славу божию
OB: да не воздам славы человѣку паче славы божия

5:14 LXX: σὺ δὲ εἴσελθε εἰς τὴν δοχήν
PE: ты ж вниди ... в пир
OB: ты же вниди ... на пир

In the verbal system, it is striking that the PE text renders the Greek morphological medio-passive preponderantly by means of a reflexive construction, in contrast to OB's more frequent periphrastic passive or the equivalent indefinite-personal active construction with third person plural and accusative object.

2:2 LXX: ζητηθήτω τῷ βασιλεῖ κοράσια
PE: да взыщутся цару отроковицы
OB: да взыщут царю дѣвицы

2:3 LXX: καὶ παραδοθήτωσαν τῷ εὐνούχῳ
PE: и да прикажутся евнуху
OB: и да отдадут евнухови

2:8 LXX: καὶ ἤχθη Ἐσθήρ
PE: и приведеся Есфир
OB: и бысть поята Есфир (=GB)

2:22 LXX: καὶ ἐδηλώθη Μαρδοχαίῳ ὁ λόγος
PE: и показася слово Мардохею
OB: и возвѣстиша слово Мардохею

8:1 LXX: καὶ Μαρδοχαῖος προσεκλήθη ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως
PE: и Мардохеи призвася от царя
OB: и Мардохеи призван бысть к царю

19 For a similar range of examples taken from the printed 1859–62 Kazan' edition of Maksim's works (hereafter KI), see loci adduced by Baracchi (1971–72 II, 251–55).

Why, and at what stage in his life, did Maksim undertake a new translation of Esther? Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence to answer this question. No quotes from the PE text have yet been identified in his original writings.[20] Only in one rather marginal instance does he refer to the text. In an original composition, the "Discourse Against the Blasphemers of the Most Pure Mother of God" (Ivc149, Слово на хулникы пречистыя Божия Матери), he has occasion to compare the Virgin Mary with other righteous women in Scripture (KI I, 499), among whom are listed Esther and Susanna. We may note that in addition to the PE, the Burcev collection contains an excerpt from the book of Susanna (Ivc68, frequently entitled "Молитва целомудренныя Сосаны" in the manuscripts). Both of these are generally associated with a "Prophetic Miscellany," a group of excerpts from the Old Testament prophets with catena, taken by Maksim from the manuscript tradition associated with the eleventh-century priest Upir' Lixyj. All of these focus on the plight of righteous victims unjustly accused or otherwise suffering—a thematic concentration that has particular relevance in Maksim's own compositions and biography.[21] It is thus quite reasonable to attribute to Maksim a personal sympathy for the figure of Esther and the lessons of her story. This scarcely provides an explanatory motivating factor, however, the more so since Maksim mentions ten righteous women, and no particular emphasis is placed upon either Susanna or Esther.

We may speculate that Maksim, having had occasion to peruse the GB translation of Esther, was dissatisfied to discover that its text differed from the Greek LXX and hence the Orthodox tradition. The basic MT part of the text corresponded to the Hebrew (this point might or might not have been clear to him), but the additions directly reflect the text and organization of the Latin Vulgate, with which he clearly was familiar. The vehemence of his anti-Latin views is generally known. His displeasure with the "Latinate" GB text might well have prompted him to undertake a translation that would satisfy his Orthodox point of view.

Sympathy for Esther and dissatisfaction with extant Slavonic versions of the book of Esther suggest motives that might be attributed to Maksim as reasons for his making a new translation, but they cannot constitute proof. The ascription of the translation to Maksim must, therefore, rest—at least at

[20] It should be said that the book of Esther is scarcely mentioned in the works of the Greek and Latin church fathers; cf. Hanhart 1966, 38.

[21] See Olmsted (forthcoming, *a*) for an introductory survey of the contents, themes, and rather extensive uses in Maksim's original works of the Prophetic Miscellany, and some discussion of the Susanna excerpt (p. 25 and note).

this stage of investigation—primarily on the combined grounds of manuscript tradition, linguistic features, and textual relationships.

Until now, no one has suggested a connection between the Ostroh Bible and the PE, much less a link to Maksim himself. Ivan Roždestvenskij argued, adducing many examples (1885 207–214), that the OB Esther is primarily the older Slavonic translation (cf. fn. 8, above), which was included in the GB, somewhat edited on the basis of the Greek LXX. Gorskij and Nevostruev gave more weight to the role of LXX, concluding (1855–1917 I:57) that unlike the GB Esther, the OB version represents a separate translation from the Greek; Rižskij (1978:98) concurs. This view is more accurate, although apart from implying that the OB editors themselves were responsible, Gorskij and Nevostruev do not elaborate on the nature or sources of the "translation from the Greek text," let alone suggest any connection to Maksim Grek. We will show that the PE was the primary basis for the OB text.

The close relationship of PE and OB is evident in shared variants—additions, omissions, and other deviations—that are not known from any Greek version of the text. Particularly significant is a long omission, from the third word of 9:17 (after καὶ ἀνεπαύσατο, и почиша) through 9:31. Here are some shared variants:

6:12 LXX: λυπούμενος κατὰ κεφαλῆς
PE, OB: скорбя скорбиею велиею

B:5 LXX: πρὸς τὸ μὴ τὴν βασιλείαν εὐσταθείας τυγχάνειν
PE, OB: дабы царствие наше не получило тихости (OB тихость) и смирение

3:8 LXX: ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν
PE, OB: въ всѣх языцех

4:8 LXX: ἐκ θανάτου
PE, OB: от горкия смерти

6:10 LXX: τῷ Ἰουδαίῳ τῷ θεραπεύοντι ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ
PE, OB: удеянину угоднѣ служащему во дворѣ нашем

8:6 LXX: καὶ πῶς δυνήσομαι σωθῆναι
PE, OB: и како спастися

Even in cases where they do not completely agree, PE and OB variants can show close similarity with one another against the LXX:

A:13 LXX: καὶ ὑπέδειξεν τῷ βασιλεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν
PE: и сказа цару яже она думают
OB: и сказа царю яже она помышляют

3:14 LXX: καὶ προσετάγη πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἑτοίμους εἶναι
εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην
PE: и повелено бысть всѣм готовым быти во уручены день
OB: и повелено бысть всѣм готовом быти во уреченныи день[22]

Not only is the OB Esther close to the PE, it surely derives from it. In cases where PE and OB disagree, directionality can frequently be distinguished, for PE agrees with LXX, and clearly precedes OB. Mistranslations in OB can frequently be explained as corruptions of the PE text, e.g.:

3:8 LXX: καὶ οὐ συμφέρει τῷ βασιλεῖ
PE: и не на успѣх царю
OB: и не наустих царю
6:9 LXX: καὶ δότω ἑνὶ τῶν φίλων τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν ἐνδόξων
PE: и да дасть единому от преславных друг царивых
OB: и да дасться ему от преславных друг царевых
B:6 LXX: καὶ δευτέρου πατρὸς ἡμῶν
PE: и втораго отца нашего
OB: и втораго от царя нашего
D:5 LXX: ἀπεστενωμένη ἀπὸ τοῦ φόβου
PE: стѣснен от страха
OB: стеняше от страха
D:7 LXX: μετέβαλεν τὸ χρῶμα αὐτῆς
PE: преминися цвѣт лица ея
OB: измѣнися лице ея

It should be noted that the "density" of OB's agreement with the different sources varies over the length of the book. Some sections show extended word-for-word agreement with PE; others show greater departures from PE and greater proximity to either GB or a different version of the LXX text. For example, in addition E, the compilers evidently did not use PE at all, but made an effort to translate independently from LXX. Their PE protograph may have lacked this addition in whole or in part.[23] Even with such departures, however, it is to the PE that the OB text shows the closest affinity overall.

The influence of the GB Esther and a version of LXX on OB has been noticed, especially by Roždestvenskij. The general dependence of the Ostroh Bible on the text of the Gennadij Bible was first indicated by Gorskij and Nevostruev (I, viii). With respect to the Esther text in particular they say only that it (or are they referring exclusively to the additions?) was

[22] In this case the words τοῖς ἔθνεσιν are lacking also in the *b* recension and in the 1518 Ald. edition.
[23] E:5–9 is missing in the KUL 378 copy of PE.

translated from the Greek (I, 57). Roždestvenskij adduced several examples of "doublets" in the OB version (1885, 214), in which a single Greek expression was rendered twice in the Slavonic: once in a form corresponding to the GB, and the second in a form corresponding to the LXX. Roždestvenskij took the latter to demonstrate direct use of the LXX by the compilers of GB (citing examples from 1:1, 1:4, and 2:7). In fact, they derive from the PE. For example:

4:1 LXX: ἐπιγνοὺς τὸ συντελούμενον
PE: разумѣв замышляемое
GB: бѣ вѣдая все еже творяше царь
OB: разумѣв замышляемое и все еже творяше царь

8:3 LXX: ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν Ἀμάν
PE: над всѣми имѣнии Амановыми
GB: над домомь Амановомь
OB: над домом и над всѣм имѣнием Амановым

It has been suggested that the LXX Greek text used by the compilers of OB was the Aldine 1518 *editio princeps* (e.g., Mathiesen 1981, 92). A similar view was expressed specifically for the book of Joshua by Lebedev (1890, 342–49), and by Alekseev for the Song of Songs (1985, 122). As for Esther, Roždestvenskij noted with somewhat greater reservation (1885, 210) that some of the readings in the OB text showed similarity to the printed Aldine (Ald.) and Complutensian (Compl.) editions, as well as to "certain manuscripts." He cites:

A:11 LXX: εἶχεν αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ
Ald., Compl: A, 311, *b*
εἶχεν τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦτο ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ (⁺αὐτοῦ: 236)[24]
PE: держаше соние сие во сердци
OB: дръжаше соние сие въ сердцы си

7:9 LXX: εἶπεν δὲ ... εἷς τῶν εὐνούχων οὗτος δέ ἐγνώκει
τοῦτο τὸ ξύλον ἰδὼν τοῦ σταυροῦ[25] ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ Ἀμὰν
ὅτε ἐκάλει αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸν δεῖπνον τῶν βασιλέων
καὶ περὶ τούτου πυθόμενος ἔγνω παρ' ἑνὸς τῶν παιδῶν
τὸ κατασκευαζόμενον (⁺καὶ εἶπε 248) πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα
PE: рече же ... один от скопцов сеи же вѣдяше видѣв
древо кресту пред домом амановым
егда призываше его на обѣд царьскыи
и о сем испытав уразумѣ от единого отроков
замышляемое и рече к цару

24 Sigla and other conventions are as in Hanhart 1966.
25 This word is omitted in MS 108, but present in Ald.

OB: рече же ... один от скопцев сеи же вѣдяше видѣв
древо пред домом амановым
егда призываше его на обѣд царьскии
и о сем испыта единаго от отрок и разумѣв
замышляемое и рече к царю

As is clear from these examples, the PE text follows Ald. more closely than does the OB. When OB agrees with Ald., it is because PE agrees with Ald. Now, this sort of similarity is shared by a number of Greek manuscripts; they are therefore not distinctive and cannot be used to show a particularly close link between Ald. and OB. When OB and PE disagree (in those readings characteristic of Ald. as part of the *b* recension), PE agrees with Ald. against OB. (Compare in A:11 the insertion of си in OB; in 7:9, OB's omission of кресту and its addition of и рече). The identification of PE casts a new light on the relationship between OB and Ald. Roždestvenskij's caution in linking the readings too closely with Ald. was quite justified. In a sense his examples no longer prove what they once seemed to. Further examples in support of our contention may be easily adduced,[26] e.g.:

A:2 Ald., *b*: θεραπευτὴς ὢν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ
LXX standard text: θεραπεύων ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ
PE: служебьник сыи во дворѣ
OB: служа въ дворѣ

D:1 LXX standard, Ald.: ἐξεδύσατο τὰ ἱμάτια τῆς θεραπείας καὶ περιβάλετο τὴν δόξην αὐτῆς
PE: совлечеся риз работѣпных, и облечеся во славу свою
OB: съвлечеся с риз скорбных, и облечеся в ризы свѣтлыя[27]

Altogether, then, the accepted notion that the OB editors relied specifically on a copy of the Ald. 1518 edition—at least with respect to Esther—is in need of revision. Instead, they evidently used a manuscript which, like Ald. and PE's protograph, represented the *b* recension, but which differed in some particulars from both of them. PE agrees with Ald. more frequently than does OB, but there are disagreements, e.g.:

[26] Still other examples are found in C:14, C:26, C:27, 5:5, 5:7.

[27] The OB disagreements with PE and Ald. find some parallels in individual manuscripts: скорбных corresponds to Greek πένθους, in the 13th-century Vatican MS 248; and в ризы свѣтлыя to τὰ ἱμάτια τῆς δόξης, found in the 10th-century Grottaferrata MS 392.

2:15 LXX, Ald.: ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναπληροῦσθαι τὸν χρόνον Ἐσθὴρ [τῆς θυγατρὸς Ἀμιναδαβ ἀδελφοῦ πατρὸς Μαρδοχαίου] εἰσελθεῖν
PE: егда же исполнися время Есфири внити[28]

2:15 LXX, Ald.: ὧν ἐνετείλατο [αὐτῇ] ὁ εὐνοῦχος
PE: от нихже заповѣдал евнух[29]

4:11 LXX: ὅτι τὰ ἔθνη πάντα τῆς βασιλείας γινώσκει
PE, OB: яко обычая царевы вся вѣси[30]

From such examples one may conclude that the PE itself was also produced not on the basis of Ald., but rather from a manuscript representing a tradition close to Ald. This prototype has yet to be identified.

Our conclusions about the provenance of the Ostroh Bible's book of Esther can be summarized as follows:

1. OB and PE are close relatives, with OB largely deriving from PE.
2. The generally accepted derivation of OB from GB and LXX must be adjusted in the following particulars:
   a. presumed LXX readings derive largely from PE.
   b. residual LXX readings derive not from Ald, but from some different version of the LXX, belonging to recension *b* but less similar to Ald. than is PE.
3. The pattern of borrowing, as defined by the density of proximities to the various sources, varies: in some sections there are greater departures from PE and greater dependence upon GB or LXX. The PE protograph may have lacked addition E altogether (so an effort—which one must acknowledge as unsuccessful—was made by the OB compilers to translate independently from LXX).
4. The PE LXX prototype is closer to Ald. than is the LXX Esther text used directly by the OB compilers, but it, too, differs from Ald.
5. Doublet readings in the OB Esther derive from PE plus GB or, marginally, LXX as well.

28 The bracketed section in Ald. is omitted not only in PE, but also in some of the oldest Greek manuscripts, e.g. Codex Sinaiticus, 4th cent. (formerly GPB and now British Museum), the Chester Beatty papyrus, 3rd century, as well as in the *a* recension manuscripts 106, 107 (Ferrara, 14th century).

29 The bracketed word in Ald. is omitted in PE as well as in the major Greek uncial witnesses and in recension *a*.

30 Roždestvenskij (1885, 212) thought that the OB compilers had misread ἔθνη as ἔθη, but in fact OB once more simply reflects PE. Greek manuscripts with ἔθη are known (e.g. MS 392, Grottaferrata, 10th century); the PE rendering is more likely to be a faithful translation from such a manuscript than a mistake on the part of Maksim (cf. comments above about the translator's knowledge of Greek).

Since the earliest Burcev manuscript dates to around the time the Ostroh Bible was being produced, we may ask whether the PE could, instead of deriving from Maksim Grek, have been inserted into the Burcev tradition at just that moment? Could it have originated with the compilers of OB themselves? This question brings even greater problems of its own:

1. How to explain the Maksim Grek features in the language.
2. How to explain the simultaneous greater fidelity to the LXX text and the less standard Slavonic in the PE than in the OB text.
3. How to explain the derivative, secondary relation of the OB text to the PE.
4. What alternative origin to posit for the PE itself.

Taking all of these problems into account, we submit that it is highly improbable that the PE text could have originated with the OB compilers themselves. Unless one acknowledges Maksim Grek's role, no plausible source is evident. The simplest, most satisfactory explanation is that Maksim Grek himself made the translation.

Nevertheless, some indirect connection between the presence of the early Burcev manuscripts in the Ukraine and Belorussia and the biblical publishing project in Ostroh is not to be excluded. Both the Ostroh project and the increased circulation of Maksim's manuscripts were certainly connected with the heightened interest at the time in defending Orthodoxy against challenges from the West.

Much remains unclear. It would be helpful to gain a more concrete understanding of why and when Maksim might have undertaken the translation of Esther. But even so, we believe that our discussion has established that Maksim Grek was the translator of the PE. The manuscript tradition, the fidelity to the Greek, the plausibility on grounds of personal interest, and, especially, the peculiarities of language—all this together makes a compelling case for ascribing the translation to Maksim.

Further, the textual relationships between the PE text and the OB version of Esther are close and apparent. The OB compilers seem clearly to have used the PE as their primary text, relying on the GB version and another Greek LXX text by turns for secondary editorial support. Thus, the Ostroh Bible's text of Esther, together with the derivative version in the 1663 **Библия**, should be acknowledged as derived primarily from the translation made by Maksim Grek.

Evidently, then, Maksim Grek must be given credit not only for another significant translation that has hitherto gone unacknowledged, but also for having contributed to the development of the Slavonic Bible tradition in a

much more substantial way than has been suspected. Further work should continue to throw light on the imposing heritage he left in Muscovy.[31]

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APPENDIX: Manuscripts Containing the PE

The prefix 'BMS–' designates the listings in Belokurov 1898; 'S–' refers to pages in Sinicyna 1977. The fact and locus of the PE's inclusion in these manuscripts where unidentified is provided by Sinicyna; other references are identified explicitly. Folia are given where available.

A. Burcev manuscripts in which the PE has been identified:

1. **Katolicki Uniwersitet Lubelski (KUL) 378**, Fols. 424.9–440v.22, late 16th cent. (BMS–); S 240. Source of text as cited in present article. Description: Ščapov 1976 II, 17–23. *inc.* В лето второе царства А(р)таксе(р)ксова великаго... *des.* ... соборо(м) и радостию и веселие(м) пре(д) бо̃го(м) в ро(д) во ве(к) в люде(х) свои(х)
2. **BAN Dobroxot. 32** (Voskr. 6), Fols. 301v–[317v], late 16th cent. (BMS–); S 240. Description: Sreznevskij–Pokrovskij II, 63–69 (PE is described as follows: "Повесть о Есфири" Книга Есфирь. Гл. 85-ая.).
3. **BAN 1.5.97** (Burc. 25), Fols. 235v–243, late 16th cent. (BMS–); S 239–40. This manuscript is summarily registered in Burcev 1901, 64–65 (a very brief listing; PE not mentioned). Ivanov (s. n. 70) declares that in this manuscript "помещена вся книга Есфирь, разделенная на 30 коротких глав, вместо 9, на которые она разделена в Библии 1663 г." (This characterization is repeated word for word, with only the most minor changes, from Vostokov 1842, 380], where it refers to Rum. 265; cf. also his use of Vostokov's text cited in fn. 3, above).
4. **Vilnius 249/49** Fols. 288–[300], 17th cent., (BMS192); S 241. Description: Dobrjanskij 1882, 402–410 (PE is described as follows: "Повесть о Есфири. Глав 30 вместо 10. Кончается книга словами: въ людех. Недостает последнего стиха, сравнительно с печатною Библией").
5. **GBL Rum. 265,** Fols. 356v–[368], 1st half of 17th cent.(?) (BMS49); S 241. Description: Vostokov 1842, 380 (PE is described as follows: "Здесь помещена вся книга Есфирь, разделенная на 30 коротких глав, вместо 9, на кои разделена оная в Библии 1663 г. Последней (10) главы, здесь, как и в

[31] This paper was written while Moshe Taube was in Cambridge as Visiting Fellow at the Harvard Russian Research Center, during his sabbatical leave from the Department of Slavic and the Department of Linguistics, Hebrew University. He is grateful to both the Russian Research Center and the Hebrew University for the financial support that made this leave possible. Both authors would like to express their indebtedness to Horace G. Lunt for the considerable help he provided during the editorial process.

Библии 1663 г. нет. Перевод вообще сходен с печатным. Только здесь много русских слов и оборотов"). Cf. also notes 1 and 3 above.

6. **GBL Muz. 8290** (Stroev 61), 2nd quarter of 17th cent. (BMS–); S 240. No other description.
7. **GPB OLDP O.XV/1291**, 18th cent. (1726) (BMS239); S 240. Description: Loparev 1892–99 III, 26 (PE not mentioned).

Burcev manuscripts characterized by Sinicyna (1977: 241–42) as *not* containing the PE are: GPB Sof. 1200, 1201 (BMS225, 226); GBL Kostr. 32 (BMS–); GBL Tixonr. 632 (BMS78); CGALI op.1 N.93 (BMS–); GBL Prjanišn. 136 (BMS165). Additional Burcev manuscripts adduced by Bulanin (1984:223–27) are also characterized as lacking the PE: CNB AN USSR no. 285 p./7 (BMS197); Gos. Ermitaž (Russkij otdel) E/RB–30 (BMS–); Minsk, GB BSSR 091/4236 (BMS–); CNB AN USSR, RO, DA/P–no. 521 (BMS193); Minsk, GB BSSR 091/4195 (BMS–)/CNB AN USSR, RO, no. 176/673 (BMS–).

B. Nikiforov manuscripts identified as containing the PE:

1. **GBL Nikif. 79**, 2nd quart. 17th cent. (BMS–); S 237. No other description.
2. **CGADA RO MGAMID no. 585**, 2nd quart. 17th cent. (BMS3); S 237. No other description.
3. **GPB Pogod. 1144**, 17th cent. (BMS215); S 238. No other description.
4. **GIM Ščuk. 537**, Fols. 302v ff., 17th cent. (BMS73, repeated as BMS 189); S 238. Description: Jacimirskij 1896–97 I, 121 (whole manuscript: pp. 117–26). PE described as follows: "Повесть о Есфири. Нач: В лето второе царства Артаксерксова Великого."
5. **GBL Egor. 1198**, end 17th—beg. 18th cent. (BMS–); S 238–39. No other description.

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In the text of the article, abbreviations for standard publications, manuscripts collections, etc., are rendered as in *TODRL*; recensions and manuscripts of the Septuagint (LXX) as in Hanhart 1966. Others are given below.

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The Language Question in the Ukraine in the Twentieth Century (1900–1941)*

GEORGE Y. SHEVELOV

VI. THE YEARS OF UKRAINIANIZATION (1925–1932)

As a body of official documents, decrees, and resolutions, the policy of Ukrainianization can be traced from the year 1923, or even from 1920. But as a series of practical measures implemented consistently and persistently, it hardly began earlier than 1925. As Popov rightly reported: "The broad work of the party in the field of Ukrainianization unfolded. . . some time around the summer of 1925" (282). In June of 1926, L. Kaganovič justly spoke of the first anniversary of Ukrainianization (*Budivnyctvo* 48). By that time, two prerequisites for the policy had emerged in the Ukraine: a new, urban-based intelligentsia who had broken with the countryside, not yet very numerous but large enough to be taken into account; and a marked, though still very limited, Ukrainian element within the party. Other factors favoring the introduction of the new policy were the reconstruction, by 1925, of industry ruined during the years of civil war, and the proclamation of industrialization made at the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in December 1925; these would precipitate an influx of peasants to the industrial centers. Whether the peasants would become Russianized or whether, on the contrary, they would Ukrainianize the cities was now a development indisputably on the horizon—and one fraught with consequences for decades to come.

The impending development was important not only for the Ukraine, but also for all other non-Russian parts of the USSR. There were other—in fact, crucial—considerations of an all-Union character at play that made the Central Committee of the CPSU cast the dice for Ukrainianization and press for its speedy materialization. They brought about the downfall, in December of 1925, of E. Kviring as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (CPU), a Latvian who since 1918 had been actively against Ukrainianization and who in 1925 was at

* Editors' note: Part 1 of this study, comprising five chapters and covering the period up to 1925, appeared in vol. 10, no. 1/2 (June 1986).

best lukewarm to it. L. Kaganovič was appointed in his place and received the special task of actively promoting the new policy while making sure that it did not exceed the limits acceptable to the party—i.e., that it did not overflow into separatism in politics nor, in fact, in culture. Kaganovič had been tried and tested on numerous occasions and in various places—Saratov, Homel', Nižnij Novgorod, Voronež, Turkestan; from 1922 he had worked in Moscow. Probably the only First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU who to that time had mastered Ukrainian and occasionally used it in public, he was a ruthless party man and an ace troubleshooter. Kaganovič was appointed on 6–7 April 1925 (*Visti*, 8 April 1925, no. 79). Just two months later, on July 13, V. Čubar, a Ukrainian, became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (CPC), and Rakovs'kyj was sent to London as the Soviet ambassador, even though by that time he seems not to have opposed Ukrainianization. Rakovs'kyj's signature had appeared on a decree of 8 August 1923 that strongly favored an actual Ukrainianization (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'* 1923, 29, p. 919; other signatories were Petrovs'kyj and Bucenko).

The reasons for the new direction of the Central Committee of the CPSU were the collapse of expectations for a proletarian revolution in the industrialized countries and the stabilization of Europe. The party turned to the new policy of supporting colonial revolutions in the hope that they would weaken the West and hasten its downfall. Although he did not mention the first consideration, Stalin fairly frankly expounded on the second at the Twelfth Congress of the CPSU, in April 1923:

> One of two things: either we put in motion, revolutionize the deep rear of imperialism, the oriental colonial and semicolonial countries, and thus accelerate the downfall of imperialism, or we miss [doing so] and herewith strengthen imperialism and by the same token weaken the power of our movement The entire Orient looks at our Union as at an experimental field. If in the framework of that Union we solve correctly the national problem in its practical application, [if] we here, in the framework of that Union establish really fraternal relations among the nations, an actual cooperation. . . the entire Orient will see that in our federation it has the banner of liberation, has the advance guard, in the wake of which it must go, and this will be the beginning of the collapse of world imperialism. (*Dvenadcatyj s"ezd* 480)

As an additional consideration he pointed out that "formerly oppressed nations occupy the areas most needed for economic development and the places most important from the point of view of military strategy" (481).

The national republics were to become showcases of these developments. Stalin did not conceal that even the small Asiatic Soviet republics carried more weight than the Ukraine in this regard: "If we commit a minor mistake in the Ukraine, this would not be so sensitive a matter for the Orient. But a minor mistake in a small country, an Adjaristan (population

120,000), would create a reaction in Turkey and in the entire East'' (659). Nonetheless, the Ukraine was to follow the same path. There the general policy of *korenizacija* (going to national roots) was to become Ukrainianization, even if in Stalin's thinking the process was superfluous.

Stalin's utterances should be supplemented (and in part corrected) by the materials of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International. The congress held three special sessions devoted to the national question, on 30 June and 1 July 1924, at which D. Manuil'skij was the main speaker. The outcome was the adoption of a resolution that focused not on the Orient, but on Central Europe and the Balkans. After stating that ''the national question after the World War has acquired a new importance and, at this time, is one of the most essential political questions of Central Europe and the Balkans'' (*Cinquième congrès* 427), the resolution devoted a separate section to the Ukrainian question in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Romania, which began: ''The Ukrainian question is one of the most important national questions in Central Europe'' (430). One overall solution should be sought for the Ukrainian lands occupied by the three states: just as colonial movements in Asia and Africa were regarded as crucial for the coveted collapse of the great Western states, so the Ukrainian question would be the key to the dissolution of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Romania. The ultimate goal of the policy adopted by the congress was the unification of all the West Ukrainian lands with the Ukrainian SSR. Kaganovič, already in charge of the Ukraine, expressed the new principle thus: ''If for Oriental nations the Uzbek, Turkmen and Kazakh republics can and must be the model, for the Western nationalities the Ukraine must serve as an example and a model of solving the problems of national liberation of oppressed masses by the proletariat'' (*Budivnyctvo* 41; also pp. 42, 50).

In 1925 these problems became more acute. On the one hand, in the bitter struggle within the CPSU Stalin needed support from every quarter, including the not very numerous national communists (he did receive the support of Skrypnyk; e.g., Skrypnyk 114); it was not by chance that Zinov'ev, his main opponent at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, made overtures to these same ''comrades'' (*Dvenadcatyj s"ezd* 604). On the other hand, the international situation, with the formation of S. Baldwin's conservative, anti-Soviet government in England (1923) and the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno (1 December 1925), was perceived in the Soviet Union as the beginning of an encirclement by enemies. Finally, events in Poland, which in 1926 led to the coup of J. Piłsudski, could have had some importance specifically for the Ukraine.

It was in the wake of these internal and, especially, external events that the Ukrainian minority in the CPU found itself tolerated and even encouraged in its long-dreamed-of policy of Ukrainianization. The fact that this policy was most strongly motivated by circumstances outside the Ukraine, that even internally motivation came more from within the CPSU than from within the CPU, and that, in any case, it did not arise as any popular movement, explains its strengths and weaknesses as well as the relative ease with which it would later be discontinued. The policy did not reflect a movement of Ukrainians against Moscow, but, to a great extent, represented just another turn in the policy of the Kremlin. As Petljura prophetically wrote in a letter to M. Šumyc'kyj (3 November 1923): "In general the affair of Ukrainianization makes the impression of a certain tactical move on the part of Bolsheviks; if it does not yield the desired outcomes, it will soon be abandoned" (2, 542).

In anticipation of the decisions of the Twelfth Congress of the CPSU, the Seventh Conference of the CPU (4–10 April 1923) spoke of "the complete independence of the Soviet republics in their national-cultural development and sufficient independent action in economics" (*Rezoljuciji* 221). In April 1925, at its plenary session, the Central Committee of the CPU gave a broad survey of the state of Ukrainianization, and in June 1926, at the next plenary session, it issued "Theses on the results of Ukrainianization," which would serve as political guidelines for the next five years. Afterwards there was hardly any major meeting of the CPU in which these problems did not figure prominently. One indirect testimony to the importance they had is the speech of S. Kosior, First Secretary of the Central Committee, at the November 1928 plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU. That was the year collectivization of the peasantry had been undertaken. Kosior devoted 13 pages of text to the collectivization, and 34 pages to Ukrainianization (Kosior 21ff.).

No less attention was given to Ukrainianization by the government. Of basic import were the decree of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the CPC on 30 April 1925, "On measures for the speedy completion of Ukrainianization in the Soviet State machinery," and the decree of the CPC on 16 July 1925, "On practical measures for the Ukrainianization of the Soviet State machinery" (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'*, 6 June 1925, no. 26, pp. 202f.; 10 August 1925, no. 56, pp. 653ff.). They were supplemented by several others concerning specific matters: e.g., "On the form for texts (signboards) on buildings of Soviet institutions," of 10 October 1925; "On the order for installing, on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, signboards, inscriptions, letterheads, seals, and labels in Ukrainian," of 31 December 1925 (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'* 78, 1925, pp. 653, 983—viddil I; 27, pp. 486,

483f.—viddil II); "On the Ukrainianization of clerical work at the commodity exchanges," of 15 June 1926 (Durdenevskij 158). In 1926 the People's Commissariat of Education published a whole book of decrees and directions, entitled *Ukrajinizacija radjans'kyx ustanov* (*Dekrety, instrukciji i materijaly*, no. 2, Kharkiv). All the decrees and laws were summarized and reconfirmed in the extensive "Regulations on securing the equality of languages and on assistance to the development of Ukrainian culture," dated 6 July 1927 (Durdenevskij 145–54).

If one compares party resolutions and government decrees of 1925 to 1927 with those of preceding years, some important differences in phrasing and content become obvious. In 1919, "all local languages are declared equal in their rights" (*Sobranie uzakonenij* 1919, 23, p. 347); in 1920, it is stated that "the Ukrainian language should be used alongside the Great Russian one" (*Sobranie uzakonenij* 1920, 1, p. 5); in 1923 this is explicitly rejected: "The formal equality of the two languages most widespread in the Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, as applied so far is insufficient" (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'* 1923, 19, 914). Now the exclusive use of Ukrainian is required of all civil servants, to begin not later than 1 January 1926; those who cannot or do not want to comply must be fired (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'* 1925, 26, 381); no one who does not have a command of Ukrainian is to be employed in any government office; everyone who applies as a student at a university, institute, or college should pass an examination in the Ukrainian language (Durdenevskij 149).

The very motivation for Ukrainianization had changed. Previously the impetus was the necessity of accommodating the peasantry (as shown in part 1, chap. 5). Even in June 1923, the association of the Ukrainian language with the countryside was preeminent. The resolution passed by the June 22 plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPU contained such stipulations as "In organs of the provincial [party] committees, materials concerning work in the countryside, both official and by local authors, must be published in Ukrainian"; also, "The work of conferences of delegates, [and] of circles and discussions (*spivbesidy*) in villages, should be conducted in the Ukrainian language" (*Kul'turne budivnyctvo* 231f.). The clear implication was that party life beyond the countryside was to proceed in Russian, as before.

Now such use of Russian was being rejected outright, as implying the inferiority of Ukrainian culture and language and its imminent withering away in confrontation with the superior Russian culture and language; the latter was assumed in the "theory of the conflict of two cultures" allegedly launched by D. Lebed' (see part 1, chap. 5), who was removed from the

Ukraine at the same time as Kviring, in 1925.[57] In 1926, the identification of the Ukrainian culture and language with the village was flatly rejected (e.g., by Zatons'kyj—*Budivnyctvo* 12), as was any assertion of the superior character of the Russian culture and language. Zatons'kyj declared that such contentions were based on a false identification of the Russian culture with the proletariat and the Ukrainian one with the peasantry (*Budivnyctvo* 16). When Skrypnyk was reproached for the suppression of the Russian language in the Ukraine—which must have been a reference to the situation in the cities—he responded that there was no such suppression, because "in *rajony*, in the countryside" party and state machinery operated in Russian if the *rajon* or the village were Russian (Skrypnyk 55). This followed the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPU (of 19 July 1927) suggesting that *rajony* with such a national minority must have enough "agricultural literature in Russian, which takes into account peculiarities in the agricultural work of Russian peasants in the Ukraine" (*Budivnyctvo* 204). Both Skrypnyk and the Central Committee were silent about the policy of Ukrainianization aimed at the retreat of the Russian language from the cities, and the summary regulations of 6 July 1927 bluntly state that cities and towns could not be made into separate "national-territorial administrative units" (§ 8, Durdenevskij 146). Some unpublished circulars on the matter must also have been sent out; for instance, in the Artemivs'k district (Donec'k region) there was a requirement that 75 percent of books purchased by libraries be in Ukrainian (Xvylja 1930, 40).

Theoretical foundations for the policy of Ukrainianization are few in the programmatic party documents of the time. This is hardly surprising, for it is indeed difficult to reconcile the policy with the Communist program as a whole, in which all national problems are only of tactical interest. Thus L. Kaganovič, the factual supervisor if not the major proponent of the policy,

57 The "theory" incriminated to Lebed' was stated in his article "Nekotorye voprosy partijnogo s"ezda," published in *Kommunist*, 17 March 1923, no. 59. Its main thesis was: "The active Ukrainianization of the Party and consequently of the working class (the Party cannot undertake it without also transferring it onto the working class) would now be a reactionary measure in relation to the interests of cultural advancement, because artificial introduction of the Ukrainian language in the Party and in the working class with the present political, economic, and cultural interrelation between the city and the countryside would mean taking the position of the lower culture of the countryside in comparison to the superior culture of the city."

Lebed' recommended that the Ukrainian language be admitted where the Ukrainian peasant wanted it, but no further. He envisaged the future engulfment of the Ukrainian language and culture by the Russian ones.

The first strong reaction to these views came from O. Šums'kyj, in his article "Po povodu odnoj formuly," to which Lebed' answered in the article "Pomen'še pospešnosti"; both appeared in *Kommunist*, 4 April 1923, no. 78.

in his programmatic report at the Tenth Congress of the CPU (November 1927), could only refer to the international situation and to "our answer to the imperialists and their henchmen, the petty-bourgeois democrats" (*Budivnyctvo* 150). Implicitly, this constituted recognition of the tactical nature of Ukrainianization.

The practical measures that made up Ukrainianization concerned the use of the Ukrainian language in the state machinery, on the one hand, and in culture, in the broad sense, on the other. Of course, in both areas, this entailed the de-Russification of the cities and industrial centers and affected only the urban centers of the country. The countryside did not need any Ukrainianization. The entire policy was centralized and conducted from the Central Commission for Ukrainianization of state institutions, headed by V. Čubar, chairman of the CPC. The Commission was founded on 16 July 1925, and branches were established in the administrative centers of the country (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'* 1925, 26, 384).

Ukrainianization was compulsory for all state officials. Every official was required to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language and culture. For those who did not know Ukrainian or knew it insufficiently, special courses were organized. At the beginning such courses were free, but instruction was scheduled for two hours after the regular work day; from 1927 those lagging behind in Ukrainianization had to pay for their instruction (Regulations of 6 July 1927, § 65, Durdenevskij 153). Those who evaded or, after completing the course, still failed an examination were to be fired without any unemployment compensation (ibid., § 72). Those who passed were required to use Ukrainian in all written correspondence and in all oral communications with Ukrainian visitors and parties (*Ukrajinizacija* 12, 23, passim). All courses of instruction in Ukrainian were under the supervision of so-called Central Courses of Ukrainian Subjects (*Central'ni kursy ukrajinoznavstva*) organized in Kharkiv, which established programs of instruction and sent inspectors to check on how the Ukrainianization measures were being implemented in various offices and institutions.

The language of the army remained basically Russian. Yet besides the Ukraine's two schools for Red Army officers, one in Kharkiv and the other in Kiev, a Cavalry Corps of Red Cossacks was organized in Hajsyn, Podolia. Skrypnyk demanded that the army be reorganized into territorial units bound to the area from which the recruits came (Majstrenko 115f.), but little was done in this regard.

In education, the success of Ukrainianization in the elementary schools (grades one through four) was stunning. While in 1922 the number of Ukrainian schools was 6,105 and those Ukrainian in part (i.e., Russian-Ukrainian) was 1,966, in 1925 the numbers were 10,774 and 1,128, respec-

tively (the totals were 12,109 in 1922 and 15,209 in 1925; *Ukrajinizacija* 62). By 1930 the number of Ukrainian elementary schools had again jumped, to 14,430 vs. 1,504 Russian schools; for seven-grade schools, the numbers were 1,732 vs. 267 (Skrypnyk 210f.). In all non-Ukrainian schools, the Ukrainian language was taught as a subject. According to Siropolko (25), by the end of 1927, 77 percent of elementary school students were Ukrainian, a figure almost equaling the percentage of Ukrainians in the population (80.1 percent).

The change was less dynamic in other types of schools, but it was definitely noticeable. Among professional schools, the number of Ukrainian schools equaled 65.8 percent, supplemented by 16 percent Ukrainian-Russian and 5.3 percent Russian-Ukrainian schools (as of 1 November 1929; Siropolko 61). For workshop schools (*fabzavuč*) even the most rigid laws on Ukrainianization, the regulations of 6 July 1927 that had demanded the use of Ukrainian in all schools, were more lenient, insisting only on the "native language" of students (Durdenevskij 149). Nonetheless, even the vocational schools numbered 42 Ukrainian, 48 Russian, and 100 bilingual (Siropolko 72). The so-called workers' faculties (three- or four-year courses designed to prepare little-educated workers to enter schools of higher education) were, at the same time, 48 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, and 18 bilingual (Siropolko 77). Institutes of higher education numbered 14 Ukrainian, 2 Russian, and 23 bilingual (Siropolko 92). By speciality, the numbers were as follows: agricultural—3 Ukrainian, 6 bilingual; pedagogical—6 Ukrainian, 4 bilingual; technological and medical—2 Ukrainian, 2 Russian, and 7 bilingual (Siropolko 204). According to Skrypnyk (184), by 1929 the institutes were up to 30 percent Ukrainianized. But one must keep in mind that in most bilingual schools of higher and industrial education the most important subjects were more often than not taught in Russian, whereas Ukrainian was used to teach such marginal subjects as political education and the like.

The Ukrainianization of the press reached 68.8 percent in 1930, and 87.5 percent in 1932 (Siropolko 191). Landmark events were the Ukrainianization of the central organ of the Central Committee of the CPU, *Komunist*, on 16 June 1926; the founding of the Ukrainian newspaper for industrial workers, *Proletar*, in 1926; and the Ukrainianization of the *oblast'* newspaper in Odessa, *Čornomors'ka komuna*, previously entitled *Izvestija* (31 August 1929; Skrypnyk 134f., 142, 148). According to Majstrenko (112), in 1930 only three major newspapers in the Ukraine were still published in Russian: in Odessa (the important *Večernie izvestija*), in Stalino, and in Marijupol' (now Ždanov). In 1930 the circulation of *Komunist* was 122,000; of *Proletar*, 79,000; of *Visti*, 90,000; yet that of *Radjans'ke selo*,

geared to the peasantry, reached 600,000 (Skrypnyk 24). Factory newspapers were 63.4 percent Ukrainian-language in 1930. In some instances the Ukrainianization drive brought about cut-backs in circulation, and in others, its growth (e.g., in Kryvyj Rih; Kosior 27).

The number of journals grew quickly, and so did their differentiation by types. The traditional literary and political "thick" journals represented by *Červonyj šljax* alone from 1923 now included regional publications (*Žyttja j revoljucija* in Kiev, *Zorja* in Dnipropetrovs'k, *Metalevi dni* in Odessa, *Literaturnyj Donbas* in Artemivs'k-Stalino), and those representing specific literary organizations (*VAPLite, Literaturnyj jarmarok, Prolitfront*—the group led by M. Xvyl'ovyj, *Nova generacija*—the futurist group of M. Semenko, *Zaxidnja Ukrajina, Molodnjak, Hart*—the All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers, etc.). Various other types of journals proliferated, among them political, technological, theatrical, scholarly, illustrated, popular, and journals of music, as well as those of literary criticism, of the cinema, of satire and humor. The total number of Ukrainian journal titles reached 326 in 1929 (Siropolko 191).

In book production, publications in Ukrainian constituted 45.8 percent in 1925/26, 53.9 percent in 1927/28, and 76.9 percent in 1931, according to Siropolko (184). According to Skrypnyk (212), in 1931 Ukrainian titles comprised 65.3 percent of publications, while in circulation they were 77 percent. The difference, clearly, was due to mass publications in Ukrainian. Among scholarly books, up to 50 percent were published in Ukrainian; among textbooks for higher education, up to 79.4 percent were in Ukrainian.

Russian theater, including opera, was practically expelled from the Ukraine. Major theatrical buildings in downtown urban areas were assigned to Ukrainian companies that had previously performed in peripheral and often poor locales. Sometimes these measures encountered resistance, e.g., by the Odessa opera, with its long-standing Italian and Russian tradition. In 1931 there were in the country 66 Ukrainian theater companies, 12 Jewish, and 9 Russian (*EU* 2, 3328). The production of Ukrainian cinema grew markedly (36 films in 1928), and Ukrainian radio began to broadcast (in 1924/25).

After many lean years, the budget of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Kiev soared. Although technical publishing facilities were still inadequate, the Academy published 46 books in 1925 (*Zvidomlennja za 1926*, 5, 11), 75 in 1926 (ibid., 125ff.), 93 in 1927 (*Zvidomlennja za 1927*), 90 in 1928, and 136 in 1929 (*EU* 2, 3336). The staff of the Academy increased at a roughly equivalent rate.

Ukrainianization crossed the frontiers of the Ukrainian SSR to touch the millions of Ukrainians who lived in other Soviet republics, especially Russia. The movement was particularly successful in the Kuban' region, but in some other places, too, Ukrainian schools, Ukrainian newspapers, and Ukrainian clubs were founded.

The main goal, however, was clearly the de-Russification of the cities and industrial centers of the Ukraine. Unrelentingly, and often blindly, the heavy machinery of the totalitarian state struck against these strongholds of Russian language and culture in the Ukraine. At the beginning of the Ukrainianization drive, individual voices spoke out, demanding that the workers be Ukrainianized (e.g., V. Zatons'kyj, 1926—*Budivnyctvo* 13f.; Xvyl'ovyj 1926—Shevelov 1978, 40). The demand was risky as a slogan, because it implied that Ukrainianization was not desired by the proletariat, but imposed on it. Yet such slogans did appear in the provincial press, e.g., the Stalino-district newspaper *Diktatura truda* (published in Russian!) carried phrases like "acceleration of the Ukrainianization of the masses" and urged the government "to push forward the actual Ukrainianization of the proletariat of the Donbas" (quoted from Xvylja 1930, 49f.).

It was Skrypnyk who rescued the situation, with his theory that Russian-language workers in the Ukraine formed two groups: those who were Ukrainian by origin but were partly Russianized and spoke a mixture of the two languages; and those who were completely Russian. For the first group, more numerous, Ukrainianization was but a help in their precarious situation of being neither one thing nor the other. The Russian nationality of the second group was to be respected: its members should be attracted to the Ukrainian culture and language by its intrinsic value, without coercion (*Budivnyctvo* 31, 61ff.; Skrypnyk 151). This highly vulnerable thesis was incorporated into the programmatic party documents of the plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPU in June 1926, under the title "On the results of Ukrainianization."[58]

Coercion was, theoretically, admissible only in relation to state officials and only when they were on duty. In reality, however, Ukrainianization was implemented (and probably conceived) as a frontal offensive against the language and cultural pursuits of the cities. In undertaking to Ukrainianize this or that newspaper, and in all other measures, it was impossible to distinguish between the two groups of workers, not to speak of the overall

[58] Skrypnyk's theory of Ukrainian workers who have forgotten their native tongue is strikingly similar to the "theory" of Romanians who have lost their mother tongue applied in Romanian legislation to justify the Romanization of Bukovina Ukrainians. See below, chap. 8, section 2.

infeasibility of assigning individuals to only one of the two groups (for instance, even workers of Russian descent spoke Russian with some Ukrainian admixture). And, of course, no one asked the members of the nominally Ukrainian group whether they wanted to return to their original, allegedly pure Ukrainian environment. Some sense of the workers' attitude is contained in reports of a poll organized among workers of Artemivs'k, in the Donec'k region (Kosior 1929, 25). Eighty-four persons were questioned about their attitude toward Ukrainianization. Their responses to the initial questions showed that 49 understood Ukrainian well and 14, poorly—from which it follows (though this was not stated explicitly) that 21 (or 25 percent) did not understand Ukrainian at all; 35 could read Ukrainian, 19 could write Ukrainian, 18 could speak the language fluently, and 2 could speak it poorly. Eighteen subscribed to Ukrainian newspapers, and 24 read Ukrainian books and journals. In response to the prime question, 59 said—probably reflecting some preliminary indoctrination by the press and radio—that it was desirable to organize discussion groups on Ukrainian subjects for workers, and 14 wanted Ukrainian books to be less expensive.

Xvylja (1930, 54) quotes an active member of the Komsomol as saying: "I need that Ukrainianization as you [need] the Jewish Talmud!"; he also cites workers who were said to have been in favor of Ukrainianization, among whom some could well have been sincere. The opponents were undoubtedly sincere, but there is no way to determine who and how many the supporters were. After all, Ukrainianization was the official line, a campaign to bring it about was in full swing, and in the communist system, it was easy to solicit the desired response, however insincere.

In world history, during industrialization some cities are known to have changed their language under the impact of the surrounding countryside; for instance, Prague lost its German character, as did Riga and Tallin. But the process usually took at least one generation. The Ukrainian promoters of Ukrainianization must have felt pressured to move more quickly, given the industrialization drive launched in November 1926, at the Fifteenth Conference of the All-Union Communist Party, and its supplementation a year later, in December 1927, by the drive to collectivize the peasantry announced at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU. They knew that the industrial centers of the Ukraine had to become Ukrainian before the mass migration of peasants into the cities if the newcomers were to avoid becoming subsumed in the urban Russian-speaking environment. In their zeal, party members, bolstered by the Bolsheviks' traditional conviction that the masses are pliable and that coercion and fear are the foundation of politics, applied coercion bordering on violence. Occasionally they showed surpris-

ing naïveté. One example of the latter is the request of Kosior (23) addressed to party members: "At meetings, conferences, encounters with your comrades—do speak Ukrainian." Ironically, it recalls a similar appeal attributed to S. Petljura (2, 372) ten years earlier (see part 1, chap. 3).

The impact of the policy of Ukrainianization on the status and prestige of the Ukrainian language was complex and often contradictory. Xvyl'ovyj's declaration that "Ukrainianization. . .is the result of the invincible will of a nation of thirty million" (Shevelov 1978, 17) was at best wishful thinking. Launched from Moscow, taken up and directed by the Communist party with its specific methods, Ukrainianization met with sympathy and support from some groups of the Ukrainian population and a cautious neutrality from some others. In the party itself, the policy was promoted by a minority. According to the official data, Ukrainians formed 37 percent of the party in 1925 and 47 percent in 1926 ("Tezy CK KP(b)U," June 1926. *Budivnyctvo* 61). The increase should be viewed with caution: in those years Ukrainians were often being advanced faster than non-Ukrainians, and many a careerist could profitably declare himself to be a Ukrainian without being one. How many of these old and new Ukrainians genuinely supported Ukrainianization? There are many statements to the effect that resistance to Ukrainianization was strong within the party (e.g., Čubar, *Budivnyctvo* 37), in the trade unions (see, e.g., Kosior 1929, 26), and in the state institutions; moreover, there is evidence that even during the years of Ukrainianization, Ukrainians in the party experienced harassment (e.g., Šums'kyj, 1927—*Budivnyctvo* 134). There were charges that Ukrainianization was merely an artificial camouflage which too often was in the hands of non-Ukrainians (e.g., Šums'kyj 1927, Čubar 1926—*Budivnyctvo* 135, 37). Finally, the Ukraine's Russian minority, which in the large cities and industrial centers was often the majority, tried (with a few exceptions) to ignore or circumvent the policy whenever possible.

As a result, the effects of Ukrainianization were far from straightforward. On the one hand, more people than ever mastered Ukrainian and became to some extent familiar with Ukrainian literature and culture; some of them even switched to speaking in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language was heard more frequently in the streets of the major cities, although in none did Ukrainian replace Russian as the vehicle for everyday communication. On the other hand, the aura of coercion and artificiality accompanying the policy aroused hostility. The number of derisive jokes about the Ukrainian language (which, unfortunately, have never been collected or published) ran high.

The social basis for the policy of Ukrainianization was thin; in fact, it comprised only the Ukrainian intelligentsia that belonged to or sympathized with the Communist party. The proletariat and the middle class were at best indifferent. There was also no overt enthusiasm on the part of the peasantry, but this fact should not be misinterpreted. In those social and cultural spheres that were not yet in party hands, e.g., in the church, Ukrainianization progressed vehemently and rapidly. Founded in October 1921, after several years of groundwork, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) became influential and grew very fast, in both rural and non-rural settings. In 1927 it had about 1,050 parishes (Vlasovs'kyj 151) vs. 8,324 traditional Russian ones (Curtiss 223, with reference to *Antireligioznik* 1929, 4, 115). Most of the Ukrainian parishes were very active and found support among the population.

The Ukrainian church was strong in the Podolia, Kiev, Poltava, and Černihiv regions. On the other hand, Kharkiv had only 12 parishes, Dnipropetrovs'k–Zaporižžja had 29, Odessa–Mykolajiv–Kherson had 6 (Vlasovs'kyj 152). The number of parishes belonging to the UAOC was only 11 percent of all parishes (ibid., 154). But one has to take into account that the Ukrainian church had grown rapidly, that its beginning was noncanonical, that it had married bishops, and that it was constantly being chicaned and persecuted by the regime (ibid., 155ff.). In addition, the number of Ukrainian parishes increases if one considers that in addition to the UAOC there were two other Ukrainian church organizations: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church headed by Feofil Buldovs'kyj (ibid., 194), and the so-called Active Christ Church, which the Soviet authorities supported in its activity against the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church (ibid., 164).

Another channel into which peasants' energy was directed was the cooperative movement. In 1928 there were 41,734 cooperatives, which carried on 74 percent of the retail trade (*EU* 2, 1126). Some unions of cooperatives, such as *Vukopspilka* and *Sil's'kyj hospodar*, were large and influential.

Neither the UAOC nor the rural cooperatives needed any Ukrainianization. They were Ukrainian in their very essence, as was the mass of Ukrainian peasantry. In fact, while supporting or promoting their church and cooperatives, the peasants appeared indifferent to official Ukrainianization. Whether a *Narkomfin* wrote a letter to a *Narkomjust* in Ukrainian or in Russian was a matter of little concern to the peasants, and most of them cared little about the language used in Communist propaganda.

A potential source of support of Ukrainianization was the Ukrainian intelligentsia not aligned to the party, especially scholars, teachers, and writers. The return of the emigrants M. Hruševs'kyj, M. Voronyj, V.

Samijlenko, and many others in 1924–1926 exemplified the will of these groups to cooperate with the new policy. But the Soviet regime was paranoically suspicious of any initiatives in the policy of Ukrainianization coming from outside the party. Studying the chronology of events in the Ukraine gives one the impression that every escalation of Ukrainianization brought about the destruction of a Ukrainian force or of a potential Ukrainian force.

The first blows fell on party members who genuinely supported the policy. The attacks on the "nationalist deviations" of M. Ravič-Čerkasskij (a Jewish historian of the Ukrainian Communist party, as opposed to the official Communist Party of the Ukraine) in 1923–1924 (Majstrenko 101), the repression of M. Xvyl'ovyj in 1925, initiated by Stalin himself, the purge of the virtually all-Communist editorial board of *Červonyj šljax* in 1926 (*Budivnyctvo* 101), the banishment of Šums'kyj and Hryn'ko to Russia in 1926–1927, the liquidation of the historian M. Javors'kyj and his school in 1930 (Polons'ka 1, 66) were among the many such measures undertaken. In 1930, Skrypnyk announced the unmasking of nine (specifically nine!) "counterrevolutionary organizations" (Skrypnyk 222).

From 1927–1928 on, intellectuals who were not party members became targets of the attacks. The fate of the Ukrainian intellectuals connected with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev is well documented. Until 1926–1927 scholars affiliated with the Academy and their researchers were paid by the state and were relatively free to pursue their work. A new approach was introduced by Skrypnyk himself. During a visit to the Academy in 1927, he ordered the dismissal of two academicians, K. Xarlampovyč and F. Myščenko (Polons'ka 1, 53). About the same time (March 1927), P. Ljubčenko demanded that the Academy be completely Sovietized (*Budivnyctvo* 131ff.), and a little later L. Kaganovič called that it be "freed from bourgeois influences" (*Budivnyctvo* 152). The party assigned young Communists to study under Academy members without even asking the latter's consent (Polons'ka 1, 51). In 1928, seven party men were imposed on the assembly of the Academy (ibid., 54). The newly reelected secretary of the Academy, A. Kryms'kyj, who was also one of its founders, was removed from that post (ibid., 55). In 1929, the CPC declared that henceforth candidates to the Academy would be nominated by the public and not by the Academy members themselves. As a result, on 28 June 1929, at a session open to the public, under intense pressure and in a voice vote, seven party candidates of high rank, including Skrypnyk, were elected to the Academy (ibid., 61). As early as July 1928, the Academy declared its readiness to work within the Five-year Plan (ibid., 56), and in 1929 it

entered into "socialist competition" with the Belorussian Academy (ibid., 63).

With the addition of "new blood," the time had come to purge the Academy of the old "bourgeois-nationalist" influence. In the summer of 1929, all voluntary scientific societies affiliated with the Academy were disbanded (Polons'ka 2, 119). At the same time, scores of the Academy's associates were arrested, including the chairman of its Ruling Board and its actual *spiritus movens*, S. Jefremov. There followed the arrests of, it is estimated, several thousand people who were indirectly connected with the Academy or who had engaged in the national liberation movement of 1917–1920. Thus, the background was set for the highly publicized court trial of "traitors," "bourgeois agents," and "nationalistic wreckers" allegedly united in a counterrevolutionary *Sojuz vyzvolennja Ukrajiny* (SVU), or "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" (9 March–19 April 1930). Of the 45 individuals put on trial (others were sentenced without a trial), 29 were affiliated with the Academy (Polons'ka 1, 74). In effect, these actions crushed the Academy and the intelligentsia of the Ukraine who had participated in the fight for the country's liberation some ten years before. In early 1931, the reprisals continued, bringing banishment of the other pillar of the Academy, M. Hruševs'kyj, to Russia (where he died in unclear circumstances) and the final dismissal and arrest of A. Kryms'kyj. The publications of the Academy were suspended. All work in the humanities was charged with being "bourgeois nationalist," while the sciences were directed to undertake the technical tasks posed by industrialization.

In literature the apolitical "neoclassicists" were forcibly silenced. The writers' organizations VAPLite in Kharkiv and MARS in Kiev were forced into "self-dissolution" (1927, 1929) and "self-criticism," and many of their members were persecuted. To counterbalance the influence of these organizations, new "proletarian" organizations were founded under the protectorate of the party. Two such organizations were ostentatiously greeted by L. Kaganovič at the Tenth Congress of the CPU in November 1927 (*Budivnyctvo* 152): "Molodnjak" (1926) and VUSPP (All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers, January 1927). Devoting their work entirely to party propaganda, the members of these organizations produced a large quantity of writings, none of which had any literary value. Analogous developments took place in theater, music, and the arts. Čubar stated in June 1926 (*Budivnyctvo* 39) that Ukrainian culture and its indispensable vehicle, the Ukrainian language, would attract the population, especially city-dwellers, by its high achievements. Yet everything possible was done to preclude such achievements, so that Ukrainian writings were identified as low-level pieces of propaganda. Similar developments took place in

Russian culture, but there not all artistic or cultural achievements were eliminated. Whether this difference was due to a deliberate policy or to the lower cultural level of the Communist rulers in the Ukraine is a moot question.

Simultaneously with the "proletarization" of Ukrainian culture, all manifestations of "spontaneous" Ukrainianization met with severe reprisals. In ecclesiastical matters, the year 1928 brought the arrest of Metropolitan Vasyl' Lypkivs'kyj, all the bishops, and many priests of the UAOC. By 1931, that church, as a separate entity, was completely destroyed and, by the same token, the Ukrainian language eliminated from church use. In the cooperative movement, restrictions began in 1927. Soon direct interference by the government in the form of high taxation and similar measures crushed what had been the relatively independent Ukrainian cooperatives (*EU* 1, 1127). This meant further limitations on the use of the Ukrainian language in the economic realm.

Thus, Ukrainianization was actually a two-sided process. Measures aimed at spreading the Ukrainian language were paralleled by measures aimed at degrading the Ukrainian culture and language. The latter measures spread fear among the population. Speaking Ukrainian publicly, though officially encouraged, was in general considered to be risky, unless an occasion was explicitly designed to be conducted in Ukrainian. The stigma attached to the use of Ukrainian in the large cities did not dissipate;[59] instead, it acquired new dimensions. Well-educated people were to speak Ukrainian in public when prescribed, but not spontaneously. Those who wanted to succeed were expected to pass examinations in Ukrainian, but not to use it any more than required.

Occasionally Russian chauvinism was exposed and counteracted, and its perpetrators were persecuted. Among such cases were those of M. Romanovskij, theater reviewer for Russian newspapers in Kharkiv, who was charged with hinting at the alleged inferiority of Ukrainian culture (Skrypnyk 62ff.); A. Malickij, a professor of law who ridiculed Ukrainianization (Majstrenko 138); the Odessa Philharmonic Society (Skrypnyk 89ff., 144), which disdained Ukrainian music. But no exponent of anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian views was legally persecuted. In the worst scenario, they were publicly criticized and dismissed, whereupon they left for Russia and obtained good positions there.

[59] Note the resolution of the CPC of 1 December 1925: "Some functionaries know the Ukrainian language but are ashamed of using it" (*Ukrajinizacija* 62); Zatons'kyj, in 1926, noted the same in relation to industrial workers (*Budivnyctvo* 14). There is no way to establish where the shame ended and the fear began.

The most publicized case was that of D. Lebed', who was transferred from the Ukraine to Russia in 1925. Although thereafter often criticized in the Ukrainian press, Lebed' used a new post in Russia to fuel the anti-Ukrainian side of Ukrainianization. In 1928 he published in the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU an article on "the theory of the conflict of two cultures," a theory he was credited with devising. There he contended that any surviving Russifying tendency constituted no immediate danger in the Ukraine, whereas that "which knocks on the door, the elemental force (*stixija*) of Ukrainian *kulak* chauvinism, today requires special attention" (Lebed' 1928, 87).

Torn from its only real potential social basis, imposed by a non-Ukrainian party and state machine, deprived of sincerity and spontaneity, consistently counterbalanced by anti-Ukrainian measures, Ukrainianization appeared to the average Russian or pro-Russian city dweller as a kind of comedy, occasionally having some dramatic overtones but still above all a comedy. He learned in what circumstances and to what degree he had to reckon with this official façade, he learned that these were relatively limited and small, and he learned that it was wise not to transgress the boundaries. He knew that, by law, those officials who did not have a command of Ukrainian were to be fired; he also knew that whereas a messenger, a typist, or a secretary was occasionally dismissed on these grounds, the high functionaries, or *specy*, were in practice excused from Ukrainianization. He knew that whereas signboards were scheduled to be redone in Ukrainian (by the resolution of the CPC of 3 October 1925—*Ukrajinizacija* 14), behind the façade the old Russian bureaucratic machine continued to exist (cf. Kosior 29).

The city dwellers who actually discovered for themselves the Ukrainian language and culture and wholeheartedly embraced them were most clearly a minority. For the majority, Ukrainianization was but a mimicry, a pretense, a ruse. One small example epitomizes their attitude and the situation. An issue of the *mnogotiražka* (internal circular) *Za radjans'ku akademiju* (1931, no. 9 [11]) printed for the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, supposedly the foremost exponent of Ukrainian culture and the stronghold of the Ukrainian language, carried a front-page appeal by five academicians to join in the spirit of socialist competition. The text was accompanied by portraits of the signatories and facsimiles of their signatures. The appeal was in Ukrainian and the names typeset under the portraits were in Ukrainian transcription: *Symins'kyj, Je. Paton, Fomin, Plotnikov*. The signatures, however, read *Siminskij* and *E. Paton*—both Russian forms—and *Fomin* and *Plotnikov*—written with *i vos'meričnoe* (Russian и). It was obvious that the appeal had been put together in Russian, and that for

publication it had donned a Ukrainian guise, or else that the academicians, for whatever reason, deliberately chose to sign it in Russian.

In some industrial centers even the guise of Ukrainianization was ferociously resisted. As late as 1930, in Artemivs'k (the Donec'k region), out of 8,323 clerks, 3,681 (44.2 percent) did not comply with the orders to Ukrainianize, and 796 succeeded in being excused. In the industrial centers of the Stalino (now Donec'k) district, out of 92 elementary schools, only 2 were Ukrainian; none of the higher schools were Ukrainian (Xvylja 1930, 40, 47). As one of the workers said: "We talk a lot about the Ukrainian language; it is high time to try to talk *in* Ukrainian. I advise our union to conduct the first general meeting of workers in Ukrainian" (ibid., 51). The implication, of course, is that until that time (mid-1930) no such meetings were conducted in Ukrainian.

These situations show that all too often, in the large cities and industrial centers the use of the Ukrainian language was no more than a pretense. When it came to important events, Russian was used consistently. In such circumstances, a derisive attitude toward the Ukrainian language became widespread. One of the most frequent anti-Ukrainian jokes was to ask: "Do you speak seriously or in Ukrainian?"

A coercive administrative campaign could hardly succeed in transforming Russian and pro-Russian city speakers into Ukrainians. This was even less possible in the milieu of a two-faced, contradictory policy which, on the one hand, encouraged and required the use of Ukrainian and, on the other hand, viewed any sincere personal move in that direction as suspect and dangerous. Šums'kyj was perspicacious enough to declare, as early as in November 1926, that "forced Ukrainianization of the state machinery is nonsense" (*Budivnyctvo* 107). Xvyl'ovyj had one of the characters in his novel *Val'dšnepy* (published in 1927) call Ukrainianization "idiotic" and "a drag on social processes" (Shevelov 1978, 44).

The successes of Ukrainianization, if any, lay elsewhere. Passive mastery of Ukrainian, though still not universal, now encompassed much broader circles. No statistics are available, but it is beyond any doubt that the number of people interested in Ukrainian culture grew substantially. Probably some intellectuals who under different circumstances would have worked within Russian culture opted, instead, for the Ukrainian one. One such individual was Ivan Kaljannikov, who became the Ukrainian poet Kaljannyk (and was later liquidated as an "Ukrainian nationalist"). No doubt more such cases can be uncovered and documented. Finally, the policy of Ukrainianization left an indelible imprint on the normalization of the standard Ukrainian language.

A rapid upsurge in the publication of manuals and textbooks of the Ukrainian language characterizes the years of Ukrainianization. Their circulation was unprecedentedly high. In fact, the compilation and publication of such materials became highly lucrative. According to an incomplete listing given in Červins'ka and Dykyj, in 1925–1928, 60 textbooks and manuals of Ukrainian were published in the Ukrainian SSR (each edition was counted as one item). These included textbooks for various school grades as well as self-instruction manuals. Many of these appeared in several editions. Presumably, the number of published textbooks climbed even higher in 1929–1931, after rules for Ukrainian orthography were published. Some of these books were written or compiled by outstanding linguists, such as O. Kurylo, O. Synjavs'kyj, and M. Sulyma.

The years 1925–1928 also saw the publication of two new Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries and four Russian-Ukrainian ones, some of which appeared in several editions. Of the Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries, the most important and interesting was the new edition of B. Hrinčenko's *Slovar ukrajins'koji movy*, edited and supplemented by S. Jefremov and A. Nikovs'kyj. Three volumes appeared, for the letters A–N, in Kiev in 1927–1928. Leaving the entire text of the original Hrinčenko dictionary intact, the editors added twentieth-century materials, including many loan words about which Hrinčenko had been very cautious. Thus the new dictionary was planned to be a synthesis of old and new. Unfortunately, it was never completed because the editors became embroiled in the trial of the SVU.

The *Rosijs'ko-ukrajins'kyi slovnyk* the Academy began to publish in 1924 added five more volumes, covering words through the letter P (1927–1933). Editorial techniques had improved considerably in comparison to the first volume. Excessive populism was in part overcome, and the dictionary grew into a representative, reliable, and fairly complete collection of Ukrainian words and idioms. Its novelties were, in the words of the editors, "improvements in differentiation between meanings of Russian and Ukrainian words, more precision in commentary, clearer delimitation of stylistic nuances in the meanings of Ukrainian words and phrases" (II, 1054).

Great emphasis was placed on the compilation of terminological dictionaries. This work was concentrated in the Academy of Sciences, where in 1921 an Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language had been founded. The institute comprised five departments (agriculture, technology, society and economy, natural history, arts) and thirty-three sections (Polons'ka 1, 80). In 1926 it occupied 11 editors, 2 philologists, 3 technology experts, 21 paid (irregularly) collaborators and 250 unpaid collaborators, who were

responsible to the institute's head, H. Xolodnyj (*Zvidomlennja za 1926*, 14). After the SVU trial (1930), where Xolodnyj was accused of "terminological sabotage" and was condemned, the institute was formally liquidated, but in practice it became (from 1931) part of the Institute of Linguistics. During 1925 to 1932, the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language and its continuator published more than 27 terminological dictionaries (Gregorovich 10ff. lists 27, but the list is incomplete: e.g., *Rosijs'ko-ukrajins'kyj slovnyk vijs'kovoji terminolohiji* by S. and O. Jakubs'kyj [1928], *Slovnyk antropolohičnoji terminolohiji* by A. Nosiv [1931], *Rosijs'ko-ukrajins'kyj slovnyk pravnyčoji movy* edited by A. Kryms'kyj [1926] are not included; according to *Slavjanskoe jazykoznanie* 1, 252ff., the total number of terminological dictionaries then published in the Ukraine was 49). The institute also had contracts to publish 34 more such dictionaries.

Virtually all dictionaries published in 1925–1932 were Russian-Ukrainian or Ukrainian-Russian. There were almost no dictionaries based on languages other than Russian, the single apparent exception being I. Šarovol's'kyj's German-Ukrainian dictionary (1929).

The compilation of terminological dictionaries on private initiative for the most part died, and the work was essentially centralized. This reflected what was probably the most important novelty of the period: the effort to achieve normalization of the language. In the Academy dictionary this effort manifested itself moderately, mostly in editorial remarks on style accompanying debatable words. Terminological dictionaries were as a rule prescriptive, even though in most cases they were subtitled "Project." Their data were incorporated into school books and "adopted" by general publications. Following their prescriptions was the responsibility of style editors and proofreaders, as decreed by the CPC (*Zbirnyk uzakonen'*, viddil II, 31 December 1927, p. 483). However, the penetration of new terminology into the spoken language, if any, was very limited, due to the general character of Ukrainianization.

Work on normalization of Ukrainian spelling had the most far-reaching and most durable effect. The Academy's "main rules" (*najholovniši pravyla*) were clearly both insufficient and debatable. Some supplements were provided in the *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys* by M. Hruns'kyj and H. Sabaldyr (1925), but it was generally agreed that a thorough revision was needed. Revision of these rules started with the appointment, on 23 July 1925, by the CPC, of a special commission. The commission originally consisted of 36 persons, including ten Academy affiliates and ten prominent Communist party members. Formally, its first chairman was Šums'kyj, Commissar of Education, later succeeded by M. Skrypnyk; in fact, direction was in the hands of O. Synjavs'kyj, an outstanding linguist. The commission under-

took to revise and expand the Academy of Sciences' previously published *Najholovniši pravyla ukrajins'koho pravopysu*, approved by the Commissariat of Education in 1921. It was then to present a draft for general discussion and approval by a specially convoked conference and, finally, by the government. It was decided that the commission would establish not only the rules of orthography, but also of morphology (in its written form), of punctuation, and of some elements of orthoepy and accentuation (Synjavs'kyj 94). The guiding principle for the normalization was "the tradition and the nature of the Ukrainian language," with attention to its history (ibid., 95f.). The written rules set down by the commission were edited by A. Kryms'kyj, V. Hancov, and Synjavs'kyj (the orthographic dictionary, by H. Holoskevyč), and then were passed along for final additional editing to Synjavs'kyj.

In August 1926, a draft was printed and made subject to public discussion. About sixty letters proposing changes were received (Synjavs'kyj 98); subsequently a Conference on Spelling (*Pravopysna konferencija*) was convened in Kharkiv, participation in which was by invitation only. It was in session from 25 May through 6 June 1927. The participants were four high functionaries of the Commissariat of Education, five members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, twenty-eight university professors of linguistics and philology, eight teachers, seven journalists, and eight writers (Synjavs'kyj 109). Three participants represented the Western (Polish) Ukraine: K. Studyns'kyj, I. Svjencic'kyj, and V. Simovyč.

The conference was obliged to confront the difficult problem of two orthographic traditions, the Central-East vs. the West Ukrainian. On the question of the rendition of *l* and *g* in loan words (*l* or *l'*, *g* or *h*), the conference did not reach agreement. Resolution of this issue, as well as the final form of the written rules, was entrusted to the presidium of the orthographic commission: Skrypnyk, A. Pryxod'ko (Deputy Commissar of Education), Kryms'kyj, Synjavs'kyj, and S. Pylypenko, a writer. After ten meetings and long discussions, the presidium approved the final text (prepared by Synjavs'kyj). On the controversial question of rendering foreign *l* and *g*, a compromise was introduced: to use *l* and *h* in loan words of Greek origin or mediation, and to use *l'* and *g* (for foreign *g*) in loan words of Latin and modern European origin or mediation. These rules were signed into law by Skrypnyk on 6 September 1928; published in 1929, they became compulsory in all schools and publications of the Ukrainian SSR. The text of these rules comprised 103 pages, as compared with the no more than 20 of the Academy's previous rules on spelling. Never before was the spelling and the morphology of the Ukrainian language codified in such detail and precision.

The work of the orthographic commission was by no means simple or easy: it had lasted more than three long years. Behind each discussion of this or that orthographic rule stood two different cultural traditions and two disparate schools of linguistics. The new code was a compromise that did not satisfy either party. What was worse, the compromises did not correspond to any one tradition or school, but introduced rules of spelling and pronunciation that were totally new. It is impossible (and unnecessary) to note all the controversial spelling problems here. To illustrate the contradictions it suffices to focus on two rules, concerning the rendition of foreign *l* and *g*. Typically, as already stated, usage in the Western (Polish) Ukraine had foreign words with *l'* and *g*, and that in the Central-Eastern (Russian) Ukraine, with *l* and *h*; in both cases there were some exceptions. Synjavs'kyj presents this discrepancy as being chiefly a West European tradition vs. a Byzantine one. For the most part, this presentation is invalid. Politically dependent (colonial) nations usually acquire the bulk of their loan words through the mediation of the governing nation. This was the Poles in the Western Ukraine, and the Russians in the Central-East. Many words borrowed in the late sixteenth or seventeenth century from West European languages throughout the Ukraine were adopted, because of the Polish mediation, with *l'* and *g*; later, however, under Russia, they were readopted with *l* and *h*. Vice versa, some words introduced into Old Ukrainian (up to the fifteenth century) with *l* and *h* (from the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, all instances of *g* changed to *h* in Ukrainian, both in native and borrowed words) in the Western Ukraine were readapted to Polish, receiving *l'* and *g*. Thus, with a few exceptions, all loan words in the Ukrainian language of the Central-Eastern Ukraine have *l* or *l'*, as does Russian, with *h* used consistently as a substitute for Standard Russian *g*; in the Western Ukraine the same words all have *l'* and *g* (for Western *g*). Seeking other sources for this development may bolster Ukrainians' self-respect, but historically no other explanation is valid.

In the two parts of the Ukraine then separated by a political frontier, the choice of *l* or *l'*, of *h* or *g* was dictated by Russian or Polish mediation. In each part of the country, the system of the other part was unknown in everyday communication. Prescribing the unknown pronunciation, and then only to a portion of loan words, constituted a radical linguistic experiment. It is questionable whether such an experiment could succeed in an independent state; certainly, it had little chance to succeed in the conditions of a bilingual intelligentsia and of a low level of education among other social groups just beginning to accept Ukrainianization. In other words, none of the social and political prerequisites for the experiment's success existed. Although elaborated very carefully by the best linguists, the ortho-

graphic rules of 1928/29 were utopian and doomed to failure. From the very beginning, they were highly unpopular. The planned reconciliation of two cultural traditions remained unachieved. The preservation of two different traditions could not be brought about by a peculiar, artificially imposed compromise.[60]

Innovations in vocabulary caused a different reaction, because at issue was not a change in known language components, but the addition of lexical items to the vocabulary already in use. The use of Galicianisms in the standard language, so important before 1925, now gained a new topicality. A. Nikovs'kyj gave a fit characterization of the new situation: ''The question. . .of the influence of the 'language of Galicia' (*'halyčanščyny'*), once so live and acute in our press, is now subsiding in the Central-Eastern Ukraine. Previously the situation was such that because of Galician phrases, the reader of Ukrainian books could find himself annoyingly distressed by drastic words and become antagonistic to reading in Ukrainian. Now, when there are Ukrainian schools, Ukrainian institutions, more of the press, and plenty of dictionaries, the achievements of the Galician literary language should not be rejected. On the contrary, they should be welcomed and applied for general use, as material well worked out (*vyroblenyj*), very often to the point, and conveying West European influences'' (Nikovs'kyj xv). Similar pronouncements were made by other lexicographers of the time, e.g., Z. Vysoc'kyj (1926), P. Horec'kyj (1928), O. Kurylo (1928, see Wexler 153), and H. Xolodnyj (1928). Xolodnyj, as director of the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language, wrote: ''The works of Verxrats'kyj have pointed out the main road to be trod in future'' (*Visnyk IUNM* 1).[61] The Academy dictionary also included many Galician words and phrases, some of which were labeled as regional and some of which were not, indicating that they were considered regular components of the standard language. For instance, the primary equivalent of the Russian word *zavod* (s.v.) is given as *vyrobnja*, without any comment, whereas in the discussion of this choice reference is made to four previous dictionaries (by O. Partyc'kyj, F. Piskunov, Je. Želexivs'kyj, and V. Kmicykevyč), three of which are Galician (Shevelov 1966, 119); in the entry *zavidovat'* (s.v.), on the other hand, the word *pozavydity* is marked as Galician.

[60] A parallel development with a similar outcome occurred in Belorussia. A Conference on Spelling (with guests from the West) took place on 14–21 November 1926; its proceedings were published in 1927; the draft of its resolutions was published in 1930. The rules were abolished by the decree of the CPC of Belorussia in 1933 (Mayo 26ff.).

[61] In this context, it is interesting to note how a Galician student of Verxrats'kyj's assessed his language: to him, Verxrats'kyj wrote ''in such a heavy language'' that his subject became the most difficult of all (Šax 36).

This new attitude toward things Galician was reflected in attempts to establish contacts with West Ukrainian linguists. Their invitation to the Conference on Spelling of 1927 was one such measure. The election of four Galician scholars to membership in the Academy in 1929 was another. (At the demand of the government, they were expelled from the Academy in 1934: Polons'ka 1, 62; 2, 22.) During the first years of its work, the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language sent drafts of its terminological dictionaries to Lviv for suggestions and revisions (Shevelov 1966, 119). During Ukrainianization, a number of Ukrainian language instructors were Galicians who had immigrated in the revolutionary years 1917–1920 or even later (Shevelov 1966, 117).

The willingness to include some Galicianisms in the standard language was another manifestation of the general attitude. Those who worked at normalizing the standard language by filling its gaps generally gave priority to the internal resources of the language. It was expedient, therefore, to open the standard language to various dialects, to treat it as "a common interdialectal and superdialectal (*mižhovirkovu j nadhovirkovu*) Ukrainian literary language" (Synjavs'kyj 100). This general attitude underlay the "spelling compromise" between the West and the Central-East discussed above. Lexical Galicianisms were, however, different from the material of other dialects. They did not come directly from local dialects. Rather, they were components of the Lviv koine, that is, they were sublimated by having risen to an urban and—to some extent, even if low—literary standard. Other dialects were typically rural and virginally primitive; at best, some of them had been expanded and generalized through use in folklore.

Such considerations did not stop the language legislators from seeking out Galician dialectisms and, at least in theory, elevating them to the standard language. Time and again, they referred to dialectal expeditions, to recording dialectal vocabulary, and to using it in general and terminological dictionaries. M. Hladkyj wrote (1928): "We turn the attention of our collaborators. . .to the need of studying. . .Ukrainian folklore and the materials of dialectological and ethnographic collections" (translated and quoted in Wexler 115). O. Kurylo added (1925): "The Ukrainian folk mentality, as expressed in the language, has in it much material for rendering abstractions, and this should be used in the scientific language instead of coining new and artifical expressions" (Kurylo 1942, 9; Wexler 115). Accordingly, expeditions were sent to various localities, with directions that typically read as follows: "[The material must be gathered] for the most part from people who, by living in villages, have preserved a sufficiently pure language, people who are tied in their work to the conditions and needs of the village: peasants, potters, smiths, locksmiths, carpenters,

weavers, fishermen, hunters, mechanics, etc.'' (Wexler 116). Data collected on dialectological expeditions, records of dialectal materials made by paid and unpaid collaborators, and excerpts from earlier dialectal records constituted the foundation of the very rich card files of the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language.

In the use of these data, words were often semantically recycled, that is, words semantically rooted in village life, including agriculture and handicrafts, were assigned a new ''industrial'' meaning, as in the case of *vyrobnja*, originally 'workshop', then 'factory, mill,' or *prohonyč* (mentioned above), originally 'shutterbolt', then 'bolt' in general (Shevelov 1977, 255). Such a recycling is a natural, spontaneous process in the languages of societies that industrialize. In the Ukrainian case, however, the recycling was part of a planned, organized reshaping of the language.

Alongside the use of colloquial and dialectal materials, new words were coined on the basis of existing morphemes, most frequently by affixation (e.g., *dvyh-un* and *ruš-ij* 'motor', *vy-myk-ač* 'electrical switch', etc.). Some of these, such as *dvyhun* and *vymykač*, have been accepted into the language (Shevelov 1977, 255f.), but the majority exist only on the pages of terminological dictionaries. Words were also created by compounding, though less frequently, e.g., *sklo-riz* 'glazier's diamond', *vodo-zbir* 'cistern', etc.

The restoration of archaic elements, a device widely used in developing languages at the time of national rebirth (e.g., in Czech), was generally not typical of the normalization of Ukrainian at the time of Ukrainianization. In scientific terminology, such restoration was exceptional; it was used only a little more frequently in legal (court) terminology. Restoration was rare in military terminology, where the Cossack terminological tradition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, resuscitated by the national army of 1918–1921, was rejected, with but a few exceptions (e.g., *sotnja* 'company', *šanci* 'entrenchment'–Jakubs'ki s.vv.). The reasons for this restrained attitude were probably twofold: on the one hand, there was the strong populist tradition established as early as the nineteenth century; on the other hand, there was the desire to stay away from the usages of the military in the Ukrainian National Republic and the Hetmanate. Nonetheless, in the preface to the *Rosijs'ko-ukrajins'kyj slovnyk pravnyčoji movy* (Kiev, 1926), its ''editors'' (i.e., A. Kryms'kyj) declared: ''We have deliberately introduced into the dictionary many words from the old Ukrainian legal language in order to disclose the tie of the contemporary language with the old one, to buttress the present-day legal language with a historical foundation, and to show how many words the contemporary language of the Ukraine retains from the old legal language and how gravely err those who

accuse the present-day Ukrainian language of being artificial, forged, Galicianized. It proves that the Ukrainian language some two or three hundred years ago used those same words that at times, it seems, so grate on our Russianized ear'' (Kryms'kyj 1926, viii). This dictionary was severely criticized by Skrypnyk in 1931. In fact, however, it contained only ca. 2,000 archaic words (the total number of words was over 67,000), which were singled out by the editorial comment *star.* (ancient) and had no prescriptive intent (Krymskyj 1926, v).

Behind all these practices, no doubt, was an effort to purge Ukrainian of excessive patterning on Russian. This was the same process which occurred in Czech, during its national rebirth purged of Germanisms, in Bulgarian in relation to Turcicisms, in Romanian in relation to Slavicisms. The crucial difference in those cases, however, was that Bulgaria and Romania were fully independent states and that the Czechs were benefitting from cultural autonomy in a constitutional state. Neither situation was true of the Ukraine at the time.

The decision to rely upon internal lexical resources, primarily those of the ''unspoiled'' popular language, was one on which all Ukrainian language legislators seemed to agree, but not all of them wanted to implement the decision equally. One can distinguish their division into two main groups.

One group aimed at filling gaps in the language that up to then had typically been filled by inserting Russian words. Linguists in the second group proposed, in addition to filling the gaps, to replace elements considered non-native with native ones. One can call the trend of the second group ethnographic, that of the first, synthetic (i.e., striving for a synthesis of native rural components with urban, European ones; cf. Shevelov 1962, 314ff.); the first group was extremely puristic, whereas the second was moderately puristic. The main representatives of the ethnographic, extremely puristic school were Kryms'kyj, Je. Tymčenko, O. Kurylo in her early writings, M. Hladkyj, S. Smerečyns'kyj, and, outside the Soviet Ukraine, V. Simovyč in his early writings and I. Ohijenko. The synthetic, moderately puristic trend was represented by O. Synjavs'kyj, M. Sulyma, M. Nakonečnyj, O. Kurylo in her later writings; close by them stood V. Hancov and A. Nikovs'kyj.[62] The extreme puristic trend was stronger in

[62] Cf. Nikovs'kyj's statement: ''Now that the state, the state machinery, business correspondence, professional and technical groups, science and school are placing demands on the Ukrainian language, our language can undergo, along with a quantitative growth, a severe drain of blood, jetting up [from the ground] to, after all, empty heights of routine and illusory technical perfection'' (vi).

Kiev, the moderate one in Kharkiv. The volume *Normy ukrajins'koji literaturnoji movy*, by O. Synjavs'kyj, although published in Kiev (1931), was written in Kharkiv, as were two detailed surveys of the modern standard Ukrainian language, collectively written and edited by L. Bulaxovs'kyj: *Zahal'nyj kurs ukrajins'koji movy dlja včyteliv-zaočnykiv* (1929) and *Pidvyščenyj kurs ukrajins'koji movy* (1931). These three were major achievements in the description of the standard Ukrainian language of the time. Conventionally, the two groups, and the trends they represented, are also labeled the Kiev versus the Kharkiv school.

The Kiev, extremely puristic, school was strongly represented in many terminological dictionaries. For instance, on its recommendation *ekvator* was to be replaced by *rivnyk*, *paralel'nyj* by *rivnobižnyj*, *konus* by *stižok*, *sektor* by *vytynok*, *štepsel'* by *prytyčka*, *kursyv* by *pys'mivka*, etc. Linguists of this school were also active in studying syntax. Here, too, the tenor of their activity was to bring the literary language close to the spoken language while freeing it from blind patterning on Russian syntax. Forms and constructions untypical of colloquial speech, whether based on Russian or on the traditions of Greek or Latin, were rejected by the extremely puristic school: active participles, passive constructions, and substantives denoting processes were considered non-Ukrainian. Kryms'kyj went so far as to have the word *zmist* 'contents' replaced by the phrase *De ščo je*, literally 'what is where', in publications of the Academy of Sciences. The simplistic approach became nearly humoristic in *Zrazky prostoho slova* (Kiev, 1929) by Oleksander Synjavs'kyj (not to be confused with Oleksa Synjavs'kyj). In general, verbal constructions were recommended at the expense of nominal ones.

The Kharkiv, moderately puristic, school was not so categorical in its prescriptions. It fully admitted constructions based on European tradition and practice, while also supporting the expanded use of "native" constructions. Linguists of this school clearly distinguished between various styles and genres, whereas the extremists virtually disregarded such differences. As in lexicography, in syntax the moderates defended the synthesis of popular "colloquial" elements with assimilated European components. (In lexicography, this approach is well represented in *Praktyčnyj rosijs'ko-ukrajins'kyj slovnyk*, by M. Johansen, M. Nakonečnyj, K. Nimčynov, and B. Tkačenko—1926.)

Interestingly enough, the ethnographic school found hardly any followers in belles-lettres. A few works recorded colloquial rural speech—e.g., by A. Holovko and K. Hordijenko—but these were stylizations offered through the mediation of a narrator. The general trend clearly favored the urban language. Within this trend one can speak of writers who cultivated a

refined "Europeanized" language (e.g., M. Zerov, M. Ryl's'kyj) as opposed to those who adopted the colloquial urban language, with its choices that easily included some Russianisms (e.g., M. Xvyl'ovyj, M. Semenko). A chasm separated prescriptive linguistics from the writers. It is telling that M. Hladkyj wrote a full volume of criticism, occasionally strident, of the language of contemporary writers (*Mova sučasnoho ukrajins'koho pys'menstva*, Kiev, 1930; first published in *Žyttja j revoljucija* 1928, 11–12, and 1929, 1–6). Couched in softer language but essentially in the same vein was a study by M. Sulyma on the language of Xvyl'ovyj ("Frazeolohija Mykoly Xvyl'ovoho," *Červonyj šljax* 1925, 1–2, pp. 263–86), in which Sulyma systematically contrasted the "most original, most cardinal peculiarities of popular Ukrainian mass phraseology," to "the Russianized language of the big cities, of Donec'k factories, of barrack colonies, of sanatorial zones, of responsible specialists" (263f.), to "the contemporary intelligentsia's chat (*balačku*) about writers, about scholars, about newspapers, the language of city-dwellers" (283).

This discrepancy between writers and linguists (at least those representing the ethnographic trend) was symptomatic. It showed that the "perfect" Ukrainian standard language devised by linguists was an abstract ideal which might, at best, prevail in the long run, but was for the time being utopian (as was "spelling" which required relearning all foreign words). In an interplay of what existed with what should have existed, a compromise would gradually have been found. It probably would have occurred if Ukrainianization lasted. But Ukrainianization did not last. It began to weaken and wither in 1931. With the year 1933 it would be officially discontinued.

The work of the Ukrainian linguists of the Ukrainianization period was not entirely in vain, however. For the first time in the history of Ukrainian, the language was normalized, and the normalization was conducted, basically, on a scholarly basis. Much of the language legislation would be rendered null and void; yet much remained through the traumatic events of the 1930s, when virtually all the linguists of the period of Ukrainianization were silenced or destroyed.

For all its artificiality, groundlessness, internal contradictions, tragicomic excesses and zigzags, Ukrainianization reasserted the existence of Ukrainian as a standard language, rather than just a sum of rural dialects. It extended the mastery of that standard language through various strata of the population, and contributed to its survival during the coming years of constraint and persecution.

VII. BETWEEN 1933 AND 1941: THE UKRAINE UNDER POSTYŠEV AND XRUŠČOV (KHRUSHCHEV)

The waning Ukrainianization came to a sudden halt with the arrival in the Ukraine's capital, Kharkiv, of Stalin's plenipotentiary, Pavel Postyšev, on 25 or 26 January 1933. Postyšev, a Russian and a prominent party man in the Ukraine in 1923–1930, was generally known as an adversary of Ukrainianization. He had been recalled to Moscow in 1930, probably due to opposition against him by Ukrainian Communists (Skrypnyk?). Now, in 1933, he returned in triumph, to fulfill what was probably his personal wish and was certainly his official commission: to crush his ideological (and personal) foes and to subdue Ukrainians in the party and as a nation. Returning with him was Vs. Balickij, not long before removed as chief of the secret police, and about three thousand party members from Russia. Their common assignment was to exterminate any and all Ukrainian resistance (Majstrenko 147). Appointed Second (rather than First) Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPU as well as First Secretary of the Oblast Committee of the party in Kharkiv, Postyšev had the right to give orders to anyone in the Ukraine, including the First Secretary of the Central Committee, S. Kosior. The theoretical basis for Postyšev's activity was announced a year later, at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, where Stalin declared that by that time "local nationalism," i.e., Ukrainian in the Ukraine, had become the principal danger. Within this party line, Postyšev remained the absolute dictator of the Ukraine until 1937.

The violent end of the Ukrainianization policy was brought about by internal and external developments. In spite of its promoters' many declarations that the policy was not aimed at the appeasement of the peasantry, Ukrainianization was in fact planned as exactly that. Now, by 1933, appeasement was no longer an issue. Stalin was engaged in an undeclared war with the peasants. It began with the proclamation in 1929 of the policy of (forceful) collectivization and took material form with the liquidation of the kulaks in 1930–1931 and the "minor" famine of 1932, caused by the state's heavy-handed grain collection. These were a prelude to the famine of 1933 that killed several million people and brought the Ukrainian peasantry to its knees. Achieving the capitulation of the peasantry was one of Postyšev's major tasks and he carried it out to perfection. From 1931, there was no longer any need to make overtures to the Ukrainian peasants.

In foreign policy, the hope to bring about "world communism" with Moscow at its center through colonial liberation movements, the hope that had motivated the policy of *korenizacija*, including Ukrainianization, was frustrated. Instead, a major war in Europe was becoming a tangible pros-

pect with the Nazis' seizure of power in Germany on 30 January 1933, the same week that Postyšev arrived in Kharkiv. In that war, the Ukraine would be the main arena. Therefore the country must be ruthlessly pacified and rendered a Russian province. This was Postyšev's second assignment.

The policy of Ukrainianization was not formally abrogated either by Postyšev or by any other party or government official. The Twelfth Congress of the CPU, held in January 1934, in its resolution on the report of the Central Committee, briefly mentioned the task of "further unfolding the Bolshevik Ukrainianization" (*Rezoljuciji* 559). Only deviations from the "correct Ukrainianization" caused by "bourgeois nationalists" or "their agents," including Skrypnyk at their head, were to be excised mercilessly. Henceforth Ukrainian culture, and the Ukrainian language as an essential ingredient thereof, should follow the dictum "national in form but proletarian/socialist in content," coined by Stalin as early as 1925, although launched only at the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU in 1930 (Luckyj 177, Stalin 367). References to the successes of Ukrainianization can be found in pronouncements of party leaders during the Postyšev era. For instance, M. Popov, in November 1933, mentioned continuity in party policy in this respect; in January 1934, a resolution of the Twelfth Congress of the CPU advised "speeding up national cultural construction and Bolshevik Ukrainianization based on industrialization and collectivization"; as late as May 1937, the Thirteenth Congress of the CPU faulted "the insufficient Ukrainianization of the Party, the Soviets, and particularly of trade-union and Komsomol organizations" (Kostiuk 73, 75, 125).

Several gestures in that direction were ordered by Postyšev: the erection of monuments to Taras Ševčenko (the poet was depicted as being guarded by a *kolxoznik*, an industrial worker, a young communist, and a redguardist) in Kharkiv (1933–1935) and Kiev (1935–1939), the transference of the capital to Kiev (1934) and, most important, the appointment of several renowned Ukrainians to leading government (but not party) posts, including V. Zatons'kyj as commissar of education, A. Xvylja as his deputy, and P. Ljubčenko as chairman of the CPC (the latter two were former Borot'bists). Several Russian-language newspapers were established in cities of the Ukraine, but the only official outlets of the Central Committee, the newspaper *Komunist* and the journal *Bil'šovyk Ukrajiny*, continued to be published in Ukrainian alone. In the same vein, several Russian theaters were founded, without displacing Ukrainian ones; opera continued to be performed in Ukrainian.

Factually, however, the impetus for Ukrainianization had vanished. All its leading cadres in both the Commissariat of Education and in the Ukrainianization courses were arrested and either sent to labor camps or shot to

death. The promotor of the whole process, M. Skrypnyk, faced with the demise of all his accomplishments and imminent personal destruction, committed suicide on 7 July 1933.

The most pernicious aspect of Postyšev's policy lay not in the prohibition of the Ukrainian language nor in the formal abolition of Ukrainianization, but in the nearly total destruction of Ukrainian intellectuals. In harmony with the new slogan of culture national only in form, anyone who ascribed to the traditions of the Ukrainian past was to be silenced or destroyed. The terror assumed previously unheard-of proportions. Thousands were arrested on false accusations; under unbearable conditions and torture, they "confessed" to belong to underground subversive "organizations" which never existed and never figured in any open trial, but which were mentioned in the public speeches of Postyšev, Kosior, and others. By referring to these contrived comments, Kostiuk (85–108) determined that there were fifteen such fabricated organizations, among which some allegedly had thousands of members. The executions of the very real "members" of those fictitious organizations were in some instances made public, especially after the murder of S. Kirov in Leningrad on 1 December 1934 (which had no trail leading to the Ukraine), but more often were conducted in silence. Not a single group of the intelligentsia in the Ukraine escaped the arrests and executions, from clergy to engineers, from workers in cooperatives to actors, from writers to agronomists. Some groups were virtually liquidated. Such was the fate of the priests of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, of the usually blind singers of Ukrainian folklore (*kobzari* and *lirnyky*; Shostakovich, 214f.), of the professors of VUAMLIN (All-Ukrainian Association of Marx and Lenin Institutes, in 1933; the organization was disbanded in 1936), of historians who had studied with M. Javors'kyj (1933), of artists belonging to ARMU (Association of Revolutionary Artists of the Ukraine), and of members of the Academy of Sciences. The closure of the Academy of Sciences' institutes of Ševčenko studies, of Jewish proletarian culture, and of Polish proletarian culture during the latter half of the 1930s was probably also due in part to the decimation of their members. Other groups of the intelligentsia were affected selectively, but in none was the percentage of victims low.

For party members, arrests often came following public denunciation during the purge that raged in 1933–1934 and resulted in the party's expelling 23 percent of its members, or 27,500 people (Kostiuk 61), of whom 2,750 had held leading positions (*Narysy* 411).

The loss of the intelligentsia was all the more painful because the severely quelled and decimated peasantry was incapable of producing a new wave of intellectuals.

Also falling victim to the purge were periodicals (e.g., *Litopys revoljuciji*, discontinued in 1933; *Istoryk-bil'šovyk*, closed sometime in the mid-1930s; *Nova* [later *Socijalistyčna*] *hromada*, in 1933; *Žyttja j revoljucija* in 1933; *Červonyj šljax* in 1936), theaters (e.g., the theater group "Berezil'," disbanded in October 1933), and cinema (the famed director O. Dovženko was sent to Moscow the same year).

Struck at the same time were the national minorities of the Ukraine, with the single exception of the Russian one. Jewish, Bulgarian, Moldavian, German, Greek, and Polish administrative units were disbanded entirely or in part, and their schools and press were closed entirely or in part (Kostiuk 94).[63]

The gaps in the ranks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were as a rule left unfilled; in the party and in the state machinery, those eliminated were replaced. More often than not, the new functionaries were Russians. As already mentioned, when Postyšev came to Kharkiv from Moscow, he brought with him 3,000 party workers. In November 1933, he noted that 1,340 "comrades" had been newly appointed to district managerial jobs and that 237 (out of 525) new secretaries were serving district party committees, without disclosing their nationality. Ten thousand men were sent to administer the collective farms; most likely, the majority of them were Russians. "Political detachments" were created at tractor stations (MTS) and state farms "with the aid of the All-Union CP that supplied 4,500 party men" (Kostiuk 28, *Narysy* 402), who were undoubtedly predominantly Russian. The same was probably true of the newly formed (June 1933) group of industrial "party organizers," especially in the Donec'k basin (*Narysy* 399f.).

An important development during the Postyšev era in the Ukraine, though one not initiated by him, was the growing centralization of the administration in the Soviet Union. In overt violation of the constitutions of the USSR and its component republics, various republican commissariats were replaced, one after another, by all-Union or mixed commissariats centered in Moscow. At the time of the formation of the USSR there were five

63 As of the beginning of 1927, there were 21 national *rajony* in the Ukraine: 9 Russian, 7 German, 3 Bulgarian, 1 Polish, 1 Jewish. Several more were in the planning stage: 6 Greek, 3 German, 2 Jewish, and additional Russian ones. Apparently, the majority of planned *rajony* were indeed established in the years 1927–1931 (*Itogi raboty*, p. 23). All had schools in their national languages. No such schools survived into the 1940s. In the postwar period, official and semi-official pronouncements mention only Polish, Hungarian, and Moldavian schools, i.e., schools using the languages of the "new" national minorities incorporated into the Soviet Union at war's end (e.g., Bilodid 8). The silence about schools of other national minorities would imply their absence (this did not apply to Russian schools, for Russians were no longer considered a national minority).

all-Union commissariats; by 1935, the number had grown to twelve (Sadovs'kyj 103). The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, adapted in January 1937, recognized only eight republican commissariats, such as: auto-transportation, dwelling construction, municipal economy, furniture and carpentry industry, local fuel industry, education (which did not extend to institutions of higher education, art, or culture), and social security (*Konstitucija* 76). This meant that the "government" of the Ukrainian SSR had no more functions or rights than a municipality. New laws and proclamations concerning matters specifically Ukrainian were issued in Moscow and implemented from there, in complete disregard of rights granted by the original constitution. Such were, for instance, the laws on the formation of six new districts in the Ukraine (19 November 1935; Sadovs'kyj 98) and on the improvement of coal mining in the Donec'k region (31 March 1940; *Narysy* 443), as well as annual regulations on the size of areas sown with various crops, among hundreds more. Sadovs'kyj (98) counted that in 1935 alone there were 526 such laws. After all, the constitution (§ 16) held that "the laws of the USSR are binding on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR," a provision that specified no limits to interference in the internal affairs of the Ukraine.

The effect of the anti-Ukrainian terror that followed upon Stalin's pronouncement of "local nationalism" as the major danger to the existence of the Soviet Union, and of the unscrupulous and relentless government centralization on the use and status of the Ukrainian language, was dramatic. In cities and larger towns, it went underground, except for officially sanctioned ceremonial occasions. The achievements of Ukrainianization, small as they were, in inculcating the Ukrainian language as a medium of communication in urban everyday life were struck down. Russian was fully reinstalled in that function. Even within the Academy of Sciences, Russian became the language of normal conversation (Polons'ka 2, 37), and even by official data, the percentage of Ukrainians in the Academy fell to 54.9 by 1937. The name changes of the Academy reflected its evolution: until 1935, it was "All-Ukrainian," then it became "Ukrainian," and from 1936, the Academy "of the Ukrainian SSR." Also, the immediate effect of the direct subordination of the whole state machinery to Moscow was the switch to Russian throughout the government administration.

Superficially, however, Ukrainian remained the predominant language in the Ukraine. Statistically, the number of Ukrainian schools, press organs, theaters, and published books exceeded Russian ones, although these were on the rise.

The Postyšev-Balickij terror had one more, less direct effect on the status of the Ukrainian language. Standard Ukrainian could have been enhanced by the eminence of Ukrainian culture as expressed in literature, cinema, theater, etc. But this was precluded by the terror that stalked writers, cinema and theater directors, artists, composers, etc. As a rule, its victims were the Ukraine's most outstanding cultural figures. Les' Kurbas, the leader of modern Ukrainian theater, was arrested and eventually liquidated, as were many prominent actors; Olexander Dovženko, the leading personality in cinema, was forced to leave the Ukraine; Mykola Xvyl'ovyj, perhaps the most outstanding Ukrainian prose writer of the time, was driven to suicide; hundreds of talented writers, those capable of independent thinking and experimentation, including the most gifted novelist Valerijan Pidmohyl'nyj and the leading playwright Mykola Kuliš, were shot or banished, never to return. The writers who remained were as a rule careerists with little talent or individuals willing to adapt themselves to the situation. The general level of literature and art, now squeezed into the narrow framework of socialist realism and political slogans, fell so low that it lost all appeal. Interesting works were exceptions that tended to appear only at long intervals (e.g., *Veršnyky* [The riders] by Jurij Janovs'kyj, 1935). The same general situation obtained in all Soviet literatures of the time,[64] but the percentage of writers who fell victim to the terror in the Ukraine was higher than in, say, Russia. Most critical was that Ukrainian literature virtually lost all attraction for the reader. Even Ukrainian prerevolutionary, classical literature and art were purged, and much of it was either not reissued or banned.

The Postyšev era came to an abrupt end in 1937. In mid-March he was suddenly and without any explanation recalled to Russia, where he was arrested and then disappeared. Balickij shared his fate. One reason for Stalin's action could have been Postyšev's emphatic attempts to build up his personal popularity in the Ukraine, which Stalin may have perceived as threatening. Another reason might have been the aggravation of the international situation. In 1936 Germany embarked on a course of military aggression and reoccupied the Rhineland. This reminded Stalin of the role he intended the Ukraine to have in any future war. A new pacification of the country was becoming imminent. Stalin may have contemplated the liquidation of the Ukraine as even a nominal state; Postyšev and his efforts at personal glory did not suit such a scheme.

64 A decree of the Central Committee of the RCP disbanded all voluntary literary organizations and made writers state functionaries supervised by the centralized Union of Writers (23 April 1932).

If this speculation is correct, Kosior, who with the removal of Postyšev became ostensibly the number one person in the CPU, misconstrued the reasons for the removal of Postyšev. In the resolutions of the CPU's Thirteenth Congress, which convened on 27 May 1937, Postyšev's demise was used to revivify the problem of Ukrainianization.The congress, without mentioning Postyšev by name, blamed him for "the insufficient Ukrainianization of the party, of the soviets, and particularly of trade unions and Komsomol organizations" and for "the inadequate promotion of Ukrainian Bolshevik cadres to leading party, soviet, economic, and trade union posts" (cited from Kostiuk 125). This is the more significant because the Constitution of 1937 said nothing about language in the Ukraine, except for the statement that "citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to an education. This right is secured. . .by school education in the native language" (*Konstitucija* 122, p. 75; it is noteworthy that the word *škola* 'school' in the Ukrainian vernacular most often refers to elementary school).

The reaction of the Kremlin and the events that followed were not publicized; to some extent they can only be conjectured here. In its issue of July 9, *Pravda* attacked the Central Committee of the CPU. In August a special commission comprising V. Molotov, N. Ežov, and N. Xruščov (Khrushchev) was sent to Kiev, and a plenary session of the Central Committee was convoked. According to unconfirmed information provided by the sovietologist Avtorxanov, by that time "several trainloads of special NKVD troops had arrived in Kiev from Moscow" (quoted from Kostiuk 127). It is a justified guess that the Moscow commission expressed no confidence in the Central Committee of the CPU and the government of the Ukrainian SSR. Whatever resistance, if any, may have followed, P. Ljubčenko, the head of the CPC, committed suicide on 30 August 1937. In the next few days two of Kosior's aides, M. Popov and M. Xatajevyč, were arrested; Kosior himself was recalled to Moscow, where he disappeared. All other members of the Politbureau, all members of the Orgbureau, all members of the Control Commission, all but two of the 62 members and 40 candidate members of the Central Committee, all the leading figures in the Ukrainian government, including the Commissar of Education Zatons'kyj and his deputy Xvylja, as well as a substantial number of oblast' and local functionaries, were liquidated. The entire machinery of rule was destroyed. It was, without question, a coup d'état. What is especially striking, and what makes one speculate that the very existence of the Ukrainian SSR was in danger, is that for five months no one was elected or appointed to replace those dismissed. Several Russian "comrades" now controlled matters in the Ukraine, the obscure individuals Starygin, Lemkov, Smirnov, Ljutavin, Špilevoj, and

Telešov (listed in Kostiuk 131), but even they held no publicly defined posts.

Finally the decision to maintain the formal existence of the Ukrainian republic prevailed. On 28 January 1938, it was announced that N. Xruščov, a Russian, was "elected" the First Secretary of the Central Committee and M. Burmistenko, another Russian, its Second Secretary; on February 22, a new chairman of the CPC, D. Korotčenko, was announced; appointed commissar of education was H. Xomenko, a political nonentity of whom little was known before or after his appointment. The interregnum ended with the election of the Central Committee in June 1938, at the Fourteenth Congress of the CPU.

The impact of these events, which bordered on the liquidation of formal Ukrainian statehood and the urban use of the Ukrainian language, can readily be imagined. The terror of 1937–1938 was much more intense than that of 1933–1934; the accompanying uncertainty and bewilderment were extremely powerful additional factors. The new tenor of things was made very clear by two new measures taken by Xruščov. Before his "election," starting on the first of January 1938, the daily organ of the Central Committee of the CPU, *Komunist*, published in Ukrainian since 1926, was augmented by a Russian-language newspaper, *Sovetskaja Ukraina*. This was tantamount to recognition that the Soviet Ukraine and its governing party gave the Russian language the same status as the Ukrainian language. If any specific event can be considered the formal end of Ukrainianization, the initiation of that newspaper was this event. It roughly coincided with the liquidation of the last old-guard Ukrainian elements in the party: the former Borot'bists, including P. Ljubčenko and A. Xvylja, and the former (prerevolutionary) Ukrainian Bolsheviks, including V. Zatons'kyj and H. Petrovs'kyj (the latter escaped arrest, but was removed to Russia and given a humble post).

The second measure of both symbolic and large practical import was the decree of the CPC of 20 April 1938 on the compulsory teaching of the Russian language in all Ukrainian ("non-Russian") schools beginning in the second grade, for four to five hours weekly (Majstrenko 160); prior to that time, teaching Russian started in the third grade, for two to four hours per week (Siropolko 48). The Fourteenth Congress of the CPU (June 1938) emphasized "the necessity to eliminate the after-effect of the hostile sabotage in the teaching of the Russian language in elementary and secondary schools as well as in institutions of higher education," and c...iected the

necessity directly with the danger of "the separation of the Soviet Ukraine from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (*Rezoljuciji* 601f.).[65]

In accordance with the new policy, some old propaganda slogans were modified and some new ones were promulgated, either directly from Moscow or via Kiev. During the Postyšev era, the prevailing slogan had called for the rejection of artificial barriers between the Ukrainian and the Russian nations and languages. Constantly reiterated now, in 1938, was the assertion that the Ukraine is an inseparable part of the Soviet Union and that the friendship of the united Soviet peoples is eternal, with emphasis placed on the greatness and leading character of Russian culture (Kostiuk 140; *Narysy* 428). This concept was also projected back into history. The contention that the Ukrainian (as well as Belorussian) nationality first arose after the Tatar invasion of the thirteenth century, whereas prior to that time there existed a monolithic "old-Russian nationality" that was the common ancestor of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, was overtly formulated only later, after World War II. But as early as August 1934, Soviet historians were instructed that "the history of Great Russia [should] not be torn apart from the history of other nations of the USSR" (J. Stalin, A. Ždanov, S. Kirov, "Zamečanija po povodu konspekta učebnika po istorii SSSR," *K izučeniju* 23). This was tantamount to abolishing the history of the Ukraine (and other non-Russian nations) and to its dissolution in the "history of the USSR," i.e., in practice, of Russia. This concept was systematically set forth in the all-Union obligatory textbook edited by Andrij Šestakov, entitled *Istorija SSSR, kratkij kurs* (first edition 1937, with many subsequent ones; cf. Shtepa 128ff.). This newly created "history of the USSR"—which began no earlier and no later than half a million years ago—actually replaced the history of the Ukraine, especially in schools. A set purpose loomed behind the Stalin-Šestakov concept that the Ukrainian culture and language had no deep historical roots, but were due to the historical accident of the Tatar invasion and thus were fated to wither away.

In terms of practical language politics, the time of the dictatorship of Postyšev and later Xruščov brought substantial changes in education and publication.

In education, an increasing number of schools in urban and industrial centers were de-Ukrainianized; these switched in part, under Zatons'kyj, to dual Ukrainian-Russian usage and later to instruction in Russian. The

[65] The often quoted pronouncement of Xruščov, "Now all peoples will study the Russian language" (*Pravda*, 16 June 1938), is ambiguous: it is unclear whether he is referring to the new policy or to a general statement on the advantage of being in command of Russian because it is the language in which Lenin and Stalin wrote.

development has been confirmed by numerous witnesses, but it cannot be fully substantiated by statistic data, for from ca. 1938, data on the distribution of Ukrainian and Russian schools have usually been withheld (cf., e.g., the article on education in *Ukrajins'ka radjans'ka encyklopedija* 17, 412). What information appeared in the press was episodic and cannot be verified. For instance, Xruščov reported to the Fourteenth Congress of the CPU that there were 17,736 Ukrainian schools in the republic, with a total of 4,319,000 students (*Pravda*, 16 June 1938). The semi-official publication of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (*Radjans'ka Ukrajina za 20 rokiv*, Kiev, 1937, p. 98) added that Ukrainian schools constituted 82.8 percent of all schools. These data seem highly suspect. Even at the peak of Ukrainianization, in 1930, the number of Ukrainian schools was 16,162 and their percentage of all schools in the Ukraine was 77. The blackout of data on the language of education (which extended to other areas of cultural life, such as theater, film, radio, party and government pronouncements, etc.) shows that the de-Ukrainianization of education was carried out furtively and gradually, but also consistently and relentlessly. In institutions of higher education, the switch to Russian as the language of instruction was accelerated by the formation of an All-Union-Republican Committee to deal with matters pertaining to higher education (1936), to which corresponding government agencies were subordinated (the USSR's Ministry of Higher and Special Education was formally established in 1946).

Statistical data on the revival of Russian theaters in the Ukraine are also lacking. But if in 1933 "forty new theaters" were founded (*Narysy* 407), one can safely guess that most if not all of them were Russian.

Production of books in Ukrainian underwent a decline under Postyšev and Xruščov. In 1930, titles published were 6,394. The number dwindled to 3,472 in 1933; 3,232 in 1936; 2,566 in 1937; 2,159 in 1938; 1,895 in 1939 (*EU* 1, 977). Of the total number of books published in all languages, Ukrainian books, per annum, constituted 79, 69, 59, 60, 52, and 43 percent. Again, there is reason to surmise that the bulk of the non-Ukrainian production was in Russian. In addition, Russian books published in Russia were imported freely and in large quantities. The main reason for the decline in the percentage of Ukrainian books published was the policy of the government; the reasons for the decline in absolute figures were more complicated. Among them were, probably, the public's reluctance to read literature imbued with official propaganda and, generally, low in quality; another was a decrease in the number of readers, due to the extermination of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and educated peasantry.

Russian newspapers started to grow in number under the Postyšev regime; in Xruščov's time, practically every oblast' had a Russian newspaper alongside the Ukrainian one (*Narysy* 427). The general share of Russian newspapers grew from 10.1 percent in 1933 to 22.2 percent in 1940 (*EU* 1, 992). In addition, many Russian newspapers were imported, and some even had a special printing produced in the Ukraine (e.g., *Pravda*). In many cases the pre-Ukrainianization dichotomy of Ukrainian for rural use and Russian for urban and industrial use, so vigorously denied during Skrypnyk's era, was reintroduced. In certain cases this was even reflected in the titles of newspapers: e.g., published in Kharkiv were the Ukrainian *Socialistyčna Xarkivščyna* vs. the Russian *Xar'kovskij rabočij*; published in Odessa were the Ukrainian *Čornomors'ka komuna* vs. the Russian *Znamja komunizma*.

All these developments reflected, on the one hand, a political course aimed at the gradual undermining of the part played by the Ukrainian language, and, on the other hand, a certain attitude among speakers of Ukrainian. It was impractical to adhere to a language whose communicative value and social prestige were steadily falling. Under these conditions, surprising was not the retreat of the Ukrainian language, but rather its relative tenacity. This was, possibly, the explanation behind the cautious and slow pace of the de-Ukrainianization measures, as well as the furtiveness and secrecy of the Russifying ones. For one thing, the ferocious terror conducted against Ukrainian intellectuals as a rule was not noted in the press, except at the beginning of the Postyšev era. Of course, consideration of possible repercussions outside the Soviet Union must also have had some effect. Nonetheless, the main policy goal Skrypnyk had set—namely, that peasants joining the proletariat in Ukrainian-speaking cities would preserve their Ukrainian language—was destroyed. The new industrial recruits arriving from the countryside entered a Russian-speaking milieu in which the prestige of the Ukrainian language was low and its communicative function only rudimentary. These peasants were destined to be denationalized. This was even more true of those who succeeded in moving into the higher echelons of the society, to become technicians, administrators, ideologists. The traditional deficient structure of Ukrainian speakers was being reinstated: again, those who spoke the language were primarily peasants and the humanist intelligentsia.

The political course of the 1930s also deeply affected the Ukrainian language from within. It was subjected to regimentation more severe than any in its history. For the most part this was another manifestation of the centralization and regularization typical of the time; in part it had been prepared by the earlier, strict regimentation of the language's spelling (in

the broad sense, including morphology and orthoepy), terminology, syntax, and vocabulary. The spirit of standardization that had been introduced by the normalizers of Skrypnyk's time was now turned against them.

During the SVU trial, S. Jefremov, accused of sabotage in his language work, reasonably stated: "I think that sabotage in language is merely impossible. When a saboteur floods a mine he does not leave his visiting card, but when one compiles a dictionary he places his name [on it]. . . . Everyone who writes wants to be read by the broadest circles of readers. In my opinion, sabotage is unthinkable in that area" (quoted from Smal'-Stock'kyj 102f.). Nonetheless, the language normalizers of the 1920s were accused of sabotage, and the charge was repeated *ad nauseam*.

The campaign against these "saboteurs" would rage for more than two years. Not only linguists, but also politicians were participants, including Postyšev, Zatons'kyj and, most actively, Xvylja. The attack was initiated in 1930 with an article by Naum Kahanovyč entitled "Proty 'narodnyctva' v movoznavstvi (Kudy ide ukrajins'ka literaturna mova?)" (Against populism in linguistics [Where is the Ukrainian language going?]), which was published in *Prapor marksyzmu* (no. 1), the outlet of VUAMLIN, a party institution opposed to the subdued but still suspect Academy in Kiev. A man of Jewish descent and of Russian culture, Kahanovyč produced a useful study about the history of active participles in Russian, which remained his only scholarly work. He ventured into problems of Ukrainian when it was still protected by Skrypnyk and when the latter's sway over the Ukraine seemed secure. Kahanovyč's position in the 1930 article was essentially close to that of Synjavs'kyj and other "anti-ethnographers" in Ukrainian linguistics, but his sharper tone invoked the specter of Marxism in linguistics. Wrote Kahanovyč: "For a linguist, particularly for a sociologist and a Marxist, it is obvious that such a path [as recommended by Kurylo and Sulyma] is impossible. The slogan 'back to the people's speech' is essentially conservative and harmful." And he concluded: "This language [i.e., Standard Ukrainian of the future] will, of course, be created on the basis of so-called 'popular' speech, but the latter will serve only as the foundation and by no means as the entire edifice. That edifice, that real literary language, will appear as the synthesis of heterogeneous components. It shall absorb the popular components and the *jazyčyje* [the literary language developed by Galician Moscophiles, containing Church Slavonic and Russian elements] and the language of newspapers and journals, etc. This is the path of all languages. Such is also the path of the Ukrainian literary language" (63–64). Without directly referring to the Russian language (this was not yet in fashion), Kahanovyč actually called

Ukrainian away from the excesses of populism to the pattern familiar to him in Standard Russian.

A few months later a new article by Kahanovyč was published, also in *Prapor marksyzmu* (1930, 3), under the innocuous title "Kil'ka sliv pro slovnyky" (A few words about dictionaries). It was directed against the Academy dictionary, noting only in passing a terminological dictionary of mechanics. Kahanovyč had grounds for two of his criticisms: that the Academy dictionary relied on prerevolutionary sources and often neglected new words of the Soviet period; and that some words invented during the Ukrainianization period were "pseudo-scholarly substitutes" (*surogaty*; 124). In comparison to subsequent articles by Kahanovyč and to those by Xvylja and his subordinates, the tone of the article is moderate, although it does contain two denunciatory statements: "this is scholarly sabotage" (124) and "Ukrainian bourgeois national [sic!] *xutorjanstvo*" (126). The latter word, derived from *xutir* 'farmstead of a wealthy farmer', is here synonymous to kulakdom, a serious political incrimination in the circumstances of the time.

In a year or two, when the "unmasking" of Skrypnyk and of the purists in Ukrainian linguistics became topical, Kahanovyč's daring sally opened the gate to a meteoric career. Suddenly he became the head of an officially approved and promoted antipurist movement, the director of the Institute of Linguistics in Kiev, the editor-in-chief of the newly founded periodical *Movoznavstvo*, and a corresponding member of the Academy (May 1934—Polons'ka 2, 32)—in a word, the arbiter in Ukrainian linguistics. After Skrypnyk's downfall, the quiet and partly scholarly tone of his political debut proved too mild. Kahanovyč underwent "self-criticism" for the "insufficiency" (but not inadequacy) of his approach in 1930. He should have spoken, he admitted, not of populism, but of aggressive bourgeois nationalism; he should not have just discussed problems but inaugurated a language pogrom.

Accordingly, a third article by Kahanovyč appeared, in the monthly *Za markso-lenins'ku krytyku* (1933, 10). It bore the title "Movna teorija ukrajins'koho buržuaznoho nacionalizmu" (The language theory of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism). Here it was claimed that representatives of the ethnographic school in Ukrainian linguistics, i.e., Kurylo, Tymčenko, and their followers, "continued the tradition of the Union for Liberation of the Ukraine [SVU]" (37), that to them the people meant the kulaks (on which point, strangely enough, they are charged to have followed in the footsteps of Potebnja and Vossler—pp. 34, 32). A work by another linguist, Smerečyns'kyj, was described as a "frontal attack of the class enemy on the development of the Ukrainian literary language as undertaken [?] by the

Communist party according to the indications of Lenin and Stalin'' (39). The charge against the ''bourgeois nationalists'' referred specifically to the seven following points: (1) rejection of neologisms coined during the revolutionary epoch; (2) rejection of international words; (3) rejection of language components common to those in languages of the other Soviet republics, especially Russian; (4) attempts to inculcate language components having a class enemy character; (5) attempts to spread feudal and bourgeois ideology through language; (6) attempts to spread artificially created language components; and (7) distortion in the meaning of many notions, especially those political and economic.

The immediate pretext for Kahanovyč's third article was the publication, in Kiev, of a collection of articles entitled *Na movoznavčomu fronti* (1931). The volume was the first publication of the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences. The institute was organized on 7 March 1930 to replace the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language and other linguistic sections and commissions of the Academy (*Visti VUAN* 1930, 2, p. 1f.). The institute's director, and the editor of the collection, was H. Tkačenko, a party man. The bulk of the book was devoted to criticism of the Academy's previous work in linguistics in light of the new political requirements (and phraseology, as the title of the collection indicates).

The ''program'' of Tkačenko differed but little from that of Kahanovyč. As Tkačenko wrote (in *Visti VUAN* 1930, 4): ''The proletariat, who took power into their hands in the Ukraine, also brought with them their language, their phonetics, vocabulary, and phraseology. While widely making use of the attainments of their predecessors, the proletarians adapt everything to their needs, to the needs of the broad toiling masses, beginning with spelling and the meaning of individual words'' (p. 12). Hence Tkačenko's promise that the Institute of Linguistics ''will periodically report on its work in factories, to the mass of workers'' (p. 16).

Tkačenko's program, however, was considered faulty (and hence, in the phraseology of the time, bourgeois nationalist) because his criticism was said to have been relatively mild and, particularly, because he failed to expel all the old cadre of linguists from the Academy and to destroy all their work. Instead he declared the necessity ''to select from the older staff of the linguistic institutions those who had better qualifications and who sincerely undertook to build Soviet-style research'' (p. 17). Following his call, the published first three volumes of the Academy dictionary were all reviewed by V. Jakymiv, M. Kalynovyč, and O. Synjavs'kyj, and in part (vol. 2) by O. Kurylo, who also reviewed research in dialectology. Tkačenko, while rejecting Smerečyns'kyj's views, still considered the latter's book on syntax to be a useful collection of data. That approach, and

the work of such collaborators, aroused Kahanovyč's ire. He wanted, as did the party, all work of the Academy linguists to be discredited, and the staff to be dismissed and liquidated, which would later happen.

Kahanovyč's third article, unlike his first two, was not a daring solitary call. It was part of a well-organized frontal offensive against "nationalism" and "sabotage" in linguistics. Discounting vitriolic attacks by Postyšev, the somewhat more professional campaign opened with A. Xvylja's article (in *Komunist*, 4 April 1933), "Za bil'šovyc'ku pyl'nist' na fronti tvorennja ukrajins'koji radjans'koji kul'tury" (reprinted in *Movoznavstvo* 1, 1934). On 25 April 1933, a commission, headed by Xvylja and charged with reexamination of work "on the language front," was organized at the Commissariat of Education (its two resolutions, one of a general character, the other specifically on terminology, were published in *Movoznavstvo* 1, 1934, pp. 15–21). Two days later, on April 27, *Pravda* published a far from professional correspondence from Kiev by a certain B. Levin concerned with "how bourgeois nationalists bossed (*orudovali*)" that vehemently attacked "the group of Petljurovite intelligentsia... Elena Kurillo [!], Professor Timčenko, Draj-Xmara, Šelud'ko a.o.," accusing them of "a zoological hatred to everything coming from the Russian language," and H. Tkačenko, "under whose wing the bourgeois nationalists gathered." That same year, 1933, Xvylja published another article, "Na borot'bu z nacionalizmom na movnomu fronti" (in *Za markso-lenins'ku krytyku*, 7), and the book *Znyščyty korinnja ukrajins'koho nacionalizmu na movnomu fronti* (Kharkiv). Beginning in 1934, the newly organized semiannual organ of the Institute of Linguistics, *Movoznavstvo*, at first edited by P. Mustjaca, a Moldavian, and then (from no. 5) by N. Kahanovyč, took over the campaign (H. Tkačenko simply vanished). Its first issue contained, following an editorial note, reprints of Xvylja's article and of two resolutions of the Commissariat of Education, and an article by S. Vasylevs'kyj entitled "Dobyty voroha" (To deal a final blow to the enemy), which in tone and character strongly resembled the writings of Xvylja.

The specific measures called for by Xvylja, his commission, and Vasylevs'kyj were to purge the cadre of linguists and linguistic institutions; to withdraw all the publications of the "bourgeois linguists" in terminology, lexicography, and syntax; to revise spelling; and to prepare new general and terminological dictionaries. The principal accusation against the work already done was expressed by Xvylja thus: "Ukrainian nationalists carried out a large-scale sabotage on the linguistic front in attempting to tear away the development of the Ukrainian language from the Russian language" (*Znyščyty*..., 4). The main targets of the attack were the chief

representatives of the ethnographic trend in Ukrainian linguistics: Kurylo, Tymčenko, Smerečyns'kyj, Kryms'kyj, and Šelud'ko, as well as Sulyma, all of whom were said to have been "assistants of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the proletarian revolution" and to have "fostered fascist interventionalist plans" (Vasylevs'kyj 29, 36). Many others were mentioned in passing (cf. a long list, compiled by P. Horec'kyj and I. Kyryčenko, of "saboteurs" in *Movoznavstvo* 2, 41, which included such representatives of the moderate trend as O. Synjavs'kyj and L. Bulaxovs'kyj). Ludicrous as these charges were, they could not be refuted, because the accused were never allowed any public self-defense and because the works on which the incriminations were based were immediately withdrawn. In the conditions of a total blackout, the accused were fired from their jobs, arrested, and more often than not liquidated. The introductory editorial of *Movoznavstvo* called upon linguists "to break forever with the bourgeois philological tradition and to walk out into the *kolxoz* fields and factories." More to the point were reproofs for specific recommendations that were labeled as localisms, regionalisms, archaicisms, and infelicitous neologisms (Resolution of the Commissariat of Education; *Movoznavstvo* 1, 18).

The initial general articles calling for a sweeping purge in linguistic matters were followed by ones on specific issues. P. Horec'kyj defended the suffixes *-nnj(a)*, *-ttj(a)* and *-k(a)* in substantives denoting processes, *-čyk* and *-ščyk* in substantives denoting acting persons, *-vydnyj* in adjectives denoting similarity, *-yr-* in loan verbs; except for the first two, these forms were borrowings from Russian (*Movoznavstvo* 1, 37–57). H. Sabaldyr rejected archaic syntactic constructions that had been recommended by Smerečyns'kyj (ibid. 1, 53–67). D. Drinov solicited the use of some geographical names in their Russian forms (ibid., 5, 43–51). O. Babenko suggested a similar approach in physical terminology (ibid., 5, 53–57). Some articles were essentially a critique of the language of some published work, intended either to discredit the author (e.g., V. Babak on Ostap Vyšnja, *Movoznavstvo* 3–4, 49–60; translations of Lenin's works—Kahanovyč, ibid., 9–24) or, in the case of "proletarian writers," to laud him (e.g., V. Masal's'kyj on I. Kyrylenko, ibid., 25–47). In the same vein, the Institute of Linguistics published several pamphlets "unmasking" the linguistic misdeeds of bourgeois nationalism (e.g., N. Solodkyj, *Iz sposterežen' nad syntaksoju sučasnoji ukrajins'koji hazetnoji movy*; and K. Nimčynov, *Proty nacionalistyčnoho škidnyctva v syntaksi ukrajins'koji literaturnoji movy*, both published in Kharkiv in 1934) and a small collection of articles on the language of some "proletarian" writers (Mykytenko, Kornijčuk, Holovko, writers of children's books, were criticized by Kahanovyč, O. Finkel', M.

Tetijevs'kyj, O. Matvijenko, in *Za jakist' xudožn'oji movy*, Kharkiv, 1934). There were also attacks on historians of the Ukrainian language and on etymologists, as well as sallies against "bourgeois nationalism" in the Moldavian language and in the Turkic languages; a characterization of them is beyond the scope of this study.

The theoretical level of these discussions was uninspiring: they offered no contribution to general linguistics. In fact, their only essential point was to bring Ukrainian closer to Russian—a political problem, not a scholarly one. In fact, the very target of the critics, namely, the ethnographic school of the 1920s, was not strong in theory. That school's tenor and approach were romantically emotional and populistically patriotic, rather than based on a consistent philosophy or theory; its nature did not provoke theoretical discussion. The only attempt at such a discussion, the article by O. Finkel' entitled "Terminolohične škidnyctvo i joho teoretyčne korinnja" (*Movoznavstvo* 2), which was directed chiefly against T. Sekunda and M. Kalynovyč, failed on the theoretical level. Referring to Humboldt's and Potebnja's theory of a word's internal form (69), Finkel' tried to prove that terms without an obvious internal form have the advantage of being free from unnecessary associations (70), a debatable point but one never properly developed. Both etymologically lucid and etymologically opaque terms have advantages and disadvantages. But, generally speaking, when a word becomes a term, its etymological ties are broken. For instance, when in Slovene 'comet' is rendered as *repatica*, derived from *rep* 'tail', hardly any astronomer who uses this word thinks of a dog's or cat's tail. When a Hungarian calls 'ethnography' *néprajz*, based on *nép* 'people' and *rajz* 'description', so that the term literally means 'a people description,' the "concreteness" of the word hardly precludes him from being as good an ethnographer as, say, any American scholar working in that field. Finkel' made some comparisons with Czech and Polish, but these he took from Sekunda and used haphazardly. Terminological problems in the languages of Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Yugoslavia, India, and the Arab countries were not even mentioned. Time and again Finkel' strayed from a scholarly key into cheap journalism bordering on political denunciation.

Even quantitatively, the linguistic attack was limited. Probably all its publications could be collected in a single volume. But some articles constantly reappeared in newspapers and journals published for mass circulation, and they were continually quoted and referred to. This saturation created a depressing and suffocating environment for linguistic endeavors.

Nominally the journal *Movoznavstvo* had an orientation toward Marrism. But there were no followers of Marr in the Ukraine (not even Kahanovyč espoused Marrism; the single, feeble attempt at an original work was V.

Babak's report at a conference of young scholars, "Pro dejaki pytannja istoryčnoho rozvytku ukrajins'koji movy"; *Visti AN Ukr.S.R.R.*," 1936, 1, 185–195). The gap was filled with translations of works by Russian Marrists. (In 1935 the Institute also published an anthology of Marr's texts, *Narysy z osnov novoho včennja pro movu*, compiled by M. Suhak and I. Zborovs'kyj; this, too, contained no original contributions.) The generally low level of the publication can be shown (for issues 1–5) by grouping the contents into political denunciations, Marrists' writings, and scholarly materials; these three kinds of materials are represented by 333, 74, and 37 pages, respectively (discounting the chronicle and the terminological lists). Under Kahanovyč, no scholarly books were published and *Movoznavstvo* was the only outlet for scholarship in linguistics,[66] so it can be said truly that linguistic study in the Ukraine was entirely suspended.

Undoubtedly, Xvylja regarded the revision of spelling as his most urgent linguistic task. That task was accomplished in a very short time. Unlike the preceding code of spelling rules, the new one was not subject to public discussion, but only to several of Xvylja's pronouncements. Nor was it revealed who carried out the actual work—most likely it was Kahanovyč. The new spelling was introduced in newspapers and other publications suddenly, in May 1933, without any preliminaries. Unprepared readers were confronted with an accomplished linguistic coup. Teachers and students realized that the language rules they knew were now invalid, whereas the new ones were unknown to them. Soon, however, the rules were set forth in preliminary form in a little-known periodical, *Politexnična osvita* (1933, 6; see Hol'denberh and Korolevyč 180). A separate booklet of the new rules, entitled *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys*, was published at the end of 1933.

According to Xvylja (*Za markso-lenins'ku krytyku* 1933, 7, 18), 126 corrections, many of them substantial, were made to old rules, and the chapter on foreign words was rewritten in its entirety. For native words

66 The several pamphlets (e.g., N. Solodkyj's) decrying nationalism in lingustics did not differ in tone or in scholarly level from articles in *Movoznavstvo*. One peculiar publication was the small collection of articles edited by N. Kahanovyč, *Mova robitnyka* (Kharkiv, 1934), containing contributions by Kahanovyč, L. Dohad'ko, V. Nevzorova, Z. Veselovs'ka, and I. Žurba. The articles contained observations about what was supposed to be the language of workers at the locomotive mill in Kharkiv. Inasmuch as they relate to strictly Ukrainian and not general Soviet language data, one can presume that they were actually based on the language of peasants recently driven *en masse* into industry, a case with parallels to the "mobilization" of shock-workers in literature (described by V. Hryško in *Sučasnist'* 1980, 2, pp. 70–95). Specific elements of the language of workers in the Ukraine remained unexplored, just as they were before the publication of Kahanovyč's sixty-page collection; they did not fit the scheme of Soviet ideology, which considered workers to be politically and culturally the leading class.

having doublet forms, preference was given to the forms resembling Russian: e.g., in the genitive singular of feminine substantives ending in a consonant, the desinence *-y* was replaced by *-i* (*radosti*, *soli*). Such forms occur primarily in the Southeastern dialects, so that a certain shift in the dialectal basis of the standard language ensued. In some cases, however, spellings that existed in no major dialects were introduced (e.g., the genitive singular *imeni* instead of the older form *imeny*). In the distribution of the adjectival suffixes *-s'k-* vs. *-z'k-* vs. *-c'k-*, the Russian forms were followed so closely that it was impossible to give any rule based on the structure of Ukrainian. The formulation that speakers should be led by language habits was reiterated, but nothing was said about these habits being Russian rather than Ukrainian.

In the choice of how to spell loan words, the reliance on Russian was nearly absolute. Use of the letter *g* was abolished wholly, so that, say, in Ukrainian *Goethe* was spelled *Hete*; the distribution of *l* vs. *l'* was copied, with all its inconsistencies, from Russian, where the usage was historically motivated (*Islandija* vs. *Finljandija*). As noted in the preceding section, East-Central Ukrainian did, as a rule, have loan words in the form mediated by Russian, so for the speakers of that—largest—part of the country, the new literary usage was a welcome innovation (or, rather, return to the old practice). For Western Ukrainians, the new spellings were a flat repudiation of their speech habits, which in the rendition of foreign words mostly followed the Polish pattern. In the Soviet Ukraine, the times called for fostering active hostility to all things Galician. The name of the Academy of Sciences was changed from "All-Ukrainian" to "Ukrainian," and its Galician members were dismissed (see above, chap. 6). Virtually all Galicians who lived in the Ukrainian SSR were arrested and liquidated. Xvylja went so far as to accuse the "Galician language" (!) of being imbued with "numerous influences of Polish bourgeois culture" (*Za markso-lenins'ku krytyku* 1933, 7, 21).

But the new spellings went farther than was justified by the speech habits of any speakers of Ukrainian. Words that had a form differing from the Russian one before the spelling reform of 1928/1929 were now relegated to the Russian usage, e.g., *xemija* 'chemistry', *ljampa* 'lamp' now became *ximija*, *lampa*. While admitting the pronunciation of *g* in some native words (onomatopoeic and naturalized medieval borrowings) Xvylja dropped the letter *g* from the Ukrainian alphabet (*Znyščyty*. . ., 69), apparently at the instigation of Postyšev. Overall, either the complete identity of Ukrainian and Russian forms or a one-to-one relation between the two was introduced wholesale, the only major exception being adherence to the traditional so-called "rule of nine letters" (the rule required that the

West European *i* be rendered as *y* after nine consonants if before another consonant, and as *i* in other positions; the rule was already part of the original spelling of 1919—note its § 10). All in all, no more than perhaps half a dozen foreign words preserved their traditional Ukrainian form, e.g., *adresa*, *pošta*, *Evropa* vs. Russian *adres*, *počta*, *Jevropa*.

In lexicography, the new Institute of Linguistics was charged with preparing replacements for the Academy's general Russian-Ukrainian dictionary and for all the withdrawn terminological dictionaries published or cancelled in preparation. The chronicle section of *Movoznavstvo* time and again listed new dictionaries—eleven in number—as being in preparation (2, 143; 3–4, 165). Supposedly, not only Russian-Ukrainian, but also English-, French-, and German-Ukrainian dictionaries were to be published. None of these appeared. In terminology, published during Kahanovyč's time were only the so-called "terminological bulletins," i.e., lists of Ukrainian equivalents for the most common terms and abridged dictionaries for school use. Five terminological bulletins—botanical, mathematical, physical, technological, and medical—were published in 1934–1935, ranging in length from 24 to 82 pages each (of which about one-fifth was taken up by a theoretical introduction directed against "bourgeois nationalists"). Published during the same timespan were ten school dictionaries, ranging in length from 35 to 212 pages, for the fields of biology, botany, geography, mathematics (two), chemistry, anatomy, natural history, zoology. The only terminological dictionary on a somewhat higher level was *Slovnyk medyčnoji terminolohiji*, 1936 (220 pp.).

During Xvylja's time the dearth in the publication of new dictionaries—always an unmistakable sign of a language's suppression—was reinforced by the lack of new monographs in linguistics and of Ukrainian language manuals for adults. Exept for *Poradnyk z ukrajins'koho pravopysu ta punktuaciji*, by O. Bondarenko and J. Kudryc'kyj, nothing was published in those years.

The promised new general dictionary prepared by the Academy did not appear. The only completed work by the Institute of Linguistics in this domain was a Russian-Ukrainian dictionary compiled by S. Vasylevs'kyj and Je. Rudnyc'kyj, edited by Vasylevs'kyj and P. Mustjaca (Kiev, 1937). That work falls far short of all the requirements applied to academic dictionaries. It is relatively limited in size (890 small pages); in specific entries the semantic breakdown is underdeveloped, phraseology underrepresented, and the choice of vocabulary is arbitrary, with no reference to sources. Clearly, the compilers sought primarily to exclude all "class hostile" words and to include all "revolutionary" words, as well as, of course, to avoid "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism": wherever possible they selected (or

introduced) words close to Russian and deleted synonyms that might lead the user to stray from this orthodox path. Their task was all the easier because the compilers did not delve into the realm of synonyms, lest the user gain the impression that Ukrainian was richer in words and semantic nuances than Russian. Examples of words taken directly from the Russian, with the necessary phonetic substitutions, can be quoted by the score, e.g., *hruzovyk* 'truck', *čužak* 'alien', *pryhorod* 'suburb', *rysystyj* 'trotting'. No less numerous were the semantic adaptations of Ukrainian words to the Russian ones, following the rule of one-to-one relation, e.g., Russian *dvor* 'yard' was rendered as Ukrainian *dvir*, without noting any synonyms (cf. Ukrainian *podvirja*, *obijstja*); since two Russian words, *rybak* and *rybolov*, correspond to the Ukrainian word *rybalka* 'fisherman', the latter was assigned to Russian *rybak* while for Russian *rybolov* the same word was introduced as a Ukrainian form.

In summary, the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary published in 1937 almost ideally reflected the ideological requirements made of it. Yet it appeared at the wrong time. The dictionary's publication coincided with the fall of Postyšev and the subsequent new wave of terror, which engulfed Zatons'kyj, Xvylja, and P. Ljubčenko, as well as their followers and henchmen. Kahanovyč, too, was slated for annihilation, as were many of the "proletarian" writers he had praised, such as I. Mykytenko and I. Kyrylenko. But more scapegoats were needed. The dictionary provided them. Two correspondents of *Pravda*, T. Lil'čenko and D. Vadimov, were dispatched to Kiev with the special assignment to find Ukrainian nationalism within and around the CPU. The campaign Xvylja had promoted in 1933 was repeated in 1937, only this time Xvylja was the target. Between reports on how Ukrainian nationalism was allegedly blossoming in the museums of Kiev (*Pravda*, 25 September 1937) and in the Kiev Opera (*Pravda*, 4 January 1938), one article made a particularly frenzied attack on the Institute of Linguistics.

The issue of *Pravda* dated 4 October 1937 published the article, entitled "Kak 'očiščali' ukrainskij jazyk" (How the Ukrainian language was 'rectified'). It was signed N. N. Koševoj, probably a pseudonym (Lil'čenko and Vadimov may have been the authors). Since the scholarly production of the institute was nearly nil, and since Koševoj, or whoever the authors were, clearly understood little about linguistics, the target of the attack was the newly published Russian-Ukrainian dictionary. To quote from the report: "Ukrainian nationalists exerted every effort to tear Ukrainian culture away from the fraternal Russian culture and to direct the Ukrainian people toward the capitalist West, toward fascist Germany"; "The enemy of the people Xvylja directed all his endeavors to fighting so-called 'Rus-

sianisms,' which quite legitimate and necessary Ukrainian words were often understood to be.... This line of Xvylja's became official because it was supported by the enemies of the people Ljubčenko, Popov, and Killerog. For four years the Ukrainian language was 'rectified' in that way.'' (The author[s] obviously knew very little about the campaign of 1933 and the ''nationalism'' of the twenties so that he presented it as beginning in 1933 with Xvylja!)

Specific facts in the *Pravda* report were few. The dictionary rendered Russian *upravljat'*, *verxovnyj*, *batrak*, *torgaš*, *blagodušnyj*, *zlonravnyj*, *gonka*, *starejšina*, *lom*, *glyba*, *sjurtuk*, *lugovoj*, and *služebnye časy* by the Ukrainian *keruvaty*, *najvyščyj*, *najmyt*, *kramar*, *bezžurnyj* and *bezturbotnyj*, *neputjaščyj*, *honytva*, *najstaryšyj*, *bruxt*, *bryla*, *surdut*, *lučnyj*, and *urjadovi hodyny*, respectively. The author of the report maintained that the Russian words should be used in the Ukrainian dictionary entries. The other charge was that the dictionary (following the officially adopted spelling) admitted the declension of the words *bjuro* and *depo* and, in part (instrumental singular), *radio*—usage that was condemned as the ''grossest vulgarization'' (in Russian these words are indeclinable). It was for giving such usages that Xvylja and the compilers of the dictionary were said to have paved the way for German military intervention.

The accusation was so ludicrous that members of the Institute of Linguistics, headed by Mustjaca (apparently Kahanovyč had already been removed), politely repudiated them, a daring and rare act in those days. They admitted only that *verxovnyj* 'supreme' should have been used in Ukrainian, too. The root of the problem was that until 1936–1937 *verxovnyj* was used in Russian to denote the supreme court, which in Ukrainian was generally rendered by *najvyščyj sud*. The Constitution of 1936–1937 introduced the new governmental body called, in Russian, *verxovnyj sovet*, which in Ukrainian was to be rendered *verxovna rada*. In justifying their choice, Mustjaca and his colleagues stated that the dictionary was already printed when the term appeared, and they promised to rectify the situation in the next edition. Disagreement with anything *Pravda* printed was unprecedented. In the issue of 29 December 1937, D. Vadimov (yes, no longer Koševoj!) responded with the report ''Russko-ukrainskij slovar' i ego sostaviteli'' (The Russian-Ukrainian dictionary and its compilers). Paraphrasing the statement of Koševoj (his alter ego?), Vadimov wrote, ''Following the instructions of the fascist agents Ljubčenko and Xvylja, the bourgeois nationalists expelled (*vytravlivali*) from the dictionary every word even slightly similar to Russian and international terms while filling the dictionary with hostile humbug.'' He labeled the compilers of the dictionary a ''gang of spies that have ensconced themselves in the Institute of

Linguistics.'' His statement ''The majority of the compilers of the dictionary have been unmasked as bourgeois nationalists, as traitors of the fatherland with long-running experience'' would indicate that its authors and editor had by that time been jailed. The dictionary was withdrawn from circulation.

At about this same time, *Komunist* launched an attack against Xvylja's *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys*. Finding an anti-Russian bias in that work was even harder than determining one in the dictionary. The only factual reproaches contained in the spelling manual were against *Evropa* (the word would be *Jevropa* in Russian pronunciation) and against compound words of the type *dvopoverxovyj* and *trystupnevyj*, which following the Russian pattern would begin with *dvox*- and *tr'ox*- (Russian *dvux*-, *trëx*-). The remainder of the article reiterated the familiar formulas about espionage, fascism, interventionism, etc.

The Institute of Linguistics had been routed, nearly all its workers had been arrested and either sent to forced labor camps or shot, and the publication of *Movoznavstvo* was suspended. The situation in linguistics resembled that in the political leadership of the Ukraine.

A few remarks about the staff of the linguistic institutions of the Academy are in order. After the major purge of 1929, when the trials connected with SVU were initiated, a few collaborators of the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language escaped censure and became members of the Institute of Linguistics that replaced the defunct institution. None of these individuals survived the purge of 1933. The new staff of the Institute of Linguistics was swept away in 1937–1938, with only two exceptions—I. Hubarževs'kyj and I. Kyryčenko. One person whose name appeared in all three periods was P. Horec'kyj, but even this exception is deceptive: in 1932 or thereabouts he was arrested and for several years not allowed to do scholarly work. (A list of the collaborators of the institute is given by Polons'ka 2, 169ff.; unfortunately it is not fully accurate.) Any continuity in Ukrainian linguistic study was lost.

No linguists remained to revise Xvylja's spelling. Yet the language had to be ''purified'' from Xvylja's and Kahanovyč's ''nationalistic'' distortions. The initiative was taken by the style editors of party publications. There are now no written documents confirming this activity, but I, for one, saw lists of prohibited words that the style editors of *Komunist* sent to all periodicals. The lists contained two columns. The first was titled ''Words not to be used,'' and the second bore the heading ''Words to be used.'' The words in the second column were closer to Russian than those in the first. Although the lists were never published, they were taken as binding. Another source of information about the language norms was official publi-

cations, especially the translation of the book *Kratkij kurs istorii VKP(b)*, whose Russian original was approved and partly written by Stalin and whose Ukrainian text mirrored the original as closely as the anonymous translator(s) deemed possible. Only in exceptional cases were instructions rectifying the language printed: for instance, Hol'denberh and Korolevyč (246) register a *Movnyj bjuleten'* (1; Kiev, 1936) based on the Ukrainian translation of Lenin's work (not available to me). In most instances such instructions were hectographed.

The havoc in norms for the Ukrainian language heavily affected schools. Teachers were confused and frightened, and students were bewildered. Not to follow the new trend was criminal, but to follow it was impossible, because of the lack of information. Instability seemed to be an inherent feature of the Ukrainian language, in contrast to Russian, which suffered no upheaval of any kind. The already damaged prestige of Ukrainian sank further.

With the rise of Xruščov and the cessation of mass terror, the situation began to normalize. As if symbolically, the Institute of Linguistics got a new director, M. Kalynovyč. His fields were Sanskrit and the Romance languages, but at least he was a scholar, not a career party man—after all, Xruščov wanted to establish order, not to foster Ukrainian culture and language. Some real changes took place only later, with the occupation in September of 1939 of Galicia and Western Volhynia and their legal incorporation into the Ukrainian SSR (except for the Berestja [Brest] area, which went to Belorussia); in June of 1940 the occupation spread to Bukovina.

Conscious of the perilous effects of the tsarist administration's policy of Russification during World War I, the government of the USSR sought to play on the patriotic, i.e., Ukrainian (and anti-Polish), feelings of the West Ukrainian population. Of the seven major newspapers that began publication (replacements for the "bourgeois" newspapers that were shut down on the day of the occupation), six were in Ukrainian and only one in Polish. (A Russian newspaper also began publication, but it was designed specifically for the military.) The university and all institutions of professional education became Ukrainian. Ukrainian replaced Polish on all signboards; it became the language of the legal system and general administration (Prokop 46ff.). To be sure, the arrest and deportation of Ukrainian civic leaders began a few days after the occupation (Prokop 45), under the direction of political police (NKVD), whose cadres were Russian; but during the first months of the occupation the heaviest blows fell on the Poles.[67]

[67] By the beginning of 1941, however, terror had clearly begun to be directed against Ukrainians. The incompatibility of what was labeled "bourgeois nationalism" with the new

All these measures signified a necessity for some semblance of protecting, and even fostering, Ukrainian language and culture also in the "older" Soviet Ukraine. The steps taken in that direction had a symbolic and superficial character, for no cessation of Russification was intended. Nonetheless, there was some reaction to the new situation.

Some idea of the character and scope of the "new wave" in national and language policy in the Ukraine can be obtained from an enumeration of the new measures. The Galicians expelled from the Academy in 1934 were restored to their academic status. To demonstrate regard for the older generation of Ukrainian scholars and writers, academician A. Kryms'kyj, who for years had been in disfavor and in danger of annihilation, was celebrated and bestowed an order on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, in January 1941, although he was not entrusted with any editorial work (later, at the beginning of the world war, he was apparently murdered). At the Institute of Linguistics, *Movoznavstvo* was revived under a new title, *Naukovi zapysky*; volume 1 appeared in 1941. L. Bulaxovs'kyj was given the task of preparing a survey of Modern Standard Ukrainian (which was published, in two volumes, after the war). A new standardization of spelling was initiated: M. Hruns'kyj, a scholar of the older generation, was commissioned to undertake the task, and in 1939 his *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys* (fourth edition) appeared in print. In what was perhaps the most symptomatic gesture, the national (not only social) liberation of the Western Ukraine was touted. For the first time, the phrase "the great Ukrainian people" appeared in propaganda. (For example, *Pravda* gave the following account of Xruščov's report at the Fifteenth Congress of the CPU, in May 1940: "Comrade Xruščov ended his speech with a toast in honor of the *great* Ukrainian people reunited under the leadership of comrade Stalin in one Soviet Ukrainian state" [*Pravda*, 17 May 1940]; he is quoted as having said the phrase "the reunification of the *great* Ukrainian people in one Soviet Ukrainian state" (*Pravda*, 18 May 1940; emphasis mine). Until that time, the epithet was reserved for the Russian people alone, as in Xruščov's speech at the Fourteenth Congress of the CPU two years previously: "The Ukrainian people... is bound with blood ties to the great Russian people" (*Pravda*, 16 June 1938).

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regime had become clear. This became especially evident in the case of 59 Ukrainian nationalists brought to trial in Lviv in January of 1941 (Prokop 78). Even sooner, with the arrival of Metropolitan Nikolaj (Jaruševič) early in 1940, the active Russification of the Orthodox church in Volhynia began (Prokop 58).

In Bukovina, occupied a year later, on 28 June 1940, the political sway towards Ukrainian was less ostentatious; it is said that the language of administration was to a great extent Russian (Prokop 83).

The measures were decorative in character; they introduced no substantial changes in the status of the Ukrainian language. The rules of the "Soviet Ukrainian" language set forth in 1939 were imposed on Galician writers and school students without any concessions (Wexler 153); the new edition of *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys* published in that year only eliminated some inconsistencies and incongruities. Government functionaries and other delegates sent to Galicia, Volhynia, and Bukovina used Ukrainian when speaking with or for the "natives." This had a favorable effect on the status of the Ukrainian language. By that time any remaining Ukrainian linguists were so frightened that they dared not raise their voices. By contrast, some writers did venture to do so, although they, too, had been subjected to persecution.

As has already been noted (chap. 6), during the years of Ukrainianization many writers were unhappy with the severe regularization of the standard language motivated by populist interests, and with the linguists of the ethnographic school who imposed rules on literature without regard for its unique requirements. By 1937–1938, the language situation had changed radically, but the seeds of mutual discontent were again in evidence. Ukrainian was again severely and arbitrarily regularized, this time in favor of similarities with Russian. A number of words, phrases, and syntactic constructions were outlawed.

Writers could and did protest by using prohibited language components. One writer who did so was Mykola Bažan. To give one example, the word *bryla* 'block, boulder', as already noted, was proscribed by no less an authority in questions of Ukrainian linguistics than *Pravda*, yet Bažan used it in his—otherwise officially approved—translation of Šota Rustaveli's *The Knight in Tiger's Skin*. In addition to such "silent" resistance, there was at least one instance of "loud" resistance, even prior to the occupation of Galicia and Volhynia. In 1939 *Literaturna hazeta* (no. 34, July 4) published an article by Jurij Janovs'kyj entitled "Narodna mova." Janovs'kyj overtly objected to what he called the impoverishment of the language by style editors who barred so many words and phrases in popular use. Reversing roles, Janovs'kyj made these "purificators" of the Ukrainian language from so-called nationalistic words into "nationalists" themselves: "It was in their Ukrainian nationalist interest to call native words nationalistic, to expel the national spirit (*narodnyj dux*) from the literature, so that the writer would become unable to serve his nation." He continued: "Following the example of style editors of newspapers and publishing houses, we construct something like language hencoops and hold them up as something worthwhile." Janovs'kyj went on to indulge in unabashed national romanticism: "The history of a language is the history of a nation. A nation's

language is her soul, her pride, her past, present and future. . . . Let us love our people's language. If there is no language, there is no writer. Let us be frank: we are negligent in our attitude to the language. Our language is poor, lean, colorless, awkward, half-baked. . . . We do not study the language of our classical writers. We do not know the language of our people, neat and tidy." He concluded: "Let us learn from our people. Let us learn from Stalin [sic!]."

Every charge was here, expressed in Aesopian language. The "impoverishment" of the language meant its Russification, "style editors" referred to language standardizers, "language of the people" was Ukrainian free from the prescriptions of Soviet planners. Those who devoted themselves to that language, the linguists who perished in the purges of the 1920s and 1930s, Janovs'kyj did not even mention. But the Soviet reader, accustomed to all published materials being replete with an official set of clichés, was sensitive to the smallest nuances. No doubt, the article was understood by many in the meaning Janovs'kyj had intended.

Literaturna hazeta tried to organize a discussion of the article. It published (in no. 36, 16 July 1939) four responses to Janovs'kyj's initiative—by a writer (M. Ryl's'kyj, "Davno nazrile pytannja"), by a teacher (M. Oleško), by a journalist (H. Sabata), and by a student (P. Perepelycja). Ryl's'kyj wrote: "The system of issuing decrees, of prohibitions and restrictions, the system of administrative interference, cannot be beneficial to the development of language culture." He accepted what Ukrainian had in common with Russian, but he also defended "Polonisms," within and without quotation marks. He wanted the dictionary being prepared at the Institute of Linguistics to be submitted to a public discussion.

No further discussion ensued, and Janovs'kyj's article has not been mentioned since. Yet neither Janovs'kyj nor the editor of *Literaturna hazeta* was punished—a novelty for the time. After so many years of relentless, cruel mass terror, an intellectual had spoken out about the Ukrainian language situation without paying dearly for the act.

An effect of the occupation of Galicia, Volhynia, and Bukovina was the exposure of the Soviet Ukrainian population, albeit limited (permissions to visit the occupied regions were issued only by the secret police), to an entirely different status of the Ukrainian language. In the Western Ukraine, speaking Ukrainian was an act of pride and defiance. During the ensuing years, a number of the Soviet (even communist) intelligentsia became "contaminated" with the same kind of nationalism (as well as other kinds, including political). Among them were K. Hupalo, playwright, H. Stecenko, prose writer, and J. Pozyčanjuk, correspondent of *Komsomolec' Ukrajiny*. These individuals broke with the Soviet system and ideology;

some took part in the struggle against it during the war years, in reaction to the Soviet language and nationalities policy. Such changeovers were hardly a mass phenomenon, but they were not insignificant.

Twelve years earlier, in November 1927, L. Kaganovič had listed seven items in defining Russian nationalism in relation to the Ukraine. These are quoted below in full:

(1) Lessening of the significance of the Ukraine as a part of the USSR; attempts to treat the USSR as in fact a liquidation of the national republics

(2) Preaching of a neutral attitude by the party toward the development of Ukrainian culture; treatment of the latter as a backward, ''peasant'' [culture] in opposition to the ''proletarian'' Russian one

(3) Attempting to preserve at any price the predominance of the Russian language in the internal official, social, and cultural life of the Ukraine

(4) [Maintaining a] formal attitude toward Ukrainianization, often recognized only by word of mouth

(5) [Constantly] regenerating great-power chauvinistic views that Ukrainianization is artificial, that it leans on a ''Galician'' language incomprehensible to the people, etc.; fostering these views in the party

(6) Tending not to carry out the policy of Ukrainianization in cities and among the proletariat, but limiting it to the countryside alone

(7) Tendentiously exaggerating specific distortions in carrying out Ukrainianization, and attempting to present these as an entire system of the violation of rights of national minorities (Russians, Jews) (*Budivnyctvo* 153).

The definition reads as a characterization of the Postyšev-Xruščov era *avant la lettre*, although its composer, Kaganovič, has never been labeled a nationalist or a deviator of any sort from Stalin's ''general line.'' In fact, the years between 1933 and 1941 was a period of systematic and frontal attack against the Ukrainian culture and language, as well as against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The period compares with the months of the first Soviet occupation of the Ukraine in 1918, only on a much larger scale. Its effects were devastating. It brought about the Russification of many speakers of Ukrainian; it precluded the planned growth in the use of Ukrainian in cities and industrial centers; and it caused many speakers of Ukrainian to develop feelings of servility and fear.

After several years of disrepute, Russian chauvinism had triumphed. Within the Soviet Union, overtly chauvinistic anti-Ukrainian utterances were not allowed in public. Abroad, however, such censorship did not exist, and some Russian émigrés approved of the undermining of Ukrainian.

Yet if the goal of the new de-Ukrainianization policy was to deal a mortal blow to the Ukrainian language and culture, it failed—at least for the time being. That failure was evident in the reaction of at least some speakers of Ukrainian to the occupation of the Western Ukraine. During the war years it would be recognized by the government itself, as it reverted to patriotic, nearly nationalistic slogans. In other words, the conflict between Ukrainian and Russian, as the two languages in the Ukraine, was not settled. It continued into the postwar years, without resolution. What Soviet policy did achieve was to draw the conflict back to the situation before Ukrainianization was undertaken: the peasantry and the humanist intelligentsia were aligned against the workers and technological intelligentsia, although the makeup of all these groups changed radically, usually in a way that did not favor Ukrainian.

The novelty of the 1933–1941 period was that along with overt efforts to Russify speakers of Ukrainian came interference into the very substance and structure of the Ukrainian language, interference which opened it defenselessly to Russian influences and which shifted the dialectal basis of the standard language eastwards. The actual penetration of Russian elements into written Ukrainian during that time is hard to measure quantitatively, but it seems not to have been very heavy; Soviet linguistic policy legitimized Russianisms which were already common in Ukrainian, rather than introduced new ones (discounting, of course, common Sovietisms which spread via Russian to all the languages of the Soviet Union). The essential character of the Ukrainian language underwent no major changes, as can be confirmed by comparing literary or journalistic texts of, say, 1925 with those of 1935 or 1940. The major attainments of the short years of the Ukraine's independence or semi-independence were retained. A much greater change was evident in a comparison of newspapers published in 1905–1917, on the one hand, and those of 1925, on the other. (These conclusions are impressionistic and should be verified quantitatively.) Nor can one observe any drastic reduction of Galician components in the general (not technical) language of 1933–1941.

There was, however, one potentially important innovation: the opening of Ukrainian to Church-Slavonicisms introduced, naturally, via Russian. Church-Slavonicisms were used in the nineteenth century by Ševčenko and P. Kuliš, but the subsequent predominance of populistic trends eliminated most of them from Ukrainian. The development resulted in the "monolinguality" of the Ukrainian standard language as opposed to the "bilinguality" of the Russian language, in which Church Slavonic components were important and often had a specific stylistic role (Shevelov 1966, 166ff; 1977, 261f.). During the Soviet period the bilingual Ukrainian intelligentsia

introduced Russian Church Slavonic, on the Russian pattern, into Ukrainian; the Ukrainians were tempted by the easy stylistic effect they produced. The main channels were newspapers; important, too, was the work of some outstanding Ukrainian poets (e.g., the words *čuždyj, obezhlavyv, smrad* in Tyčyna, 1936–1937; *syvohlavyj, vražyj* in Ryl's'kyj 1940; *zveršuje, otec', svjaščennyj, istynnyj* in Bažan 1937–1938). In poetry, Church-Slavonicisms became an ingredient of odes, a genre encouraged and imposed under Stalin. The opening of the gates to (Russian) Church-Slavonicisms threatened to change the stylistic structure of Ukrainian. The culmination of this development would come in the postwar years.

VIII. THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1920–1939) IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

After World War I, the West Ukrainian lands were divided among adjacent states. In July 1918, Romania occupied Bukovina; by May 1919, the regions of Pidljašia, Xolm (Chełm), Ukrainian Polissia, and Western Volhynia were occupied by Poland; in July of the same year the Polish occupation of Galicia was completed; after the temporary division of Transcarpathia among Czech, Hungarian, and Romanian military forces, in September 1919, the region became part of Czecho-Slovakia. It is according to these divisions that the language question is discussed here.

1. *Ukrainian Lands under Poland*

A principle of Polish policy in the Ukrainian lands was to forestall unity among the Ukrainians. Therefore the policy in Galicia was different from that in those lands previously belonging to Russia. The separation of Galicia from other Ukrainian lands was especially strict. Galician publications were forbidden outside Galicia, Ukrainian Galician organizations outlawed, and any kind of collaboration was considered illegal (*EU* 1, 555). The restriction of Ukrainian activities was stronger in the other formerly Russian lands than in Volhynia. Among the former Russian lands, there were differences in policy toward Volhynia, toward Ukrainian Polissia, and toward Xolm and Pidljašia. In Pidljašia, during the 1930s, Poland instituted the complete prohibition of a Ukrainian press, publications, and public use of the language, dissolution of the society *Ridna xata* with its reading rooms, and the subordination of the Ukrainian cooperative movement to Polish surveillance. There were attempts to revivify local ethnic group distinctions even within Galicia. Particularly persistent was the case of the Lemkians (Lemkos), who were often considered a separate people having nothing to do with Ukrainians. Non-Lemko teachers were eventually

removed from local Lemko schools and, in 1938, the teaching of Lemkian (instead of Standard Ukrainian) was even introduced in elementary schools. Some attempts were made to keep the Huculs and the Bojkians (Bojkos) apart from the Ukrainian identity, but these were more sporadic (*EU* 1, 562).

The legal status of the Ukrainian language in Poland was determined partly by international treaties and partly by the Polish constitution and Polish laws. The earliest international treaties relevant to the issue were that concluded at Versailles between the Allied Nations and Poland, on 28 June 1919, and that concluded at Riga between Soviet Russia (with the Soviet Ukraine) and Poland, on 18 March 1921. The Versailles treaty stipulated, among other things (§ 7): "No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language either orally or in writing, before the courts." The subsequent sections read: (§ 8) "Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein"; (§ 9) "Poland will provide, in the public educational system of towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents, adequate facilities for insuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their own language" (Parry 417f.).

The Riga treaty reassured Ukrainians in Poland "in conformity with the principle of the equality of peoples...free development of culture and language as well as the exercise of their religion" (§ 7, 1; Riga, p. 10). At that time, the future of Eastern Galicia was in limbo. That decision was issued two years later, on 15 March 1923, by the Conference of Ambassadors of the Allied Nations. It recognized the Ukrainian part of Galicia as a part of Poland, and reserved for it certain singularities in law (Makowski 241, Dombčevs'kyj 192).

In accordance with the obligations Poland had accepted—but without providing for the autonomy of the Ukrainian region—the first Polish constitution, of 17 March 1921, stated the following in two articles: (§ 109) "Every citizen has the right to preserve his nationality and to foster his

language and national peculiarities. Special statutes shall secure to the minorities in the Polish state full and free development of their national peculiarities by means of autonomous unions of [those] minorities established by public law, in the framework of general self-governing unions. The State shall have right of control in relation to their activity as well as of replenishment of their financial means in case of need''; (§ 110) ''Polish citizens that belong to minorities of nationality, faith, or language, have the right, equal with other citizens, to found, oversee, and manage, at their own expense, charitable, religious, and public schools and other educational institutions, as well as [the right to] use their language in them and to practice the prescriptions of their religion in them'' (Handelsman 128).

The Constitution of 23 April 1935 reiterated these two articles word for word. Moreover, it added: (§ 7, 2) ''Origin, religious confession, sex, and nationality shall not be reasons for the limitation of his [the Polish citizen's] rights''; however, these rights were limited: (§ 10) ''No activity may be contrary to the goals of the State as expressed in law. In case of opposition, the State recurs to means of constraint'' (*Constitution* 1935, 58f., 34f.).

Neither constitution designated Polish as the state (official) language. This notion was, however, firmly established by particular laws. According to the resolutions of the Sejm of 16 February 1923, and of the Senate of 23 March 1923, the language of these two institutions was exclusively Polish (Dombčevs'kyj 199). On 31 July 1924, a law specifically on the state (official) language was adopted: (§ 1) ''The official language of the Polish Republic is Polish. All state and self-governing authorities as well as the officers of administration conduct their business in internal and external service in the official language, with the exceptions referred to in the following articles'' (Dombčevs'kyj 199, Papierzyńska 220ff.). In 1927, the Ministry of Military Affairs issued a decree that began: ''All military authorities on the entire territory of the Polish Republic conduct their affairs in both internal and external service only and without any exception in the state, i.e., Polish language'' (Dombčevs'kyj 213).

Exceptions to the exclusive use of the Polish language were permitted in the five *województwa* of Lviv, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil', Volhynia, and Polissia. In March 1920, Eastern Galicia was renamed ''Eastern Little Poland (*Małopolska Wschodnia*).'' By an order of 3 December 1920, all of Galicia was divided into four województwa, with that of Cracow added to those of Lviv, Stanyslaviv and Ternopil'. The bulk of the Lemko region was included into the Cracow województwo and therefore was excluded from any guarantee of language rights. Laws concerning the predominantly Ukrainian województwa were numerous and overlapping, but their essentials can be summarized as follows. In the courts of the five województwa

in question, judges should accept statements in Ukrainian and respond in that language, but all the internal documentation should proceed in Polish. A court decision can be written, if the parties so demand, in both Polish and Ukrainian. The police was obliged to record testimony in Polish alone. All appeals made to higher courts outside the five regions had to be in Polish. Promissory notes could be written in Ukrainian in the five województwa with Ukrainian population, but then they could be contested there alone. Within the regions mail could be addressed in Ukrainian, but telegrams and packages had to be addressed in Polish (Dombčevs'kyj 204f.).

School legislation was no less entangled. The semi-official publication of the Ministry of Education issued in English (1928) stated: "The mother tongue in the public and private minority schools is not only used as [the] language of instruction, but it is considered equal to the Polish language in internal administration, in conferences of the teachers' council, in correspondence between the school and parents, and in school certificates" (*Education* 128). This regulation virtually confined Ukrainian to use within school walls. To open an elementary Ukrainian state school—provided Ukrainians were not less than 20 percent (from 1932, 25 percent) of the community—it was required that parents of not less than 40 children apply to the school authorities (their signatures should all be notarized); to have Ukrainian taught as a subject in a Polish school, the signatures of 18 parents sufficed (*Education* 123f., Dombčevs'kyj 236). The law also permitted Ukrainian private schools to exist on various levels. Opening such a school was regulated by a law of 11 March 1932. In each case permission was to be granted by the Polish administration upon the submission of the school's statute and program and of the applicant's certificate of non-involvement in any crime against morality or against the state. Private schools were subject to the surveillance of the state administration. It was understood that a school would be closed if the administration found that instruction there was disloyal to Poland or if the school failed to neutralize harmful influences upon youth (*Dziennik ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* 1932, no. 38, p. 545f.). The same law decreed that teachers' seminaries could be either Polish or bilingual. To open a bilingual state school, the written application of the parents of at least 150 students was required (Dombčevs'kyj 246f.); to open a bilingual technical school (*szkoła fachowa*), at least 40 percent of the perspective pupils should be Ukrainian and, again, their parents should have submitted a special, signed application (ibid., 248). There were also various deadlines for such applications, some set long before the beginning of the academic year.

In sum, the opening of Ukrainian schools was made dependent on many formalities, such as certified signatures, deadlines, eligibility in terms of official census data, and loyalty to the Polish state, any of which could be manipulated as desired by authorities. The existence of any Ukrainian school was completely dependent on the local educational administration, which was entirely in Polish hands and which was often hostile to any expansion of Ukrainian education. In theory, Poland's international commitments required it to permit Ukrainian schools free "in law and in fact"; in reality the established laws did not favor education in Ukrainian, and the actual situation was worse.

According to official data, in 1928 Poland had 804 Ukrainian public elementary schools, 2,120 bilingual ones, and 1,722 Polish ones with the Ukrainian language as a subject—altogether 4,646 schools offered some education in Ukrainian (*Education* 126). The dynamics of the educational system are revealed by a comparison of the interwar situation with that prior to 1919. For instance, in 1914, Galicia had 2,510 public elementary schools with instruction in Ukrainian, or 41 percent of all elementary schools (*EU* 1, 928). Under Poland the general number of schools grew, but that of Ukrainian schools declined drastically (from 2,510 in Galicia alone to 804 for Poland as a whole). A new type of bilingual school was established and became predominant. Soon growing in number to 2,120, the bilingual schools were a means of gradual but nearly certain Polonization.

The crucial years in the decrease of Ukrainian schools were the first half of the 1920s. In 1922/23 Galicia (more precisely the three województwa of Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil') had 2,450 Ukrainian schools; by 1926/27, that number had dropped to 864. There were no bilingual schools in 1922/23, but by 1926/27 their number stood at 1,339. In 1926, in the three Galician województwa the ratio of Ukrainian to Polish schools had become 864 vs. 2,298 (Papierzyńska 259).

In prerevolutionary times, Volhynia and the Polissia and Xolm areas, like the rest of the Russian Ukraine, had no Ukrainian schools. These started to appear under the German occupation during World War I, when their number is estimated to have grown to about 250. In 1922/23 their number was 442, vs. 89 bilingual and 543 Polish. By 1926/27, however, it sank to 2 versus 392 bilingual and 683 Polish. In 1937/38 the figures were 8,520 and 1,459 respectively (of the latter, 853 taught the Ukrainian language as a subject). Polissia had a negligible number of Ukrainian schools: 22 in 1922/23, none of which survived into the next academic year (one private school remained in Berestja). The Xolm region had no Ukrainian schools at all. In 1922 the Lemko area had 79 Ukrainian schools;

in 1937/38, by contrast, no Ukrainian schools existed there, although 58 schools were bilingual. It is surmised that throughout Poland during the late thirties 7 percent of Ukrainian children went to Ukrainian schools, 45 percent to bilingual schools, and 48 percent to Polish schools (Papierzyńska 259, *EU* 1, 945).

In Galicia the number of Ukrainian high schools (*himnaziji* and *liceji*) was, in 1931/32, 5 state and 13 private schools; in 1937/38, the numbers were 10 and 35, respectively. By contrast, Polish schools of these types numbered 120 in 1931/32 and 220 in 1937/38. The presence of Ukrainian technical schools was negligible: 4 private Ukrainian schools in 1931/32 and 4 private and 1 state school in 1937/38. Outside Galicia, there were practically no Ukrainian high schools or professional schools in the Polish state (*EU* 1, 945).

The university at Lviv was linguistically entirely Polish, including the courses on Modern and Old Ukrainian (taught by J. Janów). Chairs of Ukrainian language and literature were admitted only at the University of Cracow, outside Ukrainian ethnic territory. The University of Warsaw had a faculty of Greek Orthodox theology, but all subjects were taught in Polish. In September 1920 Polish authorities offered to open a Ukrainian university in Stanyslaviv. Whether the project would have materialized if the Ukrainians had cooperated is debatable; in any event, the offer was rejected (Mudryj 84f.). The issue was raised once more in 1926, but again without any result (Papierzyńska 266f.). In 1921–1925 a clandestine Ukrainian university existed in Lviv, but by its very nature that institution could not develop into a full-fledged, recognized educational center. The only educational institution of higher education with instruction in Ukrainian that was open to Ukrainians was the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv, founded in 1928.

Within Galicia, active support of Ukrainian schools was centered in the Ukrainian Pedagogic Society (some representatives in the Polish Sejm and Senate also supported the issue). Founded as early as 1881, the Pedagogic Society resumed its activities after World War I and the Polish occupation. In 1926 it took the name of the *Ridna škola* (Native school) society. Led by intelligentsia, the organization had a fairly broad base. By 1939, it included 2,074 chapters with 105,000 members. The Polish authorities, as mentioned, did not permit Ridna škola to operate in any Ukrainian region outside Galicia.

The history of Ukrainian representation in the Polish Sejm and the Senate is rather complex: indeed, it reflects the overall development of Ukrainian-Polish relations. The election of 1922 was boycotted in Galicia, except for a small group of *Xliboroby* who favored the Polish government

(Papierzyńska 137); that year Volhynia and Polissia together with Pidljašia sent 20 deputies to the Sejm and 6 to the Senate (ibid., 149f.). The election of 1928 sent 48 Ukrainian deputies to the Sejm (8 from Volhynia) and 11 to the Senate (for comparison, that year the Sejm had a total of 444 members—which would fall to 208 in 1935—and 96 in the Senate). In the election of 1930, the corresponding numbers were 26 and 5; in the elections of 1935 and 1938, they were 14 (5 from Volhynia) and 5. The decline was brought about by the Polish policy of terror (so-called pacification) in 1930 and after 1935 by changes in the Polish constitution and electoral rules. Clearly, Ukrainian representation (often split on specific issues) was too small to influence Polish legislation substantially; nonetheless, with its declarations and interpellations, it was still an important factor in shaping public opinion, in bringing the problems of Ukrainians in Poland, including language legislation and language status, to public attention, and in precluding further potential violations of Ukrainian rights.

Another factor determining the status of the Ukrainian language was the Polish terror against Ukrainians and the Ukrainian terror against Poles. Polish action against Ukrainians had three crests: in 1919, during and after the Polish-Ukrainian war, when it is estimated (*EU* 1, 556) that up to 23,000 Ukrainians were imprisoned; in 1930, when the pacification of Ukrainians was launched, especially in the countryside, so that branches of Prosvita were sacked, the boy scout organization Plast was disbanded and prohibited, and several Ukrainian *himnaziji* were closed; and in 1938. The Polish terror against Ukrainians as a group was directed by the government, with the active participation of paramilitary organizations like *Strzelec* and some other Polish groups. By contrast, the organized Ukrainian terror, which started with the founding of the clandestine Ukrainian Military Organization (1920) and gained momentum after its entry into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (1929), had an individual character, in that it was directed against Poles believed to be anti-Ukrainian and against Ukrainians believed to be traitors in the Ukrainian-Polish conflict; yet, it also targeted Polish property, means of communication, and industry. Ukrainian terror, which arose as a reaction to Polish terror, strengthened Poland's anti-Ukrainian course and, in the long run, was one factor contributing to the demise of the democratic system in Poland's gradual shift to an authoritarian state. Landmarks in that development were J. Piłsudski's coup d'état in 1926, the disbanding of the Sejm and the Senate in 1930 (preceded by the pacification), the introduction of the new constitution in 1935, and the disbanding of the Sejm and the Senate in 1938.

With these changes in the political structure of Poland, it became easier to pursue an anti-Ukrainian policy in the economic domain and to carry out such other externally non-political measures as settling an estimated 300,000 Polish farmers and city dwellers in the Ukrainian lands (*EU* 1, 580), excluding Ukrainians from state service, transferring public servants of Ukrainian nationality to Western Poland, etc. The resulting situation was a Ukrainian-Polish war overt yet without a front, fueled by spreading mutual hatred, which made a compromise virtually impossible. In such conditions, the attempt at reconciliation, the so-called policy of normalization, could yield no results.

Yet until its defeat and disintegration in September 1939, the Polish state was not openly or consistently totalitarian. Ukrainian political parties still existed, and they had some representation, however curtailed or decorative, in the legislative bodies. Ukrainian schools were in decline, but they were not entirely proscribed; the Greek Catholic church did not undergo either liquidation or the imposition of state control, but remained, instead, a bulwark of Ukrainian culture and language.[68] Restricted from pursuing careers in state institutions, Ukrainians plunged into economic activity. Some operated on private initiative, thus creating a Ukrainian merchant class. Others organized a broad cooperative movement and unions of cooperatives, among which some, such as *Centrosojuz* and *Maslosojuz*, gained sufficient economic strength to be reckoned with.

The Ukrainian press was subject to some restrictions, but it was not submitted to preliminary censorship. It could, at least in Galicia, reflect various political views and attitudes, including nationalist and communist ones. Both quantitative growth and diversification characterize the Ukrainian press in Galicia at this time. During the interwar period Galicia had 44 political organs (discounting two published by Moscophiles) and 3 illustrated biweeklies. Among Ukrainian periodicals, there were 5 designed for children, 5 for women, 8 for boyscouts, 7 for students, 6 for teachers, 5 for workers in cooperatives, 6 religious and theological, 9 literary, 1 of the arts, 2 of music, 1 of cinema, 1 of humor and satire, 4 historical and philosophical, 1 of law, 1 of bibliography, 2 popular scientific, and 2 devoted to local lore; the total number was 143. True, these figures encompass the entire twenty-year interwar period: in no one year were 143 periodicals published. But the brief lifespan typical of earlier stages in the history of the

[68] The same cannot be said of the Orthodox church in Poland. It was subject to fairly strict state control as prescribed by the decrees of 30 January 1922 and of 10 December 1938. In the Xolm region the 389 Orthodox churches that had existed in 1914 were reduced to 51 in 1939 (*EU* 1, 564).

Ukrainian press expanded in those years: the average longevity of a periodical during that period was 7.7 years. (The data are tallied on the basis of lists given in *EU* 1, 933–936, and are not exhaustive.) The situation was much worse in other regions of the Polish Ukraine, with their 4 general political periodicals, 3 church and 3 cooperative periodicals; also the Ukrainian press was completely silenced in Polissia and the Xolm region during the 1930s.

Book production boomed. The numbers of Ukrainian books published during the interwar period were:

1924	195
1928	450
1931	342
1932	288
1934	346
1935	223
1938	476

The average printing jumped from 2,204 to 6,524 copies. Again, however, there was a disproportion between Galicia and other Ukrainian lands. For instance, in 1930, Galicia—the regions of Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil'—published 340 books, whereas book production in Volhynia was 10 (23 Ukrainian books were published in Poland proper) (*EU* 1, 978).

The peculiar combination of suppression with certain liberties, of legal regulations with total arbitrariness by some officials, had an impact on the status of the Ukrainian language and on the psychology of its speakers in the Polish Ukraine. Not only was the Ukrainian language a vehicle of communication among farmers, clergy, and intellectuals; it also was a means of national self-assertion and defiance against the existing political regime. In the mid-nineteenth century, it was possible to be a Ukrainian, even a Ukrainian patriot, and yet speak in Polish to one's family. In the period between the two World Wars, such duality became impossible. Excluded from official use and often rejected as a means of communication by the state administration and the co-territorial Polish population, the Ukrainian language was purposefully used at frequent large public manifestations as a badge of belonging and as a self-imposed stigma. It seemed as if to the normal language functions of communication, appeal, and expression of affectivity (as established by C. K. Bühler in his *Sprachtheorie*, 1934) the function of ostentation was added. These psychological underpinnings sometimes stifled spontaneity in speech. In the larger cities of the Russian Ukraine, a total and apparently impersonal negation of the Ukrainian language led to its diminishing use; in the cities of the Polish Ukraine, a virulent but haphazard degradation of the Ukrainian language brought about

a peculiar kamikaze attitude, in which choosing to speak Ukrainian had elements of social hysteria and of the speakers' mutual quasi-hypnosis.

S. Šax, a longtime resident of Lviv and a fairly objective memoirist, recollects (232) as a heroic act how, as first-graders, he and his classmates undertook a trip by rail from Lviv. The children were instructed by two seventh-graders that each small boy should go, one by one, to the wicket at the main station in Lviv and ask for his ticket in Ukrainian. Each boy met with abuse and insult from the Polish cashiers, but the tickets were purchased and the ride took place. The deprivation of spontaneity from the speech act was certainly by no means normal. This minor episode reflects the status of the Ukrainian language under Polish domination, and the experience of Ukrainian speakers in the interwar period.

It is difficult to say whether this collective psychosis on language precluded the Polonization of the population. In terms of social strata, it was most typical of the educated classes (including the clergy), but it also affected many middle- and lower-middle class people. The defiant attitude even expanded to the countryside (where, in general, Ukrainian was used "naturally"), especially wherever Ukrainian peasants had to confront new Polish settlers. Šax notes a clergyman's observation that, among educated lay people, in all of urban Galicia he knew only two families in which a father, son, and grandson—i.e., three generations—identified with the Ukrainian nation (and used the language; Šax 63). Even if the observation was an overgeneralization, it reflects on the language situation. No doubt, the collectively accepted use of the Ukrainian language for ostentatious purposes hampered such processes. Yet it hardly stopped them. The Polish language remained more prestigious and, in the long run, it is prestige—especially if combined with material advantages—that tips the balance in such situations. However, the interwar period was too short a time to allow any far-reaching consequences of the new attitude to manifest themselves. The whole period lasted but twenty years, and a "new attitude" toward the Ukrainian language became fairly widespread some time after the linguistic (and social) fronts were established, following the incorporation of Galicia into Poland. Clearly, that "new attitude" was shared by those outside the bounds of the humanist intelligentsia. In spite of the efforts of the Polish administration to preclude such a development, the number of non-humanist—technical, in the broad sense—intelligentsia grew considerably. Lawyers, physicians, and engineers were at the center of that group; merchants, proprietors, cooperative entrepreneurs, and the like expanded its peripheries. V. Simovyč, a thoughtful observer of Ukrainian language circles in Lviv, described the linguistic situation thus: "After the First World

War. . . our life became much more difficult, but the framework for our life broadened substantially'' (Simovyč 1934[1], 90).

The language of the church was a special case. The Greek Catholic church, which was very influential in Galicia, continued the tradition of using a Ukrainian variant of Church Slavonic as its liturgical language and the Lviv koine or dialect of Ukrainian in sermons and in communication with parishioners. Outside Poland, the Orthodox church was subject to the Russian church authorities; in Poland, the high Orthodox hierarchy remained Russian or pro-Russian, and the liturgical language was Church Slavonic with Russian pronunciation. Many Orthodox church communities in Volhynia and Polissia were dissatisfied with the church's stand. A broad movement for the de-Russification of the Orthodox church began in the 1920s, and part of that effort became not only the Ukrainian pronunciation of Church Slavonic, but the introduction of the Ukrainian language for clerical use. After a long and often violent campaign, the Orthodox church authorities had to concede that, in principle, Ukrainian was admissible in church services, without renunciation of Church Slavonic (Statement of the Metropolitan of Warsaw Dionisij, 2 August 1928; see Papierzyńska 112).

In internal structure and form the Ukrainian language of Galicia—which influenced that in Volhynia and Polissia—remained, as in Austrian times, a regional koine typical particularly of Lviv. It was not closed to dialectal elements, which varied from district to district, but with the growth of education these dialectal features were gradually suppressed and replaced by elements of the Lviv koine. This regional character was not the outcome of a deliberate policy or attitude. On the contrary, in principle Ukrainian speakers in the Polish Ukraine wanted to eliminate many Galician peculiarities from their language and to be all-Ukrainian or, as they put it, to adhere to the Ukrainian spoken in the Dnieper region (*naddniprjans'ka mova*). The high esteem in which Standard Ukrainian as developed in the Russian Ukraine was held transpired also from another term then used for that Ukrainian literary language, Great-Ukrainian (*velykoukrajins'ka mova*). By accepting the term Galicians implicitly agreed to consider themselves and their language to be ''Little-Ukrainian'' (although that designation was never used). In the mid-1930s a more careful attitude about the ''purity'' of the language was noted by Simovyč (1934a, 90). It was also he who registered some ''hyper–Great Ukrainianisms,'' i.e., Russian words and phrases used by Ukrainian speakers in Poland because the speakers mistook them for ''pure Ukrainian'' (1934b, 150).

This was the core of the problem. Contacts between the Polish Ukraine and the Russian Ukraine became tenuous after the Sovietization of the latter; from the mid-1930s they came practically to a standstill. As part of

the campaign against "capitalist spies" and "saboteurs," the slogan "the frontier under lock and key" was launched. Certainly the war being waged by the Kremlin against the peasantry required a complete communication black-out.

The only advisers available to Ukrainians in Poland on questions of "pure Ukrainian"—i.e. the Kiev Standard—were a small number of emigrants from the Russian Ukraine who left in or about 1920. One such emigrant interested in questions of language was Modest Levyc'kyj, who wrote "Paky i paky" (*Volja* 1920) and published *Ukrajins'ka hramatyka dlja samonavčannja* (3rd ed., 1923); another was Je. Čykalenko, who wrote *Pro ukrajins'ku literaturnu movu* (1920; first published in 1907). Neither was a linguist. Levyc'kyj was a writer, and Čykalenko was originally a landowner and agriculturalist. The only professional linguist among the émigré language advisers was Ivan Ohijenko. Very active in the field, Ohienko published *Ukrajins'kyj stylistyčnyj slovnyk* (1924), *Čystota i pravyl'nist' ukrajins'koji movy* (1925), *Narysy z istoriji ukrajins'koji movy* (1927; not actually a history), and *Skladnja ukrajins'koji movy*, in two volumes (1937, 1938), among other works. Particularly influential was the popular monthly *Ridna mova* that Ohienko published in Warsaw in 1933–1939; there he applied the approach of the Kiev ethnographic school of the 1920s, which was destroyed by 1933. *Ridna mova* made use of every kind of language propaganda: in addition to articles, it published reviews of the language of various publications, advice to readers, responses to their queries, fictional dialogues about language questions, linguistic jokes, etc. But the emigrants from the Russian Ukraine were prevented by the Polish administration from settling in Galicia and other Ukrainian regions; as a rule they were restricted to purely Polish territory, especially Warsaw, which made maintaining personal contacts precarious.

In Galicia a similar approach, but without going to Ohijenko's extremes, was taken by V. Simovyč. After 1923, when his *Na temy movy* appeared as a book, Simovyč published little in the field of linguistic advice and standardization, only a few articles scattered in various periodicals.

Due to these circumstances, the practical impact of the Standard Ukrainian language on the Lviv koine was limited. School grammars either stuck to the Galician tradition entirely (S. Smal'-Stoc'kyj and F. Gartner, *Hramatyka ukrajins'koji [rus'koji] movy*, fourth edition, 1928) or innovated very little (*Hramatyčni vpravy*, for various grades and types of schools, by O. Popovyč, 1924–1928; detailed bibliography in Simovyč 1934c, 39). After the Soviet occupation, in September 1939, the Kiev standard (as it existed at that time; see above, chap. 7) was imposed by the authorities on all written texts without any discussion. There was no time to influence the

oral standard, however, and it remained intact until the retreat of the Soviet forces, in June 1941.

The "Great-Ukrainian" orientation of speakers in the Polish Ukraine was thus much more theoretical than real; by contrast, their exposure to Polish influences was very real indeed. Elementary phonetic substitutions apparently sufficed to make borrowings palatable. They abounded in urban life, starting with forms of social conduct such as addressing people and ending with technical notions. The former was examined at some length by Simovyč (1934d). Among the forms of address he noted was *panedobrodiju* (Polish *panie dobrodzieju*) and among titles, *pane mecenase* (Polish *panie mecenasie*) in addressing a lawyer (Šax, 264 reminisces that among students of the Ukrainian *himnazija* in Lviv, Polish books on good forms of behavior circulated widely). The use of urban technical terms was reflected, for example, by colloquial names for tram lines, such as *dvijka, čvirka, pjatka*, etc. (Polish *dwójka, czwórka, piątka*). Students of a given grade in school were called: *šestak, semak, vos'mak* (Šax 233: cf. Polish *szóstak, siódmak, ósmak*). When a soccer team was organized at the Ukrainian high school (*akademična himnazija*) in Lviv it was given the name *kružok hry nižnóji pylky*; one student of that school recalls that the students called it *futbolevyj kljub* (Šax 84; the episode began as early as 1908). Both these usages were patterned on Polish (*piłka nożna, klub futbolowy*). In the phonetic substitutions, Polish accentual patterns often remained unchanged. In that way the pattern ´- : - ´- (*trámvaj* : *tramváju*), completely alien to Ukrainian, was introduced into the Lviv koine.

The general situation wrought by the interrelation between the Lviv koine and Standard Ukrainian is reflected particularly clearly in matters of spelling and, in part, of terminology.

The recommendations put forth in *Najholovniši pravyla ukrajins'koho pravopysu* published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev (1919, 1920, 1921) met with some criticism in the Polish Ukraine (M. Voznjak 1921, V. Hnatjuk 1922). In 1920–1922 the Ševčenko Scientific Society (*Naukove tovarystvo im. Ševčenka*) in Lviv deliberated over matters of spelling, in an often heated debate. O. Makaruška rejected them passionately (Šax 175f.). The outcome of these deliberations was the publication, in 1922, of a booklet of *Pravopysni pravyla* formulated by K. Kysilevs'kyj (Karpova 130), which had gained the approval of the Ševčenko Scientific Society (subsequently modified by O. Panejko as member of a commission appointed by the regional inspector of secondary schools, I. Kopač—Šax 176).

Some of the traditional spelling rules used in Galician Ukrainian were set aside by the new rules (e.g., the separate spelling of the verbal postfix *sja* and of *-mu* endings in the future tense, the etymological spelling of some consonantal clusters), but others were wholly corroborated (e.g., the exclusion of apostrophes, the retention of all foreign instances of *g* as *g*, not *h*, the rendition of *l* in West European loan words as basically palatalized *l'*). Other Kiev rules were accepted in part (e.g., double *n, d, t, l* in neuter substantives, although not *s, z, š, ž, č*: therefore *zillja*, but *kolosja*) or admitted as alternatives to traditional Galician spellings (e.g., in neuter substantives *-ja* and *-je*: *žyttja* and *žyttje*; *bahato* and *bohato, inšyj* and *ynšyj, mačuxa* and *mačoxa*, dative singular in masculine substantives in *-ovi* and *-ovy*).

Upon their publication, the spelling rules of the Ševčenko Scientific Society were criticized by those who wanted stronger adherence to Kiev spelling (e.g., M. Rudnyc'kyj, 1923), as well as by those who advocated more reliance on the Galician tradition (e.g., V. Hnatjuk, 1923; I. Pan'kevyč, 1923; V. Dombrovs'kyj, 1925; bibliography, partly inaccurate, in Karpova 131f., 134, and some additional items in Šax 175ff.). In any case, the new rules, which were published only as a proposal (*projekt*), did not become compulsory, because there existed no authority that could make them so. Consequently, the spelling rules were rarely applied consistently, and usages in publications continued to differ.

Following the Kharkiv Conference on Spelling of 1927 and the publication of its resultant *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys* in 1929, the Ševčenko Scientific Society decided to adopt that set of rules, on 25 May 1929. Commissioned by the society, M. Voznjak prepared a *Ukrajins'kyj pravopys iz slovnyčkom* (of about 6,500 words; 1929). The inconsistencies in spelling caused by the compromise of two traditions were felt no less strongly in the Polish Ukraine than they were in the Soviet Ukraine (e.g., the criticisms by S. Smal'-Stoc'kyj and M. Rudnyc'kyj, among others, referred to—inaccurately—in Karpova 136). Only the replacement of the 1929 spelling by that of Xvylja, with its strong Russianizing tendency, tempered Galician hostility to the 1929 rules. For instance, K. Kysilevs'kyj's *Pravopysni pravyla* and *Pravopysnyj slovnyčok* (1934) in some cases cite (besides each other) both the spelling of 1922, by the Ševčenko Society, and that of 1929.

Even this cursory presentation of the orthographic problems in the Polish Ukraine during the interwar period illustrates the tension between two conflicting desires—that is, to maintain the spellings of the "Great Ukraine" and to preserve at least some elements of the Galician tradition—and the impasse to which the normalization of Ukrainian spelling had come.

A similar situation obtained in terminological work, though there it existed on a smaller scale, because the problems concerned smaller circles of people and because the scope of such work was very limited, due to the lack of funds and specialists in the field. Discounting K. Levyc'kyj's *Pravnyčyj slovnyk*, published in a second edition in 1920 but in structure and compilation belonging to the Austrian period, substantial new terminological works were only Volodymyr Levyc'kyj's on mathematical, physical, and chemical terminology, and Z. Lys'ko's *Muzyčnyj slovnyk* (1933). These two works constituted a compromise between the Kiev dictionaries and the Galician tradition.

In general lexicography, too, the same conflicting tendencies can be observed. Lexicographical work was very limited. Only a few practical dictionaries were published, all rather small in size: the Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Polish dictionaries by I. Svjencic'kyj (1920) and by Je. Hrycak and K. Kysilevs'kyj (1931), and the German-Ukrainian dictionary by H. Nakonetschna (1939).

In grammar, there were no publications that presented the system of the literary language as a whole. The most important works, *Opis fonetyczny języka ukraińskiego* by I. Zilyns'kyj (1932) and *Značennja ukrajins'kyx prykmetnykiv* by R. Smal'-Stoc'kyj (1926), covered limited topics; also, they treated standard language data alongside dialectal materials, often devoting more attention to the latter than to the former.

In sum, the linguistic work carried on in the Polish Ukraine was an important counterbalance to the devastation in Ukrainian linguistics that occurred under the Soviets in the 1930s. Considered on its merits, that work was unsystematic and restricted in scope; still, it sheds light on the language situation in the Polish Ukraine and on the effort to overcome its isolation. There existed much good will for unifying the Ukrainian standard language, but there were also strong centrifugal forces at play. What is more important, there were no external circumstances that could have brought about such a unity. The political regimes and styles of life were so outspokenly different in the two parts of the country that no language unity was possible. In simplified terms, the concerns that the two parts had in common were the deprivation of the Ukrainian language's essential rights, on the one hand, and its survival in spite of that condition, on the other. Government methods against the Ukrainian language also differed in the two parts. Nominally, under Polish rule there was no government interference with the internal structure of the language. Yet in fact, in both Poland and the Soviet Union, the longterm policy goal was identical: the extermination of the Ukrainian language. Under Polish domination, Ukrainians

could conduct both active and passive resistance to that policy; in the Soviet system, only passive resistance was feasible.

The similarities and the differences in the status of the Ukrainian language, and of the Ukrainians themselves, in the Soviet Ukraine versus the Polish Ukraine is epitomized by two events described below.

In Kharkiv, in 1933, when attacks against "bourgeois nationalism" in the Ukrainian language began, an instructor at the Industrial Academy surnamed Polons'kyj (his first name is unknown to me) dared to raise his voice in defense of the accused (Xvylja, *Znyščyty*..., 112). He was arrested that same night. It is unknown whether he was shot or died in prison or in a labor camp; at any rate, he was never heard from again.

In March 1923, when the Polish government decreed that in Ukrainian high schools Polish was to be used in administration and in the teaching of history and geography, an instructor in Lviv named Myxajlo Haluščyns'kyj took the floor to protest. He, head of a family of four, was immediately fired. Ukrainian organizations came to his aid. He gained popular recognition: indeed, in the next elections to the Sejm, he ran as a candidate and was elected. In the next election he became a member of the all-Polish Senate, and subsequently the deputy speaker (Šax 141ff.).

Of course, the deeds of neither Polons'kyj nor Haluščyns'kyj curbed the anti-Ukrainian policies of the Soviet Ukraine and Poland.

2. *Ukrainian lands under Romania*

After the occupation of Černivci on 11 November 1918 and the ensuing occupation of all Bukovina, Romanian law came into effect. In the next four years the legal status and rights of the Ukrainian language were determined by Romania's international obligations vis-à-vis its national minorities, as well as by the Romanian constitution and other laws.

Internationally, two treaties came into play: the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which Romania signed reluctantly, in Paris, after a delay of several months (on 9 December 1918; the treaty had been submitted to Romania in September in Saint-Germain), and the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920.

In the Treaty of Saint-Germain the language obligations assumed by Romania are outlined in articles 8, 9, and 10: (§ 8) "No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Romanian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings Notwithstanding any establishment by the Romanian government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Romanian nationals of non-Romanian speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts"; (§ 9) the

Romanian government recognized the right of citizens "to establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious, and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language"; (§ 10): "Romania will provide in the public educational system of towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Romanian nationals of other than Romanian speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction shall be given to the children of such Romanian nationals through the medium of their own language" (*Treaties* iii, 3727f.).[69]

By contrast, in the Treaty of Sèvres, concluded two years later, which for the first time legalized the Romanian occupation of all of Bukovina (§ 3, 6; *Materialien*, 206f.), nothing was said about the rights of minorities or about their language.

The obligations assumed by Romania in Saint-Germain were not incorporated into the Romanian Constitution of 28 March 1923: there it was stated that (§ 126) "the Romanian language is the official language of the Romanian state" (*Constitution* 24), and in several instances it was reiterated that Romanian citizens of various languages should have the same rights [§ 8 e.g.] "All Romanians independently of their ethnic origin, language, or religion are equal in law"—p. 6). Nowhere, however, did it guarantee any rights to languages other than Romanian. The Constitution of 27 February 1938 preserved § 126 intact (where it became § 94—*Constitution* 2, p. 19), but obliterated all references to other languages, making them non-existent in the legal sense.

Of the published laws relating to the status of Bukovina or to the Ukrainian language there and in the kingdom as a whole, two should be mentioned here. The decree of 19–31 December 1918 entrusted a special minister (later called the president of the regional commission) with governing the region; in fact, this official was a dictator who stood outside the law. His dictatorial powers were extensive, for Bukovina existed in a state of siege from 1918 to 1928 and then again in 1938 to 1940, up to the Soviet occupation on 28 June 1940. (The first ministers of Bukovina were I. Nistor from the Liberal party [Romanian conservatives], and T. Savciuc-Saveanu from the National-Peasant [*ţărănist*] party.)

The second law of major importance was no. 176 (decree no. 2,571 of the Ministry of Education) dated 24 July 1924, which referred to Romanians "who forgot their mother tongue": (§ 8) "Citizens of Romanian origin who forgot (*au pierdut*; literally, "have lost") their mother tongue must

69 These stipulations are, generally, identical to those submitted to and accepted by Poland. See above, chap. 8, 1.

give their children education only in public or private schools with Romanian as the language of instruction'' (*Colectiune* 530). The law, written in deliberately ambiguous language, does not specify whether its provisions obligate isolated families living outside Romania or larger population groups. It was, however, an open secret that it was intended to apply to Ukrainians. Thus the law introduced a legal division of national minorities into two groups: those entitled to preserve their languages—Hungarians and Germans (as explicitly guaranteed by § 7 of the same law)—and those denied that right—above all Ukrainians. In its application to Ukrainians the law was buttressed by some Romanian historians who ''proved'' that Ukrainians in Romania were but linguistically Slavicized Romanians. In any case, the law only sanctioned what was already being practiced. The resolution of each particular case was shaped in part by regional or local circulars and, probably more often, by the arbitrary decision of a particular administrator, be it an agent of the civil government or of the military, of the general police or of the notorious Romanian secret police (*siguranța*). The law opened the way to the worst forms of terror, including unwarranted arrests, tortures, and corporal punishments, as well as to a reign of fear; on the other hand, it allowed for unexpected breeches in the general policy, including short-lived particular favors.

The history of Ukrainians and of the Ukrainian language in interwar Romania is divisible into three periods. During the first ten years (1918–1928) its government was occasionally and briefly run by the conservatives and the ''people's party'' (*Partitul poporului*) of General A. Averescu; as a rule, however, power was in the hands of the most conservative ''liberals'' headed by I. Brătianu. The times seemed to require the total negation of all things Ukrainian. Very soon after the occupation, all administrative and court offices were Romanianized. The traditional regional parliament of Bukovina ceased to exist, and local self-government was discontinued. All Ukrainian political parties were disbanded, so Ukrainians could be elected to Romanian legislative bodies solely as members of Romanian parties. Their representation in the assembly was, consequently, very small (1 in the elections of August 1919, 3 in those of May 1920, 4 in those of January 1922, in an assembly of ca. 390 deputies—Kvitkovs'kyj 340, 343; Piddubnyj 222), and there were no Ukrainians in the Senate; those who were representatives rarely raised their voices about Ukrainian affairs. Most of the cultural and other societies that before the Romanian occupation had dotted Bukovina (there was a total of 1,763 such chapters—Piddubnyj 131) were also dissolved; some did survive, however, and a few new ones arose. The closing of the *Rus'ka besida* society, which had

existed since 1869, entailed the destruction of its 125 reading rooms (lists in Piddubnyj 132ff., Kvitkovs'kyj 364).

The liquidation of Ukrainian educational institutions took several years, but that, too, was accomplished. The University of Černivci was entirely Romanianized, and its Ukrainian chairs were reorganized. Three Ukrainian high schools (*himnaziji*) were closed (in Kicman' in 1920, in Vyžnycja in 1921; in Černivci in 1925; the Ukrainian language as a subject was discontinued in 1927). In primary education the tempo was slower, but the results were the same. While in 1910/11 Bukovina had 216 Ukrainian elementary schools vs. 179 Romanian ones, by 1922/23 the number of Ukrainian schools had fallen to 155 and the number of Romanian ones had grown to 391 (Piddubnyj 144; Kvitkovs'kyj 365). The process was accelerated after the publication, in 1924, of the law on "Romanians who forgot their mother tongue"; by 1927 there were no longer any Ukrainian schools in Romania and the Ukrainian language was not taught at all. This policy was buttressed by the settlement of Romanians in Bukovina. With the agrarian reform of 30 July 1921, some lands owned by the church were confiscated for distribution among peasants. Romanians were enticed to move to Bukovina by promises of parcels of the confiscated land.

Periodical and book publication in Ukrainian were not wholly prohibited, but they were subject to severe censorship. Many periodicals were closed, including the most reputed *Nova Bukovyna* (1918); some periodicals were later revived under different names, so that in number there seem to have been more such publications than was actually the case. The real situation is revealed by a look at their duration and character. There were 17 periodicals in 1919–1928: 14 political weeklies or biweeklies, 2 satirical journals, and 1 literary journal. There was no daily newspaper. The average duration of a periodical was, however, only one and a half years, often with gaps within that span (tallied on the basis of Kvitkovs'kyj 635f. and Piddubnyj 137ff.). In hardly any one year were more than three periodicals published. They were small in size and poor in content, style, and language. The number of books published was 39 titles in nine years, for an average of 4 to 5 per year. There was one Ukrainian theater, in Černivci, which did not stage performances daily (Kvitkovs'kyj 593). Bessarabia had no Ukrainian publications or institutions.

In ecclesiastical life, the Orthodox church was completely dominated by Romanians. In 1921 the "Greek Oriental" church was renamed the "Orthodox Romanian"; in 1925 it was subordinated, as one of five metropolitanates, to the Patriarch of Bucharest. The administration of the metropolitanate consisted of the Eparchial Council, Consistory, and the advisory Eparchial Assembly, with its forty laymen and twenty priests. Ukrainians

had a voice only in the Eparchial Assembly, which meant that they could not participate in any decision making; even in that body, only two Ukrainians were members (Kvitkovs'kyj 373f.). Ukrainian priests were required to carry and use Romanian documents and were encouraged to preach in Romanian (Piddubnyj 127).

In 1928 the Peasant party came to power, a development which initiated the second period in the Romanian occupation. A certain degree of liberalization was expected and some measures of the new government pointed in that direction. The state of siege was lifted, and censorship became somewhat milder—measures not revoked by the governments, coalition and liberal, that followed one after another in the years 1931–1937. This was not the case, however, with other innovations introduced by the Peasant party. Under their government, teaching of the Ukrainian language (and of religion in Ukrainian) was introduced in schools with a majority of Ukrainian pupils: eight hours weekly in the lower grades, six hours in the upper grades (decree of 31 December 1929). The actual teaching of Ukrainian continued to be hampered by a lack of teachers and schoolbooks. The decree permitting Ukrainian education was canceled by the liberal government in 1933; by a decree of 9 September 1934, twenty-four teachers who had organized Ukrainian courses were dismissed (Kvitkovs'kyj 369).

The ţărănist period and the following years brought other developments favorable to Ukrainians and their language, albeit limited ones. For the first time since the Romanian occupation, a legal Ukrainian political party was founded in Bukovina, the Ukrainian National Party (1927). It campaigned for the revision of land distribution as decreed by the agrarian reform of 1921, for the admission of the Ukrainian language in education and administration, and for cessation of the treatment of Ukrainians as Romanians who "forgot their mother tongue" (Kvitkovs'kyj 347). In the elections of 1928, Ukrainians got one seat in the assembly; in the elections of 1930, they gained five in the assembly and one in the Senate; in the elections of 1932, two in the assembly, and again two in the elections of 1933. Ukrainian cultural activities centered around the *Narodnyj dim* in Černivci were renewed. By 1937 Bukovina had at least fifteen Ukrainian societies of various types, e.g., cultural, feminist, student (Kvitkovs'kyj 359). In 1928, a Ukrainian daily, *Čas*, began publication in Černivci; in 1933, a monthly for children, *Lastivka*, started to appear (Kvitkovs'kyj 650). The relative relaxation in censorship prompted Ukrainian nationalists from outside Romania to found a monthly, *Samostijna dumka*, and a weekly, *Samostijnist'*, in Černivci; Bukovinians were among their editors (the periodicals appeared in 1931–1937 and in 1934–1937, respectively). These periodicals survived into 1937 because they focused on non-Romanian problems;

even so, they were occasionally suspended by the censorship (Kvitkovs'kyj 651). Also published were social-democratic periodicals (*Nove žyttja*, 1931–1934) and even a Sovietophile one (*Borot'ba*, 1926–1929). The number of periodicals published simultaneously grew to 7 or 8; the general number of titles fell to 10, but now their average duration was 4 to 5 years, a healthy sign. They still continued to be modest in size, and journalistically their level was often not high. Circulation was limited (*Čas* at times had only 600 subscribers, and it never had more than 3,000—Kvitkovs'kyj 645f.), so they were continually published at a loss and in need of subsidies.

There were other drawbacks and failures in Ukrainian cultural activity. Attempts to establish contacts with Ukrainians from other regions of Romania, especially Northern and Southern Bessarabia, did not succeed. The Ukrainian theater in Černivci had to accede or circumvent such orders of the local administration as a prohibition against wearing Ukrainian national attire (Kvitkovs'kyj 352). In 1929 Ukrainian cooperatives were submitted to state surveillance and soon thereafter ruined economically. Summer courses in the Ukrainian language, initiated in 1926 and gaining some popularity, were forbidden in 1933/34 (Kvitkovs'kyj 676f.). Most important, Ukrainian schools did not exist continuously, and Romanian was the language of communication in the cities. The church, too, remained basically in Romanian hands, although in 1932 Ukrainian representation in the Eparchial Assembly grew to 14, and in 1931 a Ukrainian Orthodox fraternity was founded in Černivci (Kvitkovs'kyj 375f.).

The establishment of King Carol's military dictatorship over Romania in 1937–1938 was accompanied by the elimination of parliamentarism, the dissolution of all Ukrainian and Romanian political parties, the introduction of a new constitution, and the reintroduction of the state of siege. The "liberal course" of the preceding decade had ended. Bukovina was included in the newly formed region (*ţinut*) of Suceava, which obliterated traditional boundaries. In April and June of 1937, two large-scale trials of Ukrainian nationalists took place, and their publications were closed. Of all its Ukrainian societies, Bukovina retained only five (Kvitkovs'kyj 371); of all its Ukrainian periodicals, only *Čas* remained. National minorities were supervised, from May 1938, by a special Commissariat-General for National Minorities.

In April 1940 promises of change were made to the Ukrainian representatives by the Romanian regime, now faced with the Soviet occupation of Galicia and the threat of a similar development in Bukovina and Bessarabia. On 28 June 1940 the Soviet army crossed the Romanian border. The Soviets gave the Ukrainian language in Bukovina, the Xotyn area, and Southern Bessarabia the same status it had in the Soviet Ukraine.

The gains that the Ukrainian language had made under Austria were reduced to very little during the twenty years of Romanian occupation. Its functions shrank essentially to domestic use and, to a limited extent, to use by Ukrainian societies, theater, and press. Socially, Ukrainian lost the cities and was reduced primarily to peasant use, not in its standard form but in a number of dialects. Its status in the church was precarious. Among intellectuals, Ukrainian was employed for everyday matters only by humanists—teachers, priests, journalists of the underdeveloped Ukrainian press. In spoken Ukrainian, words for new notions were as a rule cited in their Romanian form. Contacts with the Soviet Ukraine were virtually non-existent, so that neither the Ukrainianization measures nor the Russifying trends of later years touched Bukovina. Somewhat more vital were contacts with adjacent Galicia, for, after all, Poland and Romania were allied. Inasmuch as Ukrainian was used for literary matters in Bukovina, it was in the Galician (Lviv) koine, despite the Bukovinian Ukrainians' purported dislike for Galicians (Piddubnyj 99), whom they were apt to address with the phrase, ''Out of Bukovina, strangers.''

To illustrate the Ukrainian language then in use, one can point to issues of the newspaper *Xliborobs'ka pravda* (of 6 February 1938) and *Samostijnyk* (of 31 May 1936 and of 17 January 1937; the relevant passages are photographically reproduced in Kvitkovs'kyj 648, 653). Although in ideology the two periodicals differed starkly, their language is nearly identical, due clearly to patterning on the language of Galician newspapers. In spelling the two publications have in common *genij, Ljenin, Pidhirja* (in general no apostrophe is used), *ideol'ogiji*; in phonology, *narid, villjav, blesku, značinnja, vzajimno, dužannje*; in morphology, *svjatkovannja, vsi zdibnosty*; in syntax, *pjat'ox pidsudnyx. . .vidpovidatymut'*, *nosyteljamy ideji. . .ljudy*; in vocabulary and phraseology, *kruhy* ('circles'), *zabyrajemo stanovyšče* ('we are taking a position'), *pidložennja petardy, prykaz, na dnjax, rumuns'kyj horožanyn, v cilomu sviti, pid teperišnju poru.*

Given its own state of affairs, both political and linguistic, Bukovina could not exert any influence on the Ukrainian standard language in either the Soviet or the Polish Ukraine. The only linguistic goal that it could reasonably undertake was to preserve its own Ukrainian language at a bare minimum. That it did.

3. *Transcarpathia under Czecho-Slovakia*

Following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the proclamation of an independent Hungary (16 November 1918), the new social-democratic government of M. Károlyi granted, on 24 December 1918, autonomy to Transcarpathia, now called the ''Ruthene Land'' (*Ruska*

Kraina), including its own parliament and "usage of its own language" (Markus 13). This development did not materialize because of the quick pace of events: the communist *putsch* of 21 March 1919, with the ensuing civil war and intervention by neighboring states, which swept away the communist regime. During the short-lived Soviet episode in Transcarpathia (late March to early April 1919) one decree (no. 24) prescribed for use in schools the local language as codified in the grammar of A. Vološyn (Štec' 11). But at that time western Transcarpathia was occupied by the Czecho-Slovak army (from 15 January 1919) and the southeastern part of the country by the Romanian army, while in the central region Hungarians still prevailed. By May 1919, Czecho-Slovak forces were in possession of all of Transcarpathia (except Sighet and its environs).

On 8 May 1919, in Užhorod, a General National Congress convened. It comprised delegates from local "people's councils" (*narodni rady*), and its task was to decide upon the future of the country. The congress was to choose one of three possibilities: to remain in Hungary, to unite with Romania, or to unite with Czecho-Slovakia. A fourth possibility, of uniting with the Ukraine, was theoretical, only: besides having disparate social and political structures, Transcarpathia and the greater part of the Ukraine were separated by territories held by Poles and Romanians. In the circumstances the General National Congress unanimously decided to unite with Czecho-Slovakia. Whether that congress, whose delegates were not elected directly by the population, represented the actual will of the Transcarpathians and to what extent the decision was influenced by the presence of the Czecho-Slovak army are open questions. What is certain is that the other options had not found any active supporters. Hence Transcarpathia became incorporated into Czecho-Slovakia not through any armed conflict, as had happened in the Soviet Ukraine, in Galicia, and, on a smaller scale, in Bukovina, but either by its free will or by indifference. The incorporation of Transcarpathia into Czecho-Slovakia was sealed by the Allied Powers' recognition of the decision in their treaty with Czecho-Slovakia signed at Saint-Germain on 10 September 1919.

This Treaty of Saint-Germain also laid the foundation for the legal status of Transcarpathia and for language policy in it, defining the region (§ 10) as "The Ruthene territory" and as "an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State," granting it "the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State." The treaty also provided (§ 11) that "the Ruthene territory" shall have a special Diet which will "have the power of legislation in all linguistic, scholastic, and religious questions, in matters of local administration and in other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak State may assign to it." The region was to

have a governor appointed by the president of Czecho-Slovakia but "responsible to the Ruthene Diet." Czecho-Slovakia agreed (§ 12) that "officials of the Ruthene territory will be chosen as far as possible from the inhabitants of this territory." Finally (§ 13), "the Ruthene territory," like all other Czecho-Slovak areas, was entitled to elect deputies to the general assembly of Czecho-Slovakia (*Treaties* 3708f.).

The Czecho-Slovak constitution (adopted on 29 February 1920) dealt with language rights in two articles. One (§ 128, 3) guaranteed all citizens the right to "use freely any language they choose in private and business communications, in all matters pertaining to religion, in the press and in all publications whatsoever, or in public assemblies." Concerning the language of education: (§ 131) "In towns and districts in which there lives a considerable portion of Czecho-Slovak citizens speaking a language other than Czecho-Slovak, the children of such Czecho-Slovak citizens shall in public instruction, and within the bounds of the general regulations relating thereto, be guaranteed a due opportunity to receive instruction in their own language. The Czecho-Slovak language may at the same time be prescribed as a compulsory subject of instruction" (*Constitution* 1920, pp. 45f.; the Czech text, pp. 93f.). The constitution left open the question of an official language as well as that of the specific rights of other languages in education and administration.

These problems were addressed and resolved in the law of 29 February 1920, said to appear "in pursuance of § 129" of the constitution and popularly called the "language law." It opens (§ 1) with the proclamation of the "Czecho-Slovak language" (a politically motivated linguistic misnomer; that language is defined [§ 4] as Czech in the Czech land and Slovak in Slovakia) as the country's language, determining that it is the language: "(1) In which the work of all courts, offices, institutions, undertakings, and organs of the Republic shall be conducted.... (2) In which the principal texts of state and other banknotes shall be printed. (3) Which the armed forces of the country shall use for the purpose of command, and the language of the service" (*Constitution* 48f.; Czech text—Sobota iii, 140f.). It did make the provision that in localities where 20 percent or more of the population spoke another language, courts should accept statements and formulate charges in that language; another provision was that the minorities were entitled to education in their language (§ 5, p. 49).

The provisions on Transcarpathia of both the constitution and "the language law" largely paraphrase the Saint-Germain treaty. In the constitution (§ 3, 2) Transcarpathia is called "the autonomous territory of Carpathian Rus'" and it is guaranteed "the highest measure of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic";

accordingly, it "shall have its own Diet, which shall elect its presiding officers (*předsednictvo*) and other officials." This Diet shall "legislate in linguistic, educational, and religious matters, in matters of domestic administration and in such other matters as may be assigned to it by the laws of the Czecho-Slovak Republic" (*Constitution* 4, 22; the Czech text, p. 39f.). In the same spirit, the "language law" stated: (§ 6) "The Diet which shall be set up for Ruthenia shall have the right, reserved to it, of settling the language question for this territory in a manner consonant with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State" (ibid., 49; Czech text—Sobota iii, 148).

There was no consensus on what to call the unexpectedly acquired land, which almost could be regarded as a birthday present to Czecho-Slovakia. Legally, the name accepted by the "General Statute" of the region was "Subcarpathian Rus'" (*Podkarpatská Rus*), yet another name, *Rusinsko*, was also admitted. The first was justified on the grounds of historical tradition, the second was probably a translation of "the Ruthene territory" from the treaty of Saint-Germain. Both names were given only "until lawful resolution" (*do právoplatné úpravy*); but there was a surety that "in schools the people's language (*lidový jazyk*) shall be the language of instruction as well as the official [language] in general"; that language was also called Ruthenian (*rusinský*). It was to be introduced as soon as possible in the first grade and gradually extended to higher grades. As a subject it was to be compulsory on all levels (Sobota i, 132).

That surety was broken from the very outset of Czech activity in Transcarpathia. Ukrainian peasants were often not sure what language they spoke. In 1918 the villagers of Pistrjalove declared: "We are unable to decide; they [the Hungarians] took from us our Ruthenian schools and tried to wipe out our language. Now we master neither Ruthenian nor Hungarian" (as quoted by Jedlins'ka 96). What was worse, the Transcarpathian intelligentsia was similarly divided. Some considered the local language to be Ruthenian (but based on which dialect?), others indignantly rejected what they considered to be a hillbilly idiom and insisted upon adopting the Church Slavonic–Russian tradition, in its many variants. Seeking objective advice, the authorities approached the Czech Academy in Prague. In a good democratic vein, that academy responded that it was up to the members of a nationality to decide what literary language they wanted to use. But it advised against the creation of a new Ruthenian language on a dialectal base and for the use of the Ukrainian language in its Galician garb, "because the local Ruthenian dialects. . .are beyond any doubt a Little-Russian dialect," although in an etymological spelling that was more familiar to the Transcarpathians. As for the Russian language, the academy

recommended that it be taught as a subject in the secondary school (Tichý 112f.).

In good faith, guided by both democratic principles and the opinions of scholars, the Czecho-Slovak authorities invited to Prague from Vienna the relatively young Galician linguist, Ivan Pan'kevyč (1887–1958). He was to be language adviser in the department of education in the region (Štec' 19). To his great amazement, Pan'kevyč realized that he had been given "dictatorial rights in matters of language," as expressed in his letter of 25 January 1920 (Mušynka 131). But once he confronted the local situation, his enthusiasm faded quickly. About three months later he wrote: "I am sick and tired here. One has to fight for the alphabet as we had it in the 1850s. The Russophiles would not admit the people's language and started to fight against anything that has no Russian form. I seemingly mean something here and [yet] apparently [I stand for] nothing" (Mušynka 131). In order to promote the Ukrainian language Pan'kevyč had to make one concession after another, especially in matters relating to the alphabet and spelling. Even so, his secondary school grammar (*Hramatyka rus'koho jazŷka dlja molodšyx kljas škol serednŷx y horožan'skyx*) was not published until 1922. In the meantime A. Vološyn's unapproved grammar (*Metodičeska hrammatyka karpato-russkaho jazyka dlja narodnŷx škol*, 1901 and 1919) was used; it was written basically in Russian with an admixture of some local features, such as infinitives in *-ty* and *jak* instead of *kak*. Vološyn's grammar was designed for primary schools, where old textbooks were used exclusively.

In a luckier position was another Galician, V. Birčak, also a member of the Transcarpathian school administration. His task was to compile school anthologies of literature (*Rus'ka čytanka dlja I. kljasŷ hymnazijnoě y horožans'kyx" škol"*, 1922; the same for the fourth grade, 1924). Birčak gave literary texts without adapting them to local speech; he simply explained unfamiliar words and expressions by referring to their local equivalents in footnotes (Jedlins'ka 100).

The Czechs who were to deal with the local populace in Transcarpathia probably experienced a reaction similar to that of Pan'kevyč. The Czechs' democratic and pro-Ukrainian policy did not meet with approval among the Transcarpathians. Factions among them greeted each Czech measure with animosity and public or private denunciations. (According to Magocsi 140, the first such denunciation was sent to Prague in February 1920.) Newcomers to the region, both Galicians and Czechs, must have regarded such incidents as petty and spiteful.

Given this situation, the Czechs did not fulfill some of their obligations. They did not convoke an assembly. The first governor of the territory was to be a local man, but—perhaps for want of a native on whom a clear majority would agree—an American of Transcarpathian descent, Gregory Zsatkovich, was appointed in April 1920. His position was mainly ceremonial; in charge of practical matters of governance was his deputy, Petr Ehrenfeld, a Czech. This arrangement was probably one reason for Zsatkovich's resignation after less than a year (March 1921). The heads of the school administration were also Czechs, first Josef Pešek (until 1924), then Josef Šimek. Faced with a severe shortage of qualified teachers, Pešek engaged some Galicians, Russian immigrants (who had no command of either Standard Ukrainian or of local dialects), and Czech legionaries who had spent several years in Russia and learned a bit of spoken Russian (Štec' 16).

All this seemed to constitute a deliberate policy by the Prague government to absorb a colony, which Transcarpathia after all was (Zsatkovich gave this as the official reason for his resignation); probably the appearance was to some degree true. But the lack of a local political elite in Transcarpathia certainly exacerbated matters and, at least in Czech eyes, justified Prague's policy. Another justification could have been a strong Communist influence in the region at the time (Markus 17).

It was under these circumstances that the Galicians, with limited support among the Transcarpathians, began to promote the adoption of standard language based on literary Ukrainian as used in Galicia. Besides serving as advisers to schools and preparing textbooks, the Galicians' most important undertakings were founding (on 9 May 1920) and actively promoting the cultural society Prosvita and publishing several periodicals, most on that society's behalf. These ranged from the scholarly *Naukovyj zbirnyk* (1922–1938) to the popular annual *Kalendar* (1923–1938) to the children's monthlies *Pčôlka* (1923–1934) and *Naš rodnŷj kraj* (1923–1939). By 1923 Prosvita had established four branches and 82 reading rooms in addition to those in Užhorod; by 1934, the numbers were 10 and 230, respectively. It also ran an Ukrainian theater (*Rus'kyj narodnŷj teatr*, 1921–1929), a choir (*EU* 2, 2371), and the *Narodnŷj dom* that opened in Užhorod in 1928. Begun in 1921, the Ukrainian boyscout organization *Plast* became an indisputable success. The Galicians' main success, however, was that the region's intellectuals, including even the elderly and highly respected Avhustyn Vološyn (1874–1945/1946?), joined the Ukrainian orientation. Vološyn's Russophile grammar of 1919 reappeared in a revised version in 1923 as *Metodyčna hramatyka karpato-rus'koho jazŷka*. Its language was still a far cry from Standard Ukrainian, which the

author never mastered, but his revisions pointed in that direction. Vološyn's linguistic evolution reflected a general trend. Thus, the situation in Transcarpathia in 1923 differed from that of 1919–1920.

Yet Pan'kevyč and like-minded people had not forgotten the lesson of earlier years. At the First Transcarpathian Congress of Teachers (16–17 April 1920) no one even raised the question of accepting Standard Ukrainian, because the general mood was in favor of the local dialects (Jedlins'ka 98, Štec' 18). The situation prompted Pan'kevyč in his grammar to disguise the Ukrainian language as an adaptation of the Carpathian (Verxovyna) and Maramureş dialects, of which he gave but a few peculiarities (what are sometimes taken by Pan'kevyč as dialectal features—e.g., Jedlins'ka 101—were but etymological spellings), and to give etymological spellings, actually pseudo-etymological, with *i* from *o* rendered as *ô*, but *i* from *e* rendered not as *ê*, but as *ě*, i.e., by "jat'." That spelling remained obligatory for the next couple of years.

The success of Pan'kevyč and the Prosvita society should not be exaggerated. The Ukrainian orientation or "party" remained one of the region's three language "parties"; by no means did it gain sway over the entire cultural scene. A good idea of how things stood is presented by the survey of the situation in the region's secondary schools circa 1924 made by Gerovskij (1934, 512): of four *himnaziji*, two offered instruction in Ukrainian, one in Russian, and one in both; of the three teachers' seminaries, two taught in Ukrainian and one in Russian, at least formally; in reality, instruction in both Ukrainian and Russian (depending, of course, on the capabilities and education of each teacher) had a strong admixture of local dialecticisms and even of Church Slavonic. As late as 1923, a teachers' congress rejected Pan'kevyč's grammar, by a vote of 544 votes to 2 (Magocsi 140).

In general, however, knowledge of Ukrainian and regard for it was on the rise, whereas use of Russian and of the local dialects was in retreat. This alarmed the Russian "party"; it closed ranks and rushed to do battle. As a counterpoise to Prosvita, the Russophile A. Duxnovyč Society was founded in May 1923, to promote Russian language and culture. Just as in Prosvita the activists were immigrants from Galicia, so the organizers of the Duxnovyč Society were mainly Russian immigrants. This development overlapped with the installation of a new Czech administration prone to Russophilism, Governor A. Rozsypal and his deputee A. Beskid.

The Duxnovyč Society quickly organized chapters and reading rooms (274 reading rooms in 1931; cf. Gerovskij 1927, 514), founded publications (the monthlies *Karpatskij kraj*, 1923–1925, and *Karpatskij svět"* 1928–1933, 1938; yearbooks, etc.), and initiated so-called Days of Russian

Culture. The society awarded a literary prize and lobbied with influential Czechs, adroitly taking advantage of traditional Czech Russophilism. In 1937 the organization claimed 21,000 members (Prosvita had 15,000). In organizing its anti-Ukrainian activity the Duxnovyč Society imitated measures Prosvita had developed. It produced a Russian grammar that successfully counterbalanced Pan'kevyč's Ukrainian one. In 1924 there appeared a *Grammatika russkago jazyka* edited by E. Sabov (who, incidentally, in 1923 defended the use of the local dialects against both Ukrainian and Russian). The new grammar's author, Aleksander Grigor'ev, was not named, because he was a native Russian who had little to do with Transcarpathia (he resided in Prešov—Tichý 114f.).

The campaign in support of the Russian language was best summarized by Gerovskij (also an outsider in Transcarpathia), to whom Standard Ukrainian was a "language" in quotation marks. In 1927 he wrote: "To learn that 'language' [Ukrainian] a Carpatho-Russian student must spend no less effort than to learn the Common-Russian literary language, with the difference that in the first instance he will not be rewarded with access to any significant cultural values, whereas the Common-Russian language would immediately open to him the rich treasures of the world-renowned Russian culture" (142).

The militant anti-Ukrainian propaganda of the Duxnovyč Society was most strongly manifested in the popular publication series "Narodnaja biblioteka" and related publications, totaling 115 items (Magocsi 159), among them: *Narodnyj katexizm"*, 1926; *Spor" o jazykě v" Podkarpatskoj Rusi i češskaja Akademija Nauk"* by N. Zorkij, 1926; *V" čem" glavnaja opasnost'* by A. A. Volkonskij, 1929; *Nacional'naja i jazykovaja prinadležnost' russkago naselenija Podkarpatskoj Rusi*, 1928 (more information in Nikolajenko 26, Štec' 93ff.).

Both "parties" endeavored to emphasize native roots rather than émigré connections. The Ukrainian "party" invoked the spirit of L. Csopey, the compiler of a Ruthenian-Hungarian dictionary in 1883, whereas the Russian "party" pointed to A. Mytrak, who had prepared a Russian-Hungarian dictionary in 1881.

The Russian-Ukrainian language war went on with alternate successes and failures, but generally the Russophiles were gaining and the Ukrainophiles were losing. In September 1924, Pan'kevyč and Birčak were relieved of their duties in the central school administration (Mušynka 135). The Czech administration, apparently tired of the incessant "language war" and traditionally Russophile, began gradually to shelve its original pro-Ukrainian policy. A law of 3 February 1926 stated that "the Ruthenian (Little-Russian) language is *allowed* to be used" (§ 100, 2; Sobota iii, 173;

emphasis mine), not that it should be used. On 9 June 1930, the Land President of Transcarpathia, Rozsypal, decreed that since the language question had not been resolved, school inspectors were to use the Czecho-Slovak language in official correspondence. Widespread protests caused the decree to be withdrawn in August 1930 (Štec' 25), but its very appearance is significant. On 7 November 1930, the Czecho-Slovak minister of education admitted Russian textbooks for school use (ibid.) and on 1 October 1936, he recommended their use (Štec' 27). The trend culminated in the establishment of equal rights for Ukrainian and Russian, on 15 July 1937 (ibid.). Applying the very name Ukrainian to "Subcarpathia" was declared illegal (in 1933, and again in 1936; Magocsi 229).

Under these conditions the Ukrainian orientation found an unexpected ally: the Communist party, which had made use of the traditional local language (Ruthenian). In June–July 1924, the Fifth Congress of the Communist International decided that one and the same Ukrainian problem existed in Poland, Romania, and Czecho-Slovakia, and that its final solution required that all these lands join the Soviet Ukraine. A local language would hinder that plan. Communists of Transcarpathia were ordered to switch to Ukrainian and to establish contacts with Communists of the Soviet Ukraine. In December 1925, the editor-in-chief of the Communist daily *Karpats'ka pravda*, I. Mondok, attended the Ninth Congress of the Communist party of the Ukraine in Kharkiv (Jedlins'ka 104). At that time Ukrainianization was in full swing, and Mondok was apparently impressed by what he saw. (In 1927, he again went to Kharkiv, this time for the Conference on Spelling, where he pledged acceptance of whatever spelling would be adopted.) From 14 February 1926, the newspaper he edited appeared not only in the Ukrainian language (with localisms included, of course), but also in Ukrainian orthography. This was an unprecedented, revolutionary event in the region: in December of the same year, the editors published a resolution of the Seventh Regional Conference of the party under the title "End of the language question" (Štec' 56). The end of the language problem it was not, but perhaps the beginning of a final resolution was in sight.

The example of *Karpats'ka pravda* found some followers: the social-democratic newspaper *Vpered* (in 1926), the Christian-Nationalist *Svoboda* (in 1930), some literary publications (Štec' 58f., Tichý 125f.). In the third edition of his grammar Pan'kevyč introduced several changes in morphology (*vôn* instead of *ôn*, nominative plural *synĕ* instead of *syny*, *čyj* instead of *čij*, etc.; Štec' 74), although his spelling remained etymological. In the years to come a more "up to date" textbook by Ja. Nevrli was published for school use (pt. 1 in 1937; pt. 2 in 1938); it was heavily patterned on

Soviet Ukrainian grammars (Štec' 73). Also adhering to "phonetic" spelling was Franc Ahij's *Žyva mova* (1936). With the official recognition of the equality of Ukrainian and Russian as local languages, the problem of Ukrainian spelling became essentially irrelevant. In 1937–1938 "phonetic" spelling was permitted in schools (Štec' 73). The times when the censorship crossed out any sentences calling residents of the region Ukrainians had gone by (Štec', 58).

But habits died hard. Accustomed to an ongoing discussion of its language, Transcarpathian society carried the debate further. In most encounters the Russian orientation proved to be victorious. To mention only the most striking events: In May 1929, the group of teachers who belonged to the "Teachers' Society of Subcarpathian Rus'" (*Učitel'skoe tovariščestvo Podkarpatskoj Rusi*) split into two: when at its convention a majority voted for using "traditional" textbooks in the lower grades and Russian ones in the upper grades, teachers of the Ukrainian orientation left and formed a separate "Public Teachers' Society in Užhorod" (*Narodovec'ke učytel's'ke tovarystvo v Užhorodi* (Štec' 23, 67). In 1937 pro-Russian groups founded an opposing "Russian block" (Štec' 63); in response, in October 1937, Communists attending a congress of Prosvita organized a "Ukrainian block" (ibid.). Beginning in the early 1930s "school strikes" broke out randomly in villages, either to show support for Russian as a language of instruction or to protest against it (Štec' 30). In the autumn of 1937 the Czech administration decided to relegate the question of the language of instruction in schools to the local population. Voters were to say whether they preferred the grammar by Pan'kevyč or by (pseudo-) Sabov. The Russian orientation won the school plebiscite (313 schools for Russian, against 114 for Ukrainian—Magocsi 226). The pro-Ukrainian faction contended that the Russophiles' victory was due in part to their exploitation of the ambiguity of the term *russkij/rus'kyj*, which voters took to mean "Transcarpathian Ukrainian," and in part to electoral fraud by the administration. There seems to be no way to verify this contention.

The continual state of "language war" resulted in two interesting developments. One was the revival of the orientation favoring a specific local language, whose outlet became the weekly *Nedělja* (1935–1938) supported by the Greek Catholic church. The National Theater in Užhorod began giving performances in Ruthenian (from 1936; Magocsi 223). The other development was a sharp increase in Czech schools. In 1920 there were 321 elementary "Ruthenian" schools vs. 22 Czech ones; in 1931, 425 vs. 158, respectively; in municipal schools, data for 1938 point to 21 "Ruthenian" schools vs. 23 Czech ones (Magocsi 358). The growth of Czech schools is accountable partly by the increase of Czechs in the region,

from nearly zero in 1919 to 30,000 by the end of Czech rule (Markus 17), and partly by the decision of Jewish parents as well as perhaps Ukrainian parents to send their children to schools where they were not exposed to the "language war" or uncertain terminology and language norms. Also, in "Ruthenian" schools of higher education, Czech textbooks were often used: for instance, in 1934, at the Mukačevo teachers' seminary, 4 "Ruthenian" books were in use vs. 68 Czech ones (Štec' 62). These were the first steps toward Czechization of the region.

The policy of Czechization did not materialize because of the fall of Czecho-Slovakia in the late 1930s. Under the pressure of contemporary events, the Czecho-Slovak government finally initiated actual autonomy for Transcarpathia, on 26 June 1937, and granted it in October of 1938. The first regional government was formed, with A. Brodij at its head; when it proved to be pro-Hungarian, that government was dismissed, having existed for only eighteen days. On 2 November 1938 the region's southern border, including Užhorod and Mukačevo, was occupied by Hungary; Xust became the capital of the remaining territory. On 12 February 1939, in a general election, the block of Ukrainian parties was the only one submitted for consideration in voting. The Ukrainian list received 88.7 percent of the votes cast, in dramatic and unexplained contrast to the census of 1930, in which 455,000 persons declared themselves to be Ruthenians and only 2,355 said they were Ukrainians (*EU* 1, 568, Štec' 61; was the reversal a patriotic demonstration in the face of Hungarian aggression?). The proclamation of Transcarpathia's independence, on 15 March 1939, as Hungarian troops marched into the region, had a purely symbolic character. By March 20 the Hungarian occupation of Transcarpathia was complete.

The language policy of the new Hungarian regime—which existed for about five years, until 27 October 1944—was similar to that of the regime that had existed to 1919: it was hostile to the Ukrainian and Russian languages and practically prohibited their use. But now the region was given the special name of "Subcarpathian territory," a few pro-Hungarian local men were admitted to the Hungarian parliament, and the "Ruthenian" language was allowed to be a second language in the administration and in the primary and secondary schools (Markus 21). The Hungarian language program was set forth in S. Bonkáló's article "Rus'kyj lyteraturnŷj jazŷk—A Ruszin irodalmi nyelv" (published in *Zorja—Hajnal* 1–2, Užhorod 1941). The principles outlined there were the basis for the textbook *Hrammatyka uhrorusskoho jazŷka dlja serednyx učebnŷx zavedenyj*, by Ju. Maryna (Užhorod 1940; cf. Nikolajenko 27). Maryna declared that his grammar sought to restore etymological spellings and colloquial pronunciations, the former to emphasize the differences from Ukrainian,

and the latter, from Russian (as related in Štec' 32). Compiled in the same spirit was I. Harajda's *Hrammatyka rus'koho jazŷka* (Užhorod 1941).

Under the Soviet occupation, beginning in October 1944, the standards of the Soviet Ukrainian language and spelling became compulsory. The "language war" had come to an end.

The period of Czech domination, during which language discussions, albeit often pointless and mostly low-level, flourished, left a deep imprint on the region. This small territory with less than a million inhabitants, many of whom had very little education, a region without any large cities, saw twelve grammars prepared and published (counting revised editions of the same grammar) in a span of twenty years. The periodical press was blossoming. The political press was differentiated by party. The non-political press included periodicals for children, for scouts, and for youth, as well as periodicals of humor, pedagogy, religion, economy, scholarship, and literature. According to Gerovskij (1934, 534), during one year (1933?) in Transcarpathia there appeared 14 publications in Ruthenian and Russian (one daily, five weeklies, two biweeklies, six monthlies) and 8 in Ukrainian (one weekly, three biweeklies, four monthlies). According to *EU* (1, 997), over the entire Czech period, the region had 62 Ukrainian periodicals, in comparison with 39 Russian, 34 Hungarian, and 13 Czech. Book production surpassed a thousand titles. These figures are stunning, especially in comparison with those of the preceding, Hungarian period. A similar upsurge can be observed in the educational system and in the "local language," be it Ukrainian, Russian, or, in particular, Ruthenian. Linguistic motleyness did not preclude the spread of education nor the reading of publications.

Indeed, the linguistic chaos, undoubtedly present, should not be exaggerated. The three hostile camps—Ruthenian, Ukrainian, and Russian—were not so distant from each other as the era's polemical articles would indicate. Publications in pure Standard Ukrainian were very hard to find, and the few in Russian were mostly by non-native (to the region) authors. All included elements of the local dialects, in differing measures. In that sense the traditional Ruthenian language variety was not being eliminated, but was being amalgamated with other languages. Transcarpathia was working its way toward accepting one of the real standard languages, that is, Ukrainian or Russian.

To illustrate, let us take a fragment from a book for children compiled by Avhustyn Vološyn after he converted to the Ukrainian orientation:

— *Što* maju robyty?

— Ydy, Yvane, *poobteraj tablu*, **stol**, lavycě, *popozeraj*, *cy* je krejda, černylo, *cy* čysta škola?

> Y ja ne *lěnovavsja*, vse tak *jem* robyv, jak *mně* pan učytel' *rozkazaly*. U poludne *otvoryv jem výzorý* y koly'*m* peredav ključ panu **učytelju**, poxvalyly mene.
> **Ybo** ja duže ljublju čystotu y porjadok. (*Azbuka* 73)

Local dialectal words and forms are in italics, whereas traditional Church Slavonic and Russian ones are in bold type.

In later publications the number of localisms diminished, but as a rule at least some continued to be present. The "language war," insofar as Ruthenian was concerned, had become pointless. As a system it was dead; yet, isolated elements of it were very much in evidence. The conflict between Ukrainian and Russian, by contrast, was on an entirely different level: they were locked in mortal combat in Transcarpathia, in a struggle for survival. In the case of Russian, the attraction of literature which Gerovskij had pointed out probably carried less weight than the appeal of its being, presumably, the language of overlords (*pans'kyj*). Like the character in Gogol's play "Marriage" who could not believe that Sicilian peasants spoke Italian (which he mistook for French), so the Transcarpathian believed, subconsciously, that Russian was the language of lords and not of plebeians, as Hungarian had been during and to some extent after the Hungarian domination. In 1924, Hnatjuk still observed a striving toward "a 'noble, lordly' language, which to some seems to be only Hungarian" (24). In that sense, traditional linguistic Russophilism dissipated after the Soviet occupation of 1944, due not only to official policy, but also to the demise of the image of Russian lords, engendered by contacts with non-aristocratic Russians.

In oral speech, Standard Ukrainian was not used by Transcarpathian natives during the Czech period, nor was its Galician variant. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether a Transcarpathian koine, based on one dialect with an admixture of Hungarian, Czech, Standard Ukrainian, Church Slavonic, and Russian words, was in the making, or whether in towns the common (local) language was a local dialect. The second option seems more likely, but that does not preclude the possibility that some words and forms became typical of a larger area. The chaotic language situation in schools and in publications may have reflected such a trend. If that was indeed the case, in this respect, even more than in the written language, the society of the region remained on a preindustrial level. The peculiarity of language development in Transcarpathia in the interwar period was rooted in the combination of this social level with the democratic measures instituted by the Czechs.

IX. RETROSPECTIVE REMARKS

The attentive reader will draw his own conclusions from the material presented here. Some will see in it proof of the viability of the Ukrainian language; others, proof of its vulnerability and frailty. Perhaps both impressions are correct. In any case, there is no point here in going into further detail or in reiterating what has been said. On the other hand, some generalizations concerning the period 1900–1941 as a whole are not inappropriate.

The Ukrainian question, and the subordinate question of the Ukrainian language, acquired international dimensions. The most convincing evidence in this respect is not the question's emergence at diplomatic conferences and negotiations, but the fact that for decades three powerful governments engaged in active persecution of the Ukrainian language—those of St. Petersburg/Moscow, of Warsaw, and of Bucharest—and a fourth—of Prague—considered whether it should undertake such a policy. The forms this suppression took varied. It was a policy of total suppression in tsarist Russia, and very much so, also, in the first two occupations of the Ukraine by the Russians and in that by the White Army and by Romania. It was a policy of restriction and confrontation in Poland, and of support for the rival language in the last years of the Czecho-Slovak domination of Transcarpathia. A peculiar stand was taken by the Russians after their final occupation of the Ukraine: apparent support for the Ukrainian language with simultaneous undercutting of its social base and persecution of its bearers.

All the occupying powers applied the policy of compartmentalizing the territory where the Ukrainian language was spoken. Before World War I obstacles were erected against contacts between the Russian Ukraine and the Austro-Hungarian Ukrainian lands. After that war some frontiers became almost impenetrable (that between the Russian Ukraine and the other occupations); others, while not so rigid, hardly fostered the unity of the language. Besides the restrictions imposed by the existence of political frontiers, there were differences in legislation and in ways of life that were sometimes no less serious obstacles to unity. Moreover, under each occupation measures were taken to split the Ukrainian territory or to divest it of some peripheral areas. In the Soviet Ukraine, starting in the 1930s, such areas were the southern Kursk and western Voronež oblasts and the Kuban region. In Poland, the Lemko region was separated from Galicia, Galicia was separated from Volhynia, and both of these were divided from the Polissia and Xolm regions. In Romania a barrier was erected between the Ukrainians of Bukovina and those of Bessarabia, and in Czecho-Slovakia a wall was built between Transcarpathia and Ukrainian districts in Eastern

Slovakia. All these partitions were intended to make the Ukrainian language area smaller, and in some cases they apparently succeeded.

Contacts across the frontiers and across the administrative boundaries weakened substantially, but they did not come to a complete halt. Galicia continued to influence the language of the Soviet Ukraine, although on a lesser scale than prior to the Soviet occupation (cf. examples quoted in Shevelov 1966, 124; cf. also the contacts of the Ukrainian Institute of Scientific Language in Kiev with the Ševčenko Scientific Society in Lviv). Much later, in 1970, a Ukrainian linguist in charge of the standardization of the Ukrainian literary language summarized the presence of Galicianisms in the Soviet-prescribed version of Standard Ukrainian as follows: ''Eliminated from scholarly, journalistic, and official texts, Galicianisms were preserved predominantly in the spoken language and in fiction, in which they often are entirely justified'' (Piliński 366). The statement is notable for its recognition of the official policy of excising Galicianisms (a policy going back to the 1930s) and in its acknowledgement of their presence as late as 1970. Whether Galicianisms have appeared only in fiction is, of course, questionable. Galician influences also spread to Bukovina (e.g., to the nationalist publications there) and to Transcarpathia (e.g., in the variegated activity of Iv. Pan'kevyč).

On the other hand, the Polish Ukraine was exposed to the impact of Kharkiv and Kiev, especially in the 1920s. In part this influence came directly, through scholarly institutions such as the Academy of Sciences; in part through party contacts between the CPU and the CPWU; and in part through the Ukrainian political emigration in Poland and adjacent countries (I. Ohijenko a.o.).

Thus the unity of the Ukrainian language was maintained, but simultaneously, due to the limited channels of contact, regional differences were in large measure retained. The Galician koine did not merge with Standard Ukrainian, and a unique version of Standard Ukrainian was probably in the making in Transcarpathia.

These are obvious and indisputable facts. A discussion of the social basis of the Ukrainian language must stand on shakier ground. Before the beginning of the century, Ukrainian was plagued by an orientation on the peasantry, almost exclusive in the Russian Ukraine and predominant in the Austrian Ukraine. In the early twentieth century attempts were made to reorient the language, at least in part, towards the intelligentsia and the city. In literature, the attempts were successful (Kocjubyns'kyj, Lesja Ukrajinka, Vynnyčenko); in life, apparently, more often than not they failed. Infrequently did use of Ukrainian go far beyond the humanist intelligentsia, and only exceptionally did it reach the technical intelligentsia, businessmen,

capitalists, and industrial workers; the attempt to involve the latter during the time of Ukrainianization was for the most part ineffective. More effective were the same attempts in the Polish Ukraine. Out of the necessity to compete with Polish and Jewish enterprises, a class of Ukrainian businessmen began to take shape. But the advance toward urbanization was slow and limited. In terms of social base, Ukrainian remained an incomplete language.

More striking was the substantial growth in the areas of life served by the Ukrainian language: from agriculture to religion, from musicology to financial bookkeeping, from poetry to economy. But in pure science and technology,where attempts to introduce the use of the Ukrainian language were made, Ukrainian did not find broad support and, after the period of Ukrainianization, shrank considerably. This reflected, of course, the gaps in the social base of the language.

In terms of prestige, the Ukrainian language won many victories; a certain number of individuals educated in Russian or Polish schools and in the Russian or Polish culture switched back to their native Ukrainian. The capacity of Ukrainian to serve on a high cultural level could no longer be denied. Yet among the non-Ukrainian urban population the reputation of the Ukrainian language remained low, and a derogatory attitude toward it was by no means exceptional. In many cases Ukrainians defected to other cultures and languages: Russian, Polish, Romanian, and Czech. Very often the principal motivation for such defections was career or financial advancement, but behind it loomed a lack of enthusiasm, or even of esteem, for the Ukrainian language. Under all four occupations, Ukrainian failed to become the usual and common means of communication in the large urban and industrial centers.

An important shift took place in the ideological foundation for the use of Ukrainian. Before the twentieth century, the main argument fostering the use of the Ukrainian language by the educated (who, after all, were bilingual) was the need to communicate with, and enlighten, the peasants, who were not bilingual and therefore would presumably be doomed to remaining uneducated or even illiterate if not approached and instructed in Ukrainian. This argument lost its conviction and fell into disuse in the twentieth century. There were some attempts to replace it with slogans of romantic derivation, presenting language as a manifestation of national soul and as a depository of national culture, or the most important attribute of a nation.

With the caution of a scholar who preferred to stay away from ideological dictums, Vasyl' Simovyč wrote in 1934: "If one takes into account all the earmarks that make a nation a nation, language is one of the most

important features of the nation's existence. Hence the extraordinary endeavors to preserve the language, because it is assumed that with the collapse of the language, the nation stops existing Such an understanding of language as the factor of utmost importance in the existence of a nation becomes part of the national political life of that nation. Such an understanding of language is rather emotional in character, but one cannot but reckon with it. We can fight that understanding as it pleases us, but we feel there is something in it'' (35).

The ambivalence expressed by Simovyč, his acceptance and rejection, simultaneously, of the slogan of language as the determinant of nation, is indicative of the very situation of the Ukrainian language at the time. Under normal conditions the existence of a language does not need motivation or explanation. It would be highly unusual to start proving *la raison d'être* for, say, French in France or English in England. Those languages are simply there, as the air men breathe is there. No speaker would even imagine motivating their presence. If speakers of a language seek motivation for their language, an abnormality in the situation of the language in question is always present. The Ukrainian language in the first half of the twentieth century was, from this point of view, in a transitional stage: from a motivated presence to an unmotivated one. When in the mid-nineteenth century the language was spoken virtually by peasants alone, the motivation of its understandability to peasants was both necessary and sufficient. The writings of a Kvitka or of a Marko Vovčok, with their stylized narrator standing in for the peasant, were in harmony with that motivation. After P. Kuliš, Franko, Kocjubyns'kyj, and Lesja Ukrajinka—that is, after the formation of a Ukrainian intelligentsia—the situation changed radically. The language of these writers and of their social group shared phonetics and morphology with that of the peasants, but lexically and syntactically it was a far cry from the language of the countryside. The writings of a Ryl's'kyj, a Semenko, a Bažan, among many others, did not meet the requirements of ''rural ingenuousness.'' The representatives of the ''ethnographic trend'' in linguistics of the 1920s (Kurylo, Tymčenko, Ohijenko, Simovyč, a.o.) strived to fill the gap between the standard language and the language of the peasants. It would be futile to try to guess what would have happened if their ideas and efforts had prevailed, if they had not been crushed by the Soviet state machinery. There is some indication, however, that a number of these same linguists (Kurylo, Simovyč) moved away from the ethnographic orientation.

Language as the embodiment of the ''national soul'' was too romantic and poetic a notion to be acceptable as motivation in the age of science and technology. Even the thesis of language as the repository of a national

tradition was not quite applicable, because archaicization played no significant role in the development of the Ukrainian language in the twentieth century. The language of, say, the seventeenth century is hardly understandable to a contemporary speaker from any social group. This "crisis in motivation" led to the non-motivated existence of the Ukrainian language, or to what is the same, motivation by mere presence. By coincidence this was the normal condition for any viable language. In the circumstances of the bilinguality of the educated classes and of Ukrainians' bitter competition with the languages of the ruling nations—Russian, Polish, Romanian, and, in part, Czech—this normal condition, paradoxically, was abnormal. Hence came the timid but recurring attempts to stick to the romantic concept of language as the embodiment of the national soul.

The first half of the twentieth century brought the Standard Ukrainian language normalization of an unprecedented degree. A healthy phenomenon in itself, in practice it took on somewhat unhealthy forms when linguists, instead of selecting among features that did exist in the language, assumed the right to shape the language on their own, occasionally building entirely artificial, non-existent forms. True, this excess marked the "spelling" of 1928 only in the rendition of foreign words, where imposition of a system that existed nowhere in the language (*lohika* but *l'ozung*, etc.) was attempted. To some extent this also applied to vocabulary in general, and to terminological vocabulary in particular. These impositions prepared the ground, during the next reversal in Soviet policy, for another imposition of non-existent standards onto the language, this time Russian ones (Xvylja's spelling and terminology). Of course, the very fact that such experiments could take place was testimony to the permanently abnormal situation of the language, with its incomplete social bases and manifestations of internal incompleteness (the underdevelopment of technical terminology, the lack or underdevelopment of urban forms and genres of speech, including urban slang).[70]

70 The absence of Ukrainian urban slang was in part compensated, in the speech of the intelligentsia, by insertions of Russian clichés (words and phrases) with ironic overtones. Sulyma (264) noted the phenomenon in his analysis of M. Xvyl'ovyj's language: "When Xvyl'ovyj writes in a broken language, this is really 'for the intelligentsia' because it was they who had created this 'brokenness.'" Sulyma's explanation is, however, incorrect: "Someone is unable to speak Ukrainian correctly and speaks in a distorted language, with Russianisms, whereas his appearance and tone are such to make people think that he talks facetiously, deliberately 'for laughs.' And then they get accustomed and consider that manner of speech a joke." The actual reason for that deliberate, ironic use of Russianisms by people able to speak Ukrainian perfectly (as Xvyl'ovyj did) was to fill the gap created by the absence of Ukrainian urban slang. Hidden behind this usage there was also a derogatory attitude toward the Russian language, an instance of the derision a dependent nation commonly has toward those on whom it depends.

The intrusion by the government—in these particular cases, by the Russian-run government—into a language's internal regulation was a Soviet innovation and invention. Neither the Polish nor the Romanian nor the Czech government had used such tactics: nor had they been applied by the tsarist administration in prerevolutionary Russia. In their policy toward the Ukrainian language, all of these had resorted to measures of external coercion only: banning the Ukrainian language from public use, entirely or selectively; imposing the state language on speakers of Ukrainian through education, cultural developments, career opportunities, territorial resettlement; settlement of the ruling nationality on Ukrainian territory, etc. The Soviet system, in addition to applying all these "classic" methods, introduced interference into the structure of the Ukrainian language by prohibiting certain words, syntactic constructions, grammatical forms, spelling, and orthoepic standards, while promoting others patterned on Russian or directly transplanted from Russian. Through these tactics the conflict between the Ukrainian and the Russian languages in the Soviet Ukraine was extended from things external to the language into the language itself. The contamination was to affect not only speakers of Ukrainian, but the language per se in its intrinsic structure.

Under such constant assault, what augmented Ukrainian's ability to resist was the tradition (although in most cases not realized by its speakers) of the short-lived period of Ukrainian independence in the National Republic and the Hetmanate of 1917–1920. That strength came not from a political program, nor even from knowledge of the historical facts of the period (which were erased from the nation's memory by distortion and suppression), but from the actual imprint these years left on the language, in two respects: first, by extending its functions to areas where it was not admitted previously (especially state administration and education); second, by enriching it with new lexical and syntactic elements. This growth resumed, in part, at the time of Ukrainianization.

The entire range of innovations from the 1917–20 period has never been studied thoroughly or extensively. Yet even some random examples show how many Ukrainian words—to limit ourselves here to vocabulary—that now seem quite "natural" and indispensable stem from that time. A contemporary speaker of Ukrainian would be surprised to learn that the following nine words, which belong to the neutral common stock of the language, were not listed at all or not in their present-day meaning in the most comprehensive of the prerevolutionary dictionaries, namely, Hrinčenko's: *dopovid'* 'lecture', 'paper', *holova* 'chairman', *hurtok* 'circle', *hurtožytok* 'hostel, dormitory', *lystivka* 'postcard', *stavytysja* 'to treat, to have an attitude toward', *urjad* 'government', *ustanova* 'office, institution', *zdibnyj*

'gifted, capable'. In his correspondence, M. Kocjubyns'kyj systematically used for 'postcard' the word *vidkrytka* (cf. Russian *otkrytka*; e.g., his letter of 24 November 1903—Kocjubyns'kyj 304). Vynnyčenko in his diary wrote "ja do vs'oho *vidnošusja*" (1911), *sposibni* (1914), and *predsidatel'* (1914, 1915; pp. 35, 119, 130, 167).[71] J. Čykalenko, in 1908, also used *predsidatel'* (II, 11c).

All these words (except *hurtožytok*, which apparently emerged after the Sovietization of the Ukraine) can reasonably be assumed to have gained their new meaning at the time of Ukrainian independence. Some of them are recorded in S. Ivanyc'kyj and F. Šumljans'kyj's 1918 *Rosijs'ko-ukrajins'kyj slovnyk* (included there are *stavytysja*, *ustanova*, *zdibnyj*; *holova* and *urjad* occur there, too, but alongside older words borrowed from or patterned on Russian: *predsidatel'*, *pravytel'stvo*, respectively, which were common in the pre-1917 Ukrainian press; others are not yet included). It is in the Academy dictionary of 1924 and thereafter that we find *dopovid'*, *hurtok*, and *lystivka*, and it is there that *urjad* is no longer accompanied by *pravytel'stvo*. Characteristically, most of these words did not enter into the "Galician koine."

These and many other words from independence times were so strongly rooted in the language by the end of the 1920s that even the "purge" of Ukrainian vocabulary in the 1930s, under Postyšev and Xvylja, was unable to delete them; moreover, such words were probably mistaken for "genuine" and native vocabulary.[72] During the comprehensive witch hunt (for "nationalistic" witches) and afterwards, numerous words from these times were incriminated and subject to elimination, especially if they had doublets common with Russian, such as *bihun - poljus* 'pole', *pidsonnja - klimat* 'climate', *ljudnist' - naselennja* 'population', *nyzka - rjad* 'many', *na tli - na foni* 'against the background' and many more. Yet the words contributed during the years of independence survived in those cases in which the "old" words fell completely out of use and, therefore, the "new" words (now not so new) proved to be practically unidentifiable and irreplaceable. After all, the entire language purge (as well as human purge) after the 1920s was in a sense but a struggle with the spectral or real patri-

71 But in a sentence of 1914 we find *hurtok* (66). Apparently, the word came into use via the language of revolutionary parties and became common in the years of the struggle for independence.

72 The Ukrainian names for months—*sičen'* 'January', *ljutyj* 'February', etc.—apparently also entered general usage at the time of independence. Before the revolution, Čykalenko, for instance, systematically used the "international" ones: *janvar*, *fevral'*, etc. (in the Ukrainian case, taken from the Russian).

mony of the brief period of independence. The legacy of that period became and remained an important level in the Standard Ukrainian language.

In retrospect, in the period from 1900 to 1941, the Ukrainian language advanced rapidly in the sense that it became more rich, widespread, and regularized. Yet, existing as it did under four occupations, it remained incomplete in terms of its social base and in terms of the avenues of life it served. Furthermore it was threatened by the general bilingualism of the entire educated population on Ukrainian territory. Bilingualism always tends to become monolingualism; in each particular case, theoretically, speakers can opt for either of the two languages involved. The threat of the non-Ukrainian option in bilingualism in the Ukraine was heightened because the competing language served as a channel to all other languages, primarily the Western ones: Russian in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet system, Romanian in Romania, Hungarian or Czech in Transcarpathia and, to a lesser degree, Polish in Poland (before 1918, the Galician intelligentsia as a rule knew at least one of the major Western languages, German).

This situation was recognized repeatedly by leading personalities in Ukrainian cultural and political life, sometimes with indignation, sometimes with understanding. As early as 1891, Ivan Franko wrote about Russian Ukrainians: "They usually know only one language, the Muscovite language in which they were taught in schools This is their entire *apparatus criticus*" (Tymošenko 2, 18). In 1910, S. Jefremov stated: "The Ukrainian has borne and still bears two souls in his breast: he got and still gets access to all general human emotions from a Russian source, in a Russian attire.... The worst evil of our recent past was that Ukrainianophilism looked at Ukrainian life as a parochialism, as a partial variant of general Russian life" (Lotoc'kyj 2, 436). S. Petljura, in 1912, drew a conclusion from this situation: "I think that for the given moment in the development of the Ukrainian movement (*ukrajinstvo*), the influence of Russian culture is the only available means to raise our national culture, because there are so few roads to Europe that these roads look rather like very narrow paths" (Petljura 2, 191). It is for this reason that Petljura regarded Ukrainian translations of the world's literary classics as a problem with political significance (ibid., 508).

A faithful mirror of that dependence on the language of the ruling nation was the production of dictionaries. In the Russian Ukraine, whether tsarist or Soviet, Russian-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries were published almost exclusively (for the years 1918–1961, bibliographers list, discounting abridged school dictionaries, only five [five!] Ukrainian-West

European dictionaries: one French, two German, and two English; Hol'denberh and Korolevyč 125ff.). In the Austrian and, later, Polish Ukraine, German-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-German, Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Polish dictionaries predominated; in pre-1918 Transcarpathia, Hungarian-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Hungarian ones were the norm. Such dependence on the language of the ruling nation was a major handicap for the normal development of the Ukrainian language and, in fact, for the growth of more than the language. It was one more manifestation of the incompleteness of the Ukrainian language in the first half of the twentieth century.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Ukrainian Illustrations and Notations Added to Two Seventeenth-Century Books held in the Helsinki University Library*

BOHDAN A. STRUMINSKY

1. *Ukrainian Religious Cards from the Seventeenth Century*

The first religious cards offered for sale or distributed freely among worshippers appeared in Kiev in 1627, according to D. A. Rovinskij, the expert in this kind of religious art among East Slavs.[1] They were made in Kiev's Monastery of the Caves and the Počajiv Monastery by monks, including such masters of the religious woodcut as Illja and Prokopij.[2] Woodcuts from the Caves Monastery were not only used as illustrations for printed books, but also were printed separately for sale or free distribution, or were often glued to manuscripts.[3] Paul of Aleppo, who visited Kiev in 1654, noted as a curiosity that the Caves Monastery also printed "icons of the saints" (*iqūnāt al-qiddīsīn*).[4] The Ukrainian veneration of icons printed on paper was seen as heretical by Muscovites. The Muscovite voivod of

* I am indebted to Edward Kasinec, head of the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library, for bringing these items to my attention and for his bibliographical help in preparing this article.

1 D. A. Rovinskij, *Podrobnyj slovar' russkix graverov XVII–XIX vv.* (St. Petersburg, 1895), cols. 224–25. Also S. Maslov, "Bibliografičeskie zametki o nekotoryx cerkovno-slavjanskix staropečatnyx izdanijax. 1. Gravirovannye listki Kievo-Pečerskoj tipografii," *Russkij filologičeskij vestnik* (Warsaw) 44 (1910): 353–63; P. M. Popov, *Ksylohrafični došky Lavrs'koho muzeju*, vol. 1: *Ukrajins'ki starovynni gravjury typu "narodnyx kartynok"* (Kiev, 1927), preface; V. Sičyns'kyj, "Istorija ukrajins'koho graverstva XVI–XVIII stolittja," *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni* ("Peredvojenni nevydani 'Zapysky ČSVV' "), vols. 4–6, ser. 2, sec. 2, vol. 5 (11), fasc. 1–4 (Lviv, 1942—Rome, 1967), p. 270; J. D. A. Barniot and J. S. G. Simmons, "Some Unrecorded Early-printed Slavonic Books in English Libraries," *Oxford Slavonic Papers* (1951): 112–13; I. P. Kryp''jakevyč, P. J. Lucyk, and F. P. Maksymenko, "Narodni hravjury XVII st.," *Ukrajins'ke mystectvoznavstvo* (Kiev) 5 (1971): 151.

2 Rovinskij, *Podrobnyj slovar'*, cols. 238, 245.

3 P. Popov, "Materijaly do slovnyka ukrajins'kyx graveriv," *Ukrajins'ka knyha XVI–XVII–XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1926), p. 324.

4 "Voyage du Patriarche Macaire d'Antioche," *Patrologia Orientalis* (Paris) 26, fasc. 5 (1949): 699.

Kharkiv, Ofrosimov, reported in 1658 to Moscow: "Seeing their [the Ukrainians'] little religiosity because they pay homage to paper sheets..., I have written this to you."[5] When such paper icons appeared in Muscovy, Patriarch Joachim banned them, in 1674.[6]

According to P. Klymenko, in the Ukraine religious cards from woodcuts were made in the seventeenth century even by masters who worked independently from religious book printshops.[7] P. Popov noted that "a considerable part of the oldest xylographic engravings with an independent function were found by 'excavations' in old book covers."[8] More independent engravings were later found in book covers in the Western Ukraine.[9]

The two engravings under discussion here appeared on the endpapers of Peter Mohyla's Λίθος (Kiev, 1644), now held in the Slavonic Library of the Helsinki University Library.

The first illustration, on the inside front cover, represents the Madonna with the Son sitting on her left arm (fig. 1). Brief engraved descriptions appear beside the figures: MP ΘȢ (Μήτηρ Θεοῦ 'Mother of God,' in Greek) and 'ИС ХС (Иисȣсъ Христосъ 'Jesus Christ', in Slavonic); the repetition ІС ХС is handwritten. Two brouches, or floral embroideries, adorn the Madonna's kerchief and right shoulder. She holds her right hand before her and Jesus stretches his in her direction. The Greek letters ὯΝ ('He that is', i.e., God; cf. Exodus 3: 14), clumsily written, appear on either side of Jesus' head. The icon is fitted under an arch supported by two columns, a motif common in front pages of Ukrainian religious imprints of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. An inscription above the arch reads: МАТЕРЪ БГȢ ІС ХС сНь 'Mother of God. Jesus Christ, the Son'. The possessive dative construction of the first phrase, and the use of the accusative rather than the nominative, represent a vernacular form as against the more official Slavonic МАТИ БЖІѦ. The use of the front, instead of back, jer at the end of the word 'son', which is contrary to the spelling used in Ruthenian imprints from the sixteenth century on, reflects a Middle Bulgarian spelling mannerism which appeared in Ukrainian religious manuscripts until the early seventeenth century.[10]

5 Kryp''jakevyč et al., "Narodni hravjury," p. 150.

6 Rovinskij, *Podrobnyj slovar'*, cols. 227–31.

7 P. Klymenko, "Ukrajins'ki knyhodruky," *Bibliolohični visti* (Kiev, 1924), vols. 1–3, pp. 116–17.

8 Popov, *Ksylohrafični došky*, p. 6.

9 Kryp''jakevyč et al., "Narodni hravjury," pp. 155–61.

10 Cf., e.g., авраамь, исаакь (ісаакь) in two manuscript gospels of the early seventeenth century; J. P. Zapasko, *Ornamental'ne oformlennja ukrajins'koji rukopysnoji knyhy* (Kiev, 1960), pp. 91, 106.

This type of Madonna has a number of parallels among illustrations in Ukrainian religious books of the seventeenth century, of which it may be an imitation. The most similar one appears in Трїωдїон (Kiev, 1627), in an illustration made in 1626 by the wood engraver Л. Т. (with a more complete O Ω N, i.e., ὄ ὤν in Jesus' nimbus and with a different position for MP Θȣ), and is repeated in Ѵасословъ (Čorna, 1629).[11] Other parallels appear in Слȣжебникъ (Lviv, 1646), where only the letter O remains in Jesus' nimbus, and in Акаѳїстъ (Kiev, 1625), in which letters in the nimbus are transformed into an ornament. A copper-plate by O. Tarasevyč (d. 1703) printed on silk, with an empty nimbus, represents the last stage in the obliteration of that Greek symbol.[12]

The second religious card, glued to the inside back cover of Λίθος, represents Jesus' ascension to heaven from the Mount of Olives in the presence of the apostles on the fortieth day after the Resurrection (fig. 2). Although Acts I: 2–12 enumerate only eleven apostles as present (without Judas Iscariot and without Matthias, who was later selected to replace him), this card shows twelve apostles, according to the popular belief. Mary, Mother of Jesus, who according to Acts I: 13–14 appears among them only after they return from the Mount of Olives is here depicted as present during the Ascension, with the letters MP Θȣ appearing above her head. Angels on either side point fingers to the sky (cf. Acts I: 10–11, where "two men in white apparel" stand by the apostles and explain the meaning of all that has occurred, but their finger pointing is not mentioned). Jesus is presented against the background of a radiant light, within a medallion supported by two angels. Two trees in the background on both sides are meant to represent olive trees. The scene is framed by an arch on two columns, like that of the first card. The inscription above the arch reads: ВОЗНЕСЕНИЕ ГОСПОДА НАШЕГО І͞ΣА Х͞ΣТА 'The ascension of our Lord, Jesus Christ', with the Greek sigma for the Cyrillic capital *c*, a common occurrence in title pages, illustrations, and vignettes of Ukrainian imprints of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. But the archaic spelling ВОЗНЕСЕНИЕ rather than the usual ВОЗНЕСЕНЇЕ indicates an author who did not adopt the spelling dominant in imprints from the sixteenth century. The archaic -ие appeared in Ukrainian manuscripts until the second half of the sixteenth century.[13]

11 Rovinskij, *Podrobnyj slovar'*, col. 412; T. N. Kameneva and A. A. Guseva, *Ukrainskie knigi kirillovskoj pečati XVI–XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 1976), no. 455.

12 Kameneva and Guseva, *Ukrainskie knigi*, nos. 719 and 431; Popov, "Materijaly," p. 325.

13 Cf. Zapasko, *Ornamental'ne oformlennja*, p. 80 (the Peresopnycja Gospel of 1556–1561: ѵтение).

A handwritten inscription has been added below the figure of Jesus: Приидѣте поклонѣтесѧ 'Come and bow' (a phrase from the Eastern liturgy). Handwritten inscriptions in Latin on the opposite page read: *Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti Amen amen* 'of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit Amen, amen' and *Beatissima Virgo Maria, conserua me, famulum tuum humiliorem, Procopium Bazakowsky* 'The Most Blessed Virgin Mary, preserve me, one of Thy humbler servants, Prokip Bazakovs'kyj.' A Polish phrase can also be discerned: *nie chodząc* 'not going.'

Like the first card, the second appears to be a rendering of the motif that appears in a number of Ukrainian religious publications of the seventeenth century. The closest parallels found to date are the woodcut in John Chrysostom's Бесѣды на дѣѧнїѧ Стыхъ Апслъ (Kiev, 1624), probably the work of Tymofij Petrovyč, and that in Трїωдїонъ (Lviv, 1642), made by B Θ Z.[14] The most significant difference is in the position of Mary's arms: whereas they are folded in the card discussed here, they are extended in the book illustrations (the early Christian *orans* figure). Other parallels lack the olive trees, and their Mary has arms either folded (as in Апостолъ, Lviv, 1639, one illustration within the book) or extended (as in Єυаггелїонъ, Lviv, 1636; in Октоихъ, Lviv, 1639; Апостолъ, Lviv, 1639, front page).[15] In some of them Christ appears not in a medallion, but in a half-circle of clouds (the Lviv Gospel of 1636 and the Lviv Octoechos of 1639).

Both cards represent the relatively high level of woodcut art done outside of the known religious printshops. To appreciate their quality, one needs only to compare our cards with the primitive and crude samples that appear in Klymenko's article. The inscriptions in both cards allow us to date them to the early seventeenth century, i.e., near to the very beginnings of the development of this art form in the Ukraine. The cards may well be considerably older than the book into which they have been pasted.

2. *Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Notations on Charles XII and Mazepa*

In addition to historical chronicles, concise historical notations on the margins of other, usually religious, texts were made in pre–nineteenth-century Ukraine. One event that inspired owners of religious books to make such notations was the defeat of King Charles XII and Hetman Ivan Mazepa in

[14] Kameneva and Guseva, *Ukrainskie knigi*, nos. 417 and 814.

[15] Kameneva and Guseva, *Ukrainskie knigi*, nos. 677, 590, 701, and 812.

their campaign against Peter I in 1708–1709. I have published one such notation from a Slavonic prayer book preserved at Harvard (its author may have been a Muscovite).[16]

Published here is another example, taken from a book now held in the Slavic Division of the Helsinki University Library. Two notations on the Swedish-Ukrainian-Muscovite war of 1708–1709 are inscribed on the blank side of leaf 104 of the Зерцало богословїи of Kyrylo Trankvillion-Stavrovec'kyj (Počajiv, 1618), which was once the property of the Mežyhir''ja Monastery near Kiev (fig. 3).

The notations written in an eighteenth-century Ukrainian cursive script, read as follows (here superscript letters are rendered alongside the others):

Рокȣ ҂аѱи҃ въ Ноеврїи Мсц҃ѣ Гетманъ и̂ Кавалеръ Іванъ Маꙁепа ꙁъмѣнилъ Великомȣ Гсд҃Рю Передалсѧ до Шведа Которо[го] Нароѵно ꙁатѧгнȣлъ с Полскои ꙁемли с Которим много бѣди ȣѵинил ȣкраѣнѣ вмѣсто Его Поставленъ Гетманом Іванъ Скоропадскии бывшии Полковник Стародȣбскии в Глȣховѣ самым Гсд҃рем ꙁъ Соиꙁволенїем Общимъ всѣхъ ѵиновъ д҃ховных и̂ свѣцкихъ

҂аѱ҃ф: Іюнѧ кꙁ҃: Гсд҃Ръ Нашъ ꙁ Воисками свои̂ми велико и̂ малоРоссиискими Королѧ шведского ꙁ воиском его Под Полтавою Роꙁгромил, же ледво въ Трех [crossed out: тысѧѵах] Стахъ ȣтѣкъ ꙁ Маꙁепою ꙁа Днѣпръ и Ослылсѧ [sic] въ ѡ̂ѵаковѣ а Оставшыи Его всѣ воиска ҂еі҃: всѣ доброволне и̂ кинȣвши Орȣжже Поклонилисѧ. Там же весь обоꙁъ и̂ Артиллерїѧ вꙁѧта. и̂ всѣ в полон Погнаны [crossed out: въ Ранъ Бȣрхъ], и Роꙁослани въ Роꙁные Московскїе Городы

Translation

In the year 1708, in the month of November, Hetman and Cavalier Ivan Mazepa betrayed the Great Sovereign. He went over to the Swedes, whom he had deliberately dragged in from the Polish land and with whom he did a lot of damage to the Ukraine. Ivan Skoropads'kyj, the former Colonel of Starodub, was installed as Hetman in his place at Hluxiv by the Sovereign himself, with the general consent of all clerical and secular ranks.

In 1709, on June 27, our Sovereign with his Great and Little Rhossic armies routed the Swedish King with his army at Poltava, so that he barely escaped in the strength of three hundred [crossed out: thousand] with Mazepa across the Dnieper and settled in at Očakiv [Özi], while the rest of his army, all the fifteen thousand, voluntarily capitulated, throwing down their weapons. The whole train and artillery were taken there and all were driven into captivity [crossed out: to Orenburg] and sent to various Muscovite towns.

In the first notation, the unusual element is the name *Ukraine* as the country to which Hetman Mazepa allegedly ''did a lot of damage,'' because its official name was *Little Rhossia* (cf. the next notation).

[16] B. Strumins'kyj (Struminsky), ''Mazepiana in the Harvard Manuscript Collection (1691–1709),'' *Harvard Library Bulletin* (Cambridge, MA), 28, no. 1 (January 1980), p. 80.

In the second notation, the unknown author at first correctly stated that Charles XII and Mazepa crossed the Dnieper with three thousand men,[17] but then, for some unknown reason, reduced that number by nine-tenths. Our author did not know that Charles XII actually settled in at Bender, whereas Očakiv was only the first Turkish fortress to which he came, having crossed the Boh River on 18 and 19 July 1709. On the other hand, he gave the correct number of Swedes who capitulated at Perevoločna on 30 June 1709, that is, fifteen thousand.[18] The mention (then crossed out) of Orenburg, a town established only in 1735, shows that the notations were made many years after the events to which they refer. Most Swedish prisoners were in fact sent to Siberia,[19] beyond the Ural River, on which Orenburg was situated.

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[17] Cf. Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists* (New York, 1981), p. 52.
[18] Cf. S. M. Solov'ev, *Istorija Rossii*, vol. 8 (Moscow 1962), p. 358.
[19] [F. M.] Voltaire, *Histoire de Charles XII* (Paris, 1895), p. 151.

Fig. 1





Fig. 2



Fig. 3



REVIEW ARTICLES

Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*: A Challenge to the Revisionists

VLADIMIR N. BROVKIN

HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR-FAMINE. By *Robert Conquest.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 412 pp. $19.95.

Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow* is one of the most important books on Soviet and Ukrainian history in recent years. It is not only a study of the famine and its consequences in the Ukraine in 1932–33, but also an interpretive history of Soviet peasantry from the October Revolution to the mid-1930s. Placing Conquest's book in the context of contemporary historiography is not an easy task, because it is a monumental work. It breaks new ground in the study of the civil war, local peasant conditions during the collectivization, demography, economics, local government, popular attitudes, government policy, and many other fields. Conquest combines a view from above—a study of the leaders' decisions, debates, motivations, and actual policy—with a view from below—a description of how these policies affected single individuals, families, villages, entire regions, and nations, particularly the Ukraine. These two accounts are skillfully interwoven to produce a broad and yet detailed panorama of one of the most tragic events in twentieth-century history.

The book has brought from oblivion a human tragedy of millions of Ukrainian peasants for decades largely ignored in Western historiography. Because the famine—its origins, extent, and consequences—are at the center of Conquest's attention, critics and reviewers have generally discussed Conquest's treatment of it rather than the book as a whole.[1] Yet in order to understand Conquest's thesis and the validity of his evidence, it is essential to follow his examination of Bolshevik

[1] See, for example, a review (no author indicated) in *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (1987): 908, focusing on the issues of the famine alone. Patricia Blake, in her review entitled "The War Against the Peasants," *Time* 128 (8 December 1986): 91, avoided mentioning the Ukrainian aspect of the tragedy. It would be impossible to comment on all the reviews and responses to Conquest's book. To date I have counted over forty in the Anglo-American press alone, most of which regard the book as a remarkable achievement. For example, David Shipler described it as "a powerful, well-documented new work," in *Washington Monthly* 19 (February 1987): 59; and Arch Paddington characterized it as a "monumental contribution," in *Commentary* 83 (June 1987): 74.

policy toward peasants from 1917. The historical dimension of the book is a key part of its overall thesis. The events of 1932–33 must be seen in light of what happened in the Ukraine in 1918–1922. During both of these campaigns in the countryside, in Russia and in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks launched an attack on the kulaks, extracted "surplus" grain, and sent armed detachments to subdue the peasants. In both campaigns the result was famine, and in both the issue of Ukrainian nationality figured prominently.

Discussing the Communists' first, 1918–1922 campaign against the peasantry, Conquest makes three important points. The first applies to both Russia and the Ukraine, and the second and third specifically to the Ukraine. The first is that policies of War Communism—that is, grain requisitioning—were not caused by war emergency. He correctly points out that the crucial decrees were passed in May 1918, before any serious hostilities in the civil war began. Grain requisitioning, attacks on the "village bourgeoisie" or kulaks, and the creation of the so-called communes were ideologically motivated (p. 47). These were initial attempts to move to what Lenin believed was a "socialist" form of agrarian production.

The second argument concerns the character of the Bolsheviks' war with the peasantry. I could not agree more with the proposition that in both Russia and the Ukraine the peasant rebels, the Greens, represented at least as great a danger to the Bolshevik regime as did the Whites (p. 50). In terms of numbers, participants, and casualties, the peasant war eclipsed the more visible war of the Bolsheviks versus the Whites. The Bolsheviks had a very weak base in the countryside in general and almost none in the Ukraine. Conquest provides much new data, ignored by other historians, on peasant rebellions against the Bolsheviks.[2] Crucial here is that the peasant resistance in the Ukraine was stronger than in Russia. Of utmost significance for the future was the fact that the Bolsheviks were defeated in the Ukraine several times during the 1918–1922 period. In several provinces they were defeated not by the Whites, but by detachments of Ukrainian peasants.[3]

The third argument is that the battles of the civil war on Ukrainian soil in general, and the Bolsheviks' battles with the Ukrainian peasants in particular, were inseparably connected with the issue of Ukrainian national resurgence. That fact made the civil war in the Ukraine different from the civil war in Russia. When the Bolsheviks requisitioned grain in Russia, they were not perceived as foreign invaders, but when they requisitioned grain in the Ukraine to feed Russian cities, the conflict inevitably acquired a national character. The establishment of Soviet power in the Ukraine was at the same time the establishment of Russian power. Having been defeated in the Ukraine several times, Lenin settled, Conquest argues, for a

[2] Moshe Lewin, for example, in his well-known *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization* (New York, 1975), does not provide any data on the numerous peasant uprisings against the Bolsheviks during 1918–1922. By contrast, Peter Scheibert does point to this evidence in his latest monumental study, *Lenin an der Macht: Das Russische Volk in der Revolution* (Weinheim, 1984), pp. 153–56.

[3] For a vivid account of the Green movement in the Ukraine, see Ivan Derevenskii, "Bandity," *Byloe* (Moscow), no. 24 (1924), pp. 253–73.

grand compromise. He abandoned grain requisitioning, and granted a large degree of cultural autonomy to the Ukrainians.

The Bolsheviks' experience during their first war on the peasantry is important for an understanding of their habits and reactions nine years later. Their eagerness to teach the peasants a lesson during the new socialist offensive, as it was called, must be seen in this context. It is to Conquest's credit that he, unlike so many others who have written on the history of collectivization, sees the interconnection between the two attacks on the peasantry.

Much has been written on Bolshevik intra-party debates in the 1920s, the origins of the grain procurement crisis of 1928, and the beginnings of collectivization.[4] Here, too, Conquest offers some new arguments and insights. He recognizes that Nikolai Bukharin's ideas were certainly moderate. There was indeed a great difference between Bukharin's method of inducing peasants to accept collective forms of agriculture in the distant future and the methods actually employed by Stalin. Conquest points out, though, that all Bolshevik factions were committed to one-party rule, to the eventual extinction of the market economy (p. 64), and to the liquidation of the kulaks as an economic force. The Bolsheviks differed on when and how to proceed to "socialism," not whether. Stephen Cohen argued recently that method and pace made all the difference, and that the excesses were the very essence of the Stalinist transformation that cost so many lives.[5] About Bukharin, Conquest argues that his ideas were impractical and unrealistic, because the peasants were adamantly unwilling to acquiesce voluntarily to collective forms of agriculture. Clearly, Conquest does not see the ideas of Bukharin's faction or their actual record in 1929 as representing a political alternative. The right opposition hardly tried to resist Stalin's policy, and Bukharin agreed in principle that the kulaks were to be ruined as an economic force (p. 94). Moreover, the party as a whole distrusted NEP, was suspicious of the economic mechanism of the market, and as a result was incapable of dealing with the economic disequilibrium of 1928. The peasants reacted normally to the market's low prices in 1928. They held on to their products, and procurements fell. Instead of adjusting prices, the party and Stalin relied on administrative methods, which in turn wrecked the market mechanism.

[4] Of the enormous literature on these subjects it is essential to note at least the following: Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (Oxford, 1980); Robert Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary* (New York, 1973); and idem, "Between Lenin and Stalin: A Cultural Analysis," *Praxis International* 6, no. 4 (January 1987): 462–76 (here Tucker argues that Stalin had his own program in the 1920s, rather than that he maneuvered between the Right and the Left); Adam Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (Boston, 1987); R. W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-30* (Cambridge, Mass., 1980); James Millar and Alec Nove, "A Debate on Collectivization: Was Stalin Really Necessary?" *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1976, pp. 50–62.

[5] Stephen Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917* (New York and Oxford, 1986), p. 48.

It should not be overlooked that Lenin had acted in exactly the same fashion in a similar situation ten years earlier. In the spring of 1918, economists and some Bolsheviks said that the only way to get the grain was to increase fixed prices. Lenin refused to "capitulate to the petty bourgeoisie in the countryside," as he saw it, and responded with forcible grain requisitioning.[6]

Why did the Bolsheviks act as they did despite the dire warnings of Fedor Dan in 1918 and Bukharin in 1928 that agricultural production would fall because the peasants would have no incentive to produce? Conquest's answer is that when the market mechanism was ruined, "the advantage of control over crop outweighed the disadvantage of that crop's shrinkage" (p. 116). Stalin is shown as a skillful politician, moving two steps forward and one step backward, appeasing the moderates by talk about continuation of NEP, papering over his disagreements with Bukharin, and yet clearly pushing for a new offensive in the countryside while always leaving open the option of distancing himself from those who engaged in "excesses."

Conquest concludes about the 1920s that because all Bolsheviks distrusted the market, were committed to resume the "socialist" offensive at some point, and were incompetent to deal with price mechanisms, the Communist party was on a collision course with the peasantry. The cataclysms of 1930–1933 were largely an outcome of the party's ideological commitments, perceptions of economic reality, and long-term goals.

Unlike many other historians, Conquest regards the processes of dekulakization, collectivization, and terror famine as three separate and yet intrinsically connected stages in the unfolding of the Communist party's campaign in the countryside. Most research has concentrated on collectivization. Until very recently, very little has been done on dekulakization, and virtually nothing on the terror famine in the Ukraine. Conquest sees each of these three stages as having its own dynamics and its own causes and consequences. The destruction of the kulaks was intended to decapitate peasant resistance; collectivization was to establish party control over the grain supply; and the terror famine was to starve the Ukrainian peasants into submission.

Conquest's data on the liquidation of the kulaks as a class presents a dramatic and moving picture of a vast human tragedy. The definition of a kulak was flexible enough to fit anyone who dared to oppose party policy. Conquest operates not just with figures and numbers, staggering as they are, but with individual biographies, citing voluminous evidence on the deportation of this category of peasants to labor camps, mines, and settlements. Many died en route to their destination, especially children.

On many points in this discussion, Conquest's ideas and data clash with the work of the so-called revisionists, a group of American historians who define their task as

[6] For a discussion of the debates between Lenin and his opponents in May 1918, see Vladimir Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October: Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1987), pp. 102; 226; 230.

studying social processes in Stalin's "Russia."[7] It is important to note that some of the revisionists' writings came out after Conquest's book appeared. Apparently because it is hard to argue against the evidence on the horrors of dekulakization, the revisionists concentrate on the positive aspects of the social mobility created by dekulakization. Sheila Fitzpatrick, the leader of the new cohort of social historians-revisionists, recently put forward an argument about what she called the "involuntary mobility" of the peasants—a euphemistic expression for the deportation of the entire social stratum of well-off peasants on the basis of ill-defined social characteristics.[8] She argued that as a result of involuntary peasant mobility, "Tens of millions of peasants moved to towns and became workers in the 1930s," and the ". . .general trend of mobility in the Stalin period was upward."[9] Unfortunately, she ignores Conquest's evidence that the party actually tried to prevent kulaks from being employed in industry. Secondly, to characterize the deportation of peasants, so eloquently presented in Conquest's book, as upward mobility is to falsify the historical record of the kulaks' fate. Even official Soviet historians, whose job it is to defend "class struggle," have refrained from doing so.

The purpose of the massive collectivization drive in the winter and spring of 1930, according to Conquest, was to establish party control over the grain supply. In this endeavor Stalin had the support of the bulk of the party activists (p. 145). The drive's revolutionary methods of coercion served another purpose—to consolidate Stalin's position as the supreme leader. Conquest unambiguously states that the decision to launch this offensive was made by Stalin at the end of 1929. Crash collectivization of agriculture was Stalin's policy. Scores of party decisions, circulars, and targets of collectivization levels to be achieved testify to that fact.

The revisionists challenge this interpretation on two points: one is the issue of control; the other is the issue of initiatives from below, a key concept in all the revisionists' writings. In contrast to Conquest, Lynne Viola, like other revisionists, emphasizes that it was local zealots who practiced excesses. Local legislation on dekulakization, she argues, preceded the central legislation, which tried to bring order to the process of dekulakization. The central organs of the party, according to Viola, tried and failed to establish control over local activists. She argues against the proposition that Stalin "unleashed" local zealots on the peasantry. The thrust of her thesis is that the central leadership tried to regularize, control, and even restrain local activists.[10] Since there was a lot of chaos in the countryside, and local party activists did whatever they pleased to fulfill the instructions of the center, Lynne

7 Sheila Fitzpatrick defined the agenda for this group of historians in "New Perspectives on Stalinism," *Russian Review* 45, no. 4 (1986): 357–73, which was subjected to severe criticism by Stephen Cohen, Geoff Eley, Peter Kenez, and Alfred G. Meyer, ibid., pp. 375–408.

8 Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives on Stalinism," p. 366.

9 Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives on Stalinism," p. 365.

10 Lynne Viola, "The Campaign to Eliminate the Kulak as a Class, Winter 1929-30: A Reevaluation of the Legislation," *Slavic Review* 45, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 503–525, particularly 505–506. By contrast, see V. Taniuchi, "A Note on the Ural-Siberian Method," *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 4 (1981): 518–47.

Viola and J. Arch Getty argue, there was no effective control from above and initiative came from below.

At first glance, these seem to be meaningful revisions. In fact, however, they do not revise anything that has not been acknowledged by Conquest and many others. They do, however, reverse the order of things. Of course local potentates had a lot of freedom to dispose of the lives and property of a targeted social group. The point is, though, that it was the central leadership's intention to grant the local zealots that enormous power. Conquest's data shows that local Communists certainly did not wait for encouragement from Moscow to engage in excesses. More important, however, is that by carefully following moves from below and the flow of party directives from above, Conquest shows that the initiative and the explicit orders to liquidate the kulaks as a class, and to speed up the collectivization, came from above, at the end of 1929. The party's central leadership sent quotas on deportation, and it was the center that mobilized 25,000 activists to storm the countryside. Evidence that the center tried to hold the unleashed storm troopers in check does not change the fact that it initiated, conducted, and carried out the policy of mass deportation. On the other hand, control, in the sense of the party's capability to extract grain from the countryside regardless of the peasants' wishes, was established. That was the main purpose of collectivization, as Conquest correctly points out.

When the revisionists refer to initiatives from below as instrumental in pushing the party center along the path of excesses, they forget that all these initiatives were set in motion from above to begin with. Moreover, if the local activists dared to initiate something the center was displeased with, these initiatives were ruthlessly suppressed. Conquest provides numerous examples of what happened to local activists and collective farm chairmen when they stepped out of line and sided with the peasants.

The word "below" needs a more precise definition. When the revisionists say "below" they fail to explain that the word does not refer to peasants or any other social group, but to local Bolshevik zealots. The impression they create is that there was some kind of social movement from below for the transformation of society, for Stalinist revolution. Since in view of the overwhelming evidence it is impossible to argue that the peasants supported collectivization, the revisionists simply speak of support "from below." Viola equates the participation of the thousands of worker-activists mobilized by the party to storm the countryside to working-class support for collectivization.[11] In her judgment,, the collectivization drive was, among other things, a war on peasant backwardness.[12] To summarize the revisionists' arguments so far: the new offensive in the countryside came in response to pressures from below; there was widespread social support for this new stage of socialist reconstruction; Stalin was not responsible for the excesses; and in any case, the peasants' "involuntary mobility" improved their social status.

[11] Lynne Viola, *Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York and Oxford, 1987).

[12] Viola, *Best Sons of the Fatherland*, p. 213.

Some Soviet analysts are beginning to view critically the whole concept of "storming the countryside" as something that could be called socialist construction.[13] An American revisionist historian, in contrast, praises as the best sons of the fatherland not the unfortunate peasants who resisted, but those activists who descended upon them.[14] Time is working against the revisionists, though. If *perestroika* continues, more documents may come out to show what Conquest has already indicated.

Conquest shows that opposition and resistance to the storming of the countryside involved, in varying degrees, all groups of the population, including the activists. Scores of them were purged when they failed to excel in their storming efforts. The purge of local cadres continued unabated, primarily because they sided with peasant interests. Mutinies broke out in some units of the armed forces by those reluctant to fight against defenseless peasants, women, and children. Some party activists went through a crisis of conscience when they discovered what "storming the countryside" really meant. Conquest's evidence on peasant resistance to dekulakization and collectivization is so overwhelming that it can be considered definitive. It shows how ephemeral is the notion of the so-called collective farm movement.[15] The only peasant movement that existed was a reaction against collectivization. Conquest cites irrefutable evidence about numerous "terrorist acts" against party officials. The countryside flared up in peasant rebellions against the Communists once again. The conditions of civil war were recreated. Peasant detachments reappeared, "recalling those of the first peasant war in 1918–1922" (p. 155). One had to be over twenty-five to remember clearly conditions in the countryside nine years earlier, when the Bolsheviks were defeated in the Ukraine during their first assault on the peasants. It is only logical that this time they would try to make sure they would win. Rebellions were brutally suppressed. Executions, taking of hostages, deployment of armed forces against the "nests of counterrevolutionaries"—that is, peasants rendering resistance—all these elements of the first peasant war were in practice again. The long-term weapon against the peasants, particularly the most rebellious ones, the Ukrainians, was to take away their grain above the subsistence level. Grain procurements were stepped up year after year from 1928 to 1932, Conquest shows, as grain production was falling precipitously.

Peasant resistance to subjugation took the form of violent protest, the slaughter of animals, and then of passive resistance. The area of cultivation contracted; fields went unattended. A kind of peasant strike against coercion was in effect. Increase in procurements of grain coupled with the decrease in production, concludes Con-

13 For a discussion of a recent Soviet appraisal of the collectivization, see Vera Toltz, "Debates Over Stalin's Legacy on the Eve of the Seventieth Anniversary of the October Revolution," *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, no. 407 (15 October 1987).

14 Viola, *Best Sons of the Fatherland*, p. 172.

15 In his *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*, Moshe Lewin continually refers to the "collective farm movement"; here, p. 426.

quest as well as other analysts,[16] were the immediate causes of famine in the Ukraine.

J. Arch Getty, true to the revisionists' way of looking at the evidence, again absolves Stalin of direct responsibility. He writes: "But there is plenty of blame to go around.... It must be shared by... activists... and peasants who chose to slaughter animals, burn the fields, and boycott cultivation in protest."[17] In other words, the peasants chose to hurt themselves. They probably would have been better off had they chosen to submit to the party dictatorship. Getty reverses cause and effect here. First there was the new onslaught on the countryside, then came peasant protest, and then came a decrease in production. But the main factor, as Conquest shows, was not the decrease in production, or the bad harvest—that happened often—but the increase in procurements. The key question, then, is of intent. Did Stalin and the party leadership know that the procurement targets they had set would cause famine, or did they simply make a mistake in their calculations?

Here again, the peasants, not Stalin, are at fault, according to Getty. He argues that Stalin and the top party leadership had got used to the peasants' trying to outwit the party and hide grain: "...kulaks and other peasants were routinely understating harvest, hoarding grain and sabotaging the national transformation."[18] That is why the leadership increased the procurement targets—to make sure that the "hoarded grain" would be delivered. Getty clearly implies that Stalin was guilty at worst of miscalculation. Getty put forward these arguments after Conquest's book came out and in response to it. That means that he simply ignored the following evidence, presented in the book.

The party officials were aware of what the real situation was. As Conquest put it: "The activists knew very well that pits full of grain were a myth" (p. 221). In July 1932, targets of grain delivery from the Ukraine were set, and the Ukrainian party recognized they were impossible to meet (pp. 222–23). Stalin insisted on targets that could lead only to famine. Let us assume for a moment that Getty is right, and that Stalin proceeded on the assumption that peasants hoarded grain and that there would be enough grain left for them after the targets were met. If that were the case, famine would have been a tragic calamity, a miscalculation, but not a deliberate policy to starve the peasants. Even in this situation, it would be logical for the party leader to ascertain what the real situation was. Stalin flatly refused to consider the Ukrainian party's reports on the critical situation. Thus he bears full responsibility for proceeding on his assumptions rather than on hard data. If Stalin's intent was not to inflict famine on the Ukrainian peasants, why did he not release some grain back to peasants when it was obvious that there was no hoarded grain and when famine began in the fall of 1932? Stalin denied that any famine existed, and no

16 See, for example, Bohdan Krawchenko and Roman Serbyn, eds., *Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933* (Edmonton, 1986); B. Krawchenko, "The Great Famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine: Causes and Consequences," *Critique* (Glasgow), no. 17 (1986), pp. 137–46, particularly 143–44.

17 J. Arch Getty, "Starving the Ukraine," *London Review of Books* 9 (22 January 1987), p. 7.

18 Getty, "Starving the Ukraine."

relief was granted until hundreds of thousands were dying, in the spring of 1933.

The measures taken to collect grain could hardly be called a struggle against hoarding, since they included house-to-house searches and confiscation of the last cup of grain in peasant households. Struggles against hoarding hardly justified ten-year prison terms for picking a few potatoes from a field for hungry children. Evidence is overwhelming from a wide array of sources on the systematic confiscation of food from peasants in the fall of 1932.

It is to Conquest's credit that he acknowledges that local party bosses and collective farm chairmen tried to do something to help the village (p. 227). Despite their signaling of the catastrophe, a decree halted remittance of grain to collective farms for labor days as late as November 1932 (p. 238). According to Conquest, 25 to 30 percent of agricultural middle management was arrested in five months of 1932 alone, on the charge of sabotaging party policy. There was real pressure from below to adjust party policy, but Stalin's leadership pursued its own course, as on earlier occasions. What other evidence is necessary to demonstrate that Stalin deliberately inflicted famine on the Ukrainian countryside? Millions died, and deaths were concealed from the world. Conquest estimates that five million died in the Ukraine, one million in the North Caucasus, and one million elsewhere as a result of famine, and that six and a half million died due to collectivization and dekulakization (p. 229). Famine affected the Cossack lands and the lower Volga as well, but the hardest blow was suffered by the Ukrainian peasants, as one-fifth to one-quarter of them died (p. 249). This severe demographic blow was coupled with a wave of repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the church. Of 240 writers writing in the Ukrainian language, 200 were imprisoned or killed in Stalin's time (p. 271). If this record were the result of a foreign occupation, which many Ukrainians view it as, few would object to calling it genocide. Conquest says that the crime committed against the Ukrainian nation was indeed, by the standards of international law, genocide.

When evidence is so overwhelming that it is difficult to say anything substantive about it, the easiest way to deal with it is to dismiss it as unverifiable or somehow suspect. There is nothing substantive Getty can say to deny that the authorities systematically confiscated food from peasants, stopped remittance of food for labor days to collective farms, and purged local functionaries who tried to help the peasants. This evidence cannot be brushed aside as the excesses of local satraps or as the miscalculations of Stalin. All Getty can say is: "The most striking tales are generally second-hand and unverifiable."[19]

The irony is that the publication of some new documents in the Soviet Union supports Conquest's presentation. *Moscow News* recently published a letter of Mikhail Sholokhov in which he cites complaints by a peasant on how dekulakization was conducted in his native Don region in the summer of 1929:

> The Whites took only grain and horses, but our very own power took away everything to the last thread. They took the kids' blanket. I pleaded with them and wanted to buy the blanket

19 Getty, "Starving the Ukraine."

back, I'd borrow money to do so. But they told me they did not need the money and told me to catch fourteen chickens.[20]

If Conquest had obtained this letter from Western or émigré publications, as he did others, J. Arch Getty, Craig Whitney, and other revisionists would be quick to discredit it because of its non-proletarian and hence counterrevolutionary origin. Their charges against Conquest's sources amount to exactly this. In his review of Conquest's book Whitney calls debatable the validity of Conquest's central thesis that "famine was specifically aimed as an instrument of genocide against the Ukraine" because Conquest relied on émigré Ukrainian sources. Although Whitney admits that the evidence in the source he considers particularly objectionable "may indeed be reliable," he nonetheless reproaches Conquest for using books "published by émigrés in the United States and Canada."[21]

There are no scholarly, moral, or legal grounds to disqualify sources on the grounds that they are written by exiles or émigrés. They must be used and verified against other sources, and that is exactly what Conquest has done. He makes use of an impressive array of a variety of sources, including letters, memoirs, and official Soviet documents. If dekulakization went on in the way described in Sholokhov's letter and in other letters cited by Conquest, is it implausible that the same procedure was followed three years later, when grain was being extorted from the peasants?

The key piece of evidence that the deliberate policy of inflicting famine was aimed specifically at the Ukraine is that the borders between the Ukraine and Russia were sealed, and food was confiscated at the border whenever anyone tried to bring it across. Getty has no comment on this, and Whitney, as mentioned earlier, is suspicious of the sources. Another reviewer of Conquest's book counted and analyzed his sources on the closed borders issue, and concluded that the evidence is convincing.[22]

Finally, the historians and analysts who tend always to give the benefit of the doubt to Stalin question the validity of Conquest's thesis on the grounds that there was no rationale for such a monstrous crime as the deliberate creation of a famine for killing millions of peasants and thus undermining the country's economic and military potential. Of course there was no rationale for it, if we assume that Stalin's priorities were like ours. But they were not. One can argue that there was no rationale for decapitating the Red Army's high command in 1937, yet Stalin did so. Why assume that Stalin cared any more about the peasants? Considerations of security always came first to the dictator. Famine was a policy designed to make peasant rebellion impossible, and even Getty recognizes that Stalin wanted to break peasant resistance. That took priority over the country's economic losses.

20 "Sholokhov on Outrages During the Period of Collectivization," *Moscow News*, no. 28 (17 July 1987), p. 9.

21 Craig Whitney's review of Conquest's book appeared in the *New York Times Book Review*, 26 October 1986, p. 11.

22 Peter Wiles, "Stalin's Two Famines," *New York Review of Books*, 26 March 1987, p. 43.

Let us turn now to a critique of the reactions of some non-revisionist scholars.In his review of Conquest's book, an eminent British historian, Alec Nove, agreed with Conquest that it was a man-made famine, and that Stalin was responsible for it. He also supported Conquest's estimates of the death toll: ''It is appropriate indeed to call it terror famine.'' Most importantly, Nove concurs with Conquest that Stalin's motivation in creating the famine was to teach the peasants a lesson they would not forget. On just one matter does Nove disagree with Conquest's interpretation—as he puts it, on the Ukrainian aspect.[23] Did the peasants in the Ukraine die because they were peasants or because they were Ukrainians? Nove's answer is clear enough: because they were peasants. Stalin wanted to crush peasant resistance. Since most of the agricultural area was in the south—that is, in the Ukraine—the Ukrainian peasants had to bear the brunt of the blow. Since the famine struck other agricultural areas as well, in the North Caucasus and Lower Volga, argues Nove, it did not have an explicitly anti-Ukrainian character. Similarly, Nove suggests, the decimation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the attack on the Ukrainian church should be seen in the context of the decimation of the intelligentsia in all republics and of the attack on the Russian church.

The flaw in this reasoning is the artificial division of ''Ukrainian peasants'' into ''Ukrainians'' and ''peasants.'' Peasants in the Ukraine resisted a new storming of their countryside because it was an attack on their way of life, their traditions, their very identity. In other words it was an attack on what made them different from other peasants, what made them Ukrainian. Furthermore, when peasants in central Russian provinces faced requisition detachments sent from Moscow or Leningrad, they did not perceive them as foreign. When the peasants in the Ukraine faced similar detachments, they most certainly regarded them as foreign intruders. Peasant resistance in the Ukraine necessarily involved national feelings. In certain areas, the worker activists extracting grain did not even understand the language of those whom they were sent to subdue. The history of Ukrainian peasants' relations with the Moscow Bolsheviks was different from that of Russian peasants. The Bolsheviks managed to preserve their control over Central Russia, despite peasant rebellions, in 1918–1921, but in the Ukraine they were defeated and had to reconquer the land. This may well have been the factor in Stalin's decision to hit at the Ukrainian peasants particularly hard during the second storming of the Ukrainian countryside. The fact that other territories in the south were also affected by famine, and that Russian Cossacks and Kazakhs died in these territories, does not in itself disprove the argument concerning the Ukraine. Hitler perpetrated genocide against the Jews, yet the Nazis also systematically murdered Gypsies, Poles, and members of other nationalities. That does not mean that Hitler's policies were not a genocide against the Jews. Similarly, Stalin's repressions against the intelligentsia in all the Soviet republics do not invalidate the anti-Ukrainian nature of repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

23 Alec Nove, ''When the Head is Off. . .,'' *New Republic*, 3 November 1986, pp. 34–37.

The crimes of the Stalin era are so overwhelming that a natural human reaction is to disbelieve them. It is in the nature of the Western legal tradition to regard someone innocent until proven guilty. For many decades there was a tendency in the West to dismiss the horror stories in Stalin's Soviet Union as the fabrications of émigrés. Some people, like Getty, worry that revelations of their veracity may poison the climate of understanding between East and West and aid reactionary circles interested in discrediting the Soviets. But the evidence assembled in this book cannot be dismissed for reasons of political expediency. The tragic fate of the millions who died must be discussed and examined, not only in the West, but in the Ukraine.

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REVIEWS

MEDIEVAL RUSSIAN CULTURE. Edited by *Henrik Birnbaum* and *Michael S. Flier*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. xii, 395 pp. $35.00.

The title of this collection of articles is at once both comfortably cognizable and annoyingly ambiguous. One thinks one understands what is meant by "medieval Russian culture," yet when one tries to pin down the separate components of the title, perplexity ensues. In what sense "medieval"? In what sense "Russian"? In what sense "culture"? These questions take us beyond a discussion of the terminology of the title and lead us to a consideration of the conceptual problems in the book.

"Medieval" certainly is not to be understood in the West European sense as referring to the period between the ancient world and the Renaissance, since the geographical area under discussion experienced neither to any significant degree. Without the sandwiching periods, Ancient and Renaissance, in what sense can we call this period "medieval"? However "medieval" is being used here, it seems to allow the inclusion of articles about Muscovy from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, but to exclude articles about Ukrainian and Belorussian lands during that same period.

"Russian" certainly is not to be understood in the present-day sense as designating the "Great Russian" nationality, since "Great Russian," as a language identifier, develops only toward the latter part of the period covered. The editors allowed authors to use the term "Rus'ian" if they so desired, which would seem to indicate a concession to logic and clarity, yet most authors chose not to exercise this option. Their refusal leads too often to confusion in the communication of concepts. Perhaps the most blatant example of this confusion is Dean Worth's "Toward a Social History of Russian," in which he attempts to "provide an outline sketch of what is meant by 'social history of a language,' and then show how such a history is illustrated by the specific case of Russian" (p. 234). Worth never sufficiently clarifies whether he means "Russian" including "Rus'ian," that is, the common ancestor of Ukrainian and Belorussian, or "Russian" in the sense of the language that developed from the Muscovite dialect. In either case, comparison with the historical development of the other East Slavic languages was obligatory, while comparisons with South and West Slavic languages would have been helpful.

"Culture" is certainly not to be understood in the anthropological sense as the customs and habits of a people—for example, whether one places the left hand in the lap when one eats. Yet it is not entirely clear that it can be understood in the sense that, say Jacques Barzun uses it when he calls himself a "cultural historian":

religious and philosophical thought, fine arts, and so forth. Russell Zguta's article on monastic medicine exemplifies this particular ambiguity, for the author seems unsure whether he is writing about the "low" culture or "high" culture of medicine in Rus'. Other articles suggest that what we generally understand as Kievan Rus' can be considered a cultural unit with the area that presently includes the South Slavs and Moravia. That is, there is nothing to distinguish "Rus'/Rus'ian/Russian" from "Slavs," except for a few minor linguistic peculiarities. We might remember that the twelfth-century compiler of the Primary Chronicle apparently had no difficulty in attributing to Sviatoslav the view that the center of his realm was on the Danube. In addition, the editors divide the book into three sections: Culture and Society, Art and Architecture, Language and Literature. Apparently, then, there is a subset of "medieval Russian culture" called "culture" as distinct from art, architecture, literature, and so forth, but what that is remains unclear.

The essay "The Balkan Slavic Component of Medieval Russian Culture" by Henrik Birnbaum is intended to be an introductory essay to the volume, yet it is vague and confusing. What Birnbaum refers to as "component" appears to be the same concept as Ingham's "continuity of tradition." And what Birnbaum calls "Balkan Slavic" appears to be merely Byzantine cultural influences that filtered through the area that we know as Bulgaria and Serbia, whereas other Byzantine cultural influences filtered through the Crimea. On page 4, we learn that the cultural development of "Old Rus' " as well as Serbia "was patterned primarily on Byzantine models and examples," whereas on page 5, we are told that, in addition to Byzantium, Bulgaria was "the chief model" for "Kievan Rus'." Are "Old Rus," and "Kievan Rus' " two different areas, two different times, or is there on some level a contradiction here? Further on, we are told in rapid succession that *pletenie sloves*, although introduced into Rus' from "Bulgaria," is actually part of the "Serbian sub-component of medieval Russian culture," but in fact is "Byzantine" (p. 19). If the reader gets confused it is no wonder, for Birnbaum does not distinguish between the Balkan-Slavic "medium" and the Byzantine-Greek "message."

Throughout his article, Birnbaum compounds the confusion by referring interchangeably, it seems, to "Russia," "Old Rus'," "medieval Russia," and "Kievan Rus'." There is very little attempt at any terminological rigor. "Russia" is even expanded at one point to include all East Slavs (p. 21). The deep structure of the mindset seems to coincide with the Pogodin-Solov'ev theory, which argues that the "Great Russians" originated along the Danube, before they moved first to Kiev and then, in order to escape the Tatars, to Moscow. Whatever "Russian" is, as opposed to Bulgarian or Serbian, or even Rus'ian, is blurred and run together. "Russian" becomes a catchall that can then be applied indiscriminately to anything Slavic.

I regret that discussion of the conceptual-terminological problem precludes discussion of each article. Concern about vague terminology and faulty conceptualizations is by no means minor or irrelevant if these prevent comprehension of many of the ideas and distinctions the authors try to make. The resulting obscurations is unfortunate, since there are a number of excellent contributions in the collection by some outstanding scholars. Among them are Norman Ingham on the close connection between Bohemian and Rus' literature about martyred princes; Andrzej Poppe

on the so-called Khersonian antiquities, whose "authenticity" can be dated no earlier than the late fifteenth century; Ia. S. Lur'e on, among other things, the Novgorod-Moscow heretics; and Gerd Freidhof on an analysis of diglossia in the Gennadii and Ostroh Bibles.

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UKRAJINS'KA ANTROPONIMIJA XVI ST.: ČOLOVIČI IMENUVANNJA. By *Rozalija J. Kersta.* Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1984. 152 pp. 1.10 rub.

In the first part of her study Rozalija Kersta gives an outline of the system of male names in the Ukraine in the sixteenth century according to the "traditional" (in Soviet onomastics, that is) grouping by the number of components (from one to three). Discussing some typical suffixes, especially of patronymics and metronymics, she also indicates their geographical distribution—for example, *-'a* in western Galicia, *-'at* in Transcarpathia, *-enja*, *-'ak*, *-'uk* in the Western Ukraine, *-enko* in the Braclav palatinate (since such names were later known as "Cossack" names, this fact may be of interest to historians also), *-enok* in Kiev (which seems to tie that city to Belorussia with its *-onak* names). For some reason the author did not pinpoint the geography of the *-yšyn* metronymics (p. 25) that are so typical of Galicia. Kersta's word-formative principles are not always well thought out (e.g., she erroneously ascribes a detoponymical origin to some *-enko* names [p. 35]).

The main body of the work is devoted to men's Christian names, including phonetic and morphological changes in official church names. A glossary of folk variants of such names is a valuable addition. Unfortunately, the author's inattention to the Greek sources of these names prevented her from even recognizing some problems. (A case in point is the fate of the Greek θ: Why was this alien sound replaced by another alien sound [f]? Why was it sometimes also expressed by [t] or [ft]? Why did Ukrainians and other Eastern Slavs treat θ differently than did Bulgaro-Macedonians and Serbs?).

The lack of a broader linguistic perspective can also be seen in instances where the author was unable to detect obvious foreign influences—e.g., the Polish-based names Бартошко, Балторомей (p. 106), the Tatar-based names Obduła (p. 89), Аслановичъ (p. 131).

In her list of sources the author has failed to provide full identification for two of them, evidently due to censorship considerations: "Pom''janyk Horodyšča XV–XVI st." (for which she fails to mention the editor and the place and date of publication: J. B. Rudnyc'kyj, Winnipeg, 1962); and "Opysy korolivščyn v rus'kyx zemljax XVI v.," Lviv, 1895-1900, vols. 1-3 (for which she does not identify the editor: Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj). Her bibliography is marked by an eastern bloc bias: it is limited to items published in the Russian Empire and the USSR (including terri-

tories later destined to become Soviet, as Galicia) and to the peoples' democracies (or lands destined to become such). The only exception is work by F. Miklosich (perhaps because he lived in what is now neutral Austria and originated from what is now communist Yugoslavia).

The book was published by the shabby technique of rotaprint, in a mere 750 copies. Despite the study's not very high level, it deserved better.

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SEJM KORONACYJNY JANA KAZIMIERZA W 1649 R. By *Stefania Ochmann*. Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, 705; Historia, 45. Wrocław, 1985. 270 pp. 285 zł.

Over thirty years ago, Władysław Czapliński described the period from 1648 to 1655 as one of the most poorly researched in Polish internal history. Since that time, strides have been made towards explaining domestic affairs in the Commonwealth during the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. Czapliński's *Dwa sejmy w roku 1652: Studium z dziejów rozkładu Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVII wieku* (Wrocław, 1955) represented a great step forward in the study of Polish political culture and of the Commonwealth's handling of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. In 1978, Łucja Częścik devoted a monograph to the Diet that confirmed the Zboriv Agreement (*Sejm warszawski w 1649/50 roku* [Wrocław, 1978]). Now Stefania Ochmann has written a major study of the Coronation Diet of 1649.

Dr. Ochmann has already examined the Diets of 1661–1662, during which King Jan Kazimierz failed in an attempt to reform the administration of the Commonwealth. In focusing on the Coronation Diet of 1649, she has selected a less decisive case. Her goal here is not to examine a major issue, but to develop study of Polish parliamentarism through an in-depth look at the Coronation type of Diet. In practice, however, her scope is broader than the title, because she must inevitably deal with the Convocation Diet and, in particular, the Election Diet that preceded the Coronation Diet. Therefore her extensive first chapter (pp. 11–81) provides a penetrating discussion of the government and of political factions during the early phase of the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt.

The bulk of Ochmann's book is a day-by-day discussion of the proceedings of the Coronation Diet (chap. 2, pp. 85–184). Her goal is to recreate events on the basis of a German-language account preserved in Gdańsk (in two copies), supplemented by a Polish-language account preserved in Wrocław, as well as two smaller fragments, accounts in the diaries of Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł and Kazimierz Obuchowicz, and other materials. In the sources Ochmann lists, only the Vatican materials published in the Basilians' *Analecta* are missing, although she does utilize the reports of the Papal Nuncio published in *Žerela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy* by Stepan Tomashivs'kyi. Ochmann has done a great service in recording the Diet's

workings in a clear and collated form. Unfortunately, she did not publish any of the sources she has so thoroughly studied.

The volume concludes with a chapter examining the nature of the Diet's proceedings and the resolutions it enacted. It serves the student of both Polish parliamentarism and of the politics of the period. Reading the chapter is an excellent lesson in the structure and workings of the Diet, illustrating how difficult it was for that institution to take decisive action.

Ochmann's work is essential to any discussion of Polish policies during the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolt. Not only does her analysis of the Coronation Diet provide new information on the revolt, but the book offers a new interpretation of the first year of the revolt preceding that Diet.

Ochmann outlines the differences in policy between the ruling faction, usually called the peace party, headed by Crown Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński, and the war party, which she calls the hetmans' faction, consisting of Prince Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the Lithuanian Field Hetman Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, and Crown Vice-Chancellor Andrzej Leszczyński. The peace party wished to establish peace with Khmel'nyts'kyi and to continue Władysław's anti-Turkish war plan by weaning the Cossacks away from the Tatars with concessions, as well as by maintaining an alliance with Muscovy; the war party sought to crush the rebels and proposed to win the Tatars away from the Cossacks by paying them tribute, to destroy the Cossacks, and to subject the peasantry of the Ukraine to full serfdom. Ochmann discusses Ossoliński's plans as including a domestic reform program that would have increased the central government's standing army and strengthened the power of the organs of government—both the king and the Diet. She also places domestic politics in the context of Khmel'nyts'kyi's foreign contacts and plans. Although the hetman declared his support for Jan Kazimierz—indeed, taking credit for his election as king—Khmel'nyts'kyi continued to deal with Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire. He also sought the support of Transylvania, encouraging Sigismund Rákóczi to persist in his efforts to gain the Polish throne, even by force.

Ochmann is critical of Ossoliński's anti-Ottoman policy, arguing that Muscovy had lost any interest in such a joint program. She seconds Władysław Konopczyński's argument that Wiśniowiecki, not Ossoliński, was the true successor to the anti-Ottoman program, since after the Tatar alliance Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossacks had become the instrument of Islam and the forepost of the Ottomans in the Ukraine. Her endorsement of Konopczyński in this case reflects her general negative evaluation of the peace party and positive appraisal of the aims of the war party. By sticking closely to factional maneuverings and statements, Ochmann omits discussion of underlying issues of the time (serfdom and economy, differences in social structure in the Ukrainian lands and Poland, the Counter-Reformation and Orthodoxy). As a result she can be more sympathetic to the program of the war party than most Polish historians have been of late (e.g., Zbigniew Wójcik).

After dealing with grand political designs, Ochmann analyzes the policies of the new king. She sees him as trapped between a desire to meet Cossack demands and a realization that the Senate Council and the Diet would not agree to sweeping concessions. Ochmann demonstrates that, from the first, Jan Kazimierz's policies faced

great difficulties, as the Lithuanian military leaders undermined them by ruthlessly suppressing uprisings in the Grand Duchy and the disoriented nobility in the Kingdom supported them more out of a sense of weakness than of conviction.

Ochmann's next topic is the unfinished business of the Election Diet held over to the Coronation Diet. She divides this business into three categories: the repercussions of the Pyliavtsi fiasco (23 September) when the Polish army fled before the Cossacks and Tatars; religious affairs; and the demands of Royal Prussia.

She argues that the army at Pyliavtsi had not been assembled to defeat the enemy; rather, it was intended as a show of force during the negotiations conducted by Adam Kysil and the peace commissioners, which everyone expected to succeed. She calls Pyliavtsi a political, not a military, defeat, and she draws attention to the political infighting within the Polish camp. Ochmann ponders why contemporaries did not understand that the leaders of the Pyliavtsi force had desired a peaceful settlement that would have avoided a massacre of their own peasants and subjects.

There is much in her argument that explains Pyliavtsi, but it is a bit too neat. One can sympathize with the confusion of contemporaries. An army of 30,000, containing the country's last military forces after the capture of the hetmans, had been routed. Military commanders had fled to Lviv, taken up a collection for its defense, and then absconded, leaving the city to ransom itself. No one policy dominated in the Polish army, particularly since Wiśniowiecki's troops were a major component of the Pyliavtsi forces. Ochmann too cursorily dismisses Adam Kysil's charge that Polish attacks undermined his peace mission to Khmel'nyts'kyi, and too categorically places the blame for its failure on the Cossack leader Maksym Kryvonis. Also, while some eastern landowners might have regretted destroying their subjects, they had seldom refrained from slaughtering Cossack and peasant rebels. In any case, Ochmann maintains that it was the nobles from these lands who supported the program of the hetmans' faction to destroy the Cossacks. In reality, Kysil, a leader of the peace party, most frequently made statements that to destroy one's subjects is a Pyrrhic victory.

If Ochmann does not deal comprehensively with the Pyliavtsi affair, she is more thorough in discussing its consequences. The nobles who had not taken part in the fiasco demanded the punishment of the participants and leaders responsible for the defeat. Because the issue involved military leadership, it was related to the issue of designating a military leader to function in place of the two Crown hetmans, whom the Tatars held in captivity. The Diet's affirmation of the army's designation of Wiśniowiecki undermined the king's policies. In general, military leadership was in chaos, since the lifetime term of the post of hetman made it impossible for the king to change hetmans even when they were unable to fulfill their duties. The entire affair also made the nobility reluctant to raise the taxes needed for the regular army that Ossoliński sought. All these issues were postponed from the Election to the Coronation Diet.

The Election Diet had left several religious issues unresolved as well. While the Cossack rebellion had stymied efforts to effect a new union of the Eastern and the Western church, it had also created an anti-Orthodox climate in the Diet that made Orthodox nobles reluctant to argue their case publicly. In general, they saw their

support of Jan Kazimierz as ensuring amelioration of their grievances. They were little disposed to join with the Protestants, partially because they argued that only the Greek and Roman faiths were guaranteed freedom in their lands—not newcomers, whether Uniate or Protestant. In addition, the Orthodox nobles felt the same revulsion to Antitrinitarians that Catholics and indeed Trinitarian Protestants did, which made them reluctant to join in such matters as the defense of Iurii Nemyrych, an Antitrinitarian whose right to hold the office of *podkomorzy* of Kiev was questioned. In contrast, the Protestants felt endangered in 1648, and realized that the campaign against the Antitrinitarians might be only a prelude to a campaign against all of them. The Protestants, led by Janusz Radziwiłł, were in a difficult position. They had little to offer the zealous Catholics, and faced with the great revolt, they resisted breaking ranks. Consequently, during the interregnum of 1648, unlike that of 1632, the Protestants were not even able to conduct a well-organized political offensive.

In contrast to the Protestants, the delegates from Royal Prussia found their particularist cause strengthened. The revolt had devastated the eastern lands and the nobles living there realized that they needed assistance from their brothers further west. This made financial support from rich Royal Prussia indispensable, and put its delegates in a good position to argue the Royal Prussian regionalist cause, particularly in choosing how to finance military support.

The Election Diet had sent these three problems back to be discussed by the dietines, but in calling a new Diet, the king put on the agenda payment of the army and foreign affairs, such as a Muscovite alliance and a war against the Tatars. The dietines, however, debated such matters as equalization of taxes for all regions, misuse of funds, Władysław IV's responsibility in causing the revolt, and the need to ensure that neither the king nor the Senate made concessions without the Diet's consent. Ochmann shows that the dietines continued debates from the Election Diet and resisted the royal propaganda for a foreign war following an expected agreement with the Cossacks.

In discussing the proceedings of the Coronation Diet, Ochmann shows how the king and Ossoliński found little support for their foreign policy. She argues that their fear that magnates such as Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Janusz Radziwiłł would cooperate with the Transylvanian Rákóczis, who contemplated invading the Commonwealth to obtain the throne, crippled their actions. The king and chancellor expended their energies on undermining foes and missed a crucial opportunity to reform the office of hetman by abolishing its lifetime tenure. Most important, Ochmann demonstrates how a Diet called to discuss military issues spent little time doing so, and in the end did not even appropriate the funds needed for sufficiently increasing the military.

As for the matters left over from the Election Diet, the Pyliavtsi affair was buried largely because powerful senators feared that a trial could rebound against them. They were grateful to Ossoliński for defusing the question. The demands of the Protestants went unredressed. The Prussian delegates were more successful in putting through their program, which led to the further decline of central power.

Ochmann has contributed greatly to the study of the Khmel'nyts'kyi period even if her analysis of some issues may be questioned. Regrettably, she also shows evidence of holding some of the stereotypic Polish views on Polish-Ukrainian affairs. According to her, the actions of the Cossacks and the peasants in the revolt led to the belief in Poland that "they had crossed the borders of norms mandated in the civilized world" and the goal of the religious Union had been to draw Rus' "into the orbit of Latin culture." Such occasional slips in mindset do not, however, minimize Ochmann's accomplishments. She has filled in the wide range of political maneuverings and issues of early 1649. She has reminded us how issues that seem minor today and procedures in which we have little interest determined the resolution of great affairs. Similar works on the Diets of 1646, 1647, 1648 and subsequent ones would give us a fuller understanding of the government and policies of the Commonwealth during the great revolt.

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THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN GALICIA, 1815-1849. By *Jan Kozik.* Translated from the Polish by *Andrew Gorski* and *Lawrence D. Orton.* Edited and with an introduction by *Lawrence D. Orton.* Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the University of Alberta, 1986. xxi, 498 pp. $29.95 (Can.) cloth, $19.95 paper.

This volume brings together in an English translation two books by the late Polish historian Jan Kozik,[1] the first a study of the Ukrainian national awakening in Galicia between 1830 and 1848 (originally published in 1973), the second a study of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia during the revolutionary years 1848 and 1849 (published in Polish in 1975). The central subject of the first book is the cultural movement spearheaded by the Ruthenian Triad of Markiian Shashkevych, Iakiv Holovats'kyi, and Ivan Vahylevych in the 1830s. The central subject of the second book is the political organization of 1848, the Holovna Rus'ka Rada, and the journal *Zoria Halyts'ka* in which the views of the Rada found public expression. The first volume focuses on cultural issues, while the second is most concerned with political developments, and it is a tribute to the historical sensibility of the author that the two halves fit together as effectively as they do. For Kozik, from the very beginning, is profoundly conscious of the political nuances of cultural awakening, and he remains reciprocally atuned to the cultural implications of political life. The result is a masterfully subtle picture of the interpretation of politics and culture that

[1] 1934–1979; see *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 244–50.

was so strikingly characteristic of the nineteenth-century national awakening in the Ukraine and in Eastern Europe generally.

One cannot help being struck by the sensitivity of Kozik, a Polish historian, in the handling of his Ukrainian subject. This is all the more noteworthy inasmuch as one of the volume's themes is the developing bitterness of cultural relations between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia and the failure to achieve any meaningful political cooperation in the revolutionary years 1848–1849. While tracing the development of the fateful antagonism between the two nations, Kozik never loses sight of the instances and possibilities of cooperation, of the historical alternative tragically unrealized. In 1833 it was still possible for Wacław Zaleski, the Polish Slavicist, to conceive of and to publish "Polish and Ruthenian Songs" as one project in one volume. In Kozik's view, it was Polish political explosions—in 1830, in 1846, in 1848—that disrupted the early promise of cultural harmony by forcing Ukrainians to decide explicitly whether they were for or against the Polish cause. Kozik does not pursue this analysis in detail for the events of 1830 and 1846, and one is left wondering, for instance, why exactly the massacre of 1846 should have "definitively discredited the Poles in Ukrainian eyes" (p. 162). Furthermore, Kozik offers no explication for the contemporary Ukrainian observation that "the year 1846 made a laughing stock of the Poles in the eyes of the Ruthenian peasants" (p. 162). Here Kozik seems to take for granted that we, too, will appreciate the "humor" of the occasion, and that we will accept the cultural consequences as self-evident.

The events of 1848 receive much more detailed attention, and connections and consequences are more rigorously analyzed. The failure of political cooperation is dramatized by focusing on the organizational polarization of Galicia between the Polish Rada Narodowa and the Ukrainian Holovna Rus'ka Rada—openly competing, for instance, for signatures on petitions for and against the partition of Galicia. On the other hand, Kozik continues to balance his account with the instances of almost-successful cooperation that pointed towards an alternative historical development. At the Slavic Congress in Prague, remarkably, the Polish and Ukrainian delegates did agree on a compromise for an administratively united province with two national cultures. This compromise in Prague never had any real political consequences in Galicia, but Kozik betrays an almost bewildered satisfaction that such a compromise was possible at all in 1848. The force of national antagonism was almost irresistible. Iakiv Holovats'kyi, one of the Ruthenian Triad in the 1830s, who still believed in cooperation with the Polish revolutionaries at the beginning of 1848, soon had to renounce that belief. In June he conceded: "I can see that there is no point in trusting Messrs. the *Liakhy*. They would like brotherhood, but at a high price, because they want to sacrifice our language, our nationality, all our strength, for the future Poland" (p. 348). Kozik, however, laments the "tragedy" (p. 360) of Polish-Ukrainian antagonism in 1848, and the point of view he finds most sympathetic is that of Vasyl' Podolyns'kyi, who proclaimed: "One who does not wish to recognize a Ruthenian is not worthy of being called a Pole," and "One who does not wish to recognize a Pole is not worthy of being called a Ruthenian" (p. 359). Kozik is clearly very much emotionally engaged by this position, and one

begins to appreciate better the nature of the Polish author's fascination with his Ukrainian subject. For the Ukrainian national dilemma in the nineteenth century serves as a sort of mirror that reflects on the Polish national dilemma as well. It was no accident that Poles and Ukrainians began by collecting and publishing their folk songs together.

If for Kozik the crucial conditioning factor for the development of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia was the interaction of Polish and Ukrainian elements, at the same time he explores in fascinating detail the formative institutional influences exercised upon the Ukrainian nation by the Habsburg government and the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church. Neither influence was straightforward, for while both government and church acted as important sponsors of Ukrainian national development, they both also imposed serious constraints, which Kozik does not hesitate to identify. The interests of the dynasty and of the church were often closely allied, and Kozik tells the remarkable story of the Metropolitan's program in the 1830s for oratorical exercises by young seminarians: they were to deliver addresses of loyalty to the Habsburg emperor. While most of the seminarians gave their speeches in Latin, German, and Polish, Shashkevych was one of four to speak in Ukrainian—his first public presentation—and an observer recalled that his words "raised the Ruthenian spirit by a hundred per cent" (p. 47). It should not surprise us to find Shashkevych in the seminary, for almost all the figures who guided the national awakening of the early nineteenth century came from the clergy. "They are all priests!" exclaimed Ivan Vahylevych, who found this disturbing, "And I am studying to become a priest!" (p. 60). Even in 1848 the Holovna Rus'ka Rada held its meetings in the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv. The church hierarchy, however, was hostile to the literary and linguistic concerns of the Ruthenian Triad, and the Ukrainian national awakening, as Kozik suggests, took the form of an internal struggle within the church. By 1848 we find the Metropolitan almost comically confused about where he stands between the nation and the dynasty. When asked to sign a petition against the partition of Galicia, he replied that he was quite indifferent: "This one is the same as the other, and I will not sign it either, because, to tell you the truth, I have already signed the request to the ministry in support of partition" (pp. 269–70). By 1848–1849, where Kozik leaves off, the national movement has already gone beyond the walls of the seminary, and the conservative Metropolitan could not quite keep up with the events of a revolutionary year.

Interestingly, when Iakiv Holovats'kyi denounced the Metropolitan, Mykhailo Levyts'kyi, in 1846, it was for being too Polish in his sympathies, certainly not for being too loyal to the Habsburgs. For Holovats'kyi himself, in the same article, offered the Ruthenian nation to the dynasty as a "bulwark against revolutionary machinations," recognized the Ruthenians as the "children" of the Emperor Francis, invoked the spirit of Joseph II, and proclaimed that "the Ruthenian nationality's entire hope lies in Austria, in which every nationality has been safe and secure" (pp. 168–69). Kozik's extensive samplings of political opinion leave no doubt about the overwhelming prevalence of Habsburg loyalism among the Ruthenian national spokesmen, and Kozik himself does not hesitate to express his own strong negative judgment in historical hindsight. At the very end of the

volume, when he addresses the loyalism of the Holovna Rus'ka Rada in 1848, he concludes that "its political short-sightedness was appalling" (p. 367). The strong verdict comes as no surprise to the reader, for Kozik from the very beginning presents Habsburg patronage as a dubious basis for national development. One of the most fascinating aspects of the book is his analysis of the system of imperial censorship in the 1830s, and the obstacles to publication that were faced by the Ruthenian Triad from the censors in Vienna and in Lviv. When the landmark Ukrainian literary anthology *Rusalka Dnistrovaia* was published in 1837, it could only find its way into print in Budapest—and was unavailable in Galicia.

Kozik regrets Ruthenian loyalism to the Habsburgs for two reasons: first, because he does not believe that Habsburg sponsorship was anything but tactical and insincere—and therefore destined to be disappointing—and, second, because he is disturbed to find the Ukrainians of Galicia so unquestionably in the camp of social and political conservatism. Just as Kozik is wistful about the failure of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, so he is wistful about the weakness of liberal and revolutionary impulses among the Ruthenian nationalists. They are the heroes of his book, and it is all too clear that he wishes his heroes were more progressive. The Ruthenian Triad subordinated everything else to their literary efforts, "expressed themselves on national rather than social issues," and, though they protested against social inequality and *robot* (compulsory feudal labor), "they did not suggest fundamental change" (p. 65). Kozik concludes: "Unfortunately, before 1848 the Ukrainian spokesmen did not have an adequate plan for changing existing conditions" (p. 123). As for 1848, "the Holovna Rada Rus'ka also had no set programme on socio-economic issues" (p. 252). It is the word "unfortunately" which betrays the historian's personal engagement, and one cannot help suspecting that this emphasis on inadequate plans and nonexistent programs serves as a sort of euphemistic summation of social conservatism. "Shame on us," declared one Ukrainian spokesman in 1849, regretting that his nation did not display more revolutionary solidarity, "we shall be ashamed of ourselves when the news spreads around the world" (p. 354). What he found shameful in 1849 is not unrelated to what Kozik finds "appalling" in historical retrospect.

Kozik's typical insistence that there was "no set programme on socio-economic issues" is not only politically but also historiographically significant. For Kozik, program or no program, is not fundamentally interested in writing socioeconomic history. His own cultural-political approach is well adapted to "national rather than social issues"—the same priority that he discerns in the Ruthenian Triad. The opening sentence of the volume—"The latter part of the eighteenth century saw a crisis develop in the feudal-rural economy of East Central Europe"—seems almost ironically inappropriate by the time one has finished reading. It is as if Kozik had to make a token gesture towards the historiographical school in which he was trained before moving on to leave such categories of observation and analysis distinctly aside. Kozik wrestles intellectually with his own postwar historiographical background in confronting a topic of nineteenth-century national awakening, just as he must come to terms with his own Polish perspective in taking on a Ukrainian subject. That his work is subtly marked by these aspects of personal engagement in no

way diminishes the excellence of his historical achievement. On the contrary, our awareness that the historian has intellectually and culturally disciplined himself makes it all the more possible for the Ukrainian national spokesmen of nineteenth-century Galicia to speak to us so revealingly in this impressive and important work of history.

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RODNAJE SŁOVA I MARALNA-ESTETYČNY PRAHRES. By *Aleh Biembiel.* London: Association of Belorussians in Great Britain, 1985. 242 pp.

This study was first prepared in Belorussia in 1979–1981 by the historian of philosophy, Aleh Biembiel, then forty years old, as a series of interviews with Belorussians and Russians living in Belorussia on the alarming status of the Belorussian language. "If the book is not 'killed,' I will donate it to you with an autograph," the compiler told one of the interviewees (p. 140). His fears for his study were confirmed. But his book did not die, because it circulated in typed copies, one of which reached England, to be published there by the Association of Belorussians in Great Britain.

Whereas in other Soviet republics there is a struggle for domination between the local language and Russian, the issue in Belorussia is the preservation of the vanishing local language at least on the basis of bilingualism. The compiler himself, in a "self-interview," stated the goal of the preservationists thus (making use of Soviet political jargon): "it is important that the potential possibilities [sic] of one of the most wonderful achievements of established socialism, i.e., mass bilingualism, be used in our republic to the full extent, for the benefit of each of the fraternal cultures, for the benefit of a communist renewal of the world" (p. 191). Neither the compiler nor the interviewees sharing his views (and his jargon) gave any thought to the meaning of bilingualism, which is usually a complementary relation between two languages based on a division of roles, or, to put it more bluntly, an incomplete knowledge of two languages which, together, creates an impression of completeness. In the case of Belorussia, all important aspects of life are conducted in the Russian language (as is stressed many times by those Biembiel interviewed). The Belorussian language is restricted mostly to art and recreation (belles-lettres, theater, songs, popular journalism) and *Landkunde* (some scholarly work on the local language, literature, folklore, history, etc.); all education from kindergarten to university is in Russian (with only some token gestures towards Belorussian). The trend is towards Russian monolingualism, with some partial knowledge of Belorussian for limited purposes. An almost identical situation exists in Kashubia, in the Polish People's Republic, but at least there nobody speaks of bilingualism; at best one speaks of regionalism with the cultivation of the local idiom (whether it is

considered language or dialect makes no difference) for some cultural functions like those to which Belorussian is increasingly being reduced. The situation of American ethnic minorities having Saturday schools, dance groups, choirs, and periodicals edited by those who have not yet adjusted to English monolingualism is not dissimilar from that of Belorussians. Thus that language is clearly being relegated to the status of an ethnic minority language, rather than the language of a country.

Its official status is not even guaranteed by the constitution of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (as is the status of local languages in three other republics); therefore, the language's defenders have to resort to article 66 of the republican constitution, which says: "Care for the preservation of historical monuments and other cultural treasures is a duty and obligation of citizens of the Belorussian SSR" (pp. 168, 192, 237). If a language has to be defended as a monument of history and a cultural treasure, then it is no longer a practical, living entity. Vynnyčenko was quoted as saying that Ukrainian would become a normal language when even prostitutes in Kiev offered their services in it. Prostitutes may be charged with many things, but certainly not with a lack of realism or practicality. A language cultivated exclusively by idealists is a dead language (cf. the status of Cornish, for instance).

The compiler and others who took part in his study tried to convince the Soviet authorities to help the Belorussian language because its miserable situation played into the hands of enemies of the USSR in the West (pp. 191–92, 236). They did not note that the West itself had hardly a glowing record in fostering weak languages (a case in point is the attitude of the English toward the Irish language) and that perhaps the expansion of Russian westwards, closer to the heart of Europe (a Russian-speaking outpost having already been established in the Königsberg area) was a higher priority for Soviet strategists than concern about the views of the West. The limit of Soviet concern about the opinion of the West or the Third World was expressed by a village teacher: the Belorussian language is still used on radio and in magazines and newspapers "out of political considerations, so that the Belorussian SSR might stay in the U.N." (p. 83).

One of the participants, a historian, suggested that Belorussia, as a particularly weak nation, might be the first testing ground for the abolition of non-Russian languages and cultures in the USSR: "The fate of not only Belorussia, but also all other national cultures and languages is being decided here, in Belorussia" (pp. 42, 227).

In two cases the public opinion sample went beyond the Belorussian republic. A theologian from Białystok in Poland, speaking in good Belorussian, said: "Salvation is only in Jesus Christ. The language is a path to Him" (p. 196). A historian from the Smolensk area said: "It is not a nation that creates the state but it is the state that creates a nation" (an acceptable statement for America, but very dubious for Central-Eastern Europe); therefore "the ruling party and the government of the Belorussian SSR should look to the creation of favorable conditions for continuing the still unfinished process of Belorussian revival and further development of the Belorussian language and culture" (pp. 202–204). How much good will that

government has for promoting such development was indicated by the fate of the book.

A philosopher and expert in aesthetics, a Russian who had come to identify himself with the Belorussian nation, said (speaking in Russian): "Harodnia [in Polish and Russian, Grodno] is our hope. The Polish television operates as a factor in culture there" (p. 121). The overall situation was boldly expressed by a young female writer (speaking in Russian): "Belorussia is a colony of Russia, in everything, including language and culture. A policy of Russification is being carried out by Muscovites and our own collaborationists. . . . Orthodoxy (instead of Uniatism) is a major carrier of Russification" (pp. 43–44).

Ukrainians who lament the degradation of their language in the Soviet Union may find bitter solace in this book, where Ukrainians are often cited as a positive example of the preservation of native language (pp. 31, 32, 34, 50, 80). As Stanisław Jerzy Lec wrote: "I found myself at the bottom and I heard knocking from down below."

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WIDMO PRZYSZŁOŚCI: SZKICE HISTORYCZNO-PUBLICYSTYCZNE. By *Marian Zdziechowski.* Lausanne: Éditions L'Age d'Homme, 1983. 236 pp. paper.

The story of this book's delayed appearance can be viewed as symbolic. Made available recently by a Switzerland-based publishing house as the first volume of the planned *Dzieła wybrane* by Marian Zdziechowski (1861 – 1938), it is actually a photographic reproduction of the original 1939 publication. *Widmo przyszłości* was Zdziechowski's last collection of essays, prepared for print partly by himself but published only posthumously. It so happened that the book's production was finished in September 1939 in Vilnius—obviously not the best possible time and place for the publishing market. Almost all the printed copies perished during the war—a sadly fitting ending for the whole of Zdziechowski's work, the essence of which had always been historiosophic pessimism and catastrophism.

The book has come out again at a time when, after several decades of nearly total oblivion, Zdziechowski seems to have resurfaced in Polish historical, political, and critical consciousness. During his lifetime he enjoyed well-deserved respect as a scholar, writer, and public figure (he served as rector of the university of Vilnius, and after the 1926 coup he was even considered a candidate for president of the Polish Republic, an option which he dismissed out of hand). Moreover, his monumental works *Mesjaniści i Słowianofile* (1888), *Pesymizm, romantyzm a podstawy chrześcijaństwa* (1914), and particularly the collection of essays *Europa, Rosja, Azja* (1923) gradually built up his fame as a catastrophic seer and prophet. But, ironically, toward the end of his life—when a genuine catastrophe was inevitably draw-

ing near—his influence on Polish minds began to diminish rapidly. As one of his students in Vilnius, Czesław Miłosz, reminisces (in an essay written in the early 1940s in Nazi-occupied Warsaw), Zdziechowski's grim vision of the future seemed then to correspond with the vague premonitions of the young generation; however, in his unconditional condemnation of both nationalism and communism, the old professor differed widely from the youth of the 1930s who, as a rule, tended to toy with radical solutions, either right-wing or left-wing.[1] It is highly significant that the recent revival of interest in Zdziechowski's Cassandric vision of modern history (not all premises and consequences of which are accepted by today's readers, to be sure)[2] coincides with the wider phenomenon of a dramatic upsurge of anti-totalitarian opposition among Polish intellectuals. One could say that only after the historic experiences of the past five decades has Zdziechowski finally found readers who are able to understand him, if not agree with him completely.

The book under review, which consists of eight essays written between 1923 and 1938, can serve as a good introduction to the author's system of historiosophic and political ideas. Zdziechowski appears here not only as a visionary prophet who presages the ominous triumphs of totalitarianism, but also as a down-to-earth, even though seemingly "anachronistic," political thinker. The basic premises of his outlook were, nonetheless, religious and ethical. While believing in God as a source of good, he believed with equal force in the real existence of evil. The area where this evil manifested itself most visibly was the realm of politics, which had been irrevocably tainted by Machiavellian and Nietzschean concepts of the emancipation of politics from ethics. The ultimate outcome of these concepts was, in Zdziechowski's view, the modern ideology of nationalism, on the one hand, and the ideology of communism, on the other, the latter being especially dangerous because of its dynamism, long-range strategy, and appeal. (Zdziechowski goes so far as to accuse Józef Piłsudski of "underestimating the Bolshevik threat" and to call the Riga Treaty "the Riga crime.") The only ideological solution that could possibly thwart the offensive of Bolshevism was the revival of Christian ethics as a basis for political actions, although, in accordance with his historiosophical pessimism, Zdziechowski viewed that solution as a matter of moral obligation rather than as a practical probability.

In any case, the political conclusions he draws in these essays are quite specific. He appears as a self-declared conservative, even to the point of being a staunch defender of the idea of constitutional monarchy—an extremely unpopular concept in those years of triumphant republicanism—as the only system that can preserve a continuity of tradition and an organic structure of society. While opposing the left wing of the political spectrum in interwar Poland (even in its milder form, represented by the Polish Socialist party), he is equally repelled by the right wing's

[1] Czesław Miłosz, "Religijność Zdziechowskiego," in idem, *Prywatne obowiązki* (Paris, 1980), p. 240.

[2] Cf. Jan Prokop, "Zdziechowski, Rewolucja, Żydzi," in idem, *Szczególna przygoda—żyć nad Wisłą: Studia i szkice literackie* (London, 1985).

slogan of "national egoism," voiced by Roman Dmowski and his National Democratic party. In this context, it is worthy of note that the problem of ethnic or national minorities as well as the problem of Poland's historic relations with Russia and the Ukraine occupy a special place in most of the eight essays. A student of the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations will be particularly interested in reading three of them: "Idea polska na Kresach," "Pierwiastek zachowawczy w idei ukraińskiej" (a polemical review of Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi's [Wacław Lipiński] *Lysty do brativ khliborobiv*), and "Ukraina a Rosja. Trylogia Bohdana Łepkiego." Here, as elsewhere, Zdziechowski's line of reasoning was molded by the coexistence of his Christian ethics with a historiosophical pessimism, which made it impossible for him to think in categories other than the self-contradictory. While being in favor of granting rights to the Ukrainian minority, he viewed their aspirations as ultimately destructive for the Polish state; while supporting the idea of Poland's alliance with the Ukraine in face of the Soviet threat, he was perfectly aware of the unfeasability of an alliance in which neither of the two parties could be fully satisfied; while being free from narrow-minded chauvinism, he was nonetheless convinced that the course of Polish and Ukrainian history could lead only to irresolvable conflict.

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THE LOOK OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE: AVANT-GARDE VISUAL EXPERIMENTS, 1900-1930. By *Gerald Janecek*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. 314 pp. $47.50.

Literature, as opposed to painting, is not ordinarily conceived as a visual experience. While the shape of words, the style of a font, the layout of a page, and the length of a line may at times attract separate attention, these elements, for the most part, remain neutral, virtually "invisible" aspects of literature. Leaving aside Baroque figure poems, the most serious challenge to this traditional, linear, semantically oriented perception of literature was mounted by the Avant-Garde in the beginning of this century. At no other time was the awareness of language as a visual and graphic element keener or the effort to undermine its syntactic and semantic function stronger. Thanks to Italian Futurism and the international Dada movement, as well as contemporary "Concrete" and "Intermedia" poetry, the visual aspect of writing has assumed an important place in modern artistic consciousness.

Gerald Janecek's interesting and handsomely produced book explores this particular phenomenon in Russian avant-garde literature. In his examination of Symbolists, Futurists, and Constructivists, that is, of five well-known literary figures and several lesser known ones, Janecek takes his reader on a tour of highly heterogeneous visual experiments in both prose and poetry. It is worth emphasizing that his is not a study of genre, e.g., of visual poetry, but rather of "visual effects" or devices

in the broadest sense of the word. Janecek examines everything from double dashes, paragraph indentations, orthography, and handwriting, to the elaborate, asyntactical typographical arrangements of words on a page. While much of the book is necessarily descriptive, with the text accompanied by many excellent reproductions, it is also rich in rare bibliographical information and insightful analysis of literary works and the theories that motivated their production.

Aside from a cursory introduction to the ''European parallels'' and two appendixes, the heart of the volume is made up of five chapters devoted respectively to Andrei Bely, Aleksei Kruchonykh, Vasilii Kamensky, Ilia Zdanevich, and Vladimir Mayakovsky.

In discussing ''the visual expressiveness'' of Bely's texts (the *Symphonies, Petersburg, Kotik Letaev*, as well as some of the poetry), Janecek focuses on the Symbolist's use of such devices as double dashes and indentations to emphasize certain parts of his text. For Bely, the layout of the page was related to intonation and oral interpretation. Janecek notes that ''nowhere in his theories does Bely give independent value to the visual component of the text.''

The lengthy chapter on ''Kruchonykh and the Manuscript Book'' deals with a number of issues. Janecek argues that beside being experiments in defining the limits of the ''book'' as an idea, Kruchonykh's manuscript publications confront several other problems, among them the relationship of illustration to text, the visual qualities of a text, and, in particular, the link between mood and handwritten script.

The next chapter is devoted to Kamensky. Here the focus is on the concept of the page as a visual space, with discussion centering on nine ''ferroconcrete'' poems. As Janecek notes, in the absence of syntax, these works undermine the linear reading experience and force the eye to move along the page as if in a painting. Janecek returns to Kamensky again in a chapter devoted to typography, where he analyzes his ''typographically oriented poems.''

The main figure in the chapter on typography is Ilia Zdanevich. However, the reader will find here brief discussions of other individuals as well, most notably David Burliuk, Igor Terentev, Aleksei N. Chicherin, and El Lissitzky. This chapter chronicles some of the more unusual revolts against conventional typesetting practices, with many fine examples of unorthodox verse layouts and inventive typography. Zdanevich is approached from the perspective of his five one-act *zaum* plays. Their unusual typesetting was designed not only to have a visual impact, but to serve as a system of phonetic transcription for accurately reciting *zaum*.

The last chapter examines Mayakovsky and the typographical arrangement of his poetry, namely, the *lesenka*, or stepladder line. Janecek concludes that the *lesenka* is a breaking device, ''essential to the reading and interpretation of Mayakovsky's poetry,'' a ''guide for recitation'' that ''has no independent visual significance.'' As a natural outgrowth of this conclusion, he devotes a separate section on ''How to Read Mayakovsky.''

Considering the variety of material covered in this book, it would have been helpful if Janecek had provided a summary. As it is, the book's organization seems rather arbitrary, and the chapters read more like individual papers than as units of a single monograph. One questions why the chapters on Bely and Mayakovsky, as

well as the section on Zdanevich, were not grouped together in some way, inasmuch as they all deal with the relationship of the visual to oral (performance) element of literature. In the chapter on Kruchonykh, Janecek states that "a careful, thorough reading of his works, which is made more difficult and challenging by the format, remains to be done." It is a shame that he did not at least essay such a reading here, for of all the chapters, this one is least successful in integrating his observations about the visual features with their implication for "literature." The reader is left wondering what exactly is the effect of graphics on the text and on its meaning.

Despite these quibbles, Janecek's book has much to recommend it. It is generally successful in achieving what it sets out to do. It not only opens new doors for research, but it sensitizes readers to an important and often misunderstood aspect of the Avant-Garde. Specialists in the Ukrainian Avant-Garde will find much to stimulate their own research.

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RUSSIA: THE ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION. By *Robert V. Daniels.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985. x, 411 pp. $25.00.

Professor Daniels sees the roots of the Soviet-American confrontation in the contrasting historical experiences of the two protagonists. His book traces those experiences, combining a watered-down textbook history of Russia with a similarly watered-down version of American history. As such, it holds a lesson on the perils of comparative history.

A fundamental problem with Daniels's survey is that he presents controversial issues of historiography in such a way that makes it difficult to distinguish history from popular historical myth. For example, in contrast to the United States, which "has hardly any history," Russia "has been a national entity. . .as long as any of Europe's modern states. Russia has been Russia since the dawn of recorded history in Eastern Europe" (pp. 26–27). The fact that Kievan Rus', with its center rather far removed from today's Russia, "gave rise to the claim by some modern Ukrainians that Kievan civilization belongs to their history and not to that of the Great Russians" (p. 29) is dismissed in a paragraph. Even Omeljan Pritsak's *The Origin of Rus'* is listed in the bibliography as *The Origin of Russia* (p. 374). When Muscovy expanded into today's Ukraine and Belorussia, it "easily assimilated" the local inhabitants (p. 32). The Soviet reconquest of the non-Russian states that had gained independence from the Russian Empire immediately after the First World War is given short shrift, and even the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 is described as a Polish attempt "to recover Russian territories" (p. 145)—to the west of Kiev!

Daniels's basic argument is that the West should accept the legitimacy and permanence of the Soviet Union within its current borders and sphere of interest. This becomes clear in Daniels's treatment of the postwar period. The origins of the Cold War were, he tells the reader, "almost unimaginably complicated and controversial" (p. 213). One is tempted to argue that the issues were actually rather stark: Stalin retained what Hitler had originally conquered as German *Lebensraum.* Would the countries that now constitute Warsaw Pact have been merely Finlandized instead of Sovietized if America and Britain had taken less umbrage at Stalin's determination to carve out a sphere of influence form half of Europe? Daniels seems to think so. He writes "...any possibility that the West might have made concessions to Stalin and thus softened his policies died with the political fortunes of Henry Wallace" (p. 240). Given that in his quest for power Stalin showed himself to be at least as bloodthirsty as Hitler (more so when it came to the treatment of his own subjects) this statement seems naive in the extreme. Daniels's comparison of McCarthyism to the Zhdanovshchina, even as a "distant analogue" (p. 244), betrays an utter lack of historical perspective. It was certainly true and unfortunate that McCarthyite blacklisting cost some talented individuals their jobs; but McCarthyism was a molehill in comparison to the Zhdanovite mountain of totalitarian abuses in which people lost their lives.

Daniels concludes by stressing the permanence of the Russian challenge. He calls upon the West to be understanding of the USSR's insatiable quest for security and to recognize that the Russians' thinking is "warped by their tormented history...and old obsessions" (p. 358). Perhaps, he counsels, if we refrain from waving the bloody shirt and accept as permanent the Soviet domination of half of Europe, a Russian Dubček will emerge and the system will evolve to the point where a real and permanent detente is possible. One can imagine over two millennia ago a Carthaginian counterpart to our sage professor counseling in similar terms about those security-obsessed and paranoid Romans just across the sea.

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A HERITAGE IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF UKRAINIANS IN CANADA. Edited by *Manoly R. Lupul.* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1982. 344 pp. $9.95 (Can.), paper.

Ukrainian-Canadians hold a unique place in the history of the Ukrainian diaspora. Whereas other immigrants from the Ukraine ended up in countries with established social, political, and cultural traditions, the first major immigration of Ukrainians to Canada in the pre–World War I era was the result of the Canadian government's effort to settle remote and sparsely populated parts of Western Canada. In so doing, the Ukrainian settlers and their offspring were able to contribute to, and become an integral part of, what has been referred to as the "Canadian identity."

The essays in this volume deal with the experiences that ultimately formed what can now legitimately be called a Ukrainian-Canadian as distinct from a Canadian of Ukrainian ancestry, both of which exist in Canada today. Written by some of the foremost representatives of Ukrainian scholarship in Canada, the collection provides a lucid analytical treatment of the history of Ukrainians in Canada, as well as an examination of their contemporary situation.

John-Paul Himka's opening essay, "The Background to Emigration," sets the generally high tone of the book. His clear, concise, yet comprehensive discussion of the appalling social and economic conditions suffered by the average Galician and Bukovinian peasant leaves no doubt as to what drove many of them to travel thousands of miles in the hope of a better life. Furthermore, Himka provides a useful insight into some of the political influences that affected the growth of national consciousness among Ukrainian peasants and shaped the attitudes of the younger members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Canada.

The inclusion of the late Vladimir J. Kaye's description of the three major phases of Ukrainian immigration to Canada is welcome. Updated and revised by Frances A. Swyripa, this essay, as well as others in the book, attest to the fact that the acceptance of Ukrainians by Canadian society, and their subsequent contribution to it, was by no means easy. Apart from such obvious hindrances to integration as the lack of knowledge of English, Ukrainian immigrants faced a largely hostile physical and social environment: the former—the harsh Canadian winter spent in isolated and primitive conditions; the latter—the backlash to the immigration from the mainly Anglo-Celtic community, which regarded the newcomers as a threat to its superior way of life and economic well-being.

Wsevolod Isajiw, in a contribution entitled "Occupational and Economic Development," presents the thesis that the occupational "entrance status" of the first immigration of an ethnic group determines its social mobility; this, in turn, affects the rate of diversification into other occupations. He contends that once the initial status of an immigrant group is established, it takes at least two generations before the group can divest itself of it. Moreover, if there is a subsequent immigration of the same ethnic group with a different "entrance status," it has little effect on the existing perception of the group. From these premises, Isajiw proceeds to trace the socioeconomic history of Ukrainian-Canadians, beginning with the first immigration and ending, more or less, in the 1970s. The data he provides are extensive and instructive, covering not only the changes in the picture of Ukrainian occupational and economic life, but also the social, political, and economic environment in which the changes took place.

The essays by Orest T. Martynowych, Nadia Kazymyra, Rose T. Harasym, and Bohdan Harasymiv deal with the increase in participation of Ukrainian-Canadians in politics. The period 1896 to 1923, the focus of the essay coauthored by Martynowych and Kazymyra, deals primarily with the incubational phase of Ukrainian involvement in Canadian politics and the subsequent first forays into municipal and provincial politics.

Rose Harasym examines the years 1923 to 1945, which include the second major immigration of Ukrainians to Canada. It is a time, as she shows, when political activity among Ukrainian-Canadians was on the increase, stimulated by such factors as the Great Depression, the popularity in Canada of the Ku Klux Klan's anti-Catholic and anti-immigration campaigns, the failure of the Ukraine's struggle for independence, and the subsequent influx into Canada of Ukrainian political refugees.

Bohdan Harasymiv's essay "Political Participation of Ukrainian Canadians Since 1945" deserves careful reading. It is an astute and perceptive analysis of Ukrainian-Canadians in the post–World War II period which untangles and perspicuously sets out today's complex political situation. He has taken into account such factors as: time of immigration (first, second, or third wave); areas and places of settlement (Eastern vs. Western Canada, urban vs. rural); and the increasing diversity of economic and social conditions. Generally, his evidence points to a Ukrainian-Canadian community that is becoming more self-confident and hence more assertive within the Canadian political framework.

An examination of internal structures among Ukrainian-Canadians is dealt with in essays 7 through 9. The late Paul Yuzyk, whose varied and exemplary career included early work on the study of religion among Ukrainians in North America, discusses both the history and the more recent developments in religious life among Ukrainian-Canadians. The data he provides show, for example, that as of 1971 almost one-third of the Ukrainian-Canadian population had turned away from their more traditional religions, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, to some form of Protestantism.

Regrettably, the increase in diversity, which could be a sign of a vibrant and growing community, has been and continues to be a source of friction. There is, moreover, considerable organizational duplication, which Ol'ha Woycenko describes in her essay "Community Organisations." She gives a sound presentation of a complex subject that, due to the number of organizations and the religious, social, and/or political shades therein, could have been overwhelming. Oleh Gerus's essay deals with the history of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), an umbrella structure founded to encompass the many Ukrainian organizations, to break down barriers of friction and mistrust between them, and to provide a united front representative of the Ukrainian community in Canada. The UCC has been, as Gerus points out, more or less successful in forging internal unity and cohesion within the community and providing external representation on behalf of Ukrainian-Canadians generally.

Manoly Lupul and Frances Swyripa deal with public and private Ukrainian-language instruction, respectively. The former traces the erratic and problem-strewn course of "Ukrainian-language Education in Canada's Public Schools," showing that resistance to it came from both within and without the Ukrainian community. Initial efforts in the public sector were hampered by a predominantly Anglophile Canadian society hostile to any non-English instruction in the public school system. Surprisingly, more recent attempts to incorporate Ukrainian-language instruction into the public system have received a more positive response from the Canadian provincial and federal governments than from the Ukrainian-Canadian community.